In this essay the international community’s hesitation to intervene in Syria will be analysed as to whether it was due to the limitations of the Responsibility to Protect. To address this, firstly a definition of the Responsibility to Protect will be provided and discussed. The requirements for intervention will be examined in the specific case of Syria to establish whether the criteria were met. Secondly, the theoretical approaches to the subject will be analysed. Lastly, the flaws within the structure of the doctrine will be assessed. These include the argument for doing harm to ultimately achieve good and the hypothetical reason for intervention. These arguments are raised to highlight the shortcomings of both the Responsibility to Protect and the Security council as you cannot independently examine either. The literature and research that has been conducted on the topic it will demonstrate the limitation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Syria has not ratified the Rome statute also referred to as the Responsibility to Protect, therefore this essay will discuss how although the lack of intervention in Syria is due to the limitation of the Responsibility to protect it is also a limitation of the ICC and the Security Council.
The crisis in Syria began in 2011 and is due to opposing parties fighting for power. The crisis began as part of the Arab spring but has grown into its own issue surrounding the Bashir Al-Assad government. The Syrian civil war was aggravated because there are two groups of Muslim’s within the country. The Shias and Sunni both put pressure on the Syrian society (Shukla, 2017). The violence has resulted in widespread migration. The tensions exploded and with nearly half the population displaced there is no possibility for containment (Evans, 2013). One of the contributing factors for the international communities’ hesitation is the precedent that was set by the crisis in Libya. The crisis in Libya resulted in military intervention and the mass loss of lives. It is because of this case that it is harder for Syria to gain intervention. However, the Responsibility to Protect was set up with its pillars for intervention to prevent selective application. It will be discussed in this essay that the Responsibility to Protect is flawed due to its’ decision to take-action rather than its clear outline of what is required to take action. The response states make will continue to be on an ad hoc basis because there is no precedent when all the cases have different political consequences (Thakur, 2013). It is explored how the ‘lexlata’ which is the law as it appears and the ‘lexfernda’ which is how the law ought to be are different principles. In the case of the Responsibility to protect the ‘lexlata’ is clearly defined and the ‘lexfernda’ is open to interpretation (Zia, 2016). The international community cannot agree on any action; this may be due to the differing theoretical approaches.
The Responsibility to Protect is a statute set up with the intention of creating a normative principle for protecting populations from human rights violations. The international community only has the responsibility to protect if the state is adverse or incapable of protecting their own population (Birdsall, 2015). The statute outlines that if genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing is occurring they have a responsibility to protect their population (UNGA, 2005). Furthermore, there are three pillars within the statute that outline how protection is provided. Firstly, it is each state’s duty to protect their own citizens. Secondly, if a state cannot protect their population it is the international communities, responsibility to assist. Lastly, if a state fails to address the violations it is the obligation of the international community to intervene. The responsibility to protect the given state is closely connected to the responsibility to prosecute within the state. This is a normal legal procedure that outlines if there are any of the above crimes committed and there is an international legal obligation to prosecute (Birdsall, 2015). Although the two principles are focused on different things they are closely linked and in practise they function together (Ralph, 2015). The Responsibility to Protect as well as the responsibility to prosecute both reside that if the state fails to protect their population the international community is meant to intervene. In this regard Syria is an interesting case as human rights violations have occurred and yet no intervention has taken place. The example of Syria relates to the realist theoretical approach.
Realist scholars argue that despite there being a clear human rights violation states still will only intervene selectively (Seay, 2007). Realists advocate that the Responsibility to Protect creates a clash with national and international responsibility (Gallagher, 2012). It is argued that if international obligations undermine a state’s national interests then they do not have an obligation to fulfil the international communities wishes. Without a world government, that would consist of an overarching central authority, there will be constant competition for power and security. Realists therefore argue that to address human rights atrocities you need a world government to standardise the rights and crimes then it is difficult to implement statute’s such as the Responsibility to Protect. The lack of intervention in Syria supports the realist argument. It further, demonstrates that as there is no world government and that these countries are acting for their self-interests rather than in a humanitarian capacity. This further demonstrates the flaw within the structure of the responsibility to protect. Syria has not signed the Rome statue so there can be no legal obligation without self-referral or the security council. However, Russia and China keep exercising their veto vote in the security council in favour of non-intervention (Spencer, 2012).
