Introduction
The changing alliances and shifts in power polarity between the United States and India and China and Pakistan will not trigger a hot war because the fact that these powers have nuclear weapons prevents conflict. This essay will use the International Relations paradigm of neorealism to explain how and why nuclear deterrence heavily affects the prospects of war amid the changing alliance between US and India, and China and Pakistan by making the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discouraging states from starting any wars that may lead to the use of such weapons. I will include a synergy of the theories defensive realism and balance of power to explain why conflict will not occur despite the fact that nuclear weapons are increasingly being developed. Using Waltz’s rational deterrence theory, this essay will then demonstrate how nuclear deterrence successfully induces caution around the world and therefore reduces the incidence of war. “The domestic use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable, least likely to lead to escalation and to threaten the stability of the central balance” (Waltz, 1981). Waltz’s theory argues that more nuclear weapons may be better for securing national order. He asserts that all states are inherent rational actors that are deterred from conflict escalation by other states that acquire nuclear-weapons capabilities:
Nuclear weapons have been the second force working for peace in the post-war world. They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons. Nuclear weapons have helped maintain peace between the great powers and have not led their few other possessors into military adventures (Waltz, 1981).
Neorealism
Taking a neo-realist approach, the idea that distribution of power across the international system maintains a balance that represents a structural check on expansion, and a restriction on the achievement of hegemony can be directly applied to the current situation of the changing balance of power between the United States with India, and China with Pakistan. Neo-realists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system (Waltz, 1981). In a bipolar system, balancing can only occur through internal balancing because there are no extra great powers to form alliances with… and the two great powers will depend militarily on themselves. In regards to the United States and China, although China’s nuclear capabilities and aspirations to become a hegemon are growing, they will be balanced by the United States- therefore, the United States and China will internally balance.
Balance of Power
Balance of power explains that a more even distribution of power, perhaps a bipolar system, is more peaceful than a concentration of power (United States as the global hegemon). The concept of the balance of power plays a key role in neorealism. Its ultimate objective is survival and security, and so according to this theory, maintaining peace in the anarchic international system requires the preservation of hegemonic threats. “As states arise that have the means or capabilities to expand, others need to react in case they face the risk of extinction, or in any case, a loss of sovereignty, autonomy, or control over their own fate” (Jakobsen, 2013). Both the United States and China have a strategic interest to prevent war in South Asia. “In an unbalanced world, when the weak feel threatened, they seek aid and protection from the strong” (Waltz, 1981). Therefore, United States and China should be capable of preventing war between themselves as well.
Defensive realism
From a defensive realist position, states are more concerned with security and not expansion. States want to protect themselves from a potential hegemon and maintain the status-quo. Therefore, this theory attributes the balance of power between India, Pakistan, China and United States to the fact that states are security-seekers, not power-maximizers. Nuclear weapons are defensive because they will not be used unless the country is under attack- they are only deployed to deter an enemy, not attack one. Nuclear states are likely to decrease rather than increase their military spending. One reason for this is nuclear weapons are a deterrent strategy that alter the dynamics of arms races and make them pointless because if one state seeks to increase its capabilities, it may seem that others must too. Within wide ranges, neither side need to respond to increase in the other side’s military capabilities. (Waltz, 1981).
Nuclear weapons offer a promising defensive strategy against war because it ensures strategic stability between states. The forces between China and Pakistan and The United States with India are deterred because nuclear deterrence’s effectiveness, and consequently, there is little incentive to initiate armed conflict. For Pakistan, acquiring nuclear weapons is an alternative to running a disastrous, predictable race with India. Therefore, the shifting balance of power between United States and China is not likely to cause a hot war in South Asia. “If weapons are not well suited for conquest, neighbours have more peace of mind. According to the defensive-deterrent ideal, we should expect war to become less likely when weaponry is such as to make conquest more difficult, to discourage pre-emptive and preventative war, and to make coercive threats less credible” (Waltz, 1981).
