What is the first thought that comes to mind when one thinks about Colombia? Its diverse landscape, filled with pristine beaches and the lush of the Andes may come to mind, but also the corruption that has ensued its government for the past century, and countless drug wars are incidents that will never be forgotten. Colombia has been defined by its rich population of the cocoa plant, which can be refined into what we know as cocaine. Production of cocaine in Colombia peaked in the late 1980’s to early 1990’s, as the Cali Cartel, located in Cali, Colombia expanded their business to Europe, smuggling hundreds of tons of cocaine overseas every year, while laundering billions of dollars in drug proceeds. Known most notably for their presence in Season 3 of the Netflix Original, Narcos, while they spent about $1,000 US dollars to refine one kilo of cocoa, this kilo was sold for about $70,000 in cocaine hotspots, such as Miami, New York, and Barcelona. The drug empire was producing more income for themselves annually than the entire Colombian GDP (“Cali Cartel: The New Kings of Cocaine”). I became especially interested in this topic after participating in the ‘Cali Cartel Committee’ at a Georgetown University Model United Nations. I represented Pacho Herrera, one of the leaders of the cartel as we discussed issues on how to curb the drug war. Clear that the only way the Cali Cartel was able to export billions of dollars’ worth of cocaine was to get on the same side of the government, I wondered what exactly gave them so much power and influence amongst the government. This led me to my research question: How did the Cali Cartel Influence Intergovernmental Organizations in Order to Freely Export Their Product During the 1990’s? This essay will be narrowed specifically to discuss the Cali Cartel, and their influence on the police force, the branches of political government, and political elections in order to conveniently fit the word limit. There are also references to the saying plata o plomo (silver or lead), and comparing the Cali Cartel to Escobar and the Medellin Cartel’s corruptive practices, to provide an alternative lens. My thesis will be stated as so: The Cali Cartel created a non-violent relationship with the police force unlike other cartels, led their own people to be elected into powerful government elections in order to gain information about opposition tactics, as well as donated large sums of money to political campaigns in order to create leverage against political individuals.
The Influence of the Cali Cartel on the Police Force
In 1994, a senior official in the Clinton administration told the Time Magazine that Colombia was at a high risk of entering what was known as ‘narcodemocracy’. The most important step for the Cali Cartel was to get the law enforcement on their side in order to peacefully export their goods and services (Brooke. “Cali, the 'Quiet' Drug Cartel, Profits by Accommodation”). Resistance from the police force during the movements of their cocaine supply would cause the cartel to retaliate, which would create bloodshed that the drug lords did not want to be responsible of. Herrera, and the Orejuela twins especially were wary of not having any blood on their hands. Reasoning for this was particularly in case they were ever to be caught, they wanted a minimal sentence, without extradition to the United States. This is opposite of the chaos that was created by the Medellin Cartel, run by the infamous Pablo Escobar Gaviria, who awarded Colombian citizens a $4,000 USD bounty for every officer shot and killed (Lane). This way of doing business with the police was known as plata o plomo, which is translated as ‘silver or lead’. Robert C. Bonner, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration at the time, said from Washington, “In Medellin, the cartel competed with the state. In Cali, there has been a process of accommodation with the state” (Brooke. “Cali, the 'Quiet' Drug Cartel, Profits by Accommodation”). This way of winning over the police was known as ‘narcodemocracy’, a term highlighted by a senior official in the administration of President Bill Clinton when speaking to the Time Magazine in 1994. This is defined as the corruption of social institutions of democratic countries by wealthy drug corporations (Avilés, 34). This is exactly what the Cali cartel was known to do. Below is a flow chart, comparing the Medellin and Cali Cartel’s influence in Colombian corruption. In order to win over every cop in the Republic of Colombia, the kingpins needed money, which they had. This is exactly why the Cali Cartel was so persistent with their drug trade until the American DEA came in; there was no hostility from the police. They primarily used two ways to buy out the police. Firstly, they made large donations to the police programs in order to persuade the police, and trust that their corporations acted in good faith. Secondly, those who remained suspicious or did not oblige to suspend investigations against the cartel were bribed quite generously to keep quiet. This allowed the ‘Cali family’ to assert their own power and dominance over the generals and officers.
