In this essay I will outline the relation between the views on language described in Augustine's confessions, and those held by Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein. I will explain Wittgenstein's critique in his Philosophical Investigations on the Picture Theory of Language, and will explain his alternative approach to meaning. Throughout the course of my essay, I will attempt to portray the argument that Wittgenstein’s view of language is more diversified and orientated than that of Frege and Russell’s.
Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations’ begins with a statement from St. Augustine characterising the ways he first learnt to comprehend language. ‘When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered’. (Augustine, Confessions, 1.8)
This passage, as Augustine details all the aspects of the way we use language, and understands the way others use it, has become acknowledged as the Augustine Conception of Language. Augustine’s Confession can be argued to outline three points. Names mean what they denote, names may be introduced into language by ostension, and that successfully utilising a word is a cognitive achievement. Augustine’s Confession outlines the assumption that words are essentially names or labels. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 2-3)
In the initial section of my essay, I will outline the extent to which Augustine’s perspective on language relates to the views held by Frege. Frege, believed that the meaning (thought) of a sentence is a function of its syntax, determined not by the psychological state of the speaker or receiver, these thoughts are not psychological entities, but as a result of the logical depictions the sentence permits. Unlike Augustine who placed emphasis on word meaning, Frege suggested that sentence meaning is superior to word meaning. After identifying a problem with the informativeness of identity sentences, in that we may affirm them even when we don't know what the expression refers to, Frege proposed expressions as having two semantic aspects; sense and reference (Frege, On Sense and Reference)
The sense of a sentence is the thought it expresses; abstract and contributing to the thought that it’s sentence expresses (thoughts). Referents, are the objects in the world that specific lexis picks out (truth values). Frege justified this distinction in a number of ways; sense, he argued, is something possessed by a name, regardless of whether it has a reference, going against Augustine’s belief that names mean exactly what they denote. The name Odysseus is comprehensible, therefore it has sense regardless of no real object that it refers to. Furthermore, the sense of something may be different even when the referent is the same; Frege suggested that we can distinguish names from the object they directly refer to, for example numerals and numbers. The number two, for example, has many names; 1+1, 3-1, Two, or indeed the smallest prime number.’ (Frege, Concept and Object 131-132)
Like Augustine, Frege identified that some words, like names, refer to objects. Obama for example is a name that points to the person. There are also predicates such as 'is red’ that Frege believed to refer, like names do to words, to concepts; the concept of being red. Additionally, Frege believed that saying something exists is saying that it's not true that it's nothing- 'is nothing’ being a predicate. Therefore, saying something exists is consequently talking about the concept 'is nothing’, substantiating Augustine’s view that words are names and labels.
In contrast to Augustine, Russell, in his Theory of Descriptions, maintained the perspective that proper names in an ordinary language are hidden definite descriptions. Aristotle can be interpreted as the pupil of Plato, and as the mentor of Alexander. Therefore, going against Augustine’s proposal of singular meanings. Whilst Frege held the view that there are two aspects to the meaning of every term, phrase or sentence, Russell rejects the notion of sense, replacing it with prepositional function ; these propositions must have existing entities as their constituents. For example,. ‘a man, any man, the king of France….’ (Russell, On Denoting, 1)
Russell explains the epistemological motivations for his theory, explaining that there are two modes of knowing: knowledge by description and by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance is limited to sense data and to one's own private inner experiences, while knowledge of everything else can only be known by way of general descriptions. It is fair to assume that Russell believes we must fully understand the concepts of words as they relate to us information about the world, in way of general descriptions. Unlike Augustine who believes understanding the link between name and object is sufficient. (Russell, Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description)
One alternative interpretation to Russell's theory was maintained by Saul Kripke who argued against Russell’s descriptivist theory that proper names nominate the same object in every word. Kripke argues that definitions such as the President of the US don’t allocate the same in every world. Someone other than Nixon, eg Humphry might have been the president in 1970, meaning a description cannot be a rigid designator. A a proper name therefore, cannot mean the same as a description (Li, Kripke's Two Definitions of Rigid Designation)
In response to Augustine’s account, Wittgenstein writes on ‘the picture of language’ stating that ‘every word has a meaning… correlated with the word’ (Philosophical Investigations). Here, Wittgenstein is referring to Logical Atomism. Wittgenstein presented his views that every genuine proposition is uniquely analysable into elementary propositions that were both a function of names and a 'picture’ of affairs. Every simple name that originates therefore, denotes a object, which is its meaning. For example, ‘The cat is on the mat’ is a picture of a state of affairs. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus) Some propositions however (such as ethics/philosophy) are without sense as they lack such a concrete analysis. He believes that language functions as a tool, stating if one's language has no reactionary purpose, one should stay silent.
The essence of the Picture Theory of language is that essentially without the framework of propositions, these signs are meaningless (Hunnings, 47).
Wittgenstein’s philosophical career can be split into early and late theories, the era of logical atomism (Tractatus) and that of ordinary language (Philosophical Investigation). Whereas the Tractatus placed emphasis upon sentences holding meaning because of the images they produced, the Investigation states that the meaning of phrases is down to their employment and application. It is in Philosophical Investigations that Wittgenstein abandons his initial Picture Theory. Wittgenstein realises that there are no such things as propositions, discovering that there is one correct meaning despite different expressions, instead suggesting a shared linguistic habit in the form of a linguistic community, all of whom play the same language game.
To later Wittgenstein, language games meant you would only understand the language used if you are familiar with the language; language only has meaning in its particular context. When removed from this context and placed into a different one, it will not always infer the same thing.
In this context, Wittgenstein clearly goes against Augustine’s view. One such way he does this is through the ‘grocer’ example. Here we are not told that ‘five’ or ‘red’ means anything other than what they denote. Rather, our operations with these lexis continue in total indifference to what they denote. It is clear that Wittgenstein believes that language is functioning as a tool; rather than existing to represent the world or convey a thought, bringing about a certain action. Therefore, in this perspective, both Wittgenstein's Picture of Language and Augustine's description are rendered useless. (Philosophical Investigations, 1)
In order to further prove his points validity over Augustine’s, Wittgenstein wrote ‘Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right’. In doing so he uses the example of a builders language, stating;
‘A language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones, there are blocks etc. B has to pass the stones. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words block, pillar’. (Philosophical Investigations, 2)
Wittgenstein conceived this as a ‘complete primitive language’. Taking this analogy further, he asks us to imagine this as the language of a tribe of builders, asking how will their children learn this language? He answers that they must simultaneously learn how to build, and how to use the language as interwoven in the activity of building. He concludes with the statement that ‘Teaching can be said to establish a connection between the word and the thing. Thinks first of all that a picture of the object comes before the child's mind when it hears the word’. If a picture is created in the child's mind therefore, this is the ultimate purpose. However, in the builder language it is not the purpose of the words to evoke images, rather to connect things with words and serve a function. The idea that ‘slab’ prompts the student to conjure an image does not amount to the student having any understanding of the word’s meaning. In this occurrence, as echoed by Augustine, there is no linguistic meaning embedded in the context of the communities building activity.
Afforded with the benefits of hindsight and time, Wittgenstein's view of language is arguably better than that of Frege and Russell. Able to reflect upon and challenge Frege and Russell’s previous views, whilst simultaneously admiring them, Wittgenstein has been able to create an intricate, polished interpretation on the mechanics of linguistics