Bentham was an 18th century philosopher whose theory of utility argued that it was possible to weigh the pleasure an act gave to someone using a series of quantitative calculations known as the hedonic calculus. Bentham’s theory can be defined in two ways: as universal ethical hedonism, that being if an action brings more pleasure than pain then it is ‘right’, and act utilitarianism, as it’s based on the quantitative assessment of an individual action. This essay will explore utility as a way of government, human rights, social contract and the hedonic calculus in order to support my thesis that Bentham’s assertion, whilst having some redeeming democratic properties, is fundamentally flawed and deeply problematic.
Utility in government
Bentham was a prominent social reformer during the age of enlightenment. Enlightenment thinkers such as Bentham saw law and punishment during this period as inhumane and cruel. Beccaria described 18th-century laws as “the dregs of the most barbarous of centuries” (Beccaria 1764 1-2). There was a convincing case for social reform and Bentham’s anti-idealist, anti-theological, progressive utility theory provided a much sought after moral science.
It can be argued that Bentham took a much needed scientific and realist approach to morality which other theorists and societies of his time failed to do. This is evident by admitting that human happiness always comes at some cost and his opposition to Kant’s principle egalitarianism in which Bentham claimed differences in rights are basic to the existence of society, and equal rights would destroy society (Korosec 1993). In arguably its most redeeming quality, utilitarianism does advocate democracy, which when applied throughout modern history, has generally produced the happiest societies. Bentham argues that utilitarianism provides “securities against misrule” and advocated for an “interest junction-prescribing principle” which ensures that ruling groups only serve the public interest (Crimmes 2011: 110). The public will always be the greater amount than the ruling group, and ‘good’ government should always serve the interests of the public, which utilitarianism furthers. For Bentham, democracy is a means to pressure governments to act according to the greatest happiness principle, rather than an end in itself. If that governing/ruling group doesn’t increase ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ then utilitarianism supports voting that government out by a majority vote, hence giving the greatest happiness to majority of people.
Bentham was a proponent of negative liberty, advocating for free market economics, free trade, and individual freedom (Crowder 2017: 57). Utility offered justification to implement economic liberalism, a classical liberal approach of focussing on improving the conditions of the working class. However, Bentham rejected the redistribution of wealth from a classical liberal standpoint as he believed redistribution of wealth didn’t promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and this is where utility starts to become problematic. It can be argued that Bentham’s utilitarianism might have worked in older less developed societies and economies, but in very modern advanced societies, utilitarianism is actually oppressive. Bentham himself stated he wanted a society of the governed and government where “the interests of one class are more or less indistinguishably blended with those of the other” (Crimmins E 2015). However, Bentham’s assertion, whilst being progressive in the past, in modern liberal democracies is conservative (Kymlicka 2000: 48). Proponents of Bentham’s utility would argue that prejudice and discrimination are non-existent with utilitarianism as each individual counts the same: “everybody counts for one and nobody for more than one” (Jones, T 2002: 53). This works when the question is whether to defend an oppressed majority against a small privileged elite, but in a modern, privileged, society, it justifies a bourgeois society. When the question changes to defending an oppressed minority against a large, privileged majority, utilitarianism sees the continued suffering and oppression of the small minority, which isn’t morally right. Therefore, it can be argued that if the severe oppression of a small minority gives the majority the most amount of happiness, it then rubbishes claims that utilitarianism is anti-prejudice/anti-discrimination and ultimately encourages the tyranny of the privileged majority.
Bentham’s assertion places emphasis on the happiness of the majority, which proponents of utilitarianism would argue ensures a broadminded, selfless approach to decisions. Therefore, they could argue that utility is altruistic as it avoids selfishness, but this was more Mill than Bentham – who leaned more towards Hobbesian egoism (Crimmins E 2015). Bentham admits that selfless actions can be motivated by self-interest, but as long as they offer the greater return of happiness then it’s “right” (Monk 1946: 320). However, it can be argued that altruistic actions with an underlying vested interested are not moral, regardless of the happiness caused. For instance, if a baker gives a person free bread during famine, but only so his reputation is better and he gets more customers, Bentham would argue that this is moral because of the happiness caused (Crimmins 2015). However, in reality, it’s only being selfless for a selfish benefit which is exploitative and wrong.
