President Woodrow Wilson detailed his idea of a ‘new world order’ in the Fourteen Points Address to Congress in January 8th 1918. Within this speech Wilson called for a League of Nations to unite the world under a new balance of power, ensuring peace and political independence for the oppressed European states. The Senate rejected the League of Nations in November 1919. The historian John Ikenberry leads the school of thought which blames Wilson for the United States’ decision to not participate in the League. The main factors that prevented the United States from entering the League included resistance in the Senate, the weaknesses of the treaty itself and the lack of interest by the general public. This essay will explore these issues and analyse to what extent Wilson is to blame for their manifestation.
Resistance in the Senate was fundamental to the United States not participating in the League of Nations. ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations’ was established in the first twenty-six clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson returned from Paris in February 1919, confident that he could submit the Treaty and Covenant to Congress and receive its ratification. He needed a senate two thirds majority coalition in favour of the treaty. Yet this was not achieved, as opposition had built within the Senate while Wilson had been away, with many bitter that he had refused to take any senators to the Paris Peace Conference to help with negotiations. The Senate became divided into roughly three positions regarding the Versailles Treaty. There were the Democrats who followed Wilson and supported the Treaty, the irreconcilables who were Republicans and Democrats bitterly opposed to the Treaty, and the largest group, reservationists. The reservationists comprised of mainly Republicans, and were led by Henry Cabot Lodge. They supported the League with reservations, or amendments, especially regarding the controversial Article X. Article X stated that in the event of external aggression to a League member, the other members had a ‘moral obligation’ to commit troops to help. Lodge and other reservationists voiced their fears of the League infringing upon the sovereignty of the United States. The United States traditionally held an isolationist position in world politics, and therefore this Article seemed radical and caused fear over the possibility of entanglement in one foreign war after another. Lodge and others maintained that only Congress should have the power to declare war. This Article was left deliberately vague by Wilson as a way for the United States to support the independence of the new states in Europe, without incurring strict military obligations. Nonetheless reservationist remained unconvinced, with Lodge saying that the vagueness of the Covenant could draw the United States, ‘…by a moral obligation into all the quarrels of Europe.’ Wilson attempted to emphasise the moral nature of this article, arguing that legally the United States could not be forced to join any war if Congress did not approve. He maintained that the new League of nations was nothing like the old world traditional alliances. To the Senate in May 1916 he said, ‘There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common peace.’ Often conventional historiography focuses on Wilson’s internationalism, by emphasising his idea of a ‘new world order.’ This can result in his reluctance of entanglement being overlooked. But from his address to the Senate it is evident that fundamental to Wilson’s League of Nations was the idea of the destruction of the old world alliances, and the League focusing on maintaining peace and allowing conciliation. Therefore, Wilson did not abandon all thoughts of traditional isolationism in the creation of the League. He kept the article purposely vague in order to convince the Senators that America could play a global role in peacekeeping without becoming entangled in the problems of Europe.
Unfortunately, Wilson was unsuccessful in his attempts. His arguments were often confusing as he was trying to affirm to both the conflicting views of isolationism and internationalism. He tried to defend Article X by stating it was moral and not legal agreement, but contradictorily stated that moral obligations are more binding than legal ones. Therefore, reservationists remained unconvinced about what Lodge called a ‘hopelessly loose and obscure’ covenant. They maintained that in order for the Treaty to be ratified, there needed to be amendments regarding Article X. Lodge drafted fourteen reservations that reduced the power the League would have over the United States. In November 1919, the Treaty had the best chance of getting ratified when the vote came on Lodge’s version of the Treaty. Reservationists and pro-treaty Democrats could form the majority needed. However, Wilson rejected these reservations and ordered his supporters to vote against it, saying that the League had to be embraced ‘whole-heartedly and unreservedly,’ or not at all. Enough Democrats followed Wilson that it fell short by a 55-39 vote. Many argue that Wilson’s failure to agree to negotiate the Treaty cost the United States their chance to participate in an international organisation for peace. One democrat said that Wilson ‘had sinned away [his] day of grace by refusing to compromise.’ Therefore, Wilsons’ vague Treaty and confusing arguments, and most importantly his lack of ability to agree to compromise, left the United States unable to participate in the League of Nations.
