Agent causal libertarianism is the Incompatibilist view of Free will. Agent-causal libertarians maintain we are irreducible agents who, by acting, settle matters that aren’t already settled. This implies that the neural matters underlying the exercise of our agency don’t conform to deterministic laws, but it does not appear to exclude the possibility that they conform to statistical laws. Roderick Chisholm, a modern-day philosopher, was a large advocate for compatibilism. Chisholm’s argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and free will is basically this: if an action is uncaused, then it is random, and hence cannot be free. Agent causal libertarianism is believed by many because of its common sense: when you make a decision, it may feel like there is more of a chance that we make the decision and not something that just happens by an occurrence in nature. Many Libertarians that are incompatibilists believe that agent causal libertarianism is by far the best from of libertarianism. Other versions, such as event causal libertarianism make sense at first, yet they are very flawed. They are indeterministic, meaning they think our choices ultimately have no causes at all. This raises the “control problem”: which poses the question of how we can be in control of something that just happens. Agent causal libertarianism addresses the control problem. The agent causal libertarian would reason that they are the ultimate cause of their own actions, so they are in ultimate control (Ravizza, 1993).
The argument that makes the most sense when talking about free will is compatibilism. Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem, which concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism. Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent has freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer, a famous compatibilist said, "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills. In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is already determined. Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. They define free will as freedom to act according to one's motives without hindrance from other individuals or institutions. For example, when a court of law makes judgments, they do not concern themselves with the metaphysical aspect of the verdict. It’s about whether an individual was acting of their own free will in the scenario. It is assumed in a court of law that someone could have acted otherwise than in reality. Otherwise, no crime would have been committed. The idea of compatibilism implies both moral responsibility and determinism. Actions that are carried out by a person are caused by motives. Presumably those motives also had causes, and this direct relationship can go on forever. Therefore, our general idea of moral responsibility is seemingly identical to compatibilism (Peter Van Inwagen, Determinism).
One of the main objections to the idea of compatibilism lies in the consequence argument:
If determinism is true, I am not in control of the past or the laws of nature.
2. If I am not in control of the past or the laws of nature, then I cannot be in control of what necessarily follows from them.
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, I am not in control of whatever necessarily follows from the past and the laws of nature.
4. If determinism is true, my actions necessarily follow from the past and the laws of nature.
5. Therefore, if determinism is true, I am not in control of my actions.
Both premises one and four are definitely uncontroversial in the consequence argument, considering they are brute facts in accordance to the argument. Van Inwagen defines determinism very simply. "Determinism is quite simply the thesis that the past determines a unique future." He concludes that such a determinism is not true, because we could not then be responsible for our actions, which would all be simply the consequences of events in the distant past that were not "up to us." In the words of Van Inwagen, the creator of this position “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequence of laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it’s not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.”. The aim of the consequence argument is to show that, if determinism is true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything (Vihvelin, 2017).
The main objection to the consequence argument lies blatantly in the second premise. The second premise begs the question, therefore, the transfer of powerless principle is debunked. Compatibilism explicitly states that I can be free and in control even my wants are necessarily determined. Such a principle states that one considers a more careful formulation of the principle and argument below – that if an agent has no choice about p, and also has no choice about the fact that p leads to q, then it follows that the person has no choice about q. I am not in control of them (if I am powerless with respect to them), then there is no way I’m in control of (powerless with respect to) what follows from them. Rule Beta (the prior example) is the key to the downfall of the consequence argument. It’s what makes the difference between this version of the consequence argument and another indeterminant argument widely agreed to be fallacious. The argument for compatibilism is much more respected in the field of science in comparison to agent causal libertarianism because of its much wider range of information that does not come off a sa fallacy, such as one of it’s main objections. For this reason, the debate between free will and its relationship with determinism has a stronger argument in compatibilism than it does in agent causal libertarianism.