MEMORANDUM
TO: Professor Gashi
FROM: David-Thomas Chan
ASSIGNMENT: Briefing Paper 2
DATE: April 22, 2018
SUBJECT: Biological and Chemical Weapons in Syria and Russia
Intro
The eradication of biological and chemical weapons has proven to be a challenging task considering the vast stockpile owned by several countries prior to ratification of their respective treaties. Russia would own a significant portion of the world’s biological and chemical weapons at the peak of the Cold War. Bashar al-Assad’s regime would accumulate a notable stockpile of chemical weapons prior to the Syrian Civil War. Most concerning, however, is that even after ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention, the development of these weapons would continue and in some cases used in a modern conflict. Therefore, the threat of biological and chemical weapons hasn’t disappeared due to countries like Syria and Russia that continues or conceals the development of these weapons which leads to violations of the chemical and biological weapons treaties and large scale atrocities that yield insurmountable casualties.
Syria
Before the start of the Syrian Civil War, President Bashar al-Assad had