Beverley Clack defines superstitions as attempting “to connect things that are not connected” (2012:270)- in a sense, somewhat irrational understandings of practices based on this attempt at a connection, thus leading to outcomes perceived either as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. In contrast to this, Clack states that “religious beliefs are not abstract assertions” (2012:263), suggesting they have a more rational and reasoned approach to understanding perceived practices.
I intend to consider how psychoanalysis informs our conception of the relationship between religious belief and superstition. I will begin with the Freudian perspective which I believe is a central component to psychoanalysis. I will seek to show how this relates to religious belief and superstition and how, perhaps controversially, as asserted by Tilley, bolsters the argument that “religious belief and superstition, are rarely, if ever, unmixed” (Clack, 2012:265). Secondly, within this discussion of psychoanalysis, I wish to consider petitionary prayer as the central example and show how it can bring both religious belief and superstition into a comparison. I believe that using psychoanalysis to interpret petitionary prayer aids the discourse in determining the relationship between religious belief and superstition. Features such as the illusion or anxiety of belief set against the non-causal or non-abstract nature of belief serve to suggest that these two phenomena are indeed separate constructs.
Through this essay, therefore, I intend to highlight areas which I deem important to the discourse and ultimately contribute to the notion that “the distinction between religious belief and superstition is extremely important” (Phillips, 1993:73)
Firstly, I would like to consider the Freudian perspective in terms of how religious belief and superstition are related. According to the German social psychologist, Erich Fromm, it was Freud “who saw the connection between neurosis and religion” (1950:27) and Freud himself even claimed that religion was a “universal obsessional neurosis” (1907:126-127). Stemming from this universal neurosis is the idea that the call to religious belief is derived from underlying desires, or perhaps miscommunications of human wants or needs. In this sense, I believe that religious belief appears to be intertwined with superstition as belief, here, is not shown to be non-abstract, but instead, a product of human compulsion.
This compulsion, I believe, could derive from a number of sources- anxiety, desire, fear and guilt, to name a few. In terms of the anxiety of religious belief, which I will discuss further in relation to petitionary prayer, Piero Camporesi (as described in the work of Vicki Hamblin) discusses the fear of hell and states that “it is not clear whether this world is a successful imitation of hell or whether hell is a model of this world” (1991:292). This suggests that there could be some unconscious desires or pressures here which have manifested in this anxiety and which therefore cause actions to be conducted accordingly- (for example, why people participate in prayer is something I will be considering later in terms of the relationship between petitionary prayer and psychoanalysis)- Freud has referred to religion as “the primary source for both inhibition and consolation” (Elder, 1995:357)- highlighting the human need to find an outlet helping them to endure pressures and engagements of human life whilst responding to the sources- anxiety, desire, fear and guilt- from which such compulsions derive.
According to Charles Elder, Freud would claim that religion is “both a projection…and an illusion” (1995:352), again highlighting the prevalence of superstition alongside religious belief in the sense that the need to find connections has resulted in the manifestation of the unconscious into an illusory construct which requires practical human engagement to allow for the placating of the sources for compulsion. I am not seeking here to denigrate religious beliefs as false, or indeed true, but merely to ascertain the perception that such beliefs may, or indeed may not, be based on misconstrued notions of how individuals perceive and apply their internal, unconscious feelings onto the outside world.
Something I found to be of interest whilst reading the work of Charles Elder was a footnote concerning the translation of the term ‘projection’:
“17 According to Eugene Kamenka, the psychological use of the term projection in English originated with George Eliot's translation of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, and specifically with her rendering of the Hegelian terms Vergegenstiindlichung ("objectification" or "reification") and Entliusserung ("alienation"). See Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 167. (Note, however, that Freud himself generally uses the common term ‘Projektion’, as in the idea of an image projected on a screen)”
(Elder, 1995:354)
This prompted me to think about Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘impute’ in conjunction with religious rituals (1993:115-155) – Appearing to imply not merely being projected, in the sense that Freud considered as meaning ‘onto a screen’, but instead to materialise or to make concrete certain feelings inspired within us and thus, to consequently form an interpretation. Feuerbach, as has Freud also, deems religion to be the “externalisation of something internal” (Elder 1995:355)- however, in this context, Feuerbach’s use of the term translated as ‘objectification’ or ‘reification’ suggests an affiliation with Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘impute’ being that to objectify, is to materialise, or to make concrete, something that was perceived an abstract or irrational ideal.
I believe this highlights the fine line between religious belief and superstition (referring again to Tilley’s argument that “religious belief and superstition, are rarely, if ever, unmixed”- Clack, 2012:265) in the sense that despite Freud claiming ‘projection’ and ‘illusion’ to relate to religion, his fundamental understanding is that “religion is essentially a form of mystification” (Elder, 1995:352) and therefore ultimately represents an abstract ideal- again, a manifestation of need and desire which can be classified as superstition also. In terms of psychoanalysis therefore, and the idea that religious belief and superstition are intertwined on the basis that both foster abstract ideals, using the term ‘impute’ to mean realising our feelings, I believe highlights again, the nature of similarity between religious belief and superstition, thus strengthening the need for determining distinctions between the two.