The first point starts all the way back to 1993, the time of the fall of the Medellin Cartel. Pablo Escobar, the cartel’s leader was shot and killed that year on December 2nd, which quickly led to the dismemberment of the drug organization as a whole (McFadden). The Cali Cartel was a major player in allowing the police to locate and take down Escobar. In fact, a mid-level member in the cartel addressed a New York Times reporter, asserting that the Cartel “paid $5 million every two months to Los Pepes”, the death squad that was in charge of hunting Pablo Escobar down. In this report, he also assured that in doing this, the Cali Cartel was “helping the Government with intelligence” (Woody). While the Cartel was providing a generous sum to keep the program funded, they were also a secret messenger, providing the government with clues as to what Mr. Escobar’s next step may be. According to a drug expert, by that time, the Cali Cartel already had all the power it needed. “The Cali cartel is bigger than anyone gives it credit," an American drug expert said in Bogota. "Their political and economic influence is unprecedented. They have complete control of the city. They have bought the majority of the cops. If the cabdrivers at the airport see anyone suspicious, they call a special number and get several thousand pesos. There isn't a politician in the Valle del Cauca who isn't on the payroll or intimidated.” ("Drug Spotlight Falls on an Unblinking Cali Cartel”).
Going all the way back to the support of Los Pepes, it is a bold yet intelligent move for the cartel to provide monetary support to police programs of this such, not only to take down their opponent without killing him themselves, but dissembling their cartel by sailing under these false colors. By providing generous funding to the police in this matter, they are essentially playing as the wolf in sheep’s skin, winning over the favorability of the police. This essentially allowed them to get a leg up in their industry; if it came down to the police catching them red-handed exporting cocaine, they would surely turn a blind eye. Without the support of the Cali Cartel, it was possible that much of the police force would risk losing their jobs, as economic instability in Colombia at the time account for inability to fund many organizations. This created quite a foe for the Colombian Government when the federal officials decided it was time to dismantle the cartel. There was no provincial support, because everyone was working for the cartel.
The next point regarding bribes is an interesting case. As the cartel grew, so did its expenses. By 1989, the DEA estimated that the Cali cartel was paying a CNP private about $1,550 per week, a captain about $5,000 per week and a general about $15,000 per week. While this was an expensive feat for its leaders, it was deemed necessary in order to continue operations on the ridiculously large scale that the cartel had been running at, both domestically and internationally (Chepesiuk). With this in mind, those members of the Colombian National Police force who were honest, were wary of the fact that they were unsure if their corrupted counterparts would sell them out to the cartel or not. They kept in mind what happened to honest police in Medellin during Escobar’s time. An anonymous CNP agent had this to say about officers killed by Escobar. “Escobar paid two, three million pesos for each agent’s head. Many of the policemen working in the Medellin command would sell the addresses of their own partners. And the hit men would show up and kill them and their family members.” (Mills). This sense of unknowing of whether their lives were at risk or not led many members of the Cali police force to take these bribes when approached by members of the cartel. The Cali Cartel, however, rarely had to resort to bribery amongst the police force as their trust and support was already achieved by the funding of police programs such as Los Pepes, and government based organizations, such as the Cali Municipal Police Department. In fact, during a Colombian Search Bloc that took place during the pursuit of Cali Cartel member Miguel Rodriguez, a document that contained over 2,800 politicians, governors, and other government officials found that only 64 were police officers (Llorente, 118).
Relating back to the original thesis, it is evident that the Cali Cartel did not follow the tracks that were made by the Medellin Cartel, rather made it in the industry using their own ways, a form of corruption that did not promote violence, rather by paying the police force off, they were able to get their way through general checkpoints, or other situations involving law enforcement.
Influence on Politicians
While the Cali Cartel did keep close attention to its influence and control of the police force, it was arguably a miniscule form of control compared to that of their effect on the Colombian political branches. Governors, congressmen, and attorney general’s all had a price tag on themselves that the Cali Cartel was able to double, or even triple. The ways the Cali Cartel decided to take this route were by creating leverage over politicians by placing them on their payroll, similar to that of their impact on the police force. They would also elect their own individuals in political roles, and bribe certain congressmen to vote against the Extradition Act the United States desperately proposed the Republic of Colombia passed, which would allow the United States to hold all convicted prisoners from the drug wars in a US Federal Prison.
Establishing political leverage was arguably one of the most important tasks for the Cali Cartel. They were certain they were going to be captured at some point, the only question was when. The top leaders made it imperative they were going to have a future after their sentencing; living and easy life for a few years in a Colombian prison and soon thereafter, returning to their fortune was the idealistic dream. In fact, over 40% of the Cali Cartel’s income was redirected to politicians that were on their payroll (Saab, & Taylor, 466). A crystal-clear example of how they dominated the political circle with a few billion dollars. The Rodriguez brothers are two examples of drug lords who did exactly just that. When they were convicted for their crimes in 1997, Gilberto was sentenced to ten and a half years, and Miguel was sentenced to nine. This was due to the original deals made with congressmen, the Colombian Attorney General, and others who were handling the plea bargaining with their lawyers. Where they have been incarcerated looked more like an upscale apartment, rather than a prison. The prisoners have cellphones, a cable television, and drink upscale scotch, particularly due to the corrupt prisoner system that Colombia also possesses ("In case of extradition of drug trafficker from Colombia…”).
