Being the core assumption of defensive realism, the security dilemma can be basically defined as one state’s security becoming another’s insecurity (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 138-139; Jervis 1978, 167, 186). It is arguably an unintentional phenomenon, which essentially occurs in three fundamentally overarching steps: (1) As Kenneth Waltz stated because the international system does not have an overarching government and is "anarchic", survival is the main motivation of states. When states seek security for survival, the main (and arguably the only) way this happens is by maximizing power; (2) Despite this action of maximizing power being benign and not intended to be threatening, the dilemma occurs as other states will be feel less secure, therefore due to the ‘nature of the international system’ (rather than the subversive motives of states) it leads to security competition or an ‘arms race’, in an attempt to balance power, as defensive realists would say, in spite of no initial conflict existing. (3) This eventual race for arms and rapid arming of states leads to tensions in the international system, thus, the security dilemma.
Offensive realist argue that the security dilemma is inescapable as the nature of state survival means that states seek to maximise power, not security and that if the opportunity to have an advantage over another state, they will do so.
OBAMA COUNTER TERRORISM REALIST OR LIBERAL
In relation to counterterrorism, the security policies used by Obama during his two-term tenure as President can be analysed, and conclusions can be drawn from whether certain policies were realist or liberalist and how successful they were in maintaining international peace and security.
One of the more defining counterterrorism instruments used by the Obama administration was Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones. In his two terms, Obama had ordered a total of 542 UAVs to conduct targeted operations against suspected terrorists mainly in six states: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. His preference for UAVs comes mainly from its three main advantages: their risk-averse nature, their relative low cost and the advanced precision when it comes to these targeted operations they conduct.
It can be argued that Obama’s use of UAVs presents a realistic approach to security policies rather than a liberal one. This is because these strikes are carried out unilaterally by the United States and therefore with that, they are shrouded in secrecy. It is not that realism absolutely support unilateral action, but that liberalism is vocal about its need for some form of plurality and/or transparency. “The most distinctly liberal argument for differentiated, bounded political units rests on the classic liberal fear of concentrated political power and its potential to breed tyranny” (Whelen, 1959; in Abizadeh, 59). Moreover, the United Nations on numerous occasions has condemned the United States for such attacks, for instance in 2013 when the UN Human Rights Council was investigating the legality of some 25 drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, Somalia and Yemen. In fact, Ben Emmerson, who was tasked with leading the report stated that “ [the drone strikes] involve the use of force on the territory of another state without its consent and is therefore a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty” (https://www.dw.com/en/un-condemns-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan/a-16678481), of course echoing the liberal sentiment of international justice “[Liberals have] insisted that the rule of law and questions of justice and rights were absolutely central to international relations” (Steans et al., 2010, 44) and thus pointing this policy more toward the realist sphere.
Furthermore, the fact that the strikes are unilateral goes against the liberal need for plurality among domestic actors in the decision-making process of creating foreign policy. “Republican liberal theories stress the role of domestic representative institutions, elites and leadership dynamics, and executive-legislative relations” (Moravcsik, 1993). Nonetheless, Obama was regularly criticised by Congressional leaders for keeping the program directive so highly classified. The CIA “declines to provide any information to the public about where it operates, how it selects targets, who is in charge, or how many people have been killed” (Mayer, 2009).
Obama’s use of drone strikes fits better in the realism paradigm, however, not just because it is not liberalism. Balance of power is central to realism, to be more specific “whether and under what conditions the competitive behaviour of states leads to some sort of equilibrium” (Wohlforth et al., 2007, 156). From comparing the vast increase of drone killings during Obama’s tenure, and the counterterrorism policy pushed by the Bush administration (favouring regime change and democratisation), it can be said that Obama’s use of “a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists” (Obama, 2013) is more favourable to maintaining the current power status quo