The defence of insanity is outdated and should be abolished. To what extend do you agree with this statement.
The insanity rules are based on the case of M’NAUGHTEN 1843, and the defence can be raised at any point. Where D wants to rely on the defence, 3 elements have to be proved by D. These are, that at the time of committing the act, D had a defect of reason; and this defect of reason was the result of a disease of mind; and this defect of reason caused D not to know the nature and quality of his act, or not to know he was doing wrong. Where D is found to be insane, the special verdict is “not guilty by reason of insanity.”
A defect of reason means that D was unable to reason at the time he acted. In the case of CLARKE 1972 – where D absent-mindedly took items from a supermarket while depressed. This was held not to be insanity.
D’s defect of reason must be the result of a disease of the mind and this is actually a legal term decided by the judge, not a medical one. The disease can be a mental disease which is demonstrated in the case of SULLIVAN 1984 where the House of Lords gave examples of schizophrenia, paranoia and manic depression. The disease can be a physical disease which affects the mind. This includes brain tumours and in certain circumstances diabetes and sleeping disorders.
In my opinion, I agree with the statement that the defence of insanity is outdated and should be abolished. This is because, the legal definition of insanity, has not changed since 1842, and in 1953, over a century later, evidence provided to the Royal Commission stated the definition of insanity was “obsolete and misleading.” The issue of insanity has been recognised by the law commission and they include insanity in the 10th programme of reform. They stated “the problems with the existing law are many and serious. The current rules for determining legal insanity date from 1842. In those days, the science of psychiatry was in its infancy.” The fact that it is stated that the science of psychiatry was in its infancy, clearly shows that the definition is outdated, and over time with the more knowledge and understanding we have of certain conditions, insanity is due to have an updated legal definition. The law commission recommended the abolishment of the M’Naghten rules but this didn’t occur; instead the defence of Diminished Responsibility (DR) came about, as a partial defence to murder.
EXPLAIN DR
The defence of DR was supported as it was believed it reduced the uncertainties created by the defence of insanity. The defence entails proof that the defendant was suffering from “abnormality of mind” which “substantially impaired” mental responsibility for their acts. Diminished responsibility is decided by the juries, and the defence is opened to interpretation “in accordance with the morality of the case rather than the application of psychiatric concepts.” However the fact that the judges get to decide the verdict for both insanity and diminished responsibility, is a serious flaw in my opinion. Also, there is the factor of sympathy that can play a part in mitigating the sentence, which deviates from the fundamental issue of criminal liability.
As I briefly mentioned, insanity is based upon a legal rule and not medical insanity. Medical professions have criticised the law because the legal definition on insanity is ‘medically irrelevant’ since it dates from 1843, and it so happens that the courts do not take medical views on insanity into account. Smith and Hogan argue that the rules are about responsibility rather that insanity. The legal definition of insanity is only concerned with defect/fault and is not designed to take into account the developments of modern medical science. Because of to the medical and legal advances it bears no relation to modern society. The law commission stated and I quote “the application of these antiquated rules is becoming increasingly difficult and artificial. For example, the key concept of “disease of the mind” has no agreed psychiatric meaning”. Lord denning in R V Bratty states “any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to reoccur is a disease of the mind.” Dr James Reed (a consultant forensic psychiatrist) had said “the present test does not really relate in any meaningful way to the practice of the psychiatry. Therefore diversions into discussions about the M’Naghten rules are not very helpful in conveying an understanding of the clinical situation to the court.”
Furthermore the definition of “disease of mind” is a very debatable issue especially since it is argued, that it is a legal definition not a medical one. Judges give the phrase a more modern interpretation in practice in the sense that “disease of the mind” is described as “an impairment of mental functioning caused by a medical condition.” The types of disorders relating to this are not exactly what we would naturally think of as a “disease” in the ordinary sense, and the word “mind” is not interpreted to mean “brain.” Some conditions such as schizophrenia are clearly going to be considered as a disease of mind, however it can be argued that the rules are too broad because the law fails to distinguish that such conditions like diabetes and heart disease, can be controlled by medication.
This has come about due to the interpretation of the M’Naghten rules, in that it has not limited the idea of “disease of the mind” to mental disorders. Instead, it has adopted a distinction between whether the cause of the accused’s lack of control was due to an “internal factor” or an “external factor.” Conduct that is involuntary and caused by an internal factor is classes as insanity and that leads to the special verdict, however involuntary conduct caused by an external factor is classes as sane automatism, leading to a simple acquittal. The Court of Appeal has held that under the M’Naghten rules there will be no disease of the mind where a malfunction was “caused by the application to the body of some external factor” such as violence and hypnotic influences. This leads to illogical results. The application of the law to diabetics demonstrates this. Diabetics as we all know may suffer excessively high or low blood pressure, and both states may be caused by external or internal factors. So this basically means that a diabetic who, without fault, fails to take insulin and then commits a criminal act would be treated as insane. In contrast, a diabetic who took insulin through a medical prescription would be acquitted if they were an automaton at the time of committing a criminal act.
The way that the law draws a line between automatism and insanity is problematic. There will be cases in which a defendant continues to exercise some degree of control over his or her movements but will nevertheless be entitled to rely on the defence of insanity but with the same lack of capacity he would not be entitled to rely on a plea of sane automatism.
The criminal procedure Act 1991 claims the court must hear evidence of two medical practitioners who have experience in diagnosis of mental disorder, in order to establish the defence of insanity but this has now been overruled as the courts have continued to interpret the rules to include within the definition states of mind that the medical profession would not classify as a “disease of mind.” The case of Sullivan is a good example. Despite medical evidence declaring that a disease of the mind was a disorder of brain functions for a prolonged period of time and further declaring that a seizure was not a disease of the mind, this was held to be irrelevant. It was found that the defendant’s epilepsy had during the course of the actual seizure caused impairment of faculties, which in turn caused a defect of reason, thereby satisfying the legal definition of insanity. CASE
It must add further pain to the accused when the result of a successful insanity plea is not a straightforward acquittal; it is a ‘special verdict; of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ under the trial of Lunatics Act 1883. Surely it would not have been a difficult task for parliament to have repealed the act and modernised the law, rather than merely amending it in 1991.
The criminal defence of insanity seems to be incompatible with the civil law position under the Act. The rules have been stretched to over epileptics and diabetics, a category that is highly unlikely to be committed under the Act, while committing others that although not legally insane, would be committed according to established medical opinion. This highlights the fundamental issue of what actually constitutes a mental disorder for the purpose of determining legal criminal responsibility, which is clearly in a current state of confusion.
Furthermore, many criticisms can be made to the verdicts on insanity cases. The defence of insanity is rarely used, due to the strict sentencing procedure. If the defendant is found ‘guilty by reason of insanity’ then the judge would have no alternative but send him to an indefinite place in a secure hospital without a maximum sentence. In contrast, conviction for murder or manslaughter would result in a determinate sentence of between 10-15 years. Most defendants would possibly prefer a straightforward conviction. It has been suggested that many defendants with mental problems do not raise the defence for these reasons and this means that such insane defendant are not receiving the treatment they need and instead are detained in prisons. There is also a potential conflict with Article 5 of the ECHR which states a person of unsound mind may only be detained where proper account is taken of objective medical evidence.