If the Cali Cartel wanted to be certain of the establishment in the government, which ultimately gained them that leverage, they needed some of their own to be present in the higher power, working out deals for them in exchange for a cut in the continued growth in the industry. The cartel had no problem doing in bringing these people forward. According to Prosecutor General Alfonso Valdivieso, 178 congressmen were under investigation for drug corruption, most of which whom were arrested. Most notably, the Colombian Minister of National Defense, Fernando Botero Zea, was indicted and sentenced to 63 months in prison for illicit wealth gain in favor of third parties, collecting over 800 million pesos from the Cali Cartel. He served 30 months and was released on February 12, 1998. Furthermore, according to a NACLA report regarding Valdivieso’s discoveries, “One government minister and the previous Attorney General were behind bars. The Minister of the Interior, the Foreign Secretary, and the Minister of Communications were charged with complicity amongst members of the Cali Cartel. The Comptroller General and several army generals were reportedly denied visas to the United States allegedly for drug-related activities. The Commander-in-Chief of the army was forced, under U.S. pressure, to retire.” (Carrigan, 7). These men were principally convicted of ‘Illicit Enrichment’, which is what caused these leaders of political, as well as criminal enterprises to be incarcerated. However, the Colombian Senate soon thereafter attempted to decriminalize this offense by framing the crime to rather be a misdemeanor, which meant it cannot be charged unless there was commission of a felony.
It is quite evident these men were all bought and paid for by the Cali Cartel themselves. They became a part of the cartel, knowingly or unknowingly. By working with these individuals, they were able to have a say in political legislations created, to be certain everything was working in their favor. The senate’s decision to force ‘illicit enrichment’ as a misdemeanor is only yet another example of how the Cali Cartel used bribes to get the power they wanted. It would be difficult for them to have any sort of political influence if their men were in prison, which is why it was essential for them to pay off these senate votes.
The Laws on Extradition are very strict between a Colombian drug lord and an American jail. Pablo Escobar famously once quoted, “I’d rather have a bullet in my head and lie in a Colombian grave, than spend my life in an American jail.” (Ross). A drug dealer who exports more than 5 kilograms of their product into the United States at any point in time makes them eligible for extradition into the United States, because they are violating 21 U.S.C. [section] 963 of the American Criminal Code. (“Catalogue of Cases Involving Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and Other Forms of International Legal Cooperation Requested on the Basis of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”). The Cali Cartel, if extradited to the United States, would be faced with the harshest sentencing possible. They knew they were going to be convicted, which is why they ensured the Extradition Act would not be upheld in Colombia before they surrendered. They bought over congressmen to force them to vote against the treaty. In fact, they spent up to $25,000 per vote in Congress to try to block the extradition treaty being asked for by Washington (Jordan). Due to the consistent pressure placed by the Cali Cartel, the Extradition Treaty in Colombia was not passed by the Colombian Chamber of Representatives until December 17, 1997, over a year after the leaders of the Cali Cartel were captured. (Avilés, 39). While many wanted the Rodriguez brothers to be extradited to the United States for trial, the new law approved by congress stipulated that all crimes committed before the date of approval by Colombian nationals were not eligible to be considered under this new law. The cartel members were to stay in a Colombian prison, under the deals that were made previously amongst other Colombian politicians, such as the Attorney General of the Republic of Colombia.
This is a perfect example of how the Cali Cartel influenced their power in political branches using bribery. No violent crimes or dangerous acts were committed, rather under the table deals were used to make sure they got what they wanted, arguably similar to what happens in any political system around the world. Bribery is not nearly as punishable of a crime as murder is, and these leaders were well aware of this. Bringing this point back to the thesis, this case of using congressmen to influence the Extradition Treaty is a textbook example using money to create power, and gain their own political leverage.
Another interesting point about this particular lens on the matter is how Pablo Escobar ran for congress, and got elected because he paid everybody off to vote for him. He couldn’t even make it one month without the entire Colombian Congressional Committee looking into his connection with drugs, many researchers call it ‘the stupidest thing he did in his reign, which was the main thing that lead up to his death’. The Cali Cartel didn’t work that way, exposing the power in such an abusive manner. Rather, they let the professionals do the job: half of which was for the government, the other half for the cartel.
Influence on Political Elections
Those who study Colombian political history will almost immediately recognize the ‘narco-cassettes’. Just 48 hours before Ernesto Samper was elected president of Colombia, recordings tapped by the Drug Enforcement Agency surfaced. These recordings were telephone conversations between the Cali cartel's Rodriguez Orejuela and a journalist who was the "bag-man" for Samper election-campaign officials. These conversations discussed dealings between the cartel, and the administration for the new Colombian president. This ensued an entire investigation against Samper, which proved dealings made with the cartel: cash for political leverage and leniency on regulations imposed against cartels. This exposed the Colombian government, and created a lot of distrust between the people, and their own elected politicians. The entire Republic was at risk of crumbling down. This is yet another example of how the Cali Cartel was diplomatic in the controlling approach to rule their empire. Unlike the Medellin Cartel’s overt influence in politics, the Cali Cartel were more discreet in their approach to buying influence. Handling elections like this under the table not only greater leverage on politicians, but gave them a larger playing field. They were owed favors from government officials for their generosity, which in turn led them to success: the government was literally on their side.
