Television was an extremely promising technology in the 1950s, for both the Government and the people of the Soviet Union. The government initially saw television as a way of promoting state propaganda to the masses, however, as all sources agree, they initially struggled to achieve this. By 1980, centralised television was booming in the Soviet Union, but this wasn’t completely down to the Government. Televisions growth was also due to the people, who embraced the entertainment medium with open arms. The state had to alter their methods in order to appease the population who demanded entertaining television, and this was done by making shows more emotive. Christine Evans writes extensively about this in ‘The “Soviet way of life” as a way of feeling’, with these emotions being key to televisions growth. In ‘Dear television workers’, Bönker uses the communication between the state and the people, through television suggestion letters, to show the effect the population had on state policy. Roth-Ey’s ‘Finding a home for television’ focuses mainly on the 1950s and 60s, and how amateurs led television growth. The sources all agree that the growth of television was pioneered by both Soviet Central Television and the people of the U.S.S.R, but the role of each does slightly vary. Nonetheless, the fact the people influenced not only the growth of television, but the programs shown, clearly indicates the Soviet Union was not a pure totalitarian state.
Evans’ work focuses on Soviet Central television, and how it sought to “reinforce the mood of cheer, optimism, and energy” of the people1 (Evans 2015). By increasing the people’s mood, it was thought that they would be more likely to embrace the Soviet way of life, and subsequently work harder. This would boost each person’s economic output, benefiting the total Soviet Economy. However, it was more than this also. By embracing the Soviet way of life, individuals would have a stronger allegiance to the state, increasing its social control. Yet, initial attempts weren’t successful, as actors portraying the state propaganda were awkward and unpopular with viewers1 (Evans 2015). This is reinforced by Roth-Ey, who states that the “leaders of the propaganda state were disorganised, uncreative, even detached”3 (Roth-Ey 2007). The disconnect between the State and the viewers meant central television channels had a slow start. This is where the idea of bringing in emotion into programs came from as if a program was “emotionally infectious” it would gain the viewers full interest1 (Evans 2015). This wasn’t achieved until shows like Ot vsei dushi were formed in the early 1970s. Ot vsei dushi was the pinnacle of Soviet television propaganda by tying the emotions generated by the show back to state interests. The impact of this program is still being felt to this day, with Putin’s political and cultural policies bearing resemblance to that shown on Ot vsei dushi1 (Evans 2015). Unlike Roth-Ey and Bönker, Evans’ work places Central television at the forefront, shaping the landscape of Soviet television. There is very little consideration for how people may have affected what featured on television screens. ‘The Soviet way of life as a way of feeling’ highlights that the state had a clear goal on providing entertaining broadcasts, that also promote the Soviet way of life. Evans portrays that the peoples demand for television did play a role in influencing Government interest in TV, but out of all three works it focuses most heavily on the actions of Soviet Central Television.
Letters to the editorial offices of Soviet Central television allowed viewers to feedback on the programs they were watching to the state. This is the nucleus of Bönker’s work, which much like Roth-Ey, opposes the view that the Soviet Union was a truly totalitarian regime. Bönker doesn’t challenge that the state had full control over the shows presented in the 1960s and 70s, but instead that these state programmes relied on responses from viewers in order to work. The channel of communication provided by these letters “opened up new sites of negotiation between the regime and audience”2 (Bönker 2015). Although, the number of those who wrote letters as members of the communist party far outweighed the population as a whole4 (Friedberg and Mickiewicz 1983). Television still served to benefit both the state and its citizens, as Central television’s propaganda had to be entertaining enough that it would reach large numbers of viewers. Not all television programs were propaganda filled also, the state had to respond to people’s demand for pleasure and entertainment in their free time2 (Bönker 2015). Watching television is a private activity, meaning the state couldn’t monitor whether television episodes were being received well by viewers, or even received at all. Roth-Ey supports this stating officials preferred to stick with “traditional bean counting methods”, such as questions asked at a rally, as with T.V it was impossible to tell the response shows were getting3 (Roth-Ey 2007). Therefore, to guarantee large viewership, entertaining programs such as Ot vsei dushi had to be created. This process relied on feedback from viewers on what programs they enjoyed, principally through letters to the editorial offices of Soviet Central television. This making it clear that Soviet television was fuelled by the people’s demand for entertaining television, that Soviet Central Television used to promote the Soviet way of life. Which is the reason state controlled television only emerged in the 1970s, when television was already popular, and viewing trends could be seen. Before then it was unsuccessful. Bönker’s work ties in most closely with Roth-Ey’s, as both make it clear that the people of the U.S.S.R were integral in the rise of television, which led to the state developing interest in the technology. Whilst the potential of television was always known to the state, it only became realised due to the high demand shown by the people.
