When discussing altruism, it is imperative to define the ultimate and proximate distinctions (Mayr, 1961). In the literature, the ultimate explanation of altruism is concerned with the fitness consequences and survival of behaviours, whereas the proximate explanation focuses on the mechanisms which motivate the behaviour (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007). From an ultimate perspective, altruistic behaviour requires individuals to reduce their own direct fitness in order to increase the fitness of another, and this can be adaptive as the overall inclusive fitness can be positive (West, et al 2007). Evolutionary explanations have been debated at length, but less is known of the proximate mechanisms which achieve these ultimate determinants. Therefore, what is contentious is whether the behaviour is motivated altruistically, consequently, in order to determine if true altruism in humans exists, it is necessary to determine whether the ultimate motivation of a behaviour is egoistic or altruistic. This essay will use the psychological definition of altruism, which involves the ultimate motivation to increase another’s welfare, with any self-gain or alleviation of personal distress as an unintended by-product (Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, & Tsang, 2016; Feigin, Owens, & Goodyear-Smith, 2014). It will argue for the existence of true altruism in humans against its egoistic alternatives.
Due to altruism being an act intended to benefit another, sharing resources with strangers is an exemplary feature of altruistic behaviour (Edele, Dziobek, & Keller, 2013). Altruism is frequently demonstrated in the classic dictator game (DG). A participant is given an amount of ‘windfall’ money to divide as they wish between themselves and another individual, who has no choice other than to accept the offer (Engel, 2011). Therefore, the amount of money offered by the dictator is a measure of an individual’s altruistic sharing propensities (Edele, et al, 2013). On average, the dictator gives approximately 30% to the unknown recipient, without the expectation of further interaction (Engel, 2011). The results are similar even when anonymity is guaranteed, discounting the suggestion of sharing due to social desirability (Charness, & Gneezy, 2008). As can be seen, the debate is not as to whether humans are capable of altruistic behaviour, however, it is whether the motivations behind these acts are altruistic or egoistic (Batson, 2011; Feigin, Owens, & Goodyear-Smith, 2014). It is important to take notice of the motivation of behaviour to determine whether an act is truly psychologically altruistic (De Waal, 2008). If we did not, then an act would be seen as altruistic whether or not the actor intended to benefit the individual, and an act would be seen as selfish whether or not the actor purposefully sought a benefit for themselves. At the forefront of research on promoting psychological altruism, is the empathy-altruism hypothesis, that empathetic concern produces altruistic motivation (Batson, 1987; 2011; Batson, & Shaw, 1991).
There is substantial evidence to suggest that feelings of empathy are strongly connected to altruistic behaviour (Batson, 2002; reference more). The mechanism by which this is proposed to materialize is through ‘other-oriented’ empathetic emotions which produce an empathetic concern, such as sympathy; orientating the individual to the other’s needs, and consequently increasing the likelihood of altruistic behaviour (Batson, 2016; De Vignemont, & Singer, 2006). Empathy has been shown to be a key motivator in the DG (Klimecki, Mayer, Jusyte, Scheeff, & Schönenberg, 2016). A study by Klimecki, et al (2016) demonstrated that individuals in the DG gave 70% following an empathy induction. This exhibits how an individual’s situational empathy can strongly predict how much individuals altruistically share in economic interactions. Although the DG is a well-controlled measure of altruism, discounting the possibilities of reputation management and social desirability, it is artificial and arguably not representative of real-world situations (Edele, et al., 2013). Recent studies have addressed this issue; by demonstrating how prompting empathy in an individual can increase their time spent exhibiting online charitable behaviour, than when no emotion is induced. (Farrelly, & Bennett, 2018). Additionally, a neuroimaging study demonstrated that individuals influenced by an empathetic response, had a higher level of generosity in altruistic charitable giving (Tusche, Böckler, Kanske, Trautwein, & Singer 2016). Furthermore, in the real world, direct communication is common and can enhance altruistic behaviour. An experiment by Andreoni and Rao (2011) demonstrated the power of communication, namely by asking for donations to increase charitable giving (Andreoni, & Rao, 2017). Communication increased empathy for the individual, and in line with the empathy-altruism hypothesis, increased empathetic concern led to increased altruistic behaviours. However, the extent to which the altruism is true altruism is contested, with advocates of the pseudo-altruistic alternative proposing that all human acts are ultimately egoistically motivated (Batson, & Shaw, 1991; Feigin, et al., 2014; Piccinini, & Schulz, 2018).
