This paper seeks to analyze the relationship between current neoliberal ideology, societal structures and institutions and their implementation of violence and power as it is relative to frameworks of biopolitics and biopower; mainly, I seek to challenge economic frameworks of neoliberalism by deconstructing the means in which they foster, cultivate and further adapt state repression and power over the individual. To do this, I will examine the genealogies of liberal and neoliberal ideology, closely analyzing Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended and The History of Sexuality to provide reference to former analysis of dynamics of power. By supplementing my thesis with work from Johanna Oksala’s Violence and the Biopolitics of Modernity and Jason Read’s A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity I will argue in contention of neoliberal conceptions of economic process as less an ideological economic proposal and more a repressive ideological commitment to state repression and the subjectification and ultimate exploitation of the individual from a social, autonomous being to a product exploited by both the monetary competitive exchange of a capitalist economy and the politically violent acts of the state in which that economy is enabled to exist. Further, I will question the accuracy of Foucault’s conception of biopower as it stands in the context of the twenty first century, ultimately concluding for a new analysis of biopower in neoliberal economic markets as a means of determining the most effective response.
PART I
Before we can proceed in our understanding of cultivation of neoliberal, economic violence within biopolitical theory, we first must establish an understanding of the frameworks in which this violence and power are enabled to exist—that is within, biopolitics and liberalism itself. Foucault comprised the conception of biopower and the consequent biopolitical as the following:
“Biopower is an essentially modern form of power and its purpose is to exert a positive influence on life, to optimise and multiply life, by subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” (Ojakangas, 2005)
Foucault further touches on this traditional form of biopower in Society Must Be Defended and The History of Sexuality where he clarifies a new biopolitical use of power operating within appendages of the state; institutions of education, health care and military. This power operates cohesively with traditional functions of represion, formerly seen before a disbursement of functional forms of new biopower, or rather, the sovereign-judicial (Adams, 2017). This distinction is imperative in defining what Foucault refers to as the sovereign power and the new biopower; an evolution of power exercised through life and death to one that reinforces the state through subjugated forms of repressions (Ojakangas, 2005). As we read in The History of Sexuality, “Law cannot help but be armed and its arm, par excellence, is death.” (Foucault, 144). The sovereign power operates exclusively on what is death and life—the new biopower operates not within the apparent use of an extreme authority, but rather through a disguised, delegated repressive order:
“Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the norm. I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered life.” (Foucault, 144)
The genealogy of bipower outlined the transformation of these powers from the archetypal sovereign power to the thetical constitutions of power related both to discipline and subjectification and later into the “species-body” (Adams, 2017). This latter evolution of the sovereign power was, as Foucault claims, the birth of biopower and what was later the necessary conditions for the emergence and sustainability of 19th century capitalism.
Liberalism, as we understand it generationally and relative to this thesis is that which abdicates the functions of that to do with the economic to their own consideration, autonomy and oversight (Guas, 2018). The capitalist market thus may operate exclusively because of the state but not at its command or regulation. Liberalism here, hypothesizes that the economic markets inaugurate the “true” price (Gaus, 2018). This conception of the liberal economy flourishes not in an independence of state control or state violence, but rather through a relative theory of economic independence in part dependent on the function of the state if for no other purpose other than it being the container in which an economic market can function. This traditional distinction of the liberalist economy is important when discussing the generational adaptiveness of the state, state control and the repressive forms of economy and labour. The liberal economic model transcended the former understanding of an economic freedom from the state into one that demanded the valuing of an economic priority above any other value (Gaus. 2018). This is to say, that our understanding of what is economic, or liberally economic, ought be the most sensical understanding from all other elements of life. This conception leading us into what we understand as “disciplinary power”, a power utilized for the advancement of capitalist power in liberal-democratic states (Adams, 2017). Disciplinary power, according to Foucault, posits that instead of blatant use of violence and force as a means of punishment and control, ingenious and unapparent rules (punitive and reform systems, surveillance, institutional policies) can govern the actions of a group of people in a more discreet and collectively amicable manner. We can recognize this use of discipline through institutions of education, prison and workplaces.
