The 2016 UN AIDS Declaration addresses the need for member states of the United Nations to help in stopping the spread of the AIDS epidemic. The declaration declares member states must commit in making strides towards stopping the AIDS epidemic by 2030. The treaty pushes members to improve in HIV/AIDs preventative care and treatment. In international organization, the UN AIDS Declaration is a casual call for action in comparison to other issue areas such as security in the case of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). INF was a treaty from 1987 between the United States and Soviet Union that sought to eliminate both intermediate-range and short-range missiles and come to a complete halt of the production of such equipment. The INF Treaty had provisions that make states less likely engage in “bad” behavior due to the very strict and methodical approach of the treaty. Though both of these issue areas are addressed by international organizations, the dynamic in problem structure, institutional design and effectiveness are very different from one another. It is important that in effectively solving international problems we understand the problem structure and institutional design. Treaties are not all created as equally effective. Throughout this paper I will be describing the similarities and differences between the issue areas of security in regards to the INF Treaty and Human Rights in regards to the UN AIDS Declaration. I will define the problem structures of each issue in order to explain how the problems influence states international institutions and how those factors determine the effectiveness of each institution.
The UN AIDS Declaration is a human rights issue because there is a overwhelmingly clear correlation between the spread of the disease and impoverished areas. Because such areas (developing countries, in particular) do not have the resources to take preventative measures or offer proper care, the disease is able to cause a rapid decline of people in the community, widening the gap in achieving human development within society. The problem structure of human rights issues are difficult to address because many countries do not have strong incentives to respond while those who are capable of making changes are already doing so. Though a country can agree to making an effort, there is not rhetorical declarations can do to hold states fully accountable, as they would be able to, in a security treaty. The UN AIDS Declaration states in its first passage:
1. We, Heads of State and Government and representatives of States and Governments
assembled at the United Nations from 8 to 10 June 2016, reaffirm our
commitment to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030… we pledge to intensify efforts
towards the goal of comprehensive prevention, treatment, care and support
programmes that will help to significantly reduce new infections, increase life
expectancy and quality of life, and promote, protect and fulfil all human rights
and the dignity of all people living with, at risk of and affected by HIV and AIDS
and their families.
It is clear the institution feels a responsibility to protect, however, the HIV/AIDs issue is not one that all states see as an immediate threat. Because there is no immediate threat, the issue is rather low priority leaving states with low incentives to respond. Additionally, states must take into consideration the economic cost that stopping the spread of AIDS requires. Not all countries may be able to provide, leaving the issue area with the capacity problem of Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity (PEPI). According to Professor Mitchell’s Lecture #7, PEPI is, “engaging capable states and convincing that benefits of assistance outweigh costs.” Many countries may not have the capabilities to be proactive in solving the HIV/AIDs epidemic and we know the response incentives are not very high either. Because of this high tolerance and lack of capacity/power, the UN AIDS Declaration is not able to be as aggressive nor effective in achieving its goals. The declaration simply proposes that there is a problem, and the problem is something worth agreeing on making an effort to tackle it together.
The UN AIDS Declaration and the issue at hand are not considered as high priority in international organizations as nuclear security issues are, as in the INF Treaty. Even though the spread of AIDS is threatening to humanity, it generally only threatens a certain, vulnerable demographic of people who do not have the resources available to protect them from the virus. Nuclear weapon issues are much more likely to take first priority in the realm of international organization because it is threatening to all governments as well as humanity. The institutional design for the AIDS Treaty is less effective because the agenda is set by concerned actors who all were planning to take action, regardless of if the treaty existed. This institutional design of the AIDS Declaration makes it harder to make a real difference because it must convince actors who may not participate otherwise, to believe participating is beneficial to them in the long-run despite the economic costs it may bring them in the meantime. The tolerance to cheating in this treaty is very high as the treaty itself is unable to hold actors accountable for not following its terms. Actors do not risk high consequences of their actions if they do not follow the treaty, and many of them cheat because they do not have the capacity or resources to do so, as well as it is usually in their interest. The institutional design of this human rights treaty is weak because the less powerful members must be convinced to participate, and are rather free to cheat, ending up with members cheating and leaving the international problem up for the participating actors.
