In a world where four in ten countries have non-democratic regimes, the study of civil societies in non-democratic regimes is enlightening for understanding how these regimes function, stabilize themselves, and muster support for the regime from their population. Civil society and social capital are beneficial factors to the stabilization and continuation of non-democratic regimes, despite the common perception that civil societies exist only in democracies. This essay will focus on the ways in which civil society can actually support non-democratic regimes, with a particular focus on authoritarian rule.
Every state has civil society on some level, be it small town bowling clubs or large-scale labor unions. As civil society comprises everything between the state and family, there is much diversity in what counts as an aspect of civil society. Even the most undemocratic of regimes have a degree of civil society, but it’s the social capital of a civil society that determines its successes or failures in relation to the regime. As defined by Robert D. Putnam in Making Democracy Work, social capital “refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” Regardless of regime type, civic communities with high social capital exhibit higher levels of trust, cooperation, and civic engagement. The use of social capital can be both a mobilizing and stabilizing factor for a state. Thus, progressing with this understanding, it can be seen that an extant civil society and extensive social capital is not limited to democracies and can actually be both prevalent and driving factors within a non-democratic regime.
Studying civil society only through the lens of democracy is a Western and democratizing view, as many political scientists see civil society and democracy as inexplicably linked. However, by obscuring the benefits of civil society to non-democratic regimes, political scientists fall into the same trap that transitologists of the 1980s and 1990s fell into, believing that it was only a matter of time before all people would belong to democratic states. By holding Western democracy up as an ideal, political scientists of this mindset can be blinded by democratization and ignore the fact that non-democratic regimes can have high-functioning civil societies and occasionally higher levels of social capital than democratic regimes.
It can be argued that civil societies are successful in non-democratic regimes primarily as a function of refuge and escapism. While civil society can stand in opposition to the state, it can do so without vocally opposing the non-democratic regime. Civil society offers opportunities for people of a non-democratic regime to take refuge and retreat into the sphere of civic communities, used as a coping mechanism in an insecure regime. In this way, the populace is pacifistic and not directly opposing the regime, but finding ways to belong to organizations that are not regulated by an overbearing government. Thus, non-democratic regimes have a perceived reality of success because the people are peaceful, not protesting, going about their daily lives. In turn, this then stabilizes the non-democratic regime with little to no perceived threat.
It is also important to note that civil society, while autonomous from the state, is not wholly independent from the influence of politics. In this way, non-democratic regimes can exercise power and infiltrate the civil society through the grass-roots. To ensure that civil society does not mobilize towards a direction opposing the regime, public vilification, legal restrictions, and co-optation can all be used to control a civil society so that it may align with the regime’s ideology. Alternatively, the regime could selectively provide funding for groups that agree with their policies. In this way, the people get a sense of autonomy with a pluralist civil society, yet they are still being manipulated by the state.
Civic engagement can have another dark side when utilized by non-democratic regimes. As noted by Morris Fiorina, those most engaged in civil society may have extremist views and be unrepresentative of society at large. In this vein, non-democratic regimes may target these civically engaged individuals and remove them from society if they have dissenting opinions from the regime. As seen with competitive authoritarian regimes, similar revelation tactics are utilized in elections, where elections may be held in order to force the opposition out of hiding before targeting them. Civil society can reveal the opposition to non-democratic regimes, allowing them to target, remove, and, thus, strengthen their rule over the state.
While civil society and social capital can be beneficial in any non-democratic regimes to some degree, authoritarian regimes particularly benefit from the utilization of civil society as a mobilization factor. According to the categorization of non-democratic regimes by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, authoritarian regimes can be stable and high-functioning states in which there can exist a robust civil society. As Linz and Stepan note that there can be limited political pluralism and extensive social and economic pluralism, civil society under authoritarian regimes can flourish to a degree that reinforces the authoritarian regime and stabilizes the state. Due to the fact that pluralism is not entirely discouraged, as in totalitarian regimes, authoritarian regimes can utilize the positive effects of civil society to their advantage. The pluralism that exists in authoritarian regimes usually has roots that predate the authoritarian regime itself and is allowed to persist to some degree. This persistence and slice of freedom allow citizens to participate and have greater levels of trust with reduced levels of protest. The trust fostered in authoritarian regimes is translated into support for non-democratic ideals and a perpetuation of the authoritarian rule. Additionally, due to the fact that authoritarian leaders exhibit high levels of confidence, this confidence impacts that of the people, influencing their support of the regime.
To find an example of a non-democratic regime utilizing social capital to mobilize a population, one can look to Nazi Germany. Prior to Adolf Hitler’s ascent to power, there were rich networks of civil society in Germany. According to Sheri Berman, the Nazi Party infiltrated these networks to consolidate power and gain appeal for their party. Due to the potent civil society, the populace was easily mobilized towards the Nazi’s ideology, supporting them with confidence just as many civil society organizations in non-democratic regimes today express their trust and confidence in their respective regimes. While the use of civil society to mobilize the German population was not objectively beneficial from an ethical standpoint, social capital was used to make Nazi Germany a powerful and mobilized force to be reckoned with during World War II, which can be seen as successful in the eyes of the leaders of the Third Reich.
In conclusion, the role of civil society on the effectivity of a regime, non-democratic or democratic, is integral for study by political scientists and civilians alike. Social capital is a driving factor in the mobilization of a civil society and the state to which it belongs, determining the degree of coordination among the populace and regime. Non-democratic regimes may use the principles of civil society and social capital to their advantage, not as a step towards democratization. Methods of utilizing civil society for their benefit include pacification and refuge seeking, funding some organizations while prohibiting others, pulling opposition out of hiding, and encouraging pluralism with a guise of freedom. In these ways, non-democratic regimes can be stabilized and mobilize through the actions and persistence of civil society. It is when a regime compromises and wholly suppresses civil society that state failure occurs and populaces protest. Through the manipulation of civil society for their benefit, both non-democratic and democratic regimes may persist as stable powers around the world.