PART II
Neoliberalism influenced the understanding of power and disciplinary power through the evolution of an ideology that otherwise was market-centrist, exclusive from political governance, policy and regulation. This is to say, Neoliberalism cultivated itself not as a consequence of a new economic emergence or even from the traditional social expenditures of a capitalist economy, but rather through the trivial exercises of exchange of capital and labour; neoliberalism is the misplacement of power and the dynamics of this power into one that co-exists through the trade of goods both internal and external to political spheres, dictated by claims of human nature made through the assumption the worker can function most effectively within classical economic frameworks, such as capitalism and moreover, most effectively if these frameworks operate foundationally through competition (Read, 2009). Unlike liberalism, neoliberalism considers not only the independence of the market and economy within a state, but the competitive nature of the market that which further influences, governs and makes demands of the worker. Neoliberalism thus not only affects the operative components of a state but as well the daily lives of those within it (Read, 2009). It is through this distinciton that Foucault posits the homoeconomicus; or rather, the homogony of the political and the economic agent: you and I. The difference and evolution of thought from liberal to neoliberal ideology rests instead in the perspectives of the economic market’s purpose, being one that was traditionally understood as simply a means of exchanging goods and services to one that must necessitate a level of competitive exchange to ensure its sanctity.
This ideological shift is imperative in understanding how disciplinary power has become the sole operative governance within modern society. Economic competition drastically consequences the way of life, living and ultimate death of the you and I. What was an economic principle founded in a capacity to build, create or provide goods or services easily qualified and exchanged monetarily then becomes not just the capacity to produce something, but the capacity to produce something the best, fastest or cheapest way and then to compete that good or service within a market whose health is dependent on a new economic agent producing the same thing better, faster or cheaper. (Here, we could posit Marxist claims of the alienation and exploitation of labour, although Foucault may contend the comparative value of doing so.)
“The shift from exchange to competition has profound effects: while exchange was considered to be natural, competition is understood by the neo-liberals of twentieth century to be an artificial relation that must be protected against the tendency for markets to form monopolies and interventions by the state. Competition necessitates a constant intervention on the part of the state, not on the market, but on the conditions of the market.” (Read, 2009)
The neoliberal solution thus is not an investment into what one produces but rather into oneself—the homoeconomicus. This is to say, if I want to have a career as a teacher, I cannot simply learn and master the content and history of that which I would like to teach, but rather I must go to a school in which to learn the most proper skills, content and research, acquire a certificate, diploma or degree from the school, exploit and undersell my labour through internships and apprenticeships, and then at some point become profitable that I make a living or semi-living wage in exchange for my services. Furthermore, I will have to become competitive within the field of teaching to remain desirable and profitable and thus I may be required to produce my own research, work longer or harder hours, develop competitive working relationships with my colleagues and prioritize my actions and choices within the career of teaching to present myself as a well invested product in which another should buy. It is not the merit of what the agent has to offer that is now considered economically, but themselves as individuals that become the focus of the exchange and competition. We can consider this in a trade that produces a more tangible product for simplicity: if I would like to build cabinets, I cannot depend on my mastery or talent and skill of cabinetry to sell my product, but rather must invest resources, education, certification and other qualitative elements of my industry to effectively compete with other cabinet makers—regardless of how beautiful my cabinets maybe, they are worthless without the competitive elements that qualify me as their producer.
Of course we can understand why a neoliberal conception of economics presents society and society’s beings with a harmful and violent means of living. As Foucault states:
“The generalization of the economic form of the market beyond monetary exchanges functions in american neoliberalism as a principle as of intelligibility and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behavior.” (Foucault, 243)
Neoliberalism affords the theory of disciplinary power space in which to operate in a normative, discreet and conjectured manner. It propagates the conditions for repressive forms of punitive reactionarism that in turn dictate how a social being may behave or not behave. It produces dynamics of power institutionally that precept ethical doctrines onto otherwise unconsenting members of those institutions, cultivating cultures of betrayal and mistrust amongst workers while the threat of a surveilling authority regulates and governs the actions of the individual, often further enforcing conceptions of them not as autonomous agents but as economic property. Aside from these obvious examples of a cultivating disciplinary power within neoliberalism, the ideology itself threatens the way of life, biology, health and wellness, psychology and social existence of the individual through unreasonable economic demands, economic ultimatums and an overall deprioritization of one’s health over the quantity and quality of what they produce.
A study published in The Frontiers of Neuroscience, conducted by Dr. Paul Kelley of Oxford University on students whose school schedule began before 10AM concluded that by starting one’s work after mid-morning they would reduce illness and increase performance (Kelley, 2017). Through census data, Nate Silver published (republished in Expert Market) that the majority of Americans, in the 75th percentile, begin their work schedule slightly before 8AM (Silver, 2014). Although there is not any explicit reason for early work days, and although we can only speculate on its correlation to economic trends produced by neoliberalism, a competitive market employs the demand of early starting hours and late finishing hours, including the conception of “overtime” wherein laws only in recent history were introduced to prevent bosses from demanding longer work hours from employees. An article published in The Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, conducted by Dr. Allard Dembe concluded the following:
“Working in jobs with overtime schedules was associated with a 61% higher injury hazard rate compared to jobs without overtime. Working at least 12 hours per day was associated with a 37% increased hazard rate and working at least 60 hours per week was associated with a 23% increased hazard rate.” (Dembe, 2005)
We can speculate that demands produced by competition further establish trends that which alienate the worker not only from their labour and autonomy, but as well their social capacities and physical wellness while producing threatening room for forms of disciplinary power to be commanded through institutions non-exclusive to labour but as well, hospitals, policing, prison systems and education.