Human Rights and Social Contract
Social contract adopts a constructivist model of ethics which argues that morals aren’t discovered, but constructed by social groups for their mutual benefit (Waller 2016: 134). Bentham’s utilitarianism dictates that moral truth is discovered through scientific calculation, whereas social contract asserts that morality is constructed by people when a polity is realised. Social contract dictates that people give up certain freedoms in order to coexist under a system of government and laws. Once this social contract is accepted, humans leave the “state of nature” and become a polity. However, Bentham argued that humans already live in societies and argued that governments don’t come about on the basis of social contracts but instead by force or habit (Alexander, A 2003). It can also be argued that social contract asserts that our duty to obey the government relies on us promising to obey it. But why should we be obliged to keep this promise? To which the answer is because it’s in the general interests and necessities of society, which is arguably a utilitarian justification in itself (Wolff 1993). Bentham argues that such a promise would have force only if the monarch agreed to further ‘the happiness of the people’, but it can be argued that it does further it, as it is in the general interests – and therefore happiness – of society to abide. Social contract’s lenience on self-interest also crucially rejects aggregation. Rawls argues that utilitarianism ignores “the separateness of persons” (Rawls 1971: 515). Social contract therefore stops the trampling of human rights for reasons of aggregation and recognises the uniqueness of everyone’s life, emotions. Bentham is right to an extent when he argues that social contract doesn’t explicitly dictate the government to act in a way that benefits the people (the majority). However, it’s the agreement in itself that benefits the majority of people. Bentham’s critique is only valid if people weren’t rational, but people are/have proved for the most part to be rational and abide by the agreement and submit to the authority of the state.
Bentham rejected all forms of idealism and therefore didn’t support human rights, referring to them as “nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham (1996: 35). Bentham is a proponent of liberty and individual freedom but rejects human rights which protect individual freedom and liberty. Utilitarianism sacrifices liberty and individual freedom by punishing the innocent in certain circumstances. Bentham would argue that violating these freedoms would produce the greater good in some cases, but this is too demanding as it doesn’t recognise any restrictions on actions that create the greatest happiness. For instance, the right to life means no one can kill you to take your organs, even if doing so would save five people. Utilitarianism, therefore, doesn’t respect individual liberty and freedom, as much as Bentham would argue utilitarianism is a proponent of it. As Michael Shermer furthers, this assertion endorses psychopathic behaviours. Using the same example, he argues that utility would have the doctor cut an innocent person open, kill then and harvest their organs to save the other five, which is certainly psychopathic (Shermer 2018). Henry Sidgwick argues that there are two reasons for action that can conflict: prudence and morality. Prudence; what is good for you, morality; what is good for everyone. Sidgwick argued that there was no clear way to balance these against each other (Shultz 2004), and this is true. In reality, the decision maker in the organ case would adopt a Kantian stance if the healthy person was their wife or child, arguing that one ought never to treat others solely as means to an end. The fact that the majority of people would switch from utilitarian to a deontological decision when the emotional trade-off is more severe offers a warranted condemnation of the demanding objective properties of Bentham’s assertion. As Richard Volkman put it; “One's integrity cannot be simply weighed against other considerations as if it was something commensurable with them. Being prepared to do that is already to my one will be whatever the utilitarian standard says one must be, which is to have already abandoned one's integrity” (Volkman 2010: 380).
Hedonic calculus
Robertson states: “the advantages of utilitarianism as an ethical theory lie in its intuitive appeal, particularly in the case of ‘act utilitarianism’, and its apparent scientific approach to ethical reasoning” (Robertson et al 2007). Bentham argued that “objections to the utility principle hinge on examples of its misapplication” (Monk 1946 :318). However, it can be argued that the application of the hedonic calculus is, in fact, its biggest flaw. Firstly, even by Bentham’s own admission, it’s difficult to quantify happiness and pleasure: “Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which will continue distinct as before one man’s happiness will never be another man’s happiness” (Monk 1946: 323). Hence the subsequent judgements are not an accurate measure of what’s right and wrong.
