In his article of ‘Power and Weakness’ , Robert Kagan(2002) evaluates and explains many key distinctions between the US and Europe, and how power is seen by both sides. In his article, Robert Kagan (2002) outlines what approach each side prefers, stated that Europeans are more in favour of multilateralism, negotiations, cooperation, rule of law and diplomacy in areas of conflict to resolve the issue. Kagan(2002) predicts and states that Europeans tend to be more patient with their approach and can rise against the frustration of failure, as their main approach would be to resolve conflict through peaceful means. However, Kagan (2002) suggests that unilateralism is key factor when it comes to American foreign policy, and that there it little room for multiculturalism as its seen to limit their interests. The two have complete different ways of approaching conflict, Americans are seen as more impatient and expect quick resolution to issues. Also, with use of their military power, they tend to see problems solved and threats eliminated. Europeans take a more pragmatic approach, looking at the world in a more complex way than Americans, as they categorise the world into good and bad, “its time to stop pretending that Europeans Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world (Kagan 2002, p.1)” Ideally, this critique of the article will be focusing on the theoretical framework and how Kagan’s (2002) arguments align with it.
Robert Kagan (2002) argues throughout the article that Europeans are weak hence why their perception is different to Americans, who he classes as more powerful. Kagan (2002) states that many centuries back the roles were reverse and that it was in fact Europe who was more powerful and demanding, it was then that Americans feared the Europeans and preached peace and rule of law. Fast forward to now, it is the Europeans who feel threatened and preach peace. Kagan believes that Europeans ditched the idea of power politics and shifted their aims more towards integration “believe that power was no longer important” (p26 Kagan), whereas Americans shifted more towards security, protection and military power – suggesting at the end of his passage that America can deal with world issues without the assistance from the EU, Kagan states, “both have produced different strategic judgement, different assessments of threats and the proper means of addressing threats and even different calculation of interest” (Kagan 2002, p.2), which highlights the distinction in framework of the two, EU looking more in favour of Liberalism, whereas US fitting more in the Realism framework. Ultimately, their framework highlights their interest, for example, it could me said that Americans favour more materialistic status and political strength. This is evident using the fact that Americans prefer a more interventionist approach when it comes to dealing with foreign policy. Using the example of Iraq and Afghanistan in the journal written by Ivan Eland, “Excessive US Military Action Overseas Breeds Anti-US Terrorism” , Eland supports her ideas but stating that “America has sought to protect its own sovereignty and independence through a strategy of global presence and engagement.”(Eland p.11). However, in benefit to EU, it could be stated that soft approach allows them to focus more eon their economic interests and develop their relation with member states.
Furthermore, throughout his work, Kagan reflects on the work of Robert Cooper, who was a former advisor to Tony Blair (British Prime Minister). Cooper in his explanation divides the world into three different zones – modern, premodern and postmodern. To Cooper, the driving factors of the international order is the ideology of the empire and primacy of national interest (Cooper 2002). The modern zone he states is all about balance of power and stability, Cooper gives the example of the current states that are operating the in modern zone – states like China, Pakistan and India all fit the the framework of the modern zone. “the traditional "modern" states who behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and raison d'ètat (one thinks of countries such as India, Pakistan and China).” (Cooper 2002).
“The postmodern system in which we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs.” (Cooper 2002), Cooper directs that the postmodern world zone is known for its rejection of use of force to resolve conflict. The main characteristics of postmodern world according to Cooper are “The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.” , “Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance.” (Cooper 2002). The way the EU is set up would be a good example for postmodern zone.
Robert Cooper describes the Pre-modern world as a “world of failed states” giving the example of Somalia and Afghanistan. He classes these states weak, and ones who have no control over territories and are not seen as a threat by other states. This to Cooper highlights the lack of resistance they put forward to the likes of terrorist organisations, drugs and other crime groups. However, it could be said that Kagan found Coopers article compelling as he used his evidence to counterpart his power and weakness easy with.
Furthermore, it is evident to stated that Kagan found the works of Robert Cooper fascinating and one which helped back up his points in the article of Power and weakness. Firstly, in his essay Robert Cooper split the world into three different zones, he placed US in both postmodern zone and modern. In many ways one may argue that this backed Kagans points in his article. Firstly, it could be said that the article urged double standards and use of the law. It also suggested the execution of defensive imperialism which one could use to justify the war on Iraq. Secondly, Cooper placing US in the modern zone fits well with Kagans main idea in that, EU has swapped places with the US. Knowing this gives deeper understanding to Kagans analysis of the distinction between the two. It highlights that Europeans have moved away from power and are now more in favour of “Kants perpetual peace” (Kagan 2002, p.3), however, Robert Cooper quotes that “in the prolonged period of peace in EU, there has been a temptation to neglect our defence, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state” (Cooper 2002) – this further supports Kagans main argument that Europe is getting weaker. Cooper also states “whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself” (Cooper 2002) – it could be justifiable to have a foreign policy baed on unilateralism.
Also, during the article Kagan has tried to keep the main focus of the argument of power and weakness, more in the sense which makes it neither reflective nor representative of the broader dynamics of the transatlantic relationship. He quotes “Americans generally see the world divided between good and bad” (Kagan, 2002 p.4; VOA, 2009, Baker, 2003) – one could argue that Kagan could be a typical American who used power to justify the transatlantic rift. However Erik Jones states in his essay of “Debating the transatlantic relationship” that “Yet for all the commentary surrounding Kagan’s thesis, there is more to the transatlantic relationship than just power and weakness. Indeed, the argument about capabilities and values is misleading. It focuses too much attention on the preponderance of American military might and it exaggerates European military weakness.” (Jones 2004, p.604), suggesting that EU and US share many common grounds that people think.
Additionally, throughout this report Kagan makes indication of ideological perspectives within the US, for example – “favouring policies of coercion rather than persuasion, emphasising punitive sanctions over inducement to better behaviour” (Kagan 2002, p.1), which he compared to EU, who’s main priorities were “negotiation, diplomacy and persuasion of coercion” (Kagan, 2002 p.9). By this Kagan clearly highlights that there are deep root splits between Europe and America, especially in ideological perspective (Kagan 2002). For example, an article written by Amer N. Shatara “On the Hypothetical State of Nature of Hobbes and Kant; Same Premises, Different Conclusions” – provides a much deeper understanding of the theoretical perspectives, giving examples of how the two are different in the sense of ideology (Shatara 2016). In the article it states “Hobbes and Kant, surely, has a limit that cannot be breached, because they are usually considered to be oriented in opposite directions and represent different political and philosophical trends: While Hobbes is considered to be a classical realist, Kant is usually regarded as a liberal advocate.” (Shartara 2016). This could in many ways link hobbs ideology with America, as he states “Anyone may, at any time, use force, and all must constantly be ready to counter such force with force” (Shatara 2016). Scott Burchill in his book of “Theories of international relations” quotes Kant which some would say aligns with Hobbes views “wars were created by militaristic and undemocratic governments for their own vested interest” (Burchill, 2009. p.60). One might link Hobbes ideology to America, with their hard power approach, use of military intervention and self gain – as back by an article written by Nafeez Ahment stating that the main truth behind the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was to gain natural resources and more seen as a personal gain rather than an aid to the countries. (Ahmed 2014).
To conclude, the arguments given by Robert Kagan highlights a deep underlying division between America and Europe and has gotten the attention of many diplomats and world leaders. Kagan kept the focus of his work solely on power and weakness and did not shift in any other direction making his arguments highly significant and the base of his report stand out.