Nuclear Deterrence Promotes Peace (Waltz)
Waltz’s theory reflects a neorealist standpoint that the international system is anarchic and therefore assumes that states operate on the basis of survival. States’ interactions with other states reflect their desire to survive. In terms of Pakistan and India, these are both states that are not interested in war or gaining power- instead, they are focused on security, and so a hot war is unlikely. Waltz’s rational deterrence theory uses nuclear weapons as the independent variable (input), fear as the intervening variable, and peace as the dependent variable (output). In other words, he believes that nuclear weapons result in peace due to states’ fear of the consequences. (Waltz, 2009, p. 501). The capabilities of nuclear weapons can and will deter states from conventional wars of aggression out of fear of extreme retaliation. “Nuclear weapons are believed to be more effective in deterring conflict because of their enormous destructive power, the reduced uncertainty about the consequences of a nuclear war and the difficulty in defending against nuclear attack. Nuclear powers have an interest in declaring their capabilities and demonstrating to the other side that they have everything necessary to deliver nuclear strikes” (Waltz, 1981).
Waltz employs rational deterrence theory to argue that if two or more states acquire second-strike nuclear weapons, second-strike nuclear capabilities, war between them will not occur. Both states, in this case the United States and China, would be subject to massive retaliatory strikes if either were to launch a nuclear attack against the other. Accordingly, states would have every incentive to develop and deploy nuclear weapons as an ultimate security guarantee, and the more states that acquired them, the more stable the international system would be. Rational deterrence is the ultimate guarantor of global survival and stability because nuclear weapons are resources which have such an extraordinary capability of ending the human race, that using this option is unlikely. As stated in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,
Deterrent strategies promise less damage than war-fighting strategies. First, deterrent strategies induce caution all around the world and thus reduce the incidence of war. Second, wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them may retaliate if it’s vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary’s expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war (Waltz, 1981).
Deterrent strategies lower the probability that wars will be fought. If wars are nevertheless fought, deterrent strategies lower the probability that they will become wars of high intensity.
China + Pakistani and India + United States alliances explained
Due to the degree of nuclear capabilities of the countries discussed in this essay, with the United States being the greatest, China following, then India, and finally Pakistan, a system of deterrence is created that fits directly into the theory of defensive realism. The United States behaves like a hegemon because it has the power to behave like a hegemon. In terms of nuclear capability, "the United States has produced more approximately 4,000 stockpiled warheads and 2,550 retired warheads for a total of 6,550 warheads as of February 2018” (Davenport, 2018). Using the balance of power theory and defensive realism to understand why these changing alliances will not result in war due to nuclear deterrence, as long as China is aware of the United States’ nuclear capability and Pakistan is aware of India’s nuclear capability, countries will not engage in conflict. Since the two countries with the highest nuclear capabilities (United States and China) are allied with the two countries in South Asia that are suspected to have a nuclear standoff, a hot war is unlikely. “As a neighbour of China, India no doubt feels more secure, and can behave more reasonably, with a nuclear weapons capability than without it. The thought applies as well to Pakistan as India’s neighbour” (Waltz, 1981). In addition, another reason why a hot war is not likely is because, although South Asia is seen to be a crisis region because of the rivalry between Pakistan and India, “neither Pakistan nor India appear to be in an all-out race to stockpile as many weapons as possible” (Bluth, 2010).
In addition to the fact that two great powers with nuclear capabilities are allied with India and Pakistan which prevents a hot war from occurring, another example of nuclear deterrence within these countries is that India created a nuclear doctrine declaring a “no first use” pledge that it would not use nuclear weapons unless their territory was attacked or even if Indian forces are attacked anywhere (Sundaram & Ramana, 2018). This ensures peace because India’s nuclear capabilities are greater than Pakistan’s. This is a deterrent strategy because regardless of how capable these countries are in terms of nuclear weapons, having nuclear weapons is sufficient for deterrence because, as Waltz argues, “all states are inherent rational actors that are deterred from conflict escalation by other states that acquire nuclear-weapons capabilities” (Tow, 2014, p. 541).
