Introduction
The war in Syria has started in 2011 since then many non-state and state actors were active in the conflict. One of these actors involved is Turkey, the state that links the Middle East with Europe. This essay will explore the Turkish involvement in Syria by providing an answer to the research question, to what extent can the involvement of Turkey in the war in Syria be explained from a realist perspective of IR?
First, sufficient background on the Syrian conflict and Turkish involvement in the conflict will be provided. That chapter will provide a general overview of the Syrian conflict, a brief summary of Turkish interventions and background on possible motives for the Turkish involvement. Next, the analytical lens through which the Turkish motives to act in the conflict will be analyzed is introduced. The theory of realism within international relations and more specific structural, offensive and defensive realism will be explained. An analysis of Turkish actions in Syria from the structural realist perspective will follow. Finally, the conclusion provides a concise answer to the research question.
Background
Subsequently to the Arab Spring in 2011, a civil war in Syria evolved. This started with peaceful protest but soon turned to violent uprisings opposing the regime, Assad’s regime. The different international actors involved in the conflict make the situation more complex. Iran and Assad support the government, on the other hand, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey support rebel groups. Since the rise of ISIS in 2013, the Syrian conflict caught the interest of the U.S. led coalition. Since 2015 they conduct air strikes to support rebel groups fighting ISIS (CFRa, 2018).
Turkey’s interventions
Turkey has been involved in the conflict since the very first. In 2011 they helped the Free Syrian Army to become more prominent in the fight by training and sheltering its fighters (Guardian, 2012). Furthermore, Turkish forces started their first ground offensive in 2015 with ‘Operation Shah Euphrates’ (BBC, 2015). Although this was a small intervention it was soon followed up by the much larger ‘Operation Euphrates Shield’ That was miniated to protect border security and face the threats ISIS were posing (Ülgen & Kasapologlu, 2017). However, mostly Kurdish targets and not ISIS objectives were targeted (Pastore, 2018). In 2017 Turkey, together with Iran and Russia, participated in the Astana agreements. These agreements led to an operation named ‘Idlib De-escalation Control Force’, in which Turkey set up de-escalation zones in the region of Idlib. Since this year Turkey has been involved in ‘Operation Olive Branch’ (Özkizilick, 2018).
Motive: ISIS
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was on the rise in 2014 and in June of that year they declared a caliphate in Syria. At first, the stance of Turkey towards ISIS was not as negative as other western states. The government tolerated and even facilitated ISIS to grow on Turkish territory. This was mostly due to internal power struggles in Turkey. However, the fact that ISIS targeted Kurdish forces in Syria was a beneficial factor to the ISIS-Turkey relations (Yayla, 2017). However, Turkey still claims to fight ISIS and suggests being the driving power behind ISIS diminishing (Yayla & Clarke, 2018).
Motive: the Kurds
Turkey has a long-lasting and difficult relationship with the Kurds. Since mid-1980’s the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group labelled as a terrorist group by the Turkish government, has been actively fighting for an independent Kurdish state. This was mostly done by carrying deadly attacks. The People’s Protection Unit (YPG) is the main Kurdish actor in Syria and is the militant wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) which on its turn is affiliated with the PKK. However, since the Syrian conflict the Kurds and the Syrian government have a common enemy, ISIS. Both the YPG and the Turkish government, although this is contested, have been combating ISIS inside Syria (CFRb, 2018).
Motive: Arab Spring
In 2011 a wave of protests raged through the Arab world and regimes in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt were overthrown. For Turkey this was a rather unexpected move in neighbouring countries. However, at the end of 2011 polls suggested that Turkey was the so-called ‘winner of the Arab Spring’. Most citizens were in favour of the Turkish government. The Turkish government had different techniques in coping with the uncertainty that the Arab Spring brought in the region. More of which will be explored in the analysis.
Analytical lens
This paper will use a lens to analyse Turkish involvement in the Syrian conflict. The lens used will be an international relation one, and even more specifically structural realism. In order to effectively carry out an analysis, this chapter will elaborate on realism, structural realism and the two main theories within it, defensive and offensive realism.
Realism is one of three main theories used in international relations. The main assumptions of realism include an international system that is labelled as anarchic, power is a critical feature within this system, state actors are the key actors, these actors are seen as rational and there is a risk of war present at all times. Within the theory of realism, there are two main sub-theories, structural and motivational realism. The main difference between structural and motivational realism is that in the former power is seen as a necessity to ensure security; in the latter, power is seen as an end state (Collins, 2016).
Within the sub-theory of structural realism, there are two main sub-theories, defensive and offensive realism. The main thinker on defensive realism is Kenneth Waltz. Within defensive realism the security dilemma is a main argument, this differentiates security-seeking states from greedy states. If one state knows that another state is solely ‘security-seeking’ it will not feel insecure. When a state, however, might act as a ‘greedy state’ and has capabilities to harm the other state it will feel the insecurity. Furthermore, defensive realism explains that states will only act against treats and not to maximize their power (Collins, 2016).