Human rights issues are often brought to international attention through transnational advocacy networks. These transnational networks make progress by advocating to their government with hopes to bring enough attention to the issue that their state calls for action, and in turn pushes for other states to take action. Advocacy is important, however in the case of the UN AIDS Declaration, the countries that are most affected by the issue are not in the treaty and are have difficulty mobilizing internally. The UNAIDS states in a press statement:
The Political Declaration recognizes the importance of location and population,
as the epidemic is distinctive in each country and region and encourages
regional action and accountability by setting regional targets on prevention and treatment for children, young people and adults… The Political Declaration, however, fails to bring the needed visibility to key populations most affected in different regions.
For example, the best form of preventing unwanted pregnancies is through preventative education and contraceptive options. Planned Parenthood is one of the United States biggest providers of reproductive health care and also advocate for HIV education in the United States. They state in their 2016-2017 Annual Report:
Planned Parenthood is expanding access to HIV prevention, education, and services —
including pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP)… Planned Parenthood is partnering with the Black AIDS Institute, a national organization with the mission of stopping the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Black communities by engaging and mobilizing Black institutions and individuals.
In relation to the UN AIDS Declaration, these national resources do not reach the world’s most HIV/AIDS-vulnerable places, and they must rely on international help. The AIDS-plagued countries cannot afford the resources necessary to make a big impact on the issue. The treaty is less effective as it is unlikely that member countries will most likely cheat as they do not see benefits of investing in another countries public health. If countries do follow the treaty, they will most likely looking out for the public health of their own nation before another. For example, the Philippines is going into an HIV/AIDS crisis and is calling out for education and resources. According to UNAIDS, “December 1 was marked as the World AIDS Day. As of 2017, UN AIDS recorded an estimated 68,000 Filipinos diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, with an average of 32 new diagnoses a day.” (UNAIDS, 2017) If vulnerable countries do not get education or resources, the public health issue will remain a problem and inevitably grow into a harder one to solve.
With an arguably more effective problem structure, The INF Treaty is more transparent than the UN AIDS Declaration. The INF Treaty has provisions that make the U.S. and Soviet Union less likely to engage in “bad” behavior due to its strict and thorough approach to the problem. The actors in the INF are of much importance in security issues because very few states have nuclear power or the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons. In the case of the INF Treaty and security issues in general, if either party cheated, the treaty would irrecoverable, leaving the problem with a low tolerance for cheating. With security issues, there is high incentive to cheat due to how beneficial it would be for an actor to keep weapon development going. In the case that the INF treaty is called off due to cheating, the problem of rapid nuclear weapons development continues to be a problem. In reference to the security problem structure, Professor Mitchell states that there are, “Strong incentives to make a response but not to reinforce the agreement but to respond to the threat. Can’t target response at single country (weapons threaten all). Nuclear: not tolerant at all. (Lecture #5) Due to the high stakes of security treaties, negotiating an international organization is very systematic and transparent. However, there is a difference between chemical weapons, biological hazards, and small weapons versus nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons threaten the safety of the whole world and therefore the problem structure of the INF Treaty is very disciplined in order to maintain full transparency.
In most security treaties and in particularly the case of the INF, there are explicitly listed expectations of how states must act in regards to the handling, production, and existence of missiles and missile equipment. Actors must cooperate in order to maintain compliance of the treaty. In order to enforce cooperation, in the INF each state is able to conduct inspections on one another to ensure full transparency. The INF also requires data updates from both parties in order to make sure that both sides are making an honest progress in decreasing the missile threat/tensions. Information/knowledge is a very important aspect when it comes to INF because the actors involved are able to keep records to make sure the agenda of the treaty is being abided by. Harald Müller explains the risk that comes with security treaties and potential cheating:
Falling victim to surprise may be fatal, while deception is a useful instrument to achieve
surprise. Taking information by a potential enemy at face value, then, is a treacherous endeavour. The intention could be sincere, but false information could also be conveyed – pretending, for example, to be weaker or stronger than one really is may lull the ‘cooperation partner’ into complacency, or it may intimidate him into surrender and the acceptance of an unequal distribution of the gains cooperation. Countries considering security cooperation know this danger; they know the other side knows; they know the other side knows they know, and so on. (614)
In the case of the INF Treaty, there is a very systematic and strict approach that both actors are abiding by. This international organization is programmatic as everything is laid out in the treaty and the terms are clear, leaving no room for interpretation. There are deadlines for when nuclear weapon development must be stopped by, quotas to how many nuclear weapons must be eliminated by, and a program which ensures compliance of
the provisions within the treaty.