Research into the connection between the Cali Cartel and Ernesto Samper were led by the aforementioned Prosecutor General, Alfonso Valdivieso. The discoveries were shocking, yet predicted by Valdivieso. He went all the way back to 1982, when Samper worked as a campaign manager for Alfonso Lopez Michaelsen's second presidential bid. The prosecutor found out Samper arranged for a $300,000 donation from the Medellin cartel for the administration, while allowing for the free use of the Cali cartel Ochoa brothers' private fleet of airplanes. Samper's unlisted phone number was also found on the Cali cartel leader Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela’s cell phone when he was arrested in Madrid. This suggested that Samper and the Cali Cartel were involved in other negotiations. In 1989, an informant from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) also claimed to have witnessed a meeting between Samper and Call leaders Rodriguez Orejuela and Jose Santacruz Londono, from which the future president allegedly walked away with several briefcases stuffed with $300,000 in cash, presumably to use as election funds for his upcoming campaign (Carrigan, 9). Other sources suggest that the contributions by the Cali Cartel to Samper’s campaign were much greater than that, where CNN released articles saying over $6 million was donated to Samper’s administration. In return for the support of the cartel, Samper allegedly promised he would do “everything to get rid of extradition.” (“Alleged Drug Kingpin Arrives in U.S.”). With Samper being an extremely wealthy man who grew up in an extremely wealthy family, it is evident he had nothing to lose.
It can be argued that Ernesto Samper was a prospect of the Cali Cartel, and worked for them all along. When the Cali Cartel provided President Gaviria and his administration intelligence as to how the CNP would capture Pablo Escobar, they soon demanded their bill was for Gaviria to step down immediately. Soon thereafter, the 1994 election for president took place. Two men were in the running, Samper and anti-mafia crusader Luis Carlos Galan, who was also leader of the Liberal Party. Throughout the 1980s, as the drug cartels flourished and the killings escalated, Galan pressed his attacks on the corruption of his own political class. By the time he ran for the presidency in 1989, he had become a serious threat to the Cali Cartel’s encroaching grip on the Colombian political establishment. As a result, Galan was murdered on the campaign trail. Could this suggest that the cartel planned out Samper’s reign from early on? A man who wouldn’t fight, rather cut political deals was exactly who the Cali Cartel was looking for.
Analysis and Conclusion
The entire objective wraps around the fact that the Cali cartel was able to create so much leverage in the Colombian government through bribery. But the problem is that, just because the government, with support of the DEA was able to get rid of the Cali cartel, Colombia still remains to play a huge factor in the cocaine industry to this day. And, in cities like Cali and Medellin, there are tons of cocaine running through their underground refineries. Leading in to this, I ask myself, is there a way to actually end the war on drugs in countries like Colombia? I see this unfolding in 2 ways, either you just need to completely legalize it, which would then essentially create a trade embargo and complicate political ties with all G20 countries, especially the USA. Or, the government can create a middle class. Either people are fully loaded in these cities, or they are very poor. When they want to escape the poor, the easiest way, and sometimes the only way to evolve is through the drug industry. They can do this by finding a way to increase legal labor by creating more employment opportunities in these cities, preventing from people to turning to drugs as a last resort. They would do this by providing incentives to companies who have a proven track record to not have any association with drug trafficking campaigns. These incentives will encourage these firms to expand their businesses, and in turn, hire more people. There are also long-term solutions, such as improving educational services by implementing interventionist supply-side policies, which will invest in research, education and development. This would shift Colombia’s long-term aggregate supply of the entire economy. This means Colombia is using Government Intervention, using more resources to expand the supply of available investments in human capital, education, as well as the provision and maintenance of infrastructure. All social programs would essentially become better funded, while providing direct support to business, corporations, as well as industrial policies nationwide. In doing so, they will also be able to prepare Colombians for white collar jobs through providing a University education that is accessible for everyone, and not only the rich. By collaborating these ideas, and working with Non-Governmental Organizations, such as the United Nations to look for funding, there is a chance Colombia will have the opportunity to prosper as a country whose socioeconomic status is reflective of their prospering corporations, or their highly valued education systems. The people of Colombia first and foremost want peace, which will only occur once Colombia shuts down these drug lords and put an end to their drug wars; for a safer, and better Colombia.