Opposing defensive realism, and part of structural realism too is offensive realism. The main scholar on offensive realism is John Mearsheimer. According to offensive realism, states attempt to ensure as much power as possible. This is, opposed to motivational realism, not because they strive to gain power as an end, but rather as a way to defend the state from other states. State, nonetheless, have to be careful in obtaining more power as the balance of power is deemed crucial in offensive realism. Furthermore, in an uncertain situation states will assume the worst on the other states’ intentions (Collins. 2016).
Analysis
The acting of Turkey in the Syrian conflict was labelled in many different ways. Keyman, named they involvement ‘motivational realism’ (2017). Hinnebush even compared it to ‘western liberal imperialism’ (2015). This report argues that the Turkish policy in Syria reflects a structural realist approach. This argument will be backed by providing three cases, the actions of Turkey towards the Kurds, ISIS and during and after the Arab Spring. The stance towards the Kurds and ISIS can be labelled as a defensive realist approach and Turkish actions ensuing the Arab Spring can be classified as offensive realism.
The Kurds
The actions of Turkey towards the Kurds in Syria can, to a large extent, be labelled as defensive realism. According to the Turkish government, and most other western governments for that matter, the PKK is a terrorist organisation. The PKK on its turn is linked to the YPG, the armed force of the Kurds in Syria. When the YPG was surrounded by ISIS fighter during the siege of Kobani, a city on the Turkish/Syrian border, in 2014 Turkish forces did not intervene (CFRb, 2018). Intentions of the Kurds in Syria are however, not entirely clear, they cannot be labelled a ‘security-seeking actor’ or a ‘greedy actor’ since the creation of a Kurdish state in Syria might not only threaten the Turkish border but might also inspire Kurds residing inside Turkey. Therefore, Turkish actions with regards to the Kurds is security maximizing.
There is one limitation to the defensive realism explanation to the Turkish reaction to the Kurds. Realism focusses mostly on state actors and the Kurds are a stateless nation in Syria where they do not have an internationally recognized state.
ISIS
The acting of ISIS can be labelled as defensive realism. Keyman articulates the threats of ISIS as one of six security issues Turkey has to face (2017). The Turkish government however, harboured ISIS fighters and allowed them to organize themselves on Turkish territory (Yayla, 2017). This reflects difficulties in explaining the actions of the Turks towards ISIS. It however, sheds light on how the Turkish government uses ISIS to fight the Kurds (Yayla, 2017). Because ISIS was acting in Syria and had a common (sub-) goal as Turkey did, the Turks did not act. Therefore, Turkey can be labelled as a security-seeking state.
As with the Kurdish situation, the policy of Turkey towards ISIS cannot be fully explained by defensive realism. Since realism focusses mostly on state actors, and ISIS is not a state.
One other aspect of the Turkish fight on ISIS is that they often claim to fight the terrorist organisation, whereas, in reality, they are fighting Kurdish militias. This too can be demonstrated by the fact that ISIS is not almost completely diminished in Syria, however, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in Turkey at the beginning of 2018. This might reflect a changing approach of Turkey towards the Kurds.
Arab Spring
As stated above the actions of Turkey during and after the Arab Spring in the Arab region can be classified as offensive realism. First of all, the Arab Spring created an uncertain situation for Turkey. According to Keyman not only ISIS is an existential threat to Turkey, but he also claims that both the ‘failed states’ in the region, Syria and Iraq, and the new geopolitical power divisions in the region for threat for Turkish security (2017). The relations between Turkey and Syria were good at the initiation of the Arab Spring, however, when the tide turned for the Syrian regime, Turkey started supporting rebel groups within Syria and urged president Assad to step down. The behaviour of Turkey towards the Syrian conflict changed in light of the changing future of the conflict. Turkey attempted to support the most viable victor of the Syrian conflict (Yakis, n.d.). The turn in Turkish policy towards the regime demonstrates that Turkey is attempting to gain more influence in Syria after the conflict has resolved. However, without the uncertain times, the Arab Spring brought this might not have happened. Therefore, Turkish policy regarding the Arab Spring and changing power relations in the region can be labelled offensive realism.
Conclusion
Turkey has been involved in the Syrian conflict since the beginning, it has done so in different manners. From financing rebels to interventions by Turkish forces. There are different motives that can be deducted from the involvement. In finding an answer to the research question ‘to what extent can the involvement of Turkey in the war in Syria be explained from a realist perspective of IR?’ three motives were further explored.
The situation with the Kurds, ISIS and Arab Spring can all, to some extent, be labeled as structural realism. Both the situation with the Kurds and ISIS can be seen as defensive realism, however, realism focusses mostly on state actors and both these groups are, arguably, not state actors. Besides the Kurds and ISIS, the events following the Arab Spring can be, to the full extent, be classified as offensive realism.
The future for Turkish involvement will be highly interesting since ISIS is now nearly defeated in Syria. however, Turkish forces launched a new offensive in Syrian territory this year. The intentions behind this reaction is still unclear and may be uncovered in the near future.
Information for this research was provided by both academic sources and gray literature. The usage of the latter literature was a necessity since the Syrian conflict is still a contemporary conflict. Therefore, academic sources are not yet available on all aspect of the conflict.