States are not the only actors that can commit acts of violence legitimately. A state is ‘a political association establishing sovereign jurisdiction with defined territorial borders and exercising authority through a set of permanent public institutions’ (Heywood, 2013). This means that states exercise the absolute and unrestricted power above all other groups. Therefore, if a state has extreme views like an authoritarian or totalitarian state this may lead to conflict as ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s political assassin’ (Primoratz, 1990, p.131). Thus, this essay will examine the sociological evidence that exists, as to whether states are the only actors to have the right to act unlawfully and to have a state monopoly on ‘legitimate violence’ (Weber, 1991). This is despite the fact states are meant to be a mechanism to maintain order through making and enforcing neutral decisions. The final part of this essay will ask whether there are other non-state actors, like international bodies and political assassins which can commit acts of violence legitimately, due to political globalisation.
Not all states act as an ‘umpire’ or a ‘referee’ in society (Hobbes, 1651); therefore, states cannot be the only actors that can commit acts of violence legitimately because they are unable to establish a legitimate monopoly of the use of force, which Weber argues, leads to endemic warlordism, widespread criminality and social dislocation (1991). Some states are totalitarian, for example, Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s USSR which take part in a ‘comprehensive process of surveillance and terroristic policing, and a pervasive system of ideological manipulation and control,’ (Heywood, 2013, p.71). This is when the boundary of the state is not understood as it is designed primarily to keep the state out, and not to keep anything in (Chambers & Kopstein, 2008, p.365) and populations do not openly provide their consent to be governed, these are known as ‘failed states’ or ‘quasi states’. Andrew Heywood explains that ‘these states fail the most basic test of state power: they are unable to maintain domestic order and personal security, meaning that civil strife and even civil war become almost routine’ (2013, p.75). Here we can assert that this then results in the overuse of extreme violence which is disguised as the state trying to maintain order and if this is not maintained it will use violence and cohesion. This is a result of their superpower status convincing civil society that what the state is doing is legitimate because they believe their ideologies are far superior, making them invincible.
States should not be responsible for being the sole actors of committing violence legitimately because the line between illegitimate and legitimate violence is extremely fine as states ‘differ over what is good and bad in human life, and what kind of equal respect or consideration we owe each other,’ (Nagel, 1987, p.216). Legitimacy ‘broadly means rightfulness. Legitimacy therefore confers on an order or command, an authoritative or binding character, thus transforming power into authority’ (Heywood, 2013, p.81). An example illustrating this concept is the air strikes on Syria, whilst the United Kingdom as a state believed they were taking ‘right and legal’ action (legitimate violence) because of suspected chemical weapons facilities in Syria. It could be seen as illegitimate by Syria and also members of the British public as Theresa May, ‘disregarded public opinion in launching these strikes; polls indicated that only 22% of the UK population supported this bombing campaign,’ (Savage & Townsend, 2018) which resulted in the Minister for Defence admitting to the death of a civilian. The reason this was labelled legitimate by Western democracies was because of a tendency to monopolise the means of violence which makes a government’s claim to provide protection, in either the comforting or in the ominous sense of the word, more credible and more difficult to resist. (Besteman, 2002, p.38) This emphasises the increasing amount of power that is given to states, which is used for violence and then disguised as the defence of citizens’ rights (Locke) because in Western modern tradition, legitimate violence is conventionally conceptualised as acts of defence against aggression (Schillings, 2016, pp.1). Another example whereby states differ over what is good and bad in human life is abortion. At least some who oppose its legal prohibition believe that it is morally wrong, but that their reasons for this belief cannot justify the use of state power against those who are convinced otherwise. But the question of what kind of impartiality is appropriate arises there as well. Both in the prohibition of what is wrong and in the promotion of what is good, the point of view from which state action and its institutional framework are supposed to be justified is complex and in some respects obscure (Nagel, 1987, p.3).
Non-state actors often commit acts of violence more legitimately than states. The growth of politics beyond the state has also been apparent in the trend towards political globalization with the number of international non-governmental organisations usually exceeding 30,000. (Heywood, 2013, pp.74). International bodies have taken the role of the state upon themselves as acting as the ‘world’s police.’ They authorise the use of military force against a country and any actions require a ‘yes’ vote but also countries willing to act, thus highlighting the appropriate use of legitimate violence. An example of this would be the UN, an international organisation founded in 1945 and currently made up of 193 member states. The UN permits a Peacekeeping Force whereby troops occupy a country or region under the UN flag to keep the peace in a conflict but do not ‘take sides.’ This is more effective than a state as they are more neutral and act more as an ‘umpire’ like how Hobbes idealises a state to be. An example of where the UN has been more successful than the state in using legitimate violence is in Sierra Leone. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) used legitimate violence and military power which resulted in a ‘triumph for the people of Sierra Leone’. ‘Our blue helmets disarmed more than 75,000 ex-fighters, including hundreds of child soldiers. The UN destroyed more than 42,000 weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition – a potentially deadly arsenal that is now itself dead,’ (Henderson, 2015). This is because they had political legitimacy as a reason for their violence. They used ‘legal-rational authority, which links authority to a clear and legally defined set of rules’ (Heywood, 2013, p.82). UNAMSIL had a clear set of aims, for example, to provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Therefore, they were able to be successful in their mission as they had secured legitimacy and consent of the people of Sierra Leone. Thus, NGOs can commit violence legitimately resulting in states not being alone as the only actors.
States are not the only actors that can commit legitimate violence as a lot of violence is legitimised by self-defence. For example, Nelson Mandela used legitimate violence in the fight against the apartheid to protect his human rights. However, the state of South Africa saw him as a terrorist and a violent leader with radical and threatening beliefs. This was due to the paramilitary attacks against the government at the end of 1961. Mandela was not a religious martyr, he used legitimate violence for political change in an unjust society. This depicts how there are different perceptions on legitimate violence, Nagel asks if there’s a high-order impartiality that can permit us to come to some understanding or how such disagreements should be settled (1987, p.216). The state cannot be a high-order impartiality because different types of states, whether it be totalitarian, religious, minimal or social-democratic, not only have ‘conflicts of interest but conflicts over the values that public institutions to should serve, impartially, for everyone’ (Nagel, 1987, p.216) Therefore, this gives rise for non-state actors such as Nelson Mandela to act as an ‘umpire’ or a ‘referee’ (Hobbes, 1651) and change states’ perception of what is legitimate violence. Thus, freedom fighters or political assassins can also commit violence legitimately, not just states.
In conclusion,