Q1: One major “rule” that discourages student-athletes from engaging in political activities on campus is that they carry a weight beyond than just themselves. A student-athlete has the inherent responsibility of representing one’s school at all times. As a result, all student-athletes carry the burden of representation, which has become a typical norm of all student athletes that highly hinders athletes from expressing their own individual voices. Since student athletes represent both their teams and the entire Cal athletic body, they have to exercise caution when they voice their opinions or speak to the public because they can negatively impact the school. Additionally, student athletes carry a stereotyped perception by the general students (“NARPS”) at Cal; they are distanced from the political atmosphere because they are marginalized as students who are here only to play sports and not voice opinions about politics. This feeling of pressure and stigmatization is worsened by the NCAA’s inability to synthesize with its students. Most student-athletes are confined by a set of rules and regulations, which don’t allow them any freedom of expression. The NCAA establishes this burden upon student-athletes and are reprimanded if they fail to maintain these standards. Athletic programs and coaches act as enforcers of such rules. While some coaches try to provide as much support to their athlete’s expressions, others ignore any political topics in fear of gaining team notoriety or losing a player’s scholarship. Often coaches remind players to be mindful of what they say to the public and are told to avoid controversial political topics. Also, media relations establish social media rules for athletes to follow. Ultimately, a student-athlete must juggle maintaining one’s own self dignity on campus, upholding their team’s reputation, and not violating the NCAA’s rules.
Q2: Contrary to popular belief that politics and sports should not intertwine, Cohen reveals that the politicization of sports has historical roots. The idea that politics should be distanced from sports is one that is social inequality. Prior to the Civil War, Cohen highlights how sports were used as a tool to drive political agendas and for candidates to gain popularity. Since the American Revolution, politics and sports became so complementary to each other that elections were described as “races.” However, the relationship between sports and politics changed after the Civil War when elected officials and high-class Americans feared the rise of black political power. As a result, the objections against black American athletes like Kaepernick demonstrating political expressions during sporting events have more to do with hidden political fears as opposed to just the “neutral” essence of sports. As soon as black athletes had begun dominating the sports arena, white Americans were more dissuaded of combining sports and politics. To combat this potential threat, white Americans pivoted and use sports as way to support pre-existing political ideas and gained political unity. While white Americans still had an opportunity, they slowly closed the doors to the politicization of sport for black athletes. By the 1900’s, sporting events had become less politically active. Now, when black athletes protest during sporting events, the public finds it either displacing or inappropriate because it disrupts political unity. However, these misconceptions were formed due to the social inequalities that black athletes faced since the 1900’s. Therefore, black athletes are not marginalized for using sports as a forum for displaying political ideologies.
Q3a: The NCAA’s televising of football was not business-like because the NCAA did not focus on capitalizing on university football games with the highest returns. It wasn’t until 1952 when the NCAA signed a deal with NBC to begin televising collegiate football games. At that point, the NCAA served as a middle man by negotiating all football packages with NBC on behalf of the universities. Despite the $1.14M payout for the deal, Walter Byers, only took 12% percent, which he later reduced to 5%. As a result, the NCAA didn’t really take advantage of the profits. The remaining profits were shared with smaller NCAA schools. Additionally, the NCAA devised a balanced system that only broadcasted 11 games per year. None of these broadcasts were profit motivated, and the schools were chosen neutrally to be televised. Overall, the NCAA was acted more as an intermediary for handling televised football deal as opposed to a profit-driven business. Q3b: However, televised college football became more of a business when colleges had started to realize the potential profits that they could be making if they handled all broadcasting deals individually. Top football schools had become tired of sharing profits with less prominent NCAA schools. So, top football schools revolted against the NCAA, and the 1984 Supreme Court case deemed the NCAA as having too much market control over collegiate football broadcasting and cancelled the NCAA’s television contracts. Top football colleges formed a “we eat what we kill” mentality; these schools felt strongly in profiting from their respective school’s football success. Ultimately, the Supreme Court deemed college football as a business, and that each college had the right to enter the competitive market and profit from their games.