Counterarguments
The counter-argument to Waltz’s Rational Deterrence Theory is Sagan’s theory which uses nuclear weapons as the independent variable (input), accidents, impulsivity and human error as the intervening variable, and war as the dependent variable (output). Sagan opposes Waltz’s logic, arguing that it cannot be used to explain unstable states or terrorist organizations. His critique against nuclear weapons is driven by the fact that different countries’ biases, customs, and interests are involved in decision-making, so the presence of nuclear weapons could have horrendous consequences in the decision-making process. Sagan argues that the operational requirements of professional military organizations to maintain stable nuclear deterrence are not likely to be met, therefore causing unstable situations (Sagan, 1994, p. 68). He highlights that “emerging proliferators have either military-run governments or weak civilian-led government in which the professional military has a strong influence on policymaking” (Sagan, 1994, p. 68), in which case nuclear weapons would likely be used. Waltz’s Rational Deterrence Theory assumes political leaders and organizations behave rationally and are capable of making emotional stable decisions, however Sagan claims that this is a postulation rather than an absolute confirmed fact.
According to Sagan, the flaw in Waltz’s logic is that it is ignorant to the risks that nuclear weapons impose when in the hands of irrational leaders and to the fact that instability of states with nuclear weapons can potentially lead to the end of the entire human race. Mistakes, miscalculations, and accidents are possible and Waltz’s theory fails to take this into consideration. “The chances that nuclear weapons will be used vary with the character of the new nuclear states—their sense of responsibility, inclination toward devotion to the status quo, political and administrative competence” (Waltz, 1981). Waltz suggests that increased nuclear weapons and capabilities leads to increased peace… the counter-argument to this is there is no guarantee. Sagan opposes this theory- “Sagan argues that rational deterrence is hardly guaranteed in a world where military commanders are often preoccupied with how powerful domestic organizations, in contrast to political leaders, perceive the operational credibility of nuclear forces” (Tow, 2014, p. 543).
Moreover, another counter-argument is that India’s nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility then it gets credit for. In other words, India’s “no first use” pledge may not be as preventative to a nuclear disaster as is portrays to be. The reason to refute the “no first use” declaration is because it is possible that this is just an excuse for India to implement nuclear weapons system into action without criticism and without unintentionally threatening other states. The circumstance in which India would deploy nuclear weapons first against another nuclear weapons states is unclear. “Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against nuclear-weapon states that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent” (Sundaram & Ramana, 2018).
Conclusion In conclusion, Waltz’s Rationale Deterrence theory can successfully demonstrate that the changing balance of power how no implication for a nuclear standoff in South Asia since “nuclear weapons have not been fired in anger in a world in which more than one country has them… We have enjoyed three decades of nuclear peace and may enjoy many more” (Waltz, 1981). The fact that United States, China, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons prevents conflict between these powers because, as Waltz argues, nuclear states are likely to use these nuclear capabilities to prevent threats and maintain peace, rather than actually using them as combat weapons. Although a completely logical counterargument exists refuting Waltz, Sagan’s theory underestimates states’ capability to make rational decisions to maintain the stability of the state. Waltz even admits that regardless of the past, we cannot predict the future and therefore we can never have a guarantee. However, Waltz’s evidence of the post-war international system being able to successfully and peacefully “absorb changes to contain conflicts” (Waltz, 1981) is stronger than Sagan’s pessimism against nuclear deterrence because it accurately reflects the past thus far.
Works Cited
Bluth, C. (2010). India and pakistan: A case of asymmetric nuclear deterrence. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 22(3), 387-406. doi:10.1080/10163271.2010.500027
Davenport, K. (2018). Fact Sheets & Briefs. Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat
Sagan, S. D. (1994). The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. International Security, 18(4), 66-107.
Sundaram, K., & Ramana, M. V. (2018). India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament,1(1), 152-168. doi:10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737
Tow, W. (2014) The nuclear Waltz: Rational actors, deterrence and nuclear non-proliferation. Australian Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 541-546. doi: 10.1080/10361146.2014.937371
Waltz, K. (1981). The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Papers, 171.
Waltz, K. (2009). The virtue of adversity. International Relations, 23(3), 498-502. doi:10.1177/0047117809340488