In order to bring these two concepts, religious belief and superstition, into view as two comparable phenomena, I would like to discuss the idea of petitionary prayer in relation to psychoanalysis. I believe that the concept of petitionary prayer can help us to distinguish between religious belief and superstition- thus was my aim here, to highlight the importance of finding a separation between the two concepts.
According to D.Z. Phillips, petitionary prayer constitutes “specific requests” being made during the act of prayer which many believers uphold “were favourably answered” (1965:112). Praying itself is a means of communication between the human and divine. Participation in the act of prayer comes about through several ways- for example, repentance, offering thanks and asking favours. This is where I believe we can see a separation of religious belief and superstition. If we take the example of asking favours, we begin to see a reliance on causal relationships between the action of prayer and the outcome from God. In terms of psychoanalysis, therefore, humans seek relief from their fears or anxieties about the world and this manifests in certain practices- in this case prayer- in order to alleviate their feelings and attribute the outcome of their actions to a higher power. The danger of ascribing this outcome to God, however, is that it dehumanises the prayer and somewhat takes away the sincerity of the reasons behind the practice- the action becomes more of a transaction than an expression of the individual’s faith. D.Z. Phillips states that “the more tenuous the relation between the prayer and the rest of the person’s life, the more suspect the prayer becomes- the likelihood of superstition increases” (1965:115), therefore suggesting that religious belief stands aside from superstition as a fundamental part of a person’s life that is not just called upon in times of need and desire.
I believe that petitionary prayer can be paralleled with the framework of religious belief also- It is here that I would like to consider the question of why people participate in prayer. In terms of psychoanalysis, the unconscious transforming into an illusory construct in order to relieve the pressures dominating human life gives rise to practices such as petitionary prayer. However, does praying in such a way have grounds in either belief or superstition? If the grounds for petitionary prayer lie purely in the ‘answer’ of God, then I would suggest that superstition comes to the forefront of this practice. Those conducting prayers in this manner are concerned with the outcome and have come to God with a specific aim in mind- as such, representing a causal relationship- they are asking, so that they may receive. For example, “in order for God to answer a prayer… it is necessary that God bring about the object of the prayer, that which was requested by the petitioner” (Davison, 2017:10). Therefore, I believe this suggests the psychoanalytic idea of the unconscious is a way of interpreting the framework as there is no conscious processing, such as through a true expression of faith or devotion, occurring, but more so in light of manifestations of unconscious fears or anxieties, resulting in the compulsion to participate in certain actions which aid their ability to repress and overcome the unconscious. For D.Z. Phillips, “if a supposedly religious action is grounded in a false sense of causality and arises in fear it cannot be deemed properly religious” (Clack, 2012:271). On the other hand, however, if the grounds for petitionary prayer lie in the response of God, then I would suggest that religious belief is the central component to the practice. Those conducting prayers in this manner are not so much concerned with the outcome and have not come to God with a specific aim in mind. D.Z. Phillips states that “when deep religious believers pray for something, they are not so much asking God to bring this about” (1965:121), suggesting therefore, that they are not asking in order to receive, but more so communicating their faith and belief through the trajectory of praying. Believers, in this sense, will go on loving God no matter the outcome of their prayer and will not denigrate the strength of their faith based on the response of God. Through this short analysis of petitionary prayer, I hope to have shown that there can be a distinction between religious belief and superstition and that although they can overlap and intertwine, they still stand alone as individual phenomena. Interpreting petitionary prayer through the eyes of psychoanalysis lends itself to this distinction as I believe religious belief and superstition ultimately will always be composed of different root components; belief will stand on the grounds of faith and trust in God, superstition, however, stands on the need and desires of the human psyche.
To conclude, throughout this essay I have intended to highlight the distinction between religious belief and superstition and show that such a distinction is an important one. I have analysed the Freudian perspective and shown how a psychoanalytic discussion of petitionary prayer can aid our understanding of these phenomena. I have worked from the basis of Phillips’ notion that such a distinction is “extremely important” (1993:73) and have sought to show that this distinction is not an “unfortunate and radically unworkable one” as argued by Brian Clack (1995:113). Despite my viewpoint of the distinction being important, I also recognise that superstition should not be used in a derogatory or pejorative sense as superstition is part of the relationship between the things we do and the ways we behave just as much as religious belief is for the individuals affiliating with either process. Ultimately, however, I do recognise that considering the relationship between religious belief and superstition allows for an exploration of “the unconscious pressures that attend to being human in a world like this” (Beverley Clack, 2012: 278) and that this can aid cross-disciplinary understandings of human behaviours, not just in the religious sense, but also in terms of the social sciences and towards possible future research.