In his book Metaphysics, Peter Van Inwagen presents three views on free will: hard determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Philosophers often debate these three conflicting views on free will as an effort to understand how much power individuals actually hold over their own lives and their moral responsibilities. For the purposes of this essay, I will be defining free will as an individual’s freedom of action: being able to do what they want when they want. In this paper, I will argue for hard determinism by proving why the compatibilist and libertarian view on free will is implausible. Hence, through the process of elimination, I will demonstrate how hard determinism is the most valid view in the argument between free will and determinism.
To understand how determinism is the most valid point of view, it is important to first thoroughly examine all three views. The hard determinist view on free will suggests that everything in this universe is pre-determined because every event is causally inevitable. Each individual only has a certain path that they are able to take to the future, one that cannot be controlled by the agent themselves (Kane 6). It is under certain conditions and laws of nature or God that a particular event occurs. Hence, determinists argue that an event that occurs would not have occurred without the previous conditions and events prior (Kane 6). For example, Izzie is a young graduate trying to decide where to travel and has many options like Italy, Greece, or Japan. If she decides to go to Japan, determinists would argue that her decision is not something that she actually decided. Going to Japan was a pre-determined event that had to happen because of prior events. Perhaps the flights to Italy are completely full, and Greece is currently unstable due to political issues so there are no flights there. Thus, Japan would be the prime option for her travel location. In contrast to the hard determinists, the compatibilists, also known as soft determinists, would argue that free will does exist. If Izzie chooses to go to Japan without knowing about the lack of flights to Greece or Italy, then, compatibilists would argue, that Izzie is using her own free will to choose to go to Japan. Even though the lack of flights for both European countries can causally determine her decision, it does not constrain Izzie because she chose, with her own free will, to go to Japan. This view suggests that free will is compatible with determinism and not necessarily the complete opposite. Agents have free will and their actions are caused by their own desire and beliefs, but only when there is a lack of constraint (Ayer 110). Compatibilists thus believe that there is a causal and deterministic relationship between an individual’s action and their will. Because not all deterministic causes constrain individuals, determinism holds true even when free will exists (Ayer 111). Only constraining causes makes a person unfree. In contrast to the determinists, however, libertarians would argue that all 3 of these options are valid and open options for Izzie. There is no way of telling which of these 3 options Izzie will pick prior to her decision because it is entirely up to the agent, Izzie, herself to decide what she wants to do. Libertarians believe that free will exists because not all acts are predetermined (Inwagen 215). Agent causal libertarians suggest that agents indeterministically cause free actions. An agent is an individual who is able to make his or her own choices based on their own ordering and weighing of their beliefs, facts, and desires (Clarke 192). They can act freely and unpredictably without constraint, but not randomly (Inwagen 216). In the libertarian view, an agent always has a choice between alternate futures and may choose the path that they want to follow based on their will.
There are several issues with the libertarian view. First of all, indeterminism can indicate either total randomness or unpredictability. Libertarians draw a very ambiguous line between these two ideas as they argue for unpredictability in the agent’s actions but not complete randomness. If our actions are not causally determined and are thus up to chance or luck, then it undermines the idea of free will because total randomness does not indicate freedom either. In order for libertarianism to be a valid view point, philosophers would have to discover a way to differentiate between unpredictability and total randomness. Furthermore, there is always something more than the agent’s decision alone that influences the outcome. Even if an individual believes that they have free will and are acting without constraint, what they think may not necessarily be true. The agent’s personal choice is a cause that could be causally determined by prior events. Humans are biologically wired in ways that influences each and every decision they make. Right from birth, humans have no control over their life. They don’t have the free will to choose when they are born, what they look like, or what kind of characteristics they are born with. These things are all causally pre-determined by external factors that are beyond the agent’s control. They constrain the individual such that no other path but the one that they are pre-determined to may take. Yet, libertarians directly reject the idea of determinism by asserting the fact that individuals have freedom of choice. It seems implausible, however, that anyone would have the freedom to choose their own path as their actions are constantly shaped by their surroundings. Hence, in this argument, libertarianism proves to be an implausible view on free will.
Since indeterminism is false, what’s left is deciding between soft and hard determinism. The problem with soft determinism (compatibilism) is that it seems to simply be an idea created to appease people so that they think that they have a free choice when they really don’t. Determinism still holds true, and if compatibilists choose to accept determinism, it is impossible for them to accept free will as well without having to reject core principles of both sides. In the Izzie example, for instance, I would argue that Izzie actually does not have free will, she simply had an illusion of it. Just because she was ignorant to the fact that all the flights to Greece and Italy are no longer available does not mean that she freely chose. It is still a pre-determined fact that these countries are not available options for her, so she ultimately has to choose Japan. Hence, the free will that compatibilists argue for does not actually exist. The free will they define is merely an illusion because there is no such thing as a cause that does not constrain. It doesn’t matter if Izzie did not know about the unavailable flights to Greece and Italy. These factors are still constraining causes that limit her ability to travel there. She is simply given an illusion that she made her personal decision, without external influences and based on her own free will, to go to Japan. Interrelated factors and prior events causally determine future events such that it is impossible for an agent to act freely. Hence, it is inaccurate for compatibilists to argue that free will exists at all.
Since libertarianism and soft determinism are unlikely views on free will, determinism, in my opinion, is the most accurate view. Van Inwagen’s No Choice principle further supports the idea of hard determinism. This principle suggests that given a definite event that occurred in the past “p”, and if the event “p” leads to event “q”, then event “q” must occur. This undoubtedly true principle thus implies that everything happens due to a pre-existing condition (Inwagen 208-209). The universe is a very structured place with laws of nature to govern it. If such natural laws occur on the larger, physical scale of our world, why would it be outrageous to say that there is a deterministic law governing each and every individual’s day to day life and future? The reason why most people would argue against determinism is because they refuse to outright believe that they have no control whatsoever over their lives. If determinism were to hold true and there are no free actions, then this implies that no one would ever be morally responsible for any of their actions. To others, libertarianism may seem to make the most sense in this case as it accepts that everyone has to be held accountable for their actions. It is widely accepted that because we are moral beings, we have moral responsibility. In response to this, however, I would argue that although determinism means that people do not have moral responsibility in their actions, it does not mean that this view on free will is inaccurate. Free will is but an illusion upheld by our society that wrongly holds people accountable for actions that they have no control over.
In conclusion, free will does not exist because determinism proves to be the most valid viewpoint on the debate between free will and determinism. Prior events do causally determine future events. Since this calls into question the whole idea of moral responsibility, perhaps it is time for society to reassess the way individual actions are perceived and treated as individuals are technically not morally responsible for their own actions.