A no win presidency is characterized by many policies and issues which yield no desired positive results. The concept of the no-win presidency was described Light (1999) in his book The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice and from Kennedy to Clinton. A no win presidency is characterized by lack of success and growing frustration. The No win Presidency was common in the 1970s and was a result of a series of presidential misjudgments, as evident in the war in Vietnam and Watergate, and was motivated by a set of reactions by the Congress. It seems we are having some of these features today but the Congress is not overly responsive to all of the presidential judgments. "The most important of which were the War Powers Resolution and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act (Greenstein 1978)." Then it was noticeable in the manner the press covers the President, in the legislative process, and in the suggestion of one-term Presidents. "Presidents are increasingly caught in a political vise. They are cross-pressured from a number of angles with little opportunity for release."
An example indicated in the book is Carter's administration where an aide to president described the situation. He said every action taken has become no-win, involving many challenges, setbacks one after another. After a problem comes to another difficult problem, yet without a way to put an end to them. Comparing the reforms on Energy and welfare of Carter's administration to the Medicare of Kennedy and Education aid by Johnson's Aid, things seem to be in a difficult web. The aide continued by saying that there have been no significant changes in the office of the President, except for a new Office of Management and Budget, Domestic Council. The president is also said to be interacting "with the rest of Washington and the nation." The moments were characterized by less flexibility and more conflict. "Congress seems more hostile and confused; the public is uncertain. I simply think that it is more difficult to succeed now than in 1960. Lyndon Johnson would be a very frustrated President."
There are five trends that follow cause and effect phenomenon as regards domestic policy in the development of No win Presidency. The trends have fostered the creation of definite problems for the President including an increase in the cost of the presidential policy. The number one trend is the significant increase in competition in the Congress even at the scarce domestic agenda space. Congress became self-sufficient through its new information source; increased technical expertise, more staffs, and sufficient incentives to enable it to come up with its own agenda. This results in the President not have automatic access to the plans of the legislation anymore. "Whether the President is a Democrat or a Republican, the congressional system increasingly provides active competition for agenda space."
The number two trend is the continued fragmentation of the domestic policy process leading to an increase in legislative complexity. The White House is being frustrated by the emergence of subcommittee government in Congress -enactment of laws by the legislation needs to be scrutinized at certain levels (Patterson 1978). The legislative complexity is limiting the ability of the President to have a say on the outcomes. The third trend is the Presidents being faced with the loss of influence in Congress. "The White House can no longer rely on the President's party to produce the margin of support in either Congress or the electorate. The parties have been drowned out in the nominating process, and they have lost considerable cohesion in Congress." An example is the inability of Carter to achieve the passage of his domestic program despite having significant congressional majorities in 1977, which is actually close to Lyndon Johnson's 1965 margins.
The fourth trend is a result of lack of trust in government by the people. Presidents are mandated to work in an environment of increasing surveillance. Public distrust did not disappear in the post-Watergate era and the Congress is being careful of whom to choose as president. The fifth trend which is the greatest is the changes in domestic issues. Some of the plans and reforms of Carter did not work according to the traditional political framework. "The changes in the pool of issues reflect an increase in what King (1978) calls the atomization of politics." There was a need for the presidents to improve their legislative coalitions as a result of the decrease in federal resources. "The price of domestic policy success has gone up, while presidential influence has not."
Looking at the five trends described by Light (1999), we can see that not all of them are a part of the current administration. So we cannot really say that we are in the era of the no-win presidency. However, looking at the consequences of a no-win presidency with a perspective of what needs to be done, we can have the points further noted by Light (1999). Since one of the outcomes of the no-win presidency is increased congressional complexity and competition, presidents need to plan to seek legislative enactments. Choosing between reelection and the implementation of good policies is inevitable (Light 2004).
The first strategy called "move it or lose it" involves the acceptance that the legislative cannot be overly depended on, hence Presidents are to forget about the evaluation of alternatives but need to search for one that will provide the means to working policies. It was said that Nixon and Carter used the same strategy with welfare reform. It was clear that Carter was a beneficiary of the actions of Nixon, making his welfare reform to strike a similar chord in Congress as it was almost the same with the Family Assistance Plan of Nixon in 1969.
Since one of the consequences of the no-win presidency is decreasing influence, the second strategy known as Learning must wait should be adopted. It has been said that there is no sufficient time for the president to begin to learn while it is time to act as people cannot wait to have working policies. Success is only achievable in the no-win presidency when an "on-the-job-training" strategy is adopted. Also since it is characterized by increasing competition in Congress and complexity, a quick response of White House is essential. Although the making of policy mistakes is inevitable, yet the cost of waiting to learn might be too costly. Hence, Presidents need to evaluate the risks involved and determine "whether hastily packaged programs violate the search for a good policy." The presentation of the domestic agenda can come first with the assumption that the programs will work.
Another consequence is that no-win presidents will have to go for the first alternative in the search for domestic alternatives, having formed certain requirements for adoption. "Presidents increasingly demand that new programs have zero fiscal costs- Carter's 1978 urban-assistance package is an example." Presidents end up requiring a minimum potential for passage and minimal workability. The presidents in a no-win situation do not look for other alternatives once the first is in line with the search criteria. However, this will have an impact on the national policy process, as the first alternative is not always the best. It does not allow innovation and requires compromise and continuous adjustments (Edwards and Barrett 2000).
Innovation is always absent in no-win situations. Here comes the issue of "President Proposes, Congress Disposes." There is a limitation on the innovations presidents can bring on. This is because it has become costly to innovate over the years, thereby giving little opportunity for leaving Presidents to create new ideas. Hence, what we have is the encouragement to go for the available programs, not the novel solutions. Since the no-win situation is characterized by increased competition and complexity, the outcome is costly political innovation. Time is wasted by the Presidents to develop new ideas.
Details are always lacking in the no-win presidency, especially in the allocation of personal resources. It was said that one of the mistakes of Carter's presidency came from his desire to be fully involved in the details of policy. "Carter wanted to delve into the specifics of each agenda choice: to review the budget for accuracy, not substance." The results of his desire led to wastage of scarce resources, thereby leaving the staff to its own devices. Specifically, the details of the formulation of policies are not always known in a no-win presidency.
Second term ambition is crucial in a no-win presidency. Presidents are concerned with reelection before good policies in the first term without regard for the normative implications. Reelection must be the President's top priority in the first term. Although it is not bad, yet it is linked with good policies. Light (1999) opined that "recent changes in the pool of domestic issues may have heightened the conflict between reelection and good policy." An example is the tactics of Kennedy in finding good policy as motivated by reelection bid in 1961. Some of his policies that increased public approval and were Education aid, Medicare, area redevelopment and tax reform (Edwards 1983).
In conclusion, although there are certain disagreements between the stand of the legislative and the presidency on domestic and international issues in this era, we cannot say that we are in the era of the no-win presidency as the features described above are not overly visible.