In 2015, Europe experienced a rise in the numbers of refugees arriving at its borders. With a raging civil war in Syria and ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, hundreds of thousands of refugees were fleeing the devastating situations in their home countries and seeking refuge in Europe. In the first nine months of the year, around 500,000 people arrived on Europe’s Mediterranean shores, which is more than twice the number for all of 2014. The large scale arrival of refugees caught many policymakers off-guard. In the months and years following 2015 and even up until today, refugees have taken centre stage in political discussions and policy developments within European nation states and on a larger European Union (EU) scale. In this essay, I will assess the discourses and policies surrounding refugee movements and I will analyse whether refugee movements are securitised and, if so, with what effects. The narrow legal refugee definition according to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention is as follows: someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted […] is outside the country of his nationality”. However, this essay will adopt the broader vernacular refugee definition. Academics and policy makers usually categorise a refugee as someone not only crossing international borders to flee individualised persecution, but also “those fleeing other significant human rights violations (civil, political, economic, social, and cultural) to which they have no domestic remedy”. This essay will refer to a ‘refugee movement’ as a forced “large-scale population movement across national frontiers”.
I will be basing my analysis on the traditional discursive, as well as the sociological model of securitisation. The discursive securitisation model is a critical approach to security studies. It was initially developed in the late 1980s by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, and is now known as the Copenhagen School (CS). The CS is based on the idea that security is socially constructed , and that “securitisation occurs when a securitising actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is “normal politics””. Thus, a securitising act is composed of a securitising actor who presents an issue as an existential threat to a specific referent object in a speech act. The audience of this attempted securitisation can then either accept or reject the it. If securitisation is successful, the issue is moved into a securitised realm, in which exceptional policies can be employed. Since the emergence of CS, scholars led by Didier Bigo have developed a broader conceptualisation of securitisation, the so-called sociological securitisation approach. This conceptualisation is still based on the construction of an oppositional relationship between a threat and a referent object. However, the sociological approach focuses on the role of practises instead of discourses. Securitising policy practises are defined as “activities that, by their very intrinsic qualities, convey the idea to those who observe them, directly or indirectly, that the issue they are tackling is a security threat.” The securitisation which occurs through such practises does not need the explicit assent from an audience in order to produce social and political consequences. It also does not necessarily refer to an existential threat , thereby accounting for variations of intensity within securitisation. Though they are two different conceptualisations of the same model, discourses and practises can be conceived of as interrelated in the construction of an issue as a threat, as discourse oftentimes legitimises practice. In order to accurately assess the extent and degrees to which refugee movements are securitised, I will look at both securitising discourse and securitising practises.
I will answer the essay question by using empirical examples and cases from different European states, as well as the EU. As mentioned before, Europe serves as a pertinent example for analysis of the securitisation of refugee movements, due to the relevance of the topic in the current European political climate. Further, when concentrating on refugees in Europe, a specific focus on EU policies is important, as migration policy has been Europeanised since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, leaving EU politicians in charge of transnational migration policies. In the first part of this essay, I will analyse the securitisation of refugee movements in Europe through media discourse since the refugee influx in 2015. I will conclude that refugee movements have been successfully securitised and that extraordinary policy measures targeting this issue have been adopted by different European nation states. In the second part of this essay, I will analyse the securitisation of refugee movements through policy practises of the EU. I will conclude that the employment of professionals of risk management and unease leads to the creation of fields of security which necessitate the securitisation of refugee movements. Further, I will conclude that externalising EU policies designate refugees as undesirables and outsiders and thereby securitise refugee movements.