Another reason that Wilson can be blamed for the failure of the United States to join the League was due to his approach to the ‘irreconcilables,’ the group of Senators who were strongly opposed to the treaty. This group included both Democrats and Republicans, and according to Stone there were three factions within this group. The first group were strongly isolationist, and were opposed the treaty due to the loss of sovereignty they believed it entailed. The second were ‘realists’, who favoured a treaty of cooperation between the United States and European nations but believed that the League of Nations was too expansive. The third, ‘idealists,’ wanted a truly democratic League to be established, and argued that the League of Nations was not going to achieve this. These first two groups held some similar thoughts to the reservationists, however they were unwilling to accept a League even with amendments. Wilson went on tour in September 1919 as a last attempt to refute the resistance of the irreconcilables. However, the tour was a resounding failure, as Wilson both politically and physically deteriorated. During the end of the tour he was suffering memory lapses which made him appear to be deceiving the public and Congress. For example, he falsely claimed in his speeches that the British Empire would only have one vote on the Council of the League of Nations. When this lie was discovered, it weakened Wilson’s reputation further. A trip intending to increase support achieved little more than to create more resentment among the senators. As William Howard Taft noted, the tour 'weakened in some respects the support which he has heretofore had from the Republicans', driving 'the mild reservationists into the arms of the Republican reactionaries.’ Wilson had accidently pushed the people he needed most to support the League, the reservationists, into the arms of the irreconcilables, making it even harder to achieve the majority vote that was needed for the United States to join the League.
The third faction of irreconcilables formed a bloc called the peace progressives. They had an anti-imperialistic policy that advanced the left-wing alternative to the Wilsonian agenda. They maintained that Article XI, which stated that the League may take any action deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations, signified a victory for European imperialism. There were five Peace Progressives in the Senate by 1919, including La Follette who said that the League was ‘cunningly conceived’ to allow the Great Powers to intervene in the first act of revolution by Korea, Egypt, Ireland or India. One of the main questions they asked was why only league members might take advantage of Article XI’s provisions. They said that in all likelihood, it seemed that the Council would only organise League intervention if it was on behalf of the colonial. This was a cogent argument to imply that the League of nations was not going to be a fully democratic establishment. Many saw it as a contradiction that a ‘peaceful’ organisation was going to be led by imperial powers. To an extent Wilson aggravated these ideas. He was unable to address many of the arguments that the peace progressives highlighted, further bringing debate to what extent the ‘new world order’ was going to be like the old entangled alliances. Furthermore, while Wilson claimed that Article XI would ensure freedom for the oppressed people of Europe, he did not extend his attack on imperialism to Latin America, Africa or Asia. For them he recommended mandates or United States sponsored tutelage. This was a significant problem for many in the Senate, and marked the first substantial dispute within liberalism over US policy towards weaker states. Wilson’s comments simply hardened resolve among peace progressives that Article XI threatened the world-wide attack on imperialism. They criticised Wilson for pursuing different policies in different parts of the world. Wilson’s speeches and case that the League was centred around an organised common peace remained unconvincing to many of the irreconcilables. They had convincing arguments against the League, driving support away from it and preventing US to participate in what they saw as an undemocratic and imperialistic league.
