This essay will argue the significance of the extent that religion has as a dimension of inequality. The extent of which can be seen in two separate ways: the first example being as a cultural dimension on inequality, that is, the political discourse surrounding the right to wear a headscarf within schools and other public institutions, and the second example being the socio-economic issues involving employment of the Muslim population in a post-9/11, majorly-Christian population (Jenkins, 2006).
The inequalities surrounding women who choose to wear the headscarf are not only an example of religious inequality, but one that also intersects with other factors, including race and gender (Zine, 2006). With this intersection, race and religion have become not only associated, but also synonymous with each other in both cultural and political associations (Hopkins, 2010). This can also be seen by those who do not identify as Muslim, but fit physical profiles and racial identities that are associated with immigrant Muslim populations (Rabby and Rodgers, 2010). The political discussions surrounding the Muslim population have been centred around issues of both integration and terrorism (Williamson and Khiabany, 2010; Byng, 2010). It was ruled by the European Court on Human Rights that restrictions on such religious freedoms could only be restricted in the case of public security and protection (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2005). France then banned the hijab in schools, whereas in the UK there has been no ban on the hijab in public schools, only debates regarding the niqab (Byng, 2010).
In addition to this, there is also the relation between how the European states and how the United Kingdom have struggled with identifying their individual and collective identity, of which may be seen or felt as being threatened by the recent migration of large populations of Muslim-identifying people. (Ivanescu, 2010). Despite this, the emphasis on egalitarianism and secularism may be used when discussing headscarf bans. That is, nationalist and feminist arguments have been seen as “controversial” (Laborde, 2005). By using egalitarian and secularist values in the conversation, Muslims can be seen as putting their own religious law above their adopted society’s. As such, they may be vilified by the rest of the population (Howard, 2009).
The second aspect to consider is the socio-economic inequalities surrounding the ability for Muslims to find and keep a place of employment. A study by Rabby and Rodgers shows that there was an overall 10% decrease in the employment of young Muslims when being compared to non-Muslims within the same age categories since the London bombings (Rabby & Rodgers, 2010). This is interesting when considering earlier studies, which show that British job prospects were unchanged since both the 9/11 attacks and the London bombings (Braakman, 2007). It is possible that the effects of terrorism have less of an impact on the ability to find employment, but instead have stronger effect on discrimination within those already in the workplace (Poynting & Mason, 2007). Another aspect to consider is the asylum-seeking refugee population arriving from Muslim-majority countries, who do not have the legal right to work within the UK unless they meet certain requirements (Bloch, 2007). Such restrictions on employment no doubt have a significant effect on the inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims employment rates.
It is clear that there is a significant extent to which religion acts to further drive the inequalities between groups of people. That is, in both political discourse and on a socio-economic scale, there are significant differences between how Muslim populations experience the world compared to other religious populations. While law itself can be an important factor in improving such divisions, as long as a group of people are labeled as “other” by the rest of the society, no amount of law-making will make a significant enough difference (Ameli et al, 2004).
This essay will argue the importance of whiteness as a central theme within the discussion and sociology of race and racism. This includes the long-standing assertion that the study of whiteness, particularly within the context of white privilege, should be used with the intent of analysing its effect on racial stratification and other systems of inequality (Anderson, 2003). That is, whiteness and its associated privileges are one of the most important aspects when studying racism in our contemporary society (Lewis, 2004).
As if often the case, those who are identified as white may claim they do not experience their whiteness, particularly within the context of race (Lewis, 2004). When looking at the intersections between race and gender, this can be mirrored within the disclaiming of male privilege by men (McIntosh, 2007). Particularly amongst certain media organisations and white male groups, the idea of “reverse racism” gained significant traction (Giroux, 1997; Nelson, 2018). The idea of reverse racism has been used prominently as a political tool, as the white population noticed an increase in social policy made to benefit minority groups, and to be interrupted as a form of victimisation (Nelson, 2018).
The study of whiteness is an important and central concept when analysing the education system (Leonardo, 2002). Having a diverse body of student can offer different perspectives that can be beneficial to the learning experience of all, both on a broader and more individual level (Milem, 2003). Despite this, many white students wishing to pursue a teaching career have been found to have little to no experience working in a cross-cultural environment (Sleeter, 2001). This can be seen in both the treatment of minority students as well as the overall environment of the institutions (Solomona, 2006). Jones et al’s study on the ethnic minority student experience at predominantly white institutions demonstrates that although such institutions market diversity as being an important aspect within their curriculum and overall climate, action to fulfil such promises were rarely taken (Jones et all, 2002).