Securitisation of refugee movements through discourse
The reaction of the European mass media and political elites to the surge in refugee movements arriving at European borders since the beginning of 2015 offers a pertinent example of the discursive securitisation of refugee movements. The national mass media in a variety of European countries employed a discursive tactics which constructed the refugee movements as endangering national communities. Thereby, it took on the role of a securitising actor. Firstly, the refugee movements are often referred to as a refugee or a migrant ‘crisis’. According to Goodman et al. “A crisis can be understood as a rarely occurring event challenging the existing order” . Thus, the term crisis implicates a threat to the existing way of life in the European communities. This effect was exacerbated in instances where the media referred to “Europe’s migrant crisis” , thereby emphasising the dire situation of Europe, not the one of people risking their lives to flee from their homes. The categorisation of refugees as ‘migrants’ is another discursive tool contributing to a securitisation of refugees. The term “migrant crisis” has frequently been used in European mass media since 2015 to describe the increase in refugees in Europe. While international conventions establish refugees as vulnerable and deserving of help, the term migrant presents someone as not being in dire need of assistance . Thereby, the term infers that refugees are seeking support out of opportunism and undeservedly burdening European states. Further, the media portrayed the refugee movements in 2015 as a threat to the collective way of life of Europeans by focusing discourse on the large size of the movements, as well as ascribing certain threatening characteristics to refugees. Water metaphors such as ‘flood’ and ‘tide’ were often used in reference to the movements. These types of formulations trigger an abstract fear based on refugees overwhelming European countries. Further, ‘criminal’ or ‘terrorist’ emerged as popular terms ascribed to refugees. Particularly after the Paris attacks in November of 2015, refugee movements were increasingly portrayed as a way for terrorists to enter and attack European cities – as the UK Daily Mail put it: an “ISIS Trojan horse” . These examples have demonstrated that, in 2015, the European media conducted securitising speech acts aimed at refugee movements through the use of the term ‘crisis’, the categorisation of refugees as migrants, and the portrayal of the size of the movements and intentions of the refugees as threatening the lives of Europeans.
The success of the securitisation translated into policies, as the end of 2015 marked the adoption of exceptional governmental measures for many European countries. For the first time since joining the Schengen agreement, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden all began temporarily reintroducing border controls in November 2015. Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, for instance, justified his decision to fence off the Hungarian border to Serbia with razor wire as a measure to defend “Europe’s “Christian roots” against a Muslim menace”. These bordering practises fall outside of the normal politics realm for Schengen Zone countries and are therefore a clear indication for the successful securitisation of refugee movements. This successful discursive securitisation led to an exceptional political development in which refugees were physically excluded from reaching European communities. The securitisation has had a direct effect on the refugees themselves. These concrete effects are addressed in a declaration of the Council on Europe from September 2015, in which the Council warns that refugees who are stranded in a transit country due to border closure are in “a situation of precarity and vulnerability, without legal status or protection or access to basic needs and therefore at risk of exploitation, abuse and violence.” Thus, the successful securitisation of refugee movements has led to a situation in which refugees are being abandoned from European states and left without protection. An additional effect of the various frames used in the securitising speech acts is that they distort the individual identities of refugees in the public eye. Metaphors such as ‘flood’ and ‘stream’ for instance establish the idea of a collective force of refugees. Individual biographies get lost through such frames. This makes it, in turn, more difficult to establish a positive image of refugees as relatable people who deserve compassion. Stripping refugees of their identities therefore facilitates further securitisation processes.
However, while these developments confirm that refugee movements have been successfully securitised through discourse in many European countries, not all responses to the influx of refugees arriving in Europe fit the securitisation model. As Holmes and Castaneda state: “Europe has been caught between two responses: compassionate pragmatism versus fear”. Many German citizens and much of the German-language press, for instance, embraced “Willkommenskultur”, or culture of welcome, as a central theme in their initial response to the refugee movements. Refugees entering Germany have been met with cheering crowds, welcome celebrations and large groups of volunteers eager to help. German Chancellor Merkel made headlines internationally for her welcoming approach. These examples show that the securitisation of refugee movements has not been accepted by all European citizens, journalists, or political elites. The model cannot be applied to the totality of European responses to refugee movements. Adopting it as a heuristic model for interpreting public and policy reactions to refugee movements would therefore undermine alternative approaches and should be avoided.