Russia and China have different reasons for not wanting to intervene in Syria but ultimately both have self-interested motives. China did not support the intervention because it was thought to be another resolution transformed for western political advancement (Spencer, 2012). China was in favour of the international community facilitating an environment for the opposing parties in Syria to come to a resolution on their own. Whereas Russia, has more strategic reasons for protesting the intervention. Russia is not in favour of intervention because they support Bashar Al-Assad. Russia aids Assad’s campaign and provides weapons and military support in Syria. The Syrian market makes up for six percent of the Russian arms and export industry (Spencer, 2012). Russia also has a strategically placed naval base and as it is their only base not in Russia and thus are reluctant to give it up. The stability of the base would be in question should the government change. Syria highlights that it is difficult for states to act in the best interest of human rights and not their own interests. Therefore, the case of Syria, directly demonstrates one of the main flaws within the Responsibility to Protect.
The just war theory analysed in conjunction with the Responsibility to Protect have similar principles. In order, for intervention to occur, all diplomatic options need to have been explored. A flaw with the just war theory is that it puts a state’s sovereignty and the right to human rights at odds with each other (Bruntsetter & Braun, 2013). However just war theory supports the Responsibility to Protect. The most plausible connection between the two is the precautionary measures put into place to consider prior to the use of force (Bellamy, 2012). It was important for accountability that there were clear requirements that needed to be met before military intervention could be enforced. The criteria firstly cannot involve any mixed motives and intend to halt human suffering. Secondly, peaceful measures should have been exhausted, there should also be the use of minimum force and lastly It is also required that there is significant proponent for success (Robertson, 1999). The issue surrounding these criteria is that although there is a moral obligation to intervene, there will be failure to do so if all the criteria are not met. The security council has the most authority and with five powerful permanent member countries consisting Russia, China, the United States, United Kingdom and France there is seldom a case that doesn’t involve motive from one state.
The element of difference is far too great in terms of different countries, be it power, culture, religion, political ideology or historical context there are too many differences to reconcile a normative precedent. These differences make’s it complicated to implement the responsibility to protect. Despite the structural flaws discussed above there are also practical flaws highlighted by Syria. The literature on the Responsibility to protect focusses on the ethical and legal questions but not as much as the operational issues (Paris, 2014). One of the structural problems is how does one conclude if the intervention has been a success. The only plausible way is through counterfactual reasoning. Therefore, to ascertain the success of the intervention you are required to think what could have happened if there was no intervention, however this involves hypothetical thinking not practical material (Paris, 2014). Another flaw is that there is inevitably a large toll that will be paid through intervention and how does one account for the loss it will cause. With intervention, there is always the concern that more of the population they are trying to protect will be harmed in the invasion. This was one of the main reasons for the security council deciding not to intervene in Syria. The country is densely urbanised and therefore air strikes and military invasion would have resulted in large civilian casualties. Military invasion would also result in mass loss of lives because the Syrian government does not support intervention and they have a strong military. Syria also has a large Iraqi refugee community which could threaten the stability of this situation (Spencer, 2012). These are some of the reasons action was not taken and shows that one of the issues with the Responsibility to Protect is each case is analysed independently which leads to inconsistency.
In conclusion, from the above arguments it can be concluded that the Syrian case demonstrates the flaws within the Responsibility to protect. The regime of Assad has support from Russia for strategic reasons whereas China opposes intervention in an attempt to prevent western ideals being enforced. This demonstrates the issues with the Responsibility to Protects criteria as there can be no bias for intervention to occur and in the Syria case there is clear individual motivation. The realist theoretical approach supports the argument that states will always intervene selectively. The just war theory was discussed to demonstrate that they have similar principles and points out the issue with all the criteria needing to be met in the Responsibility to Protect as this is unlikely. This perpetuates the lack of ability for states to intervene even though gross human rights violations are occurring. Finally, the issue of counterfactual reasoning and the large loss that inevitably occurs with intervention were discussed. These two points demonstrate that there are practical flaws with the Responsibility to Protect that are highlighted by Syria. Therefore, it can be concluded that the international community’s hesitation to intervene does demonstrate the limits of the Responsibility to Protect and that the case exposes more of the flaws than in previous cases.