In 1945 the Truman administration dropped the first of two atomic bombs on Japan. On August 6th Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima. On August 9th Fat Man was dropped on Nagasaki. Three days later the Japanese government announced their surrender, marking the end of World War Two. The decision to drop the bombs has plagued historical thought ever since, with the question of why, being the most prevalent. On the surface, it seems that the Truman administration had no other choice, but, as we delve deeper into the historiography it’s clear that a more varied response is now present and has evolved with the question itself. This evolution has consequently led to the development of three main paradigms of thought. The traditional school, came as a first reaction to the dropping of the bombs, it certified Truman’s decision was led by the desire to end war as quickly as possible. Seemingly, this was a response to growing American patriarchy and Presidential approval during the period. Shortly after came the revisionist school. This came as a response to the traditional historians often ‘limited’ views, as well as a response to the ongoing Cold War and the questions regarding the morality of the bombs arising. Finally, came the middle ground historians, who critically responded to both paradigms, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries responding to the greater scope of newly available evidence and material, disputing earlier historical thought. Within these paradigms remain ongoing debates regarding numerous factors that might have played a role in the final decision, such as; the desire for a speedy end to war versus atomic diplomacy, naivety versus preparation, and the desire to save American lives at the expense of the Japanese people. All of these debates play key roles in the changing of the historiography of the topic, which only grows as the years proceed.
The first phase of interpretation begins soon after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and then later Nagasaki. This paradigm was prevalent in scholarly work in the early years that followed the end of World War Two, and Henry L. Stimson became the De Facto leader of it with his piece in Harpers Magazine setting the precedent. His thesis entails that the bomb was dropped to end the war quickly and with as few American lives lost as possible. Of course, Stimson was the Secretary of War for Truman and he played a major role in orchestrating the dropping of the bombs as Chairman of the Interim Committee, so his thesis undoubtedly comes with some ulterior motives in mind. He counteracts the suspicions of his own motives by deriving his conclusions from many first hand sources, giving a sense of authority to the points he makes; it was a cross-governmental decision to drop the bombs, and was done with good intention. The official nature of Stimson’s piece is one of the factors that led to its success with the US public and in scholarly thought for the years to come, leading many to use his thought as a basis of their arguments. Later, Stimson furthers the paradigm by stating that Japan simply were not ready to surrender before the bomb was dropped, instead they needed to be “shocked”. Robert Butow, corroborates with Stimson’s thesis of Japan being “shocked” into surrender, informing it as the “shock notion”. This follows the idea that the bomb was dropped to deploy elements of shock within the Japanese government which would lead them to surrender. Both Butow and Stimson address this as one of the only alternatives available to the US government at this point, to waging a full scale war– something the government wanted to avoid at all costs. To avoid total war with Japan would consequently save countless American lives, an argument that forms the basis of the traditionalist paradigm. In the years that followed the traditionalist paradigm expanded, both as a response to growing American patriarchy in literature and as a response to some early criticism against Stimson’s narrow conclusions, broadening its scope.
Louis Morton and Herbert Feis are two historians that continued the traditional legacy, yet, with broadened claims, assessing a wider scope of thought as to why the bombs were dropped, rather than focusing directly on one narrow interpretation. They set a new precedent of traditional thought, one that was critical of their own school. Morton’s The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb concludes that the bomb did accomplish its purpose. But, he also addresses the new emerging arguments against the use of the bomb, such as the fact it was used to justify the $2 billion spent on it. Morton refutes this claim quoting, Patrick Blackett stating it is a theory “insulting to the American people”. Morton’s use of Blackett plays cleverly into his hands, as Blackett himself is a strong traditional critic. By siding with his opinion Morton therefore adds a sense of credibility to his claims. Similarly, Feis begins to unpick some early revisionist thought with his 1961 book Japan Subdued. Feis discusses the alternatives to the bomb, such as an extended bombing campaign that could have the capability to bring round Japan’s surrender. Yet, he reinforces the core message of traditionalist thought, that these alternatives would not have bought around such an immediate surrender as the bomb did. This is reinforced by Morton who emphasizes how quickly surrender came after the dropping of the bombs on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Of course, as observed within Morton and Feis’ pieces, a new school of thought seemed to be developing, disputing the traditionalist paradigm, which became more and more prevalent as we rolled into the 1960’s, and led to the first major shift in historiography.