The mathematics involved are basic and reductionist. As Hayek argues, “there is no scientific criterion which would enable us to compare or asses the relative importance of needs of different persons” (Leeson, R 2013: 46). This is true, the only thing that can be deduced is what can give our own personal desires more pleasure. As Porter illustrates “I cannot say that two glasses of beer will give me twice as much pleasure as one, yet I may know very well indeed which will give me more pleasure” (Porter 1973: 110). Porter furthers this by pointing out that Bentham's calculus requires specific numerical values to be assigned to each factor of pleasure. There is an obvious imprecision and ambiguity as to how many ‘hedons’ should be awarded to each factor. For example, on a measure of 1-5, If an experience yields pleasure for one hour, is it worth 1,3 or 5 on the duration scale? (Porter 1973: 110). When comparing two actions, the issue is quantifying numerically how much higher the pleasure is. As Porter argues: “free fall from a plane is certainly a more intense experience than trout fishing, but is it twice or three times as intense?” (Porter 1995: 110). The problem therefore with a hedonic calculus as a measure of right and wrong is that it tries to get a mathematical measurement of something as amorphous as pleasure. In order for calculus to work, precision is required. Therefore, dictating morality by ambiguous mathematics leads to hugely conflicting ideas of right and wrong.
Adaptive preferences, where someone can be happy with less because they have lower expectations, is also problematic (Elster 1982: 219). Elster uses the example of the “contented slave” who would be happy not being beaten but is still bound to gruelling lifelong bondage with no freedom or rights. Should utilitarianism be a moral code, it should give the same happiness to people, not just the best of a bad situation. This is similar to unexperienced preferences, such as the ones we don’t know exist (Kymlicka, 2002: 12). The slave doesn’t know the pleasure and advantages of a full nutritional meal, but he would be happy with less because he doesn’t know any better. It’s certainly not moral to exploit inexperience and deprive certain beings of a good quality of happiness and health. John Stuart Mill addressed this problem, with the qualitative distinction of pleasures. Whilst Bentham sees all pleasures as the same, Mill argues that there are two forms of pleasure; higher and lower. Mill argues intellectual pleasures are superior (higher pleasures) than physical pleasure (lower pleasures) (Mill 1863: 9-11). Mill rightly offers a distinction between being happy and being content arguing that happiness is of higher value than contentment. He sums it up by saying "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, and if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question” (Mill 1863: 14). This could also be overcome by applying a preference utilitarianism to only universally desired goods/basic necessities (Goodin 1995) or excluding irrational preferences (Rawls 1980), which Bentham doesn’t.
The “extent” of pleasure dictates more pleasure for more people as the moral standard, which, objectively, is a good thing. However, this is flawed in certain situations. If child abusers abused victims in secret, it would bring the most happiness to the abusers, who are the majority. However – and crucially – they’re only the majority if no one finds out. If people did, it would cause pain and anger to many. By Bentham’s logic, the example shows that only other people finding out is what makes this situation “wrong” when it should be the action of killing the child. This example shows that the most amount of pleasure shouldn’t be synonymous with “morally right” this can render secretly heinous acts morally right, and therefore there needs to be another qualification than ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ for defining what is “morally right”.
Conclusion
After critical evaluating Bentham’s assertion, I would argue that it is fundamentally flawed and Bentham’s principle of utility is nothing short of crude reductionism. The hedonic calculus fails to provide accuracy and precision, and degrades “right and wrong” to ambiguous mathematics. Bentham’s assertion relies solely on pain and “wrong” being synonymous and pleasure and “right” being synonymous, which isn’t true. Whilst it improved conditions of the 18th century with its progressive and democratic tendencies, it’s now an oppressive, conservative, bourgeois centric model. Whilst it does coincide with democracy, utility still justifies heinous, exploitive and oppressive acts at the expense of intense misery and suffering of minority groups. Bentham’s also doesn’t provide a sufficient enough critique of social contract to warrant his denouncement and counter-philosophy of utility. His utility consciously denies humans the most basic rights and liberty, endorses psychopathic, inhumane actions and shows completely disregard for human emotion and integrity, which is why it doesn’t work as a measure of morality.