Colour realism is the view that objects are coloured and always have the colour that they appear to have. For example, strawberries are red, and bananas are yellow. These objects seem to have just one colour and don’t appear to have other colours. Many philosophers have different perspectives on this view. Most are against it. I will mainly discuss George Berkeley’s disagreement about this view and Hardin’s addition on Berkeley’s argument.
Berkeley was a philosopher, who came up with idealism, which is the view that material objects don’t exist, but can be represented through ideas. He was influenced by John Locke’s claim that our minds can perceive material objects, through mental representations or ideas. Berkeley argued that material objects do not exist but agreed that ideas do exist. He believes that material objects are just ideas that are produced in our minds, but the objects don’t exist themselves. To further explain his point, Berkeley comes up with the “argument of variation.”
Berkely tries to prove this in his book, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Here Berkeley thinks that idealism is the most reasonable view and lists four common sense principles. The first is that our senses can be trusted. He believes that the world does have colour, sound, taste and feels just the way we experience them on a daily basis. This is denied by most philosophers, who think that tiny particles of matter form an illusion of colour. For instance, if an object is blue, they believe that colourless particles move around so that we see it as a coloured object and therefore the objects don’t have colour in the first place. The second principle is that “that the things we see, and feel are real.” The third and fourth is that “that the qualities we perceive as existing really do exist, and that all skeptical doubt about the real existence of things is precluded.” Berkeley thought that the only way to prove these principles is to show that material objects don’t exist.
Berkeley believes that if we do perceive material objects, then we can only do that through our senses. When we first look at an object, its sensible qualities are the first things we observe. He explains that we only perceive the qualities of an object and nothing deeper. For example, we hear sounds through hearing, see colours through vision, and flavours are known through taste. In the book, Philonous convinces Hylas that we immediately perceive only sensible qualities.
To prove that there is no existence of mind-independent material objects in our immediate sensory experience, Berkeley introduces the argument of variation. Philonous explains an example to Hylas on this. If a person puts their hand on ice and another keeps their hands warm above a fire, when they both put their hands in water, one person will feel cold and the other will feel warm. Water can’t be cold and warm at the same time, so it is not a material object. Therefore, the temperature of the water belongs to the perceiver, the mind, and not the water. Likewise, taste is also something that will be different for everyone, sizes of objects are different when distance is a factor. Berkeley gives more explanations for colours and sound that enforces they idea that we can only have knowledge about something through immediate sensory experience or an inference based on our sensory experience. Berkeley is trying to prove that whatever we see, feel, or hear is exactly what we are feeling and that there is no such thing as matter that is making us perceive something else, it is all in our minds. He also adds that God is the one that has a collection of ideas and passes them on to us to perceive. This is why even though material objects, don’t exist, when we go somewhere and come back, everything in our room is still there, because god is constantly thinking about it in his mind. His original presentation explains that even though we see red tomatoes, those are just ideas or god’s ideas that is passed on to us to perceive.
Summary of Berkeley’s argument of variation
To further prove idealism, Berkeley rejects colour realism by using idealism as a to support his reasoning. He came up with the argument of variation to additionally prove that objects are colourless and that the colours we perceive are the ideas from our minds. To start off, his spokesperson Philonous, states that the colour of objects can be seen differently depending on the conditions it is put under “without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself (p.1).” He explains that “the same bodies appear differently colored by candle-light from what they do in the open day (p.1).” For instance, when shopping online the colours of objects may look different compared to when you receive them in person. There are many types of lighting to consider in this situation, that may have influenced our thoughts on the colour. There is lighting of the picture, computer screen, daylight, or lights at home. Considering these sources, how would we know under which lighting we will get the correct colour? Any of these can give us the right colour, but we always assume daylight is the most accurate because we are always exposed to it, but in reality, there really is no answer. Therefore, these objects can be assumed to be colourless. Another point that Philonous states is “the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds … vanish upon a nearer approach (p.1).” He is comparing how distance can affect our perception. It’s hard to tell if we should believe what we see from afar or what we see closer up is the accurate representation. In this case, he questions why we should think there exists colour at all. Since the red and purple colours vanished upon closer approach, it makes sense to see that the clouds are colourless. Similarly, when something big is seen from a far, it looks small, but not until we move closer, we can see the actual size of the object. Also, when an object is looked under a microscope, colours may appear differently in closer magnification. There are also drastic changes in vision between animals and humans. Something that looks red may be plain to an animal or if something looks small, it may look large to an animal. If everything in the world, is perceived differently to animals and humans under certain conditions, then material objects don’t exist, and explains that colours are just ideas in our minds. Material objects are supposed to be stable, but if colour constantly keeps changing on an object then it is not stable anymore and therefore not material too. The only explanation is that everything we perceive is in our minds.
