Aristotle defines nature as ‘an inner principle of change and stasis’. To understand what Aristotle means with the term change in that sentence, we have to begin with his response to Parmenides’ argument against the possibility of change. Afterwards, we can move onto the question of Aristotle’s definition of change in Physics III.1.
The greek philosopher gives his response to Parmenides again in his writing ‘Physics’, he begins by summarising it and the idea of this argument seems to be: in a case of coming to be, the resulting object is clearly a being, something that is. But then, from what initial object does it come to be? Parmenides offers us just two possibilities: either what is or what is not. However, if the initial object is what is, and the resultant object is also what is, we don’t really have a case of coming to be, in other words, there is no change. And if the initial object is what is not, we have another kind of impossibility, for nothing can come to be from what is not. Below, in the first part of my essay I am going to develop in more details the argument and the answer of Aristotle, along with the example of another pre-socratic philosopher. Then, I will tackle the possible errors, mostly contest related, made by Parmenides and show how the Aristotle’s elements of change not only prove the Parmenidean argument wrong, but also limiting in its conceptualisation of change.
Before dealing with the Parmenidean argument and the response of Aristotle, it is necessary to make a premise about the thoughts of Aristotle regarding the approach to the analysis of the nature of change, in point of fact he is very clear about the contest: “The first of those who studied philosophy were misled in their search for truth and the nature of things by their inexperience, which as it were thrust them into another path.”
Parmenides, along with his pre-Socratic fellows who first attempted to philosophise about the nature and truth of things, found himself driven off course by inexperience. Either in the case of things coming to be from something and of things coming to be from nothing, Parmenides rejects the possibility of a mutation in the elements of a thing which could lead to a change in the thing itself, being them qualitative or quantitative.
However, considered his context, his refusal of any conceptualisation of change does not sound odd at all, in particular readers have to keep in mind that he understands singularities as wholly separated, therefore for him nothing can come to be, since things are not connected with each other, they can not come to be as a result of a change in status of another thing.
The fallacy of Melissus, of which Aristotle talks about in the first book, shows another case in which change is completely cut out of the reasoning: ‘what has come into being always has a beginning’ Melissus says, statement which should have justified the assumption ‘what has not come into being has no beginning’, but it is absurd that in every case there should be a beginning of the thing as if change never took place suddenly. Moreover, there is no explanation coming from this reasonings for which the being is motionless and no reason why qualitative change is impossible.
If compared with the argument of Parmenides, it is clear to Aristotle that his and Melissus hold the same issue: Parmenides argument is, in fact, wrong in its premises and false in its conclusions which do not follow from the formers, his assumption that one is used in a single sense only is false, because it is used in several, therefore the conclusion doesn’t flow.
To expand into more details, what is wrong with those arguments is the concept a priori: on the contrary of that stated by Parmenides and his fellow, there is nothing that can exist separately, over and above a thing. Further, it is necessary for his argument to assume that ‘being’ has the same meaning, of whatever is predicated, but that it means what just is and what is just one. The subject to which being is attributed will not be, as it is something different from being. What follow is that something which is not will be. Hence substance will not be a predicate of anything else, for the subject cannot be a being, unless being means several things, in such a way that each is something.
Before responding directly to the Parmenidean argument, Aristotle introduces the elements of change in Physics, I. 5, 6 & 7 and every piece that was missing from Parmenides comes to light. According to Aristotle, every change involves three elements: two ‘opposites’ and ‘something underlying’; in contrast to Parmenides he believes that everything which comes to be comes to be out of its opposite or something which stays in between, consequently everything which passes away passes away into something. The latter element is described as a persisting subject that is first not the thing and then it is. Even from this piece of analysis it is clear that Aristotle not only did not refrain from investigating what happens between the coming to be and the passing away, but also took it as the focus of its argument. In fact, he continues with the study of the opposites and defines them as the varieties of actuality and potentiality in all natural change. So, the varieties are the causes of the different forms which can take place when an absence of the form or its potential is experienced, then we can distinguish between different forms acquired through disparate kinds of change, mainly split into the qualitative and substantial categories, an example of the first may be a changing in colour or weight and for the second one the building of a house.
Moving on with the chapters, in Physics, I.8 Aristotle answers to the Parmenidean scepticism, although he already began with his counterargument by stating the elements of change and positioning his theory and himself aside from the pre-socratic philosopher. What comes to be cannot come from something and what comes to be cannot come from nothing are the principal assumptions denied by Aristotle, and also the ones which made Parmenides as well as Melissus come to wrong conclusions, in fact if we take into account the ‘capacity or potential for form’, something can come to be from an absence of evolution if this absence exists in virtue of the presence of the potentiality for evolution. On that account, Aristotle is telling the reader that the argument of Parmenides is lacking of explanations, since he talks about ‘something coming from something else’ or ‘from nothing’ but he is not clarifying the nature of this change. Parmenides builds his reasoning on the fact that if the change comes from something is because that thing exists, that is why he is wrong in its premises, thus change comes from something because that being has the power to change.
To sum up with the arguments, when Aristotle undertook to explain how it is that things change, a fact apparent to anyone, he had first to confront the seemingly logic of Parmenides; thus in this essay I tackled first Parmenides’ discourse against the possibility of change, then passed to the discussion of another similar case, the fallacy of Melissus, with the aim of showing how both this argumentations, Parmenides’ and Melissus’, are yet limited, leaving the reader with a feeling of incompleteness, but necessary, Aristotle himself made use of them. In fact, I would argue it is the discovery of what was missed in those pre-socratic theories that give Aristotle the basis to build such a solid argument.
Having analysed and reflected on the way Parmenides reasons his argumentations, it is now clear that his main obstacle was not having the notion of potency.
Second, particularly with the listing of the elements of change, Aristotle improves on the theories of change of his predecessors, whose thesis were end-directed towards proving that if something is, then it is, and if it is not, then it is not. Consequently, those philosopher concluded that nothing can come to be, for that would involve it coming to be something from nothing, which cannot happen.
Here comes Aristotle’s improvement, which is to add the concept of a subject underlying change that has also the potentiality for that very same change; the actualisation of a potentially of the subject occurs through the change itself: it is the composition of the form of the thing that comes to be thanks to the subject of change.