Q4: The New Yorker would identify fantasy football within the flâneur category because spectators of fantasy sports are very detached from the actual sport itself. Spectators are more captivated by the sensation-seeking, game-like atmosphere that fantasy sports provides. Fantasy spectators are more globalized (bottom-half) in the sense that spectators are drawn to a specific team or sports due to global commercialization. Such spectators become a part of fandoms that do not necessarily match with their identity or geographical orientation. As opposed to a supporter, fantasy spectators do not have a rooted connection with any specific team or sport; they are inclined to follow famous players and won’t hesitate to bandwagon teams if they lose interest. The lack of bias and attachment allows fantasy spectators to enjoy sports on a broader, more social level. Additionally, fantasy sports are highly commodified (right-half) in the sense that fantasy spectators seek consumption. Fantasy spectators play the role of managers by picking teams with the best records and players with the best stats irrespective of bias. As opposed to followers or supporters, fantasy flâneurs seek more than just supporting the success of an individual team or set of teams. Beyond just buying merchandise and souvenirs like a fan, fantasy flâneurs seek the sensationalism and media-oriented buzz that surrounds sports and teams. To the fantasy spectator, how the game is played is of very little importance; the spectator’s primary concern is how the outcome of the game impacts his fantasy team’s stats, and how he should go about adapting his fantasy team so that he can stay relevant within his fandom. The fantasy spectator is constantly driven to find the next best meta whether it be following better players, rooting for the next best team, or switching to sports with the most social relevance.
Q5a: The norm that is assumed in the US is that “student athletes” should maintain a level of amateurism while playing in college. Collegiate athletes are referred to as “student-athletes,” and the NCAA normalized the idea that such athletes should not be rewarded monetarily for their successes on the field. Q5b: This is not a natural attribute of student-athletes because amateurism was never an inherent quality, but rather an idea that was imposed upon by the NCAA. The word, “student-athlete,” itself was coined by the NCAA to publicize how collegiate athletes should value the importance of academic scholarships. More specifically, the terms “student-athlete” and “amateurism” was used as away for the NCAA to escape liability claims and avoid paying out injury compensations by establishing that student-athletes are not apart of a business. The NCAA used the idea of amateurism and student athlete to take advantage of the exceptional talent of young collegiate athletes while, at the same time, avoiding legal and monetary repercussions. Q5c: Ever since the NCAA established the notion of amateurism and student-athlete, future collegiate athletes have no say against the pre-established norm. Any attempt for a college athlete to monetize his success is deemed as scandalous by the NCAA and are faced with consequences as dire as losing athletic scholarship or becoming ineligible to play. These stories and sanctions are publicized to redouble society’s belief of student-athlete amateurism as being the norm. Student-athlete amateurism is reinforced with a set of contractual agreements that collegiate athletes must agree to in order to play called picayune rules. By constantly policing student-athletes of every and all of their violations of the rules, the NCAA was able to legitimize the idea of student athlete amateurism to the vast public.
Q6a: Schools, like Louisville, were turning to intercollegiate athletics to potentially reap the benefits of higher revenue streams and increased school recognition. To run and maintain an athletics programs with just state funding and tuition fees were not feasible. As a result, schools turned to intercollegiate sports as a way to become more of a powerhouse within college sports. Participating in intercollegiate athletics allowed schools to be a part of ESPN, which gave schools not only lucrative television agreements, but also increased public awareness across the nation. Such schools were able to expand their fan bases, gain more donor support, and attract more prospective athletes and non-athletes to join the university. By being a part of the intercollegiate athletic network, schools had a chance to rise up to richer and more famous athletic conferences. Based on the table, Louisville amassed about $100M from intercollegiate athletics and an additional $50M from gifts. Q6b: However, this strategy is not working for over half of the “Power 5” universities because they continually tend to overspend on their athletic programs and don’t yield enough revenue to cover their expenses. This results the school in either breaking even or having net deficits; based on the table, Louisville spent more on intercollegiate athletics ($109M) than they earned in 2016. As schools climb higher in the conference ladder and gain more national recognition, they have the obligation of showcasing their school’s athletic department in the best light possible. Therefore, such schools start spending on stadium renovation, increasing coaches’ salary, and providing student-athletes with better treatment. Overall, these price tags add up, and only about half of the “Power 5” schools have the prominence to generate profits.