One egoistic alternative which has been suggested as an alternate explanation for the empathy-altruism hypothesis is the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis (AAR). This suggests that feeling empathy for someone is unpleasant and consequently we offer help to avoid the unpleasant feeling ourselves (Batson, 2011). Researchers have suggested that just as helping would remove the aversive arousal; escaping would remove the individual from the situation, providing an easy out, and therefore no helping would be needed (Batson, et al, 1981; Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009). Therefore, studies have been carried out to test whether individuals would choose to escape a situation instead of helping, and manipulated to create high and low empathy conditions. Results from these studies demonstrate that individuals do not choose to escape when empathy for that individual is high, even when the option to escape is made easy (Batson, et al, 1981; Batson, 2013). Conclusions from these studies have shown that empathetic concern does actually produce altruistic motivation to see that person relieved, as escaping would get the individual no closer to the ultimate goal of seeing the individual relieved (Batson, 2013; 2016). In the current literature, all experiments which employed the option of physical escape in determining whether an act is truly altruistic or motivated by removal of aversive arousal has provided support for altruistic motivation (Stocks, et al., 2009)
Furthermore, a study investigated whether we are motivated by AAR or empathy by presenting participants with a paradigm whereby they were required to reduce a stranger’s discomfort at a financial cost to themselves (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, Evans, & Mobbs, 2015). They used fMRI to view the brain areas activated in the decision making to differentially discover whether the altruistic motivation was due to empathetic concern or to avoid personal distress. They found that empathetic processes relied on a separate neural circuitry, specifically activating the ventral tegmental area and caudate anterior cingulate regions, which have previously been found to support social attachment, empathy and caregiving (FeldmanHall, et al., 2015; Singer, & Frith, 2005). These findings allowed differentiation of the motivation for altruistic action from selfish motives. The study included an important measure of the participant’s beliefs about being watched and correlated this with the amount of money given, which eliminated the possibility of results being due to reputation management (FeldmanHall, et al., 2015). Additionally, it included the option of escape, further corroborating results aforementioned. The results of this study revealed more altruistic helping for individuals with higher empathetic concern, providing evidence that individual differences in responses can predict prosocial choices and provides support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis (FeldmanHall, et al., 2015; Hein, Lamm, Brodbeck, Singer, & Avenanti 2011). Thus, these studies provide further support for the argument of the existence of true altruism in humans.
Another egoistic alternative to altruism is psychological hedonism; the perspective that the pleasure derived from helping other individuals is what drive behaviours (Batson, 2002). This is particularly of interest when looking at the motivations behind charitable giving (Anderoni, & Rao, 2011; reference more). From an egoistic perspective, individuals give to charity in order to achieve pleasure and positive feelings which is known as ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1990). Furthermore, warm glow has been shown to be a predictor of blood donor behaviour, which is commonly thought to have altruistic motives (Ferguson, Atsma, De Kort, & Veldhuizen 2012). However, advocates of the empathy-altruism hypothesis do not deny that there are benefits to the actor, however they argue that they come as a consequence, rather than a cause of the action intended to help another individual (Batson, 2016). As long as the ultimate goal is to help the individual, any by-product of the act does not deny the motivation behind the act as being truly altruistic (Batson 2002; 2016). Therefore, the existence of a warm glow from an act does not provide sufficient evidence to disprove the existence of altruism in humans.
Altruistic behaviours are surprisingly common in society, as has been shown consistently in the DG (Edele, et al, 2013). The concept of ‘true’ altruism in humans is arguably a very complex construct to come to a firm conclusion as to whether it exists, due to the contribution of multiple motivations behind behaviours (Feigin, et al, 2014). However, this essay has presented evidence to demonstrate how empathetic concern is a reliable mechanism in producing altruistic behaviours (Batson, 2002; Klimecki, et al.,2016; Farrelly, & Bennett, 2018; Tusche, et al., 2016). There is support for egoistic alternatives to altruism, however it is clear that egoism is not adequate to explain all aspects of human altruistic behaviour, as even when the option to escape from a situation is easy; individuals continue to participate in costly helping (Batson, 1981; 2013; Stocks, et al., 2009). Furthermore, despite the existence of ‘warm glow’ in individuals exhibiting altruistic acts, there is not sufficient evidence to confirm this as the motivator of altruistic behaviour rather than a by-product (Batson, 2016). Therefore, the evidence in this essay discounts the suggestion that ‘there is no such thing as true altruism in humans’, as there is insufficient evidence to categorically say that altruism does not exist. Rather, this essay has provided evidence for the existence of altruism, by highlighting the strengths of the empathy-altruism hypothesis against its egoistic alternatives.