The revisionist paradigm followed closely after the development of the traditionalist interpretation in the mid-1960’s. Within this paradigm the main thesis rejects that of the traditionalists, and instead imposes that Japan was ready and willing to surrender before the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as emphasizing that there were other alternatives to nuclear warfare. This thesis was primarily asserted by Gar Alperovitz in 1965 within Correspondence, and Atomic Diplomacy, these pieces defined the revisionist school for the next ten years. Within his argument Alperovitz makes a strong case that the bomb was not a necessity to induce Japanese surrender, instead claiming they would have likely surrendered before November 1946, without the agitation of an atomic bomb. Using newly available primary source material from the Joint Intelligence Committee Alperovitz, stresses that the US were aware of the Russian capability to induce surrender without the bomb, knowing that “the entry of the USSR would…. convince most Japanese of the inevitability of defeat”. Many other scholars go on to credit this point. Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed for example, two middle ground revisionists, stress that “it was only a matter of time” until Japan would surrender. However, it is this vagueness with regards to the timescale that reinforces the counterfactual nature of the revisionist paradigm. Alperovitz in particular fails to back up his points with substantial evidence, leading the argument and the paradigm to fall flat in certain places. Nonetheless, the paradigm still became one of heavy importance in the 1960s. Now, not only were historians beginning to scrutinize the US governments decisions, but, the public were too. The disastrous effects of radiation in Japan became public knowledge, which not only sparked intense debate about the morality of the bombing, but, it sparked further debate on whether this evil construction was needed in the first place. Moral historians such as John Hersey and Norman Cousins added weight to the revisionist school of thought, with their accounts regarding the Japanese situation following the deployment of the atomic bombs.
Furthermore, Alperovitz stresses that another key reason Truman dropped the bombs was to make the “Russians more manageable”, citing that Japan was not the true target, but, the Soviets were. Within this Alperovitz relies on the Potsdam Declaration as his supporting evidence. He claims that the big three were aware that by not explicitly guaranteeing the continued reign of the Emperor, Japan were unlikely to surrender. This therefore suggests, that the US government didn’t want a surrender, and instead wanted an excuse to drop the bombs which would intimidate the Soviets – this became known as ‘atomic diplomacy’. Alperovitz claims led to a soviet-focused shift in the historiography of this topic – that could not be ignored. It was now clear to historians that the rivalry between the two could have easily played a role in Truman’s final decisions, before the official outbreak of Cold War. But, many historians, unlike Alperovitz, do not cite the Soviet factor as the primary cause for dropping the bomb. Instead, a secondary cause, perhaps an added bonus. Giovanitti and Freed express this entirely. They cite the primary reason as the desire to end the war as quickly as possible, the secondary the Soviet issue. This point is further corroborated by multiple scholars, at a later stage in the historiography and will therefore be discussed at a later point. Later, Barton Bernstein furthers this explanation, and sets the precedent for a new school of thought; the middle ground. Bernstein assesses that the revisionist school is primarily counterfactual and therefore only carries so much weight. It is the latter reason that explains the popularity in development of the Middle Ground. A paradigm that picks apart the revisionist case, whilst piecing it back together, and lacing it with traditionalist elements to create a well-rounded, wholly justified school of thought, that thrives from the mid-1970’s.
In the 1970’s a shift in the historiography of the bomb occurs, with Bernstein at the forefront. Of course, this shift comes down to a desire for a more centrist approach to the question at hand. But, most of all it comes down to the death of Truman in 1972. Truman’s death leads multiple scholars to reassess their works, and thus, form alternative opinions. This is due to the new evidence at hand relating to Truman’s journals, and inter-governmental documents that give weight to both sides of the argument. Additionally, Truman’s death made scholars asses his presidency in light of Roosevelt’s, bringing new conclusions as to why he made the decision to drop the bombs. Bernstein for example, assesses that Truman’s desire to follow the legacy of Roosevelt was a key factor in his decision to drop the bomb. He states that it was difficult for Truman to “challenge the assumption”, that Roosevelt ignited. Martin Sherwin adds to this debate in A World Destroyed (1975). Sherwin uses Truman’s diaries to further the debate that Truman was following in Roosevelts footsteps. The diaries go to prove Truman’s lack of knowledge about the bomb, and his main concern being to end the war. Sherwin expands his argument giving some weight to Alperovitz argument of atomic diplomacy. Therefore, showing that elements of the revisionist paradigm were still very much alive and finding their way into middle ground thought. In addition, the focus on Truman as an individual and the role he played in the decision, are elements further expressed by historians in this period. Bernstein again suggests that Truman was not aware of the barbarity of such a weapon, due to both his lack of knowledge, but, more importantly, the bombs deployment in the barbarous landscape of World War Two. During this period as we gain a clearer insight into the Presidency of Harry Truman, we also gain a further understanding into the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. Bernstein goes on to express that in comparison to such cruel and evil ongoing in the war, the use of the bomb did not seem as debauched as it may seem today, and therefore can explain Truman’s decision to use it. This psychological reasoning behind dropping the bomb, became expansively prevalent in historiography as time progressed; expanding the middle ground of thought and forming the basis of many new revisionist arguments.