PART III
The question we are now faced with is how we ought respond to neoliberalism, as well as liberalism in our economic concepts to eliminate threats of disciplinary power and improve the biological, social and economic conditions of the individual. How do we, as Foucault states, defend society? As Oksala states, the threat begins when questions of our biological existence are rendered unaskable within the spheres of the political (Oksala, 2010). If we agree that what was political is now economic and further a neoliberal economic, an economic defined purely through competition, than society has already failed in its own defense.
Oksala argues that the solution is a politicization of the biological, and such social and economic components of the individual, stating:
“The crisis of politics in modernity cannot be resolved by depoliticising biological life in the sense of returning it to the private sphere. On the contrary, it must be explicitly politicised by dispelling its naturalness and revealing its historically specific connections with the biopolitical regime of power/knowledge.” (Oksala, 2010)
While the politicization of the individual and their life may act to oppose the first problems posed by neoliberalism (and for that matter, classical liberalism), being the element of disciplinary power, can we assume it would help to deconstruct the economic nature of competition engrained in the individual? Or would it only help to improve the conditions of the economics of the individual, and less their life as a whole? The proposal holds Marxian values; while it may help free the individual from repressive forms of power in their workplace, it does not yet free them from their workplace. On the other hand, Read argues that we must do more than just simply contend the ideology of neoliberalism (Read, 2009)—after all, a foundational core of politicization is to take contention to an existing ideology. As Read states:
“It is difficult to imagine let alone enact a future other than a future dominated by interest and the destructive vicissitudes of competition. A political response to neoliberalism must meet it on its terrain, that of the production of subjectivity, freedom and possibility.” (Read, 2009)
This isn’t necessarily an inaccurate statement either, in some ways it supports the proposal of Oksala in that we may never be able to fully imagine a world in which the competitive market does not dictate our economic needs, perhaps Oksala is correct in asserting the politicized effort or maybe we are correct in taking the Marxist route of organizers labour for the sole purpose of simply possessing the means of control (with no real change to the nature of the market). Read’s proposal falls short without any real suggestive action, but rather an alludiation that we must “meet [neoliberalism] on its terrain” (Read, 2009), but what does that mean? How can we meet neoliberalism in a playing field that does not automatically necessitate a competitive economic nature?
Neoliberalism in actuality is more than mere competition economically, I would argue it is even more than just the reinforcing economic repression of the worker. While we may agree that neoliberalism fosters a climate that necessitates Foucault’s elements of biopower and disciplinary power—and while that too is a repression in and of itself, we must ask ourselves what more neoliberalism is. Oksala and Read, as well as texts from Foucault, accurately diagnose the traits and consequences of neoliberal economic frameworks, from ideological shifts to biological threats. What they fail to assess is an approach to retaliate and respond to neoliberalism and this lack of assessment throughout academic works suggests that neoliberalism is not only an ideology but a framework that has manifested a dependency that even our own ideological resistance of proves insufficient. The veil in which we create our analysis of neoliberalism is one that also comes from the perspective of individuals both benefiting and failing from the consequences of the new competitive economic. To further complicate the task of an approach or response to neoliberalism, the ideology itself is not as tangible as issues of state repression, state violence or state power as it is but a mediator between the worker, the market and the state. In Violence as an Imperative, I illustrate carefully a framework of steps in response to state repression, liberal political ideological violence and fascism in the context of modernity, this is simple because we are talking about ideologies held and enforced by another, wherein the enemy is a tangible thing that can be met with an equalized force (Nelson, 2017); if we take that similar framework of response and apply it to an economic ideology like neoliberal thinking it fails, concluding that you cannot fight neoliberalism in the same way you can fight fascism, capitalism or colonialism—that is to say it is not a tangible threat that is held and enforced by a group of similar thinkers or a legislation or policy passed by a congress or parliament. It is, for lack of a different expression, the way things are. The question of this thesis then must not be how biopower, biopolitics and violence are reproduced through modern economic markets, but instead, how they exist seamlessly and without any real justification so far that they cannot be simply abolished by an opposing ideological threat of our own.
The question then, did Foucault misdiagnose biopower in its entirety? And if so, then our task ought be a new analysis of the threats of biopower in the twenty first century.