Summary of Hardin’s argument of variation
According to Byrne, Hardin has a better explained version of the “argument from variation,” which “appealed to an important feature of the colors.” Byrne first gives us extra info about the mixtures of colours. He uses green and orange as examples. Orange is used by mixing yellow and red and green is formed with yellow and blue. Even though they are mixed to form a different colour, they actually just reflect the colours they are being mixed with. For instance, orange is either yellowish red or reddish yellow. However, green is different. It doesn’t look bluish yellow or yellowish blue, instead it looks either yellowish green or bluish green with an exception. Green also has its own shade with no shade of yellow or blue known as unique green. Therefore, green is classified as a unique hue, while orange is a binary hue, since its shade always involves either yellow or red and doesn’t have a distinct colour of its own. Since green has its unique shade, it should be easily distinguishable. This is where Hardin forms a better version of the argument.
Hardin uses unique green as an example to show that there can be different views about the colour. Supposedly, there is a natural variation among visual systems of different people. People with normal colour vision will view unique green in different ways because “it is due to differences in pigments in the optical media of the eye, and some of it to differences in the light-sensitive pigments inside the cones (p.2).” Hardin gives an example at looking at an arrangement of chips with various shades of green and only one would have the property of unique green. One observer might pick something different compared to the other. We will want to say that one of the observers has poor eyesight because only one person can be correct, not both. Since, there is no way of knowing who is right and wrong, we can assume that none of the chips are unique green and that it is actually colourless. Similarly, “Lemons produce experiences of yellow in us, but that is all—the lemon itself is entirely colourless (p.2)”. Hardin’s argument of variation is more of a scientific approach and proves the science behind vision differences in people.
Byrne thinks that Hardin’s point is more superior because it involves the perception of two different views. Since there are two different opinions, both of them can’t be right, so the unique green is only created in the minds and it is not a property of the chips, therefore the chips must be colourless. Byrne also says that in Berkeley’s versions he is already supporting colour realism in a way because he was saying that colours are revealed better under sunlight compared to candle light. I think the argument of variation is cogent, because it is true that we will never know what the accurate representation of anything is, if everyone perceives differently. This reminds me of a controversy that was created a few years back, when a picture of a dress was posted, and some people thought it was blue and black and others thought it was white and gold. So, it may be possible that our perceptions are constructed by our brains and that we only perceive objects through sensory experiences first.
Colour realism is the view that objects are coloured and always have the colour that they appear to have. For example, strawberries are red, and bananas are yellow. These objects seem to have just one colour and don’t appear to have other colours. Many philosophers have different perspectives on this view. Most are against it. I will mainly discuss George Berkeley’s disagreement about this view and Hardin’s addition on Berkeley’s argument.
Berkeley was a philosopher, who came up with idealism, which is the view that material objects don’t exist, but can be represented through ideas. He was influenced by John Locke’s claim that our minds can perceive material objects, through mental representations or ideas. Berkeley argued that material objects do not exist but agreed that ideas do exist. He believes that material objects are just ideas that are produced in our minds, but the objects don’t exist themselves. To further explain his point, Berkeley comes up with the “argument of variation.”
Berkely tries to prove this in his book, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Here Berkeley thinks that idealism is the most reasonable view and lists four common sense principles. The first is that our senses can be trusted. He believes that the world does have colour, sound, taste and feels just the way we experience them on a daily basis. This is denied by most philosophers, who think that tiny particles of matter form an illusion of colour. For instance, if an object is blue, they believe that colourless particles move around so that we see it as a coloured object and therefore the objects don’t have colour in the first place. The second principle is that “that the things we see, and feel are real.” The third and fourth is that “that the qualities we perceive as existing really do exist, and that all skeptical doubt about the real existence of things is precluded.” Berkeley thought that the only way to prove these principles is to show that material objects don’t exist.
Berkeley believes that if we do perceive material objects, then we can only do that through our senses. When we first look at an object, its sensible qualities are the first things we observe. He explains that we only perceive the qualities of an object and nothing deeper. For example, we hear sounds through hearing, see colours through vision, and flavours are known through taste. In the book, Philonous convinces Hylas that we immediately perceive only sensible qualities.
To prove that there is no existence of mind-independent material objects in our immediate sensory experience, Berkeley introduces the argument of variation. Philonous explains an example to Hylas on this. If a person puts their hand on ice and another keeps their hands warm above a fire, when they both put their hands in water, one person will feel cold and the other will feel warm. Water can’t be cold and warm at the same time, so it is not a material object. Therefore, the temperature of the water belongs to the perceiver, the mind, and not the water. Likewise, taste is also something that will be different for everyone, sizes of objects are different when distance is a factor. Berkeley gives more explanations for colours and sound that enforces they idea that we can only have knowledge about something through immediate sensory experience or an inference based on our sensory experience. Berkeley is trying to prove that whatever we see, feel, or hear is exactly what we are feeling and that there is no such thing as matter that is making us perceive something else, it is all in our minds. He also adds that God is the one that has a collection of ideas and passes them on to us to perceive. This is why even though material objects, don’t exist, when we go somewhere and come back, everything in our room is still there, because god is constantly thinking about it in his mind. His original presentation explains that even though we see red tomatoes, those are just ideas or god’s ideas that is passed on to us to perceive.
