The notion of free will has been prescribed to humans for centuries without serious concern for implications for belief in physical determinism and idea of moral responsibility. It is important to understand whether the fundamental laws that govern the world are compatible with the idea of ‘free will’. This paper will compare the compatibilist and incompatibilist arguments in favour of free will and physical determinism, however it will conclude that the latter view is superior due to the inability to fully satisfy the criterion for free will in a fundamentally deterministic world. I will present a modified version of the consequence argument1 (Inwagen 1974) to prove how it is both logically valid and sound, whilst refuting objections against the premises. The debate of free will and physical determinism will be briefly discussed and use of common intuitions and scientific knowledge will help disprove compatibilism.
To say one has free will, means they can choose from alternative possibilities, control their desires which originate from within oneself. This three-part definition is the necessary and sufficient condition for free will in this paper whereas another philosopher may dispute this. The more general view of free will as ‘freedom’ endorsed by libertarians and compatibilists seems to be too broad and indefinite, allowing greater scope for interpretation. Physical determinism is the idea that governing laws of the universe exist, thus the state of the world and everything that happens is known to us at any moment 2 (J.R. 1970). This was proven by Newtonian Physics and Locke’s metaphysics, showing how much actions are predestined marking a shift in the belief of free will if everything is already known beforehand. An extreme example of this superintelligence is expressed in Laplace’s Demon3 where the state and all the information to know about the past and present is known. Concluding that there is no uncertainty or alternative possibilities open to us, this disproves the criteria of free will we set out earlier making it incompatible. Nonetheless, one may argue against the belief of Physical Determinism with the rise of quantum physics which is indeterministic by nature. One such example is the idea of radioactive decay, despite the fact we know it will happen but cannot know exactly when, resulting in indeterminism. This a convincing argument but it still relies on some known knowledge that decay exists4, which is a result of physical determinism in the external world. So, that objection is flawed as things can be indeterministic in occurrence but to originally understand what and how they operate require use of information that is predetermined and know to the world. With this objection cleared, we will maintain the view that the physical external world is determined, and this assumption will be continued throughout.
Van Inwagen argues that free will is incompatible with physical determinism because assuming physical determinism is true, free will means that one can or could have done something else, action a. Due to deterministic views, the initial state of the universe logically entails the state of the universe at a given time t0. Consequently, doing action a means making the state of the universe at t0 false, but you could have not changed the initial governing rules of the universe. Thus, physical determinism if true, is proven false. My first reservation is that Van Inwagen seems to beg the question5, as he begins with assuming the physical determinism, which is another contentious issue. His proof seems less rigorous and compelling with such assumptions so in my reconstruction this is not a given. Beginning from the standpoint of free will only being compatible if and only if it fulfils the three-part definition, my first premise is that if individuals have free will, they can choose between alternative choices which are equally open to them. This invokes the widely used idea of ‘being able to do something else’ which is more precisely, as Nagel says6, the fact that something else could happen only if the action was changed by another previous action. Actions are driven by stimuli from the external world and control our desires, so to be open to another choice means a change in our desires. For example, no one just has feelings, they arise from perceptions of things that people experience from the outside such as loss of a loved one leading to grief or a good grade on a test leading to happiness. This is a common-sense fact of life and to deny it would seem unconventional and counterintuitive. Given this as our definition states, desires must originate from within a person, but this seems to be dictated by the environmental stimuli. Thus, the conclusion is that since actions are determined by emotion which are determined from the outside, then it means that free will is not satisfied meaning that free will is incompatible with physical determinism.
(P1) Actions are determined by emotions, perceptions and desires
(P2) Emotions, perceptions and desires are determined by external environmental stimuli
—————————————————————————————————————–(Conclusion) Actions, are determined by environmental stimuli, thus humans do not have free will.
In my reconstruction of the Consequence argument, I have a more convincing deductive argument which logically leads to the premise. As a result, the argument is logically valid as the premises follow from the conclusion whereas Van Inwagen’s premises do not seem to be distinct from the conclusion making it a de facto valid argument. As for being logically sound, premise 1 is true and can be proved by a simple common sense. Imagine you are reading this essay. Why? Maybe because you must because it is one’s job, but it links back to that fact that your perceptions deem it to be worth doing. But why? It stems from the fact that stimulus from the outside control perceptions and by the same virtue actions. Premise 2 entails the knowledge of desires as a result of stimuli, because individuals interact in the world and inevitably this affects them, and even controls them.
The consequence argument is sometimes criticised by others for merely being a redefinition of free which changes the terms of the argument producing a weak case for incompatibilism. Unlike Van Inwagen, my argument has a rigorous criteria for free will and as my argument shows, the criterion of origination is not satisfied. Some may argue that actions are not necessarily thought out emotions and might be irrational, so the first premise might not hold. This is indeed true, with the infamous case of Kenneth Parks where he was acquitted of murder whilst sleepwalking, and my response is that clearly, he was not in control of his actions, therefore he does not have free will. Moreover, such an extreme example only exemplifies my point and strengthen my argument. It is evident that free will is multi-faceted and must contain origination, control and options available to exist. Opposition to premise 2 might come from the idea that ‘environmental stimuli’ is an ambiguous phrase but I shall clarify what I mean to silence such debate. Environmental stimuli are the external world and the things beyond human control but which they experience daily. This simply means where a person is situated their surrounding area will impact their decision-making, for example this is explicit in group scenarios where there is peer pressure. However it also exists implicitly with advertising, social constructs and common ideology that is proliferated and affects us all in one way or another. Hence it isevident that tis kind of stimulus is inescapable, rendering premise 2 true and consequently the argument is logically sound.
In conclusion, the problem of free will seems to remain contentious as it can be argued to be both for and against compatibilism. Nonetheless, I believe the arguments in favour of incompatibility, including my own, are more compelling due to the inability of the compatibilist argument to
The consequence argument is sometimes criticised by others for merely being a redefinition of free which changes the terms of the argument producing a weak case for incompatibilism. Unlike Van Inwagen y
Also the Frankfurt rgument which twists the argument ot be less of a response to free will and determinism but gets caught up in the possibility of alternative options.
In conclusion, the problem of free will seems to remain contentious as it can be argued to be both for and against compatibilism. Nonetheless, I think the arguments in favour of incompatibility between the two is more compelling due to ..