The psychology behind Truman’s decision, resonates within many prominent scholars arguments as we enter the 1980s, predominantly backing that of the revisionist paradigm. John Dower stipulates that the racist attitudes towards the Japanese were key in the decision to drop the bomb. Dower’s argument is backed by some earlier scholarly work from William Lawrence, who explains that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were deserved attacks against the evil enemy that was the Japanese, he resonates that this was also payback for Pearl Harbor. The latter is an opinion that furthered by Gioventitti and Freed. The turn to racism can be explained not only by the arguably racist language used by Truman and many of his associates within official documents and diaries (“Fini Japs”), but also, down to post-Civil Rights Movement sentiment rampant in the minds of many. In the 1990s there also seems to be remanence of racism in scholarly thought. Ronald Takaki for example, corroborates with the psychological notion, as well as Dower’s main thesis, yet, differs slightly on his primary theory. Takaki states that racism, partnered with Truman’s desire to assert his “masculinity” are the reasons behind the final decision. Takaki’s views, similar to that of Dower’s come as a response to the growing distrust for the American government around this period. The US decision to enter war in Vietnam, much to the dismay of the general public and Nixon’s humiliation within the Watergate scandal, can explain this anti-government shift in the historiography of the topic within the revisionist and middle ground paradigms. Robert P. Newman however tries to assert traditional dominance within this period, by attacking the claims of the revisionists within his argument. Newman supports the Truman administration’s decision, and uses newly available evidence to assert the opinion that the Japanese were not ready to surrender. The bomb therefore, had to be dropped to end the war quickly. Additionally, he addresses counter evidence, such as racism and the idea of atomic diplomacy, but, he reinforces his stance as a traditionist. Although Newman gives evidence to the presence of some traditional thought lingering, he is not wholly impactful. Instead the critical middle ground paradigm remains the strongest as we enter the late 1990s, leading to the final main shift in the historiography of this topic.
The final shift comes in the late 1990’s and leads on into the early 2000’s. This shift turns on the basis of distrust, back to the casualty estimates cited in the first of the traditionalist paradigm. By this stage, wholly traditional and revisionist historians were rare. Instead, predominantly traditional leaning middle ground scholars thrived. Within their main thesis Stimson was often cited – his claims that the bomb was used to end the war speedily, were supported. Whereas, his thesis regarding how many American lives were saved as a result of the decision, becoming known as the ‘casualty estimates’, was unpicked. Historians determined this alone was not a good enough reason to drop the bomb, and may explain the potential for ulterior motives in the final decision, disguised by these estimates. Samuel Walker discusses this case within Prompt and Utter Destruction. He stipulates that the casualty estimates proclaimed by many early traditionalists, and by the Truman administration itself were wrong. Walker addresses that Henry Stimson was at the forefront of aiding Truman’s decision, and consequently exaggerated casualty estimates in order to get him to drop the bomb. Sean Malloy corroborates with Walker’s thesis, addressing that Stimson’s influence was critical in Truman’s final decision to drop the bomb, due to the heavy influence he had over foreign policy, and the information that reached Truman’s desk. Walker additionally gives weight to the argument of casualty estimates by concluding that the number of likely casualties were higher around the immediate period after war. For example, Truman claimed at one point that “half a million” Americans could’ve been killed, in the immediate aftermath of World War Two. In the years that proceeded this figure went down to “125,000”. Richard Frank, disputes the claims for lower casualty estimates. Frank claims that there is some evidence to support the claim of “half a million”. He uses MacArthur’s Ultra to support his claims, as well as addressing that the larger estimates included the likelihood of the Japanese killings of American prisoners of war, and the huge amount of deaths that would result from Operation Downfall. The closer examination of war casualties, comes as a response to moral literature that scrutinizes the morality behind the decision to drop the bomb. By this stage the long-term radiological effects of the bombs on Japan are apparent, which on one hand stipulates the arguments of revisionists who claim that the bombs impact was worse than that of an invasion. But, on the other hand, adds weight to traditionalists who cite that the Truman administration was not aware of the radiological effects of nuclear weaponry, and therefore taking into account the potential war casualties, the bomb seemed like the better option. Overall however, the arguments weight the middle ground paradigm to the full extent. It is clear at this stage there is still much disagreement amongst scholars across the schools of thought. But, this disagreement comes in the finer tuned details of this great question; debated predominantly by the middle ground. Thus, the 21st century has bought with it general clarity and consensus to what the main reason behind Truman’s decision was – his desire to end the war as soon as possible.
In conclusion, it is clear that there has been considerable shifts in the historiography of this topic. There seemed to be a constant changing of hands in the most prevalent paradigm of thought over the 60 year period covered since Truman’s decision. But, the paradigm that eventually uncovered the most pervasive claims regarding the decision was that of the middle ground. The paradigms success in the late 20th century, came as a result of careful revision of traditional and revisionist thought, with newly emerged evidence to disrupt their previous claims. Historians such as Bernstein and Walker, changed the face of historiography and have left little in the way for future historians to dispute. Today, it seems the middle ground is likely to expand into the future. But, there will be a limited scope as to what can be investigated within this paradigm, with most of the detrimental reasonings behind the decision, already being explored. Instead, the historiography is likely to look deeper into the weapons themselves, as the nuclear age continues into the unknown.