Thai politics is a complex and contentious topic of which many academics have a myriad of opinions on. The article, “Democracy and the Thai Middle Class: Globalization, Modernization, and Constitutional Change” by Neil Englehart seeks to address modernisation theory and its shortcomings when applying it to Thai politics. Englehart challenges the overwhelming academic attention on the Thai middle class in processes of democratisation and offers an interesting counter-perspective. In this paper, I summarise and critically discuss Englehart’s evaluation of modernisation theory and his proposition that economic globalisation is a clearer explanation for democratic consolidation in Thailand. I begin with comments on the overall structure of the article before moving on to discuss his main points in detail, replicating the sub-headings used in his article.
Although brief, the abstract offers a succinct and clear outline of the author’s main argument; that the role of the middle class in democratisation is uncertain. The article flows well and provides a chronological overview of Thai political developments from the 1980s to the turn of the century. In the first part of his paper, Englehart seeks to discredit the contention that Thailand fits in to the modernisation approach using the examples of the 1991 coup and 1992 Bloody May Protests. Succeeding this, he hypothesises that democratisation can be better explained by economic globalisation with reference to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and constitutional reform. In the next section, a brief comparison is proffered to argue that other countries in South-East Asia enjoy a similar ambivalent attitude towards democracy. His conclusion proposes implications for the future of democracy in Thailand relating to the role of military and rise of nationalistic tendencies. Overall, the article is well-structured with clear sub-headings and footnotes providing further detail.
The Argument Against Modernisation: The 1991 Coup and 1992 Protests
Englehart begins by attempting to point out the irregular fit of Thai democratic development into modernisation theory, a common theme among other critical political scientists (Cook, 1997; Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). He correctly argues that the middle class is a vague and ambiguous social group in Thailand, although he does not expand on why this is an issue for applying modernisation theory to the country. If we cannot define the middle class, then we cannot accurately document their changing socio-economic situations and thus the impact of this on their political preferences.
One of his more persuasive points that arguably discredits the modernisation approach the most, is that the middle class are not “intrinsically pro-democratic” (p.256). He uses the events of the 1991 coup to demonstrate the acceptance of authoritarian, militaristic rule by a social group that previously elected a government. The coup removed Chatichai’s government that was well known for its pervasive corruption and introduced a more honest and stable regime, the fact that this was through undemocratic means was not an issue for most of the middle class and business elites (Nesher, 1995; Jäger, 2012). Despite being written in 2003, Englebert’s argument helps to explain the events of the 2006 coup in which the middle class supported the removal of Thaksin’s democratically elected government (Jäger, 2012).
This leads on to his next point that the middle class, “is both [a] structurally and politically diverse” (p.256) social group although Englebert doesn’t clearly denote the differences between the urban and rural middle class. He outlines modernisation theory as a model whereby economic development created a well-educated urban middle class that wanted an accountable democratic government. Other authors contend that the two groups hold conflicting expectations of elections, politicians and democratic government. Anek (1996) describes how the rural middle class perceive democracy as a means to garner benefits for oneself even if this is through patron-client ties whilst the urban middle class focus on the honesty and integrity of politicians. This is an interesting point and perhaps a deep-rooted socio-cultural explanation as to why modernisation theory failed to take flight in Thailand and why the middle class are not inherently pro-democratic.
Englebert contends that the military junta in 1991 led to fall of democracy and the reintroduction on authoritarian style rule. Whilst this is correct, it does not mean that there was a complete abandonment of democracy, but rather a restructuring of the nature of Thai politics. Anek (1996) notes the introduction of a proportional representation electoral system and a reduced number of constituencies following the coup were particularly popular among the middle class. Democratic ideals like holding elections were still being upheld by the political elites therefore Englebert should not overstate the effect of the military junta on Thai democracy.
He moves on to analyse the 1992 Bloody May protests in which he argues the demonstrations were about anti-corruption rather than democratic reforms. This is a convincing argument considering the wrongdoings of Prime Minister Suchinda and the appointment of politicians with “unusual wealth’ to his cabinet (Englebert, 2013, p.270).
Furthermore, Englebert accurately argues that the extent to which the middle class took part in the 1992 demonstrations was exaggerated in the media. Other authors such as Maisikrod (1993) over-emphasise the role of the middle class in the protests using the phrase “middle class mob” (p.333) and describes the protests as a culmination of strictly professionals, business executives and intellectuals. Interestingly, despite both authors using the same source of data, The Social Science Association of Thailand, Englebert identifies that other social groups were also present. This discredits modernisation theory since it was not just the middle class that fought for democracy in Thailand. He rightly argues that some members of the middle class may have supported Suchinda’s administration, once again highlighting the point that the middle class do not hold homogeneous political views regarding democratisation and thus modernisation theory is too simple to be applied to Thailand.
