In recent decades the literature has noted that class voting in advanced economies has been in severe decline. The frequently provided explanation for this can be classified into two groups: the demand-side argument assumes that the decline of the class-party association results from declining divisions in orientations towards redistribution and inequality between classes, whilst the supply-side argument assumes that it results from the declining relevance of these divisions to party choice (Evans and Tilley 2012). In turn, whilst proponents of the former may point to the development of alternative voting cleavages such as age, gender and matters of multiculturalism, those in the latter school may focus on the growing emphasis that is being placed on political valence and the ‘quality’ of party leaders. In order to successfully approach the statement in question, it is crucial that we discuss the nature and meaning of ‘class’. Throughout this essay the traditional interpretation of class will be assumed to fall under the Weberian definition, so as to allow direct engagement with the way class is both conceptualised and measured in empirical studies. Weber’s concept of class is rooted in the economic sphere; he considers classes as groups with shared economic interests that affect life chances as a result of finding themselves in similar positions within the labour market. In this paper I shall argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, class is still the determining factor for political party preferences, and through an alternative understanding of class we can provide a sufficient explanation for today’s social stratification in Western Europe.
There are several authors who claim that class divisions in society are waning, and as a result can no longer be feasibly used as a determinant for individual voting choice. Proponents of this viewpoint often subscribe to the dealignment theory; changes in the relationship between social class and vote choice may be explained through the changes in social cleavages and divisions within a society, which in turn affect political interests and party preferences, thereby influencing vote choice. The argument goes further as to attribute weakening social divisions to fundamental changes within society; groups within society have become increasingly fragmented, and as a result of this there has become a blurring of differences between them. Russell Dalton (1984) is one such advocate of the dealignment theory, and he promotes the argument of cognitive mobilisation. This theory asserts that increased levels of education and the proliferation of mass media have ‘enabled individuals to make political choices that are independent of external cues given by social groups’ (Elff 2007, 5(02), p 278). The argument appears to build upon the election studies carried out by Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee (1954), who argued that social classes within society demonstrate a homogeneity in their political preferences through the interpersonal relations between class members. Dalton’s reasoning is thus that greater cognitive skills equip voters with the ability to assess parties on the political spectrum with greater individual scrutiny, with the result being social groups can no longer be assumed to hold uniform political preferences. However, Dalton makes a sizeable assumption in his argument that Elff highlights; despite the fact that cognitive mobilization may in fact lead to an increase in the number of politically aware ‘opinion leaders’, Dalton presupposes that these opinion leaders will as a result become more politically heterogenous. Elff also finds a distinct lack of empirical evidence for Dalton’s claim. He reveals that data on watching televised news, education or discussing politics do not help explain the patterns of change in class voting that we observe.
Alternatively, it is worth considering the strength of supply-side arguments that seek to explain the decline of the class-party association. Evans and Tilley (2017) studied the class basis of party choice in Britain since the 1980s using British survey data from 1983-2010. The authors argue that class dealignment has resulted from the impact of an ideologically restricted set on the electoral relevance of values concerning inequality and redistribution. Evans and Tilley point to the British Labour party’s New Labour movement, which accordingly followed several other Western European left-orientated parties down the road to a centrist social democracy by moving to the ideological centre in an attempt to become a ‘catch-all’ party appealing far beyond its traditional class base. This shift was later echoed by the Conservatives on the right side of the political spectrum, and resulted in a pronounced ideological convergence between the two main parties during the 1990s. The authors contend that as a result of dealignment among the electorate, parties have become increasingly incentivised to compete at the centre-ground of the political spectrum, due to the fact that floating voters are more likely to be moderate. Dealignment has also been coupled with a melting of traditional social divisions, which may also be expected to increase moderation. This seems to build upon the work of Przeworski and Sprague (1985), who together advise socially democratic parties to seek moderate ground in response to the decline of the working-class base. However, this Downsian-themed argument does not hold up in all circumstances, as evidenced by the political climate in the USA, where we have recently seen increasing party polarization. DW-Nominate scores appear to show that the voting gap between congressional Democrats and Republicans is now larger than at any point since the series began in 1879. This fits nicely with evidence from Bartels (2008), which also suggests increasing alignment of voters in the USA. It therefore seems to be an unwarranted leap to conclude that there has been a supply-side constriction on voter choice that has led to the erosion of the class base for party preferences.
Moreover, the recent success of populist parties throughout Western Europe suggests that class may yet play a pivotal role for individual voters. From the Austrian Freedom Party to the French National Front, political parties that appeal to populist ideals are benefitting from a newfound wave of support; the success of a political ideology that at its core focusses on the struggle between classes directly questions the argument that parties are converging to the centre ground of the political spectrum and that class no longer plays a crucial role in voting. The electoral fortunes of populist parties are open to multiple explanations, including the cultural backlash thesis that is explored by Inglehart and Norris (2017). The authors consider the theory that rising populist support can be seen as a counter-revolutionary backlash by once-predominant classes within society to the ‘silent revolution’ (an intergenerational shift towards post-materialist values that arose during a period of unprecedented high levels of existential security for people living in Western societies during the post-war decades). Through eroding the industrial sector, the process of modernization that has occurred throughout Western Europe has found a victim in the working class. Unlike highly skilled employees who would benefit from technological innovation and the relaxation of borders, the working class often find themselves lacking the transferable skills that are required to adapt to the changing climate. As a result of this predicament that workers have found themselves in, many have sought to express their resentment through opting for a political alternative: populism. This has been manifest in the 2016 EU Brexit Referendum as well as the US Presidential election of the same year, whereby surprise results on both occasions were attributed to an expression of discontent among the working class. Such outcomes support the notion that class segmentation is an enduring foundation for voting choices.
The argument that social cleavages are dissipating is a mistaken one. The dealignment theory proposed by Dalton assumes that an increase in cognitive skills and political awareness would lead to a fragmentation of political views, despite the fact that there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this. While political parties appear to be converging to centrist ground in some countries, the USA demonstrates that this does not always hold. Class divisions are still prevalent on the political spectrum. However, in order to preserve the class-party association we must acknowledge the transformation that the term ‘class’ has undergone: the value change that was brought about by the silent revolution has led to the manifestation of more accentuated post-materialist class cleavage as opposed to its materialist predecessor. Whilst traditional notions of class would firmly rest in the economic sphere as established by Weber, the cleavages being witnessed across Western Europe are now centred around the concepts of cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and national self-interest.