In order to critically evaluate the relation of faith to reason in Aquinas’ thought, it is first necessary to briefly explain Aquinas’ definition of faith and reason and what characteristics the concepts of faith and reason possess. The first section of this paper shall focus on these two concepts. Reason, Aquinas argues, is a method by which humans relate to the world. Aquinas advocates an Aristotelian account of reasoning and rationality, where one must give plausible reasons for the beliefs one holds. Reason refers to the movement in one’s intellect from one cognition to another and this particular movement can be defined into two distinct categories. On the one hand, acts of reasoning can be split by the logical relations between the two cognitions. There can be acts of necessity, where the two cognitions are necessarily connected and where the first entails the second; there can be acts of contingency, where the two cognitions are contingently connected as the first contingently implies the second; or the two cognitions may not be logically connected at all, where the first does not contingently imply the second. On the other hand, reasoning can be segregated by the epistemic states that result from reason, which are as follows: understanding (intellectus), which is concerned with grasping the initial cognitions (i.e., the first principles) of acts of necessity; scientia, which is concerned with grasping the final cognition (i.e., the conclusion) of acts of necessity; and opinion, which is concerned with grasping the conclusion of acts of contingency.
When Aquinas refers to the concept of faith, he is referring to Christian faith. Aquinas’ philosophy is the classic example of faith as a belief in propositions whose truth cannot be determined by reason. Faith is a divine disposition or habitus, through which human beings share in God’s understanding of himself. True faith is a virtue of wanting and attaining God and should be considered as an ideal midpoint between the two vices of credulity and skepticism. It is a “disposition of the mind, by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is not apparent.” Faith is related both to the intellect and the will. It involves a belief in something, which is determined by the conditions of the will and not the conditions of reason. The will influences the intellect, thereby leading the intellect to assent to a set of higher propositions of faith. Although that which is believed through faith does not contravene reason, it is also not established through reason. The will is a desire for the soul to achieve greatest good and governs beliefs associated with faith. The intellect is moved to assent by the will and the will is assisted in moving by the grace of God.
As faith involves a belief in those propositions, the truth of which cannot be verified by reason, the concept of faith therefore radically transcends reason. It is thus impossible for a human to comprehend the true essence of God because of the innate nature of human beings and the limitations of reason. It is possible for natural reason to disclose certain truths about God, however, certain other truths “exceed all the ability of human reason.” An example of the former – that which is known through reason – is that the heavens and earth were created by God as He is the cause of their existence. On the other hand, an example of the latter – that which can only be known through faith – is the doctrine of the Trinity, which states that God is the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The propose of faith is to empower humans to grasp truths, which could never be comprehended exclusively through reason. It is the natural, Aquinas argues, for humans to favour reason over faith due to the natural and innate limitations of human nature. This is due to a “defect of our intelligence”, which causes humans to be more easily influenced by reason. There are two explanations for this. Firstly, humans are more likely to think discursively by composing and dividing, meaning, unlike God, humans understand concepts best through demonstration, proceeding from the beginning with premises and ending with conclusions. Aquinas differentiates between a demonstration from cause to effect (demonstratio propter quid) and a demonstration from effect to cause (demonstratio quia). The arguments Aquinas makes for the existence of God fall into the latter category. Although humans are incapable of understanding God in terms of causes to effect, it is useful to use this argument to demonstrate a real cause, the characteristics of which are unknowable to us, exists. In addition to this, the minds of human beings are more naturally inclined to understanding the essences of material things. The most natural place to start for discursive reasoning, therefore, is with the effects of God, which human beings can perceive directly through sense perception, such as the effects of God on nature. As a result, reason does not merely play an ancillary role within faith, but rather is of upmost importance. An argument, which comes solely from reason, is never demonstrative and is therefore weak. There are a number of possible objections to this account of the relation of faith and reason, which are worth examining and to which this paper shall now turn.
The first objection to the relation of faith and reason, which this paper shall examine is raised by Stephen Evans, who questions why faith should believe that which is above reason. Why should human beings ignore their natural and innate reason and accept truths, which are revealed beyond their understanding? Testimony, as Paul O’Grady notes, is a vital source of belief for human beings. It is natural and perfectly feasible for humans to believe that which is revealed to them by honest and trustworthy sources. Aquinas argues that God is the most trustworthy source possible for humans. Ergo, it is absolutely feasible to believe the information God bestows upon humans because God is the most trustworthy, honest and judicious source of knowledge that one can possibly imagine. Even though having faith is, thus, a feasible epistemic position, because Aquinas argues that faith is not scientia, a person is not to obliged to have faith. Consequently, a person can have feasible impetus for belief, however, nevertheless decline to believe, such as the person who does not desire God as his/her final end. This thus renders the act of faith as a voluntary act.
