The ‘problem of evil’ has remained a prevalent issue for centuries, and will continue to remain a colossal subject of contention between thinkers worldwide – this problem, highlighted by Mackie’s ‘Inconsistent Triad’, that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God is not compatible with the existence of evil. Many scholars have attempted to solve the problem of evil, including justifying evil as a necessary by-product of eventual goodness, blaming free will, the idea of ‘soul-making’ and evil being merely an illusion. Before considering different arguments, the definition of ‘solve’ must be addressed. Evil itself, an inevitable tenet of this world, can never be ‘solved’, and the concomitance of both evil and the traditional Judeo-Christian view of God is not plausible. In order to defend God and accept evil, one must reject at least one characteristic. However, this essay will argue that there is no satisfactory solution for the problem of evil; we can merely accept it.
It seems reasonable to suggest that belief in a traditional Judeo-Christian God can ‘solve’ the problem of evil, especially if one considers the prospect of human free will. There are many theodicies which allow for all sides of the inconsistent triad to coexist; for instance, Hick’s ‘soul-making theodicy’, largely based upon the Iranaean theodicy. Iranaeus argued that God created a purposely imperfect world to accommodate immature human beings, where humans develop into eventual ‘children-of-God’, transitioning from a state of ‘bios’ to ‘zoë’, corresponding with evolution. To allow for this, all forms of suffering are ultimately constructive in developing character traits, such as integrity and compassion – it is a ‘necessary precondition for spiritual growth’ . Hick develops the Irenaean theodicy, arguing that “man is in the process of creation” . He argues that God did not intend to create a puppet, but a being “capable of entering into a personal relationship with his Maker” , therefore creating an epistemic distance, allowing humans to freely choose to turn to him. God purposely avoids creating a hedonistic paradise and limits himself in order to allow for this free will; Hick uses a parent-child analogy to illustrate this agapeistic idea . The idea of epistemic distance is quite convincing, as it explains why humans have free will and God’s agapeistic nature However, the process of existence of evil and experience of suffering being justified by the eventual outcome does not seem reasonable. DZ Phillips argues that an omnibenevolent God would not use humans as a means to an end via the continuation of evil – the end does not justify the means.
Hick’s universal salvation concept is controversial, refuting the idea of justice, as well as many religious texts such as the Bible. It also seems to render Jesus’ death insignificant, which was supposed to relieve us from sin and evil. Mackie argues that it is logically possible and plausible for a person to always freely choose to avoid evil – an omnipotent God could have created humans who freely avoid evil. However, he did not do this and this arguably diminishes credibility of this supposedly omnibenevolent God. Hick’s weak response to this criticism, claiming that a wholly good person could not exist, further questions the validity of his argument. Even if it was not logically possible for God to make humans freely make the right decision each time, traditionally, God is supposedly omnipotent and could therefore perform the logically impossible should he wish to do so. There must have been another way for God to ascertain values and virtues without prodigious suffering.
Arguably, the strongest argument to suggest that belief in God cannot solve the problem of evil is the concept of disproportionate suffering. Even Hick cannot seem to justify it without having to refer to justification in an afterlife, categorising dysteleological suffering as a ‘real mystery, impenetrable to the human mind’ . The sheer magnitude of suffering of innocent people is enough to doubt whether this omnibenevolent God exists; a four-year-old child dying from starvation is hardly valuable. Promised harmony in heaven cannot compensate for the earthy travails of innocent humans . Protest atheism argues that no promises of salvation can ever compensate the dysteological suffering humans face in life, despite examples such as Job in the Bible suggesting that good can come out of this anguish. The main example of protest atheism is given in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. Ivan does not reject the existence of God, but God’s actions, allowing the world to be full of evil – ‘I am not rebelling against my God; I simply ‘don’t accept His world.” This implies that even if a God were to exist, he would not be one worth venerating – this is essentially a rejection of God as morally corrupt. Even if moral evil could be vindicated, there is still an issue with natural evil, as there is no clear explanation for it. Moltmann claims to ‘resolve’ the problem of evil by identifying evil within divine nature itself – “like the Cross of Christ, even Auschwitz is in God himself” . However, he admits that neither theism nor atheism will ever be capable of compensating the problem of dysteleological suffering, saying “even if the answers have disappeared, the questions and the agony have not been taken care of” . It is difficult to justify the existence of an all-loving God who allowed for the murder of children in the Crusades who claimed to have God’s permission – much suffering seems ultimately pointless and unjust.
It could be argued that a God without power and authority over us could help humans to cope with evil. Even if someone managed to ‘solve’ the problem of evil, this does not take away the pain and suffering that it has caused to most people in their lives. It could be argued that actually, “only a suffering God can help” and the thought of God suffering with us can be seen by some as a consolation. This concept of Process theology argues that God is not this transcendent figure ; he cannot force people to behave in a way which compromises their own inbuilt free will, or act against the laws of nature. The Judeo-Christian God is claimed to be a God who acts decisively and authoritatively. Meanwhile, the Process Theologist’s interpretation of God cannot manipulate finite humans; he only has the power to persuade, being ‘the fellow sufferer’ . Even if this is accepted, it rejects God’s omnipotence, upholding the inconsistent triad rather than solving the ‘problem of evil’. An Augustinian perspective would argue that evil itself is not itself a substance, but ‘privato boni’, following the Neoplatonist idea. Human beings were offered free will to turn towards or away from God; evil is simply the perversity of human beings turning away from God. However, this does not help the problem of evil to be solved – rejection of evil altogether is not a sensible solution.
In conclusion, despite many attempts to so, there is no such thing as a ‘solution’ to the problem of evil; each supposed theodicy has its faults. The only way of proceeding to understand it would be by accepting that the Judeo-Christian concept of God is invalid and refute one of his qualities. However, we can never understand God or his motives, and it is the mysteriousness of life that is necessary for development and religious belief – a trust in a God that will provide eventual salvation. Ultimately, as JS Whale wrote about the problem of evil, ‘though we cannot solve it, we may not disregard it’ .