John Ikenberry has a convincing argument when he says that Wilson was to blame for the lack of backing for the League by the Senate. Wilson clearly made many tactical errors when it came convincing the Senate to support the League. He made what Lodge called a ‘hopelessly loose and obscure’ Covenant even more confusing by changing his ideas about what a ‘moral obligation’ entailed, and leaving questions by the peace progressives unanswered. His attempt to bring back support during his September tour was ruined by his ill-health and his confusion, which caused more anger in the Senate towards Wilson. But the main failure of Wilson, according to Ikenberry, lies in his mind-set which refused for there to be any amendments to his treaty. His need for a global historical change therefore undercut an institutional agreement that was within his reach. Wilson left the pro-League Republicans alienated, driving them to support the Republican reactionaries instead. However, it is important to note that many historians agree Wilson was ‘ahead of his time’ when it came to his foreign policy, especially in regards of a league to enforce peace. Therefore, many such as John Milton Cooper argue that regardless of the actions of Wilson, this League would not have been accepted by the American people in this time. Cooper instead blames the lack of political support in America, but says that Wilsons ideology paved the way for the politics of the late twentieth century. Certainly it is fair to say that after World War Two the American people were a lot more willing to accept a similar treaty in the form of the United Nations, much of which ideology can be traced back to the idea of the League of Nations. However, this argument is less convincing than Ikenberry’s, as it disregards the important fact that Republican’s did support the creation of an international alliance with countries with common values, and they accepted that after the First World War the United States could no longer have an isolationist stance in world politics. It is highly significant that this Republican majority resulted in supporting the French Treaty, which was then able to achieve the majority needed for US participation. This implies that it was in fact Wilson’s fault that an agreement of ratification for the treaty was not achieved. Ikenberry is correct to assume that Wilson pursued the ideal of a new world order too much. The Senate preferred the French treaty instead of the vague commitment Article X provided to its commitment to peace. Historians such as James Hewes argue that Lodge was a more successful politician when it came to his foreign policy. He was able to appeal to the Senate with his rational approach to politics, whereas Wilson’s idealistic ‘new order’ proved to be too vague and unconvincing to win any substantial support.
Another reason for the failure of the United States participation in the League of Nations to pass through the Senate was the fact that the public were largely disinterested in the League. When it became apparent that the Senate were not going to approve of the Covenant, the President determined to go over the Senate’s head and appeal directly to the American people. Yet his September tour proved to be a failure. Many American’s disapproved the United States involvement in the First World War, and therefore they despised Article X of the League which threatened to entangle the US in even more foreign wars. The public understood the damaging economic and social effects of war, and remained sceptical by this Covenant which was ‘fraught with ambiguity’ over the issue.
Figure 1: The League of Nations by William McCay
Political cartoons represent American public opinion at the time, and show how opposition about the League was often portrayed. (Fig. 1) shows ‘Uncle Sam’ with his hands tied behind his back, being pulled in all directions by England, Japan, European nations and foreign nations, with rope labelled the league of nations. This implies that the public saw the League primarily as a tool for the European nations to entangle the United States in their affairs. It would result in a loss of American freedom, as the Uncle Sam figure is bound up and unable to any sovereign choice over which direction he wants to go in. This was a common impression held by the general public at this time, as for many the aftermath of World War One showed that the entrenched tradition of isolationism was safer than risking more American lives and money in wars that did not concern them. Therefore, the President would have a difficult talk in trying to convince the public that the League would be a success, and after his detrimental September tour it was certain that he was unable to sway public opinion. The Treaty was therefore not able to go above the Senates head.
Furthermore, within the United States there were minority groups who were strongly opposed to the League. German Americans felt that the treaty was too harsh on Germany, and Irish Americans felt that the treaty was giving too much power to Britain. Wilson failed in any of his speeches to answer the question over the issue of Irish independence. Unfortunately for Wilson, the Irish American’s happened to be one of the most politically conscious minorities, and had wider influences in the Catholic church and the Democratic Party. There was an extensive publicity campaign for Irish self-determination, and public opinion swayed against the league as propaganda began to denounce the Covenant, as Reverend Gerald Treacy of Bostin College called it, “a league of defence for England.” During the Presidents tour in September, Irish anti-League advertisement preceded and followed him in every city. The Irish became a united bloc in opposition, and had the backing of significant resources. They had expert propagandists, financial support, skilled political manipulators and therefore became among the greatest opponents of the League. This led to Wilson’s campaign being weakened, and ultimately he was unable to find the support he needed from the people in order to take the League over the head of the Senate.
To conclude, the strongest response for why the United States did not participate in the League of Nations falls to John Ikenberry’s argument that Wilson was too idealistic. Although there was significant opposition to the League itself, from isolationists and those opposing its imperialist nature, there was a general consensus that the United States did need a treaty which was to protect Europe from future German aggression. It was therefore Wilson’s inability to convince both the public and senators to support his vague Article X, which led to many favouring the strong commitment of the French Treaty instead. It seems that if Wilson had agreed to the Lodge Reservations he could have gained a majority for the League through the Republican reservationists. Wilson’s ideology of what the League should be prevented him to agreeing to these amendments, which could have allowed American participation in a League, albeit one which was different to what Wilson intended the League of Nations to embody.