To summarise this first section, he provides a useful historical timeline of events that helps to argue against modernisation theory as an explanation for Thai democratisation. However, it is less analytical than I expected and needs more explanatory comments to fully convince the reader that the middle class did not play an influential role in democratic consolidation.
The Argument for Economic Globalisation: The Currency Crisis and New Institution
With insight from his extensive research in Thailand, he sets forth a thesis that economic globalisation provides a better explanation for Thai democratisation than the modernisation approach. The integration the Thai economy into international trade and the subsequent accumulation of debt precipitated the currency collapse of 1997. Englebert argues that this economic crisis was the catalyst for democratic consolidation, as the country became an investment risk to foreign investors.He contends that attracting foreign investors and foreign capital became a driving force for maintaining political stability, liberalising finance and establishing democratic regimes. As such coups became unfavourable to citizens as a means of regime change. This is a plausible point shared by other authors (Acharya, 1998).
He argues that the 1997 constitution was promulgated by the desire to attract foreign investors rather than for democratic motivations. “The economy became one of the most commonly cited reasons for the passing of the draft” (Englebert, 2013, p.272). What I find surprising here, is the fact that Englebert concedes that not many other academics, commentators and political activists see economic globalisation as an important force for Thai democratisation even when it was explicitly mentioned as a reason for constitutional reform.
While Englebert’s bibliography is impressive, he doesn’t widely acknowledge the existence of pro-democracy groups and civil society movements in the push for democracy. He makes no note of such groups in Thai society creating the illusion that they were weak and ineffective however, Jambala (1998) contends that The Campaign for Democracy threatened the government with a mass rally if it did not support the draft constitution. The group had the power to influence high ranking military officials and businessmen. This leads to the next point: the lack of focus on the monarchy’s role in economic development and democratisation. Despite little de jure political power, the King was incredibly significant following the October 1973 Revolution, effectively sending Prime Minister Thanom into exile. This did lead to a period of chaotic democracy but nonetheless, it was democracy. Other articles contend that the King was again a crucial social force in later stages of democratisation in the 1990s (Maisikrod, 1993; Jäger, 2012). The King’s support of the 1997 constitution and democratisation is understandable given the Royal Family’s extensive wealth that skyrocketed during the economic boom period. By not mentioning the role of civil society movements and the monarchy, Englebert creates the illusion that it was economic development that exclusively led to democratisation.
A Comparative Perspective
His final section is useful by comparing Thailand’s experience with other South-east Asian countries notably Taiwan and South Korea. Although this last section is not as carefully constructed as the previous two, Englehart successfully argues against the applicability of modernisation theory to such nation-states. This is convincing considering the acceptance of these other countries of undemocratic governments. In South Korea and Taiwan, pro-democracy groups were advantaged by the forces of globalisation, much like the case with Thailand. This section provides a short but persuasive argument to argue that internationalisation and foreign capital flows helped to play a role in changing the political make up of South-East Asian countries, far greater than the role of the middle-class.
Conclusion: Implications for Thai Democracy
Englebert concludes by saying that Thai democracy will continue to be consolidated, with particular note to the fact that the interconnectedness of the Thai economy to world markets makes military intervention less likely. He proposes that nationalism against globalisation may prove to undermine democracy. Despite being written in 2003 this point is still relevant today, given the political climate and trends of rising nationalism. Opposition towards globalisation and free market economics is a pertinent issue both in Thailand and the rest of the world. Chavlit’s Free from Foreigners slogan bears resemblance to current American populism with Trump’s Build the Wall”.
He ends by highlighting once again that democracy in Thailand is not as unilineal and simple as modernisation theory suggests. Thai politics is the result of a synthesis of global and domestic economic and socio-cultural forces. This is a particularly important point, agreed upon by other authors such as Phon-Amnuai (2015) who argues that “local political factors, specific contexts and cultural dimensions have an important role in politics”(p.21). Thailand is an ever-evolving political arena and as such, requires a more refined explanation than modernisation theory offers.
Final Thoughts
Englebert makes a convincing argument that the middle class are not a strong, decisive reason for democratic consolidation in Thailand. He successfully addresses the limitations of modernisation theory and provides a counter-explanation to political developments in the country. However, at times, Englebert seems to provide more of a historical narrative than an analysis and does not link back to the central theme of his paper. Explicit reference of how economic globalisation relates to democratisation would be of great value in his second section. It woud be valuable to provide greater historical context such as the state of Thai politics prior to the 1991 coup to better understand why the middle class are not ‘intrinsically pro-democratic’. Without the mention of the contribution of the King and civil society movements to the democratisation process, Englebert runs the risk of painting Thai politics as being more straightforward than it actually is. Both have played significant historical roles and should not be overshadowed by the aspect of economic development.
Notwithstanding these comments, I believe that this article is an interesting and valuable contribution of critical political science and comparative politics. Further analytical articles may be needed but Englebert has provided us with much debate over modernisation theory’s relevance to Thailand and other south-east Asian countries.