Therefore, the example of the European response to the influx of refugees reaching Europe in 2015 has demonstrated that refugee movements are, in fact, securitised. This discursive securitisation has produced the image of refugees as a collective force, omitting the individual life stories of those seeking asylum. Ultimately, the securitisation has resulted in the reinstatement of border controls within parts of the Schengen area, leaving refugees excluded and without protection. However, the example of Germany’s Willkommenskultur has also demonstrated that refugee movements have not been securitised in all parts of society and that the securitisation model should not be applied as a heuristic model when analysing public responses to refugee movements.
Securitisation of refugee movements through practises
The securitising discourses aimed at refugee movements in Europe have another far-reaching effect: they not only legitimise exceptional politics within individual European nations, but they also legitimise and motivate exceptional policy practises on a grand EU-scale. These so-called ‘managed migration’ policies further designate refugees as threats and thereby continuously re-construct the security climate around refugee movements. The following paragraphs will demonstrate how policy practises on the EU-level securitise refugee movements through the involvement of threat management professionals and exclusionary policies.
Firstly, refugee movements are constructed as risk factors through the constitution of a security field of ‘professionals of management of unease’ surrounding these movements. According to Didier Bigo, immigration, including refugee movements, is securitised through a correlation between successful speech acts which mobilise against a group of people and motivate the employment of exceptional politics, and the involvement of security professionals, such as policemen, intelligence services, military, and operators of surveillance technologies. These security professionals set in motion a so-called ‘field effect’, in order to expand their own power. By employing security personnel in managed migration policies, their “ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear and unease” constitutes a climate which necessitates the designation of refugee movements as threats. In order to legitimise their involvement and the importance of their role in the management of refugee movements in comparison to other actors involved, security professionals focus on identifying refugee movements as a risk which could cause imminent danger to the European Union and thereby needs to be controlled through security measures. Thus, security professionals construct refugees as a probable harm in order to expand their own security field, thereby reproducing the threat perception and setting off a ‘vicious circle of fear and unease” . FRONTEX, which is “an independent agency specifically created for enhancing the border control regime of the EU” , is a concrete example of such a field effect. In 2016, FROTEX became a fully-fledged border and coast guard agency and has since then focused much of its efforts on maritime border control against the entering of migrants and refugees into Europe through unauthorised routes. It is tasked with intercepting those refugees, for instance, who travel to Europe without authorisation by sea through the Mediterranean. One of FRONTEX’s main tasks is the management of external borders through cooperation between Member States. These operations bring together border guards who are normally deployed to address traditional security issues such as military attacks. The deployment of such professional security personnel and the specific military training for the protection of EU borders constructs the image of a threat so immense that it must be counteracted with the same measures as an armed military attack. The military logic employed in the interception of refugees reinforces the aforementioned image that refugees are actually immigrants who are illegally entering the European Union for illegitimate reasons.
In addition, FRONTEX has been using increasingly sophisticated ‘intelligence’ technologies to gather information concerning migration and refugee movements in conjunction with private sector companies specialising in security and surveillance technologies. This information is used, amongst other things, to release annual risk assessments and provide long-term strategic analysis. The EU’s use of the term ‘intelligence’ and the employment of private sector companies securitises refugee movements. It signals that tools typically used to address traditional security problems are adequate to deal with refugees entering through unauthorised routes. Further, the private security companies tasked with creating long-term strategies apply their security-logic when providing their risk assessments. In order to expand their influence and legitimise their involvement in FRONTEX operations, private security companies are focused on creating a security field around refugee movements. Therefore, the portrayal of refugee movements as a threat to the European Union is inherent to their work, as it is necessary for their employment.
Thus, refugee movements are securitised through EU policy practises. This is the result of the employment of security professionals through agencies such as FRONTEX, who set in motion a ‘field effect’ and construct refugee movements as a threat in order to strengthen their own role in migration control.