This account of considering God as the most trustworthy and benevolent source of knowledge for humans as a reason for believing that which is above natural reason is deficient for it neglects to adequately answer the initial challenge of why a person should believe that which God reveals. Although Aquinas would argue that it is feasible to believe that which is revealed by God, simply because God has revealed it, how is it possible for a person to know what God has revealed and whether that which is being revealed is really attributed to God? In response to this, Aquinas explains the necessary characteristics a genuine divine revelation from God will possess and in the process, therefore, harmonises faith and reason by illustrating how they work together simultaneously. A genuine revelation, for Aquinas, must contain some truths, which can be confirmed by reason and other truths, which cannot be confirmed by reason; the latter form of truths transcend reason and thus require faith. Additionally, a miracle or a “work that surpasses the ability of nature” must accompany a truth knowable by reason. Reason is an extremely important facet of confirming whether God is truly the source of a particular revelation. If one can prove that a revelation is truly from God, because God is the most reliable and trustworthy source of information imaginable, this is a very acceptable for a person to hold faith and believe that which transcends reason.
Although a person who can confirm God as the source of his/her particular revelation may have a justifiable reason for having faith, it is imperative to ask why exactly God feels it is necessary to reveal truths through faith. Would it not be infinitely better for God and humanity if He revealed knowledge and truth through the most accessible and straightforward means possible and through a medium, which humans can adequately comprehend? If God could leave the balderdash and unnecessary complications resulting from the requirement of faith behind, and simply reveal himself and truths through the medium of reason, all of humanity would be obliged to believe for there would be no adequate excuse not to believe. Imagine the consequences of this: churches would be brimming, all of humanity would in divine happiness, unnecessary and violent religious wars would end, and, finally, peace would abound the universe. Why, then, is all of this rigmarole associated with faith necessary? Why does God reveal truths in such a complex manner and still expect humans to believe? Aquinas holds there are two primary reasons for why God reveals himself and truths through a medium which transcends reason. On the one hand, Aquinas holds that revelation is the only instrument through which God can reveal himself to humanity in this life because genuine truths about God transcend reason. The function of a revelation is to pertinently illustrate to humans how insignificant the human capacity is, when compared with the capacity of God. Human reason is limited and finite and Aquinas holds that human beings must understand that their own rational capacity is not the ultimate or sole source of knowledge. Aquinas takes it as self evident that limitations to reason exist. An example used by Evans shall help to explicate this point. It is self evident that humans of differing levels of education and intelligence exist in the world. The more intelligent can comprehend concepts, which those less able cannot grasp. It would be the epitome of absurdity for a less intelligent person to allege that the concepts understood by the more intelligent person were incorrect, purely on the basis that the less able person incapable of comprehending them. This is akin to a person whose only knowledge of medicine and surgery is the children’s game “Operation” insisting that the knowledge and skills obtained by a surgeon through numerous degrees from reputable universities and several years of experience were false because the unqualified person understands few concepts of surgery, aside from those covered in the game.
See Jenkins objection 2)
Additionally, why would God want someone to believe something for which there is a complete lack of palpable evidence?
Aquinas holds that scientia is the result of demonstrative reasoning, faith is the result of believing, and opinion is the result of probable reasoning. These are all located along the same epistemic spectrum. Of particular interest concerning the relation of faith and reason in Aquinas is scientia, which which Aquinas holds is the cornerstone of true knowledge or the ideal form of knowledge. He argues that to have the concept of scientia in respect to something is to posses complete and certain cognition of its truth. More specifically, scientia is the virtue of knowledge in its most complete and perfect form. Perfect scientia involves an “apprehension of a proposition, certitude in the necessity of the proposition, and perfect apprehension of the truth of the proposition.“ Perfect scientia is an epistemic state and should be considered the perfect form of knowledge because perfect justification is the result of perfect and complete cognition of the truth of a proposition. Faith, on the other hand, also involves apprehension and certitude of the truth of a proposition, however, does not involve perfect apprehension of the truth. Opinion lacks certitude and perfect apprehension of the truth. These particular epistemic states of perfect scientia, faith and opinion are mutually exclusive. It is possible to have scientia, faith or opinion about a proposition but it is not possible to hold any of these states simultaneously about the same proposition.
When Aquinas endorses Aristotle’s epistemology and account of episteme [scientia], he also endorses an Aristotelian account of perfect scientia as the ideal form of knowledge made up of three components, which are cognition, certitude, and perfect apprehension of the truth. Aristotle’s explanation of opinion is also adopted with Aquinas noting that opinion “lacks certitude and perfect apprehension of the truth.” Aquinas, however, believes a third epistemic state between scientia and opinion exists. This epistemic state would have certitude but not apprehension of the truth. Aquinas labels this credere [belief]. In order to show that faith and reason reside on the same spectrum of epistemology and are therefore compatible, the challenge for Aquinas is to explain how Christian faith conforms to the concept of credere.
Faith is bestowed with certitude and is therefore different from scientia because belief results from grace, as opposed to evidence.
Kenneth Konyndyk argues that as Aquinas’ solution to the relation of faith and reason depends upon Aristotelian versions of science and epistemology, which are obsolete and thus wrong, Aquinas’ solution is deficient. In order to respond to this criticism, it is necessary to understand what the intention of Aquinas’ project was. Aquinas aimed to reconcile faith with standards of reason set by Aristotle.
It is necessary to evaluate Aquinas solution within the framework of his epistemology and the standards epitomised by Aristotle. By a modern account of the balance of faith and reason, Aquinas’ account is utterly unsuccessful as it is contingent on an obsolete form of epistemology. If, however, one accepts Aquinas’ premise and epistemology,