Kristin Roth-Ey uses television in her work to challenge the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union. This was due to the state’s struggle in regulating television initially, leading to the growth of amateur studios3 (Roth-Ey 2007). These amateur studios broadcasted to local television stations, and were more popular than the out of touch shows created by Soviet Central television. Amateur studios often were focused purely on entertaining programs, rather than political ideas, as they had no state affiliation. Here, Roth-Ey argues against the view that the state controlled all media in the Soviet Union, as the amateur studios were not state regulated. This is not featured in the other two journals, that predominantly focus on Soviet Central television. Roth-Ey also looks at why the Soviet Union was apprehensive to use television initially. One reason is that it opposed traditional ideals. In the U.S.S.R hard work was glorified, for example, the promotion of Stakhanovism, in order to maximise each person’s economic output. Television was the opposite, it was considered lazy and often ridiculed for this very reason by the print media3(Roth-Ey 2007). This is supported by Bönker who states “contemporaries perceived that people were retreating from the politicised public sphere into “their” private sphere”2 (Bönker 2015). This opposed the Soviet Union’s ideology, as it very much encouraged unity between all its citizens under the communist party. This apprehension, and uncertainty from the state partially caused the chaotic rise of television in the U.S.S.R. Roth-Ey goes into the most depth on TVs early arrival in the Soviet Union than the other two works, allowing for reasons behind Televisions initial growth to be seen.
All three works were produced in the 21st Century, allowing for a wide range of source material to be used for evidence for each of their arguments. Subsequently, each source is able to use material from the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), which is the state archive of the Russian federation that was opened in 1992. Whilst each source uses this to some extent, Bönker uses it most frequently due to it being the source of the letters that are fundamental to her work. The state archive of the Russian federation provides a great deal of source material, but the accuracy of some of the material is not guaranteed. With it possible that officials may have tampered with data to produce statistics that are more favourable to the U.S.S.R. Separately, each journals bibliography makes it clear that the two most notable historians on television in the Soviet Union are Kristin Roth-Ey and Ellen Mickiewicz. Mickiewicz is not an author of any of the journals I have written about, but her 1992 work ‘Split Signals’ is referenced in all three works. Mickiewicz is referred to by Roth-Ey as a pioneer in the field, whose work she sought to build on when writing ‘Finding A Home For Television’3 (Roth-Ey 2007). Separately, Roth Ey’s “Finding a home for television” is a clear influence for both Evans and Bönker, who reference the work in both their journal pieces. These common sources used by each journal explain why these three works come to relatively similar conclusions.
Overall, the three works don’t fully subscribe to the orthodox model of the U.S.S.R being a pure totalitarian state and challenge this narrative using the opinions of the people. In all three works, it is shown that initially the State was out of touch with the people’s television craze, and had to alter their approach to reach a larger audience. This is most clearly the case in Roth-Ey and Bönkers work, who present amateur studios and letters to Central Television as evidence the people of the Soviet Union played a role in shaping the media displayed on television sets. In Evans’ work it is evident that the people of the U.S.S.R do influence the choice of show; however, it is focused more on the aims of Soviet Central Television. For most viewers, television was leisure time entertainment. Subsequently, television programs had to invoke emotions and be entertaining for viewers, otherwise, they would go unwatched. Which is why Soviet Central television had to listen to the demands of the people when creating propaganda programs.