Secondly, externalising policies aimed at preventing unauthorised migration securitise refugee movements, as they construct refugees as threats that must be kept away from the territory of the EU. The physical distance that is administered between refugees and European territory and the dynamic of exclusion that is set in motion through these policies reinforces the image of refugees as a dangerous outsider and an undesirable. Externalising policies also set in motion a vicious cycle of securitisation. Increases in border control of EU external borders make it more difficult for refugees to enter. Subsequently, more refugees rely on human smugglers and try to enter through new illegal routes, thereby becoming ‘illegal’ or ‘unauthorised’. This development reinforces the image of refugees as unlawful intruders and dangerous illegal immigrants. An example of a type of externalised policy of the EU are readmission agreements with third countries for returning refugees which have entered the Union illegally. The EU-Turkey Action Plan of 2016 is a pertinent example of such externalising policies. The deal signed by the EU and Turkey specifically addresses the Syrian refugees and managing irregular refugee migration into Europe. The agreement stipulates that the EU can return Syrian refugees who have travelled from Turkey to Greece without authorisation. In return, Turkey is authorised to send a documented refugee from Turkey to Europe. The EU-Turkey deal securitises irregular refugees, as it characterises unauthorised entrance of refugees as a threat dangerous enough to return those who commit it. Thus, the construction of ‘illegal’ refugees perpetuates a perception of danger posed by them. In addition, by admitting documented refugees from Turkey but rejecting refugees arriving at the European coast, the EU contributes to the securitisation of ‘undeserving’ ‘irregular’ refugees in contrast to legal and deserving ones. Therefore, refugee movements are securitised through externalising policies. These policies administer a dynamic of exclusion, designate refugees as undesirables and produce a perception of ‘illegal’ refugees who threaten the internal security of the European Union.
The securitisation of refugee movements through externalising policies and the involvement of security professional have had a significant negative effect on the protection climate surrounding refugee movements. In an antagonistic climate that is characterised by policies promoting alienation between the community and refugees trying to enter it, the protection of human rights comes under threat. For instance, the activities of FRONTEX in entry prevention have been criticised for undermining refugees’ access to asylum systems. Practises of interception at sea have been shown to endanger life and violate the principle of non-refoulement, which forbids a country receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in danger. The EU-Turkey Deal was also criticised for violating this principle, as Turkey was arguably not a safe country for refugees to stay in.
In addition, externalising policies, which make it more difficult for refugees to travel through traditional routes, thus causing refugees to attempt reaching their destination on more covert and more dangerous paths. For instance, the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal made it more difficult to cross from Turkey via Greek islands. Due to this, many refugees chose a deadlier route from Libya to Italy, causing hundreds to die, as their boats capsized on the treacherous sea route.
These paragraphs have demonstrated that policy practises of the EU contribute to the securitisation of refugee movements. Security professionals engaged in EU migration management frame refugees as security threats in order to expand their security field and legitimise their employment of security tactics. Additionally, externalising policies create a physical and symbolic distance between the community inside European territory and refugees trying to enter the Union by designating them as illegal. These types of securitising practises were subsequently shown to have a detrimental effect on the refugee protection climate.
Conclusion
To conclude, this essay has analysed the securitisation of refugee movements in Europe using the example of the 2015 refugee influx. It has demonstrated that refugee movements are indeed securitised. Securitisation has taken place through a plethora of techniques employed by European media discourse. This discourse has led to the adoption of exceptional policies by many European states in the form of reinstatement of borders. However, the essay has also demonstrated that discursive securitisation of refugee movements has not been successful across the board, with Germany being a notable exception in parts. Moreover2, EU managed migration policies have caused a further securitisation of refugee movements. Namely, the involvement of security professionals and the adoption of exclusionary policies have perpetuated the security climate surrounding refugee movements. The securitisation of refugee movements has had significant impacts on the refugees themselves. The protection climate surrounding refugees is being eroded and individual identities and biographies of refugees are abandoned due to the securitising discourse. Additionally, exclusionary policies are making it more difficult and dangerous for refugees to enter Europe.