There have also been recent and significant critiques on the study of whiteness itself as a social contract, both with its ties to racism and how it fails to incorporate the intersection of class (Hartman, 2004). One critique, particularly within the United States, is the affect that whiteness studies may have on institutional attempts to dismantle the educational focus on European studies. There is a fear that the focus may instead be re-directed from the important steps being taken to make current institutions more inclusive to minority students. Lessons on diversity would focus less on diversity itself, and more on how white people affect and are affected by it (Macmullan, 2005). Another critique criticised scholars focusing on whiteness studies who were seen to have failed to deconstruct their own powers and privileges (McWhorter, 2005). In addition to this, whiteness studies do not focus enough on the imbalances of power caused by class relations. However, the counter-critique notes that post-structuralism whiteness scholars study power balances as being two separate facets in terms of race and class (Hartman, 2004).
Though there are disagreements in regards to whether or not the study of whiteness in and of itself should be of central importance, there is no doubt that whiteness plays an important role within the study of racism. As such, the study of whiteness is important when looking at the sociology of race and racism, as the two are tied to each other within the personal experiences of minorities, the current education system, and within whiteness studies as a whole.
This essay will critically examine the quote “class disgust not only motivates but sustains the lower ranking of peoples’ (Miller, 1997, in Tyler 2008: 32). That is, the ranking of individuals in terms of social class may be caused in part by class disgust from the middle and upper classes (Imogen, 2008). Through the use of labels and coding of the working class as majorly-white by the liberal middle class, disgust has become essential to the identity of middle and upper classes (Lawler, 2005).
Disgust has played a major role in how the middle class has viewed those from working class backgrounds, particularly those of the “chav” subculture. This is most easily seen throughout popular culture representations (Tyler, 2008). The fear and demonisation of the “chav” as fueled by disgust from higher social classes, which in turn produced media mocking their dress and cultural stereotypes. It is through these popular culture representations that the emotions of fear and disgust are not only tapped into, but encouraged (Adams and Raisborough, 2013). Through both popular culture figures and the language used against the chav figure in national broadcasting, it is important to consider to poor quality of representation of the working class in media (Creeber, 2004).
Fear may also play a significant role in their perception of the chav, specifically in how others view the safety of their neighbourhood. Many may fear going out at a certain time of the day or night, for fear of being harmed by such groups (Francombe-Webb & Silk, 2015).
Another source to consider when examining chav discourse and the reaction of disgust is the justification through political beliefs and issues within recent political debates. That is, it may be considered socially acceptable for liberal members of upper classes to demonise the working class, as they themselves have opposing viewpoints (Webster, 2008). The chav is labeled as white, therefore it is acceptable for them to be stigmatised. This is particularly interesting, as the chav may also be seen by the opposing political perspective as being a “contaminator of whiteness” or of similar terms, due to their appropriation of black American culture, along with the stereotype of multiple mixed-race children (Tyler, 2008). There is also the labelling and coding of the chav through language that utilises dehumanising terms as a describer (Loughnan et al, 2014). The use of such language often stems from a place of disgust, and can be used by upper classes to further distance themselves from the chav figure and their representation or disorganisation (Adams and Raisborough, 2013). It is also important to note that the chav figure, though mostly associated with the working class, may not necessarily be poor or unemployed. This is most notably seen with the “celebrity chav” figure (Tyler and Bennet, 2010; Allen & Mendick, 2012). This is interesting, as it proves that the social ranking of individuals is therefore may not be based on economic income.
Through rhetoric used over the years, class has often been represented as a private choice of individuals, rather than something they have no control over (Bennet, 2012). It is clear that the government cuts have the strongest effect on members of the working class, compared to those in upper classes, who have not felt as extreme of affects (Reay, 2013). There is a certain emphasis on the middle class that encourages the rhetoric used against the chav figure and other members of the working class. That is, it is no longer acceptable to simply be a member of the working class. One should always be working to better their position (Hollingworth, 2009). The chav may be seen as not only failing to do so, but failing to even want or attempt to do so.
The constant and consistent rhetoric used to describe the chav figure, along with the stigmas fueled by popular culture representations, not only re-enforces but also justifies the disgust shown by higher classes. Even when those figures rise higher in terms of social mobility, disgust only encourages lower social ranking.