Summary of Berkeley’s argument of variation
To further prove idealism, Berkeley rejects colour realism by using idealism as a to support his reasoning. He came up with the argument of variation to additionally prove that objects are colourless and that the colours we perceive are the ideas from our minds. To start off, his spokesperson Philonous, states that the colour of objects can be seen differently depending on the conditions it is put under “without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself (p.1).” He explains that “the same bodies appear differently colored by candle-light from what they do in the open day (p.1).” For instance, when shopping online the colours of objects may look different compared to when you receive them in person. There are many types of lighting to consider in this situation, that may have influenced our thoughts on the colour. There is lighting of the picture, computer screen, daylight, or lights at home. Considering these sources, how would we know under which lighting we will get the correct colour? Any of these can give us the right colour, but we always assume daylight is the most accurate because we are always exposed to it, but in reality, there really is no answer. Therefore, these objects can be assumed to be colourless. Another point that Philonous states is “the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds … vanish upon a nearer approach (p.1).” He is comparing how distance can affect our perception. It’s hard to tell if we should believe what we see from afar or what we see closer up is the accurate representation. In this case, he questions why we should think there exists colour at all. Since the red and purple colours vanished upon closer approach, it makes sense to see that the clouds are colourless. Similarly, when something big is seen from a far, it looks small, but not until we move closer, we can see the actual size of the object. Also, when an object is looked under a microscope, colours may appear differently in closer magnification. There are also drastic changes in vision between animals and humans. Something that looks red may be plain to an animal or if something looks small, it may look large to an animal. If everything in the world, is perceived differently to animals and humans under certain conditions, then material objects don’t exist, and explains that colours are just ideas in our minds. Material objects are supposed to be stable, but if colour constantly keeps changing on an object then it is not stable anymore and therefore not material too. The only explanation is that everything we perceive is in our minds.
Summary of Hardin’s argument of variation
According to Byrne, Hardin has a better explained version of the “argument from variation,” which “appealed to an important feature of the colors.” Byrne first gives us extra info about the mixtures of colours. He uses green and orange as examples. Orange is used by mixing yellow and red and green is formed with yellow and blue. Even though they are mixed to form a different colour, they actually just reflect the colours they are being mixed with. For instance, orange is either yellowish red or reddish yellow. However, green is different. It doesn’t look bluish yellow or yellowish blue, instead it looks either yellowish green or bluish green with an exception. Green also has its own shade with no shade of yellow or blue known as unique green. Therefore, green is classified as a unique hue, while orange is a binary hue, since its shade always involves either yellow or red and doesn’t have a distinct colour of its own. Since green has its unique shade, it should be easily distinguishable. This is where Hardin forms a better version of the argument.
Hardin uses unique green as an example to show that there can be different views about the colour. Supposedly, there is a natural variation among visual systems of different people. People with normal colour vision will view unique green in different ways because “it is due to differences in pigments in the optical media of the eye, and some of it to differences in the light-sensitive pigments inside the cones (p.2).” Hardin gives an example at looking at an arrangement of chips with various shades of green and only one would have the property of unique green. One observer might pick something different compared to the other. We will want to say that one of the observers has poor eyesight because only one person can be correct, not both. Since, there is no way of knowing who is right and wrong, we can assume that none of the chips are unique green and that it is actually colourless. Similarly, “Lemons produce experiences of yellow in us, but that is all—the lemon itself is entirely colourless (p.2)”. Hardin’s argument of variation is more of a scientific approach and proves the science behind vision differences in people.
Byrne thinks that Hardin’s point is more superior because it involves the perception of two different views. Since there are two different opinions, both of them can’t be right, so the unique green is only created in the minds and it is not a property of the chips, therefore the chips must be colourless. Byrne also says that in Berkeley’s versions he is already supporting colour realism in a way because he was saying that colours are revealed better under sunlight compared to candle light. I think the argument of variation is cogent, because it is true that we will never know what the accurate representation of anything is, if everyone perceives differently. This reminds me of a controversy that was created a few years back, when a picture of a dress was posted, and some people thought it was blue and black and others thought it was white and gold. So, it may be possible that our perceptions are constructed by our brains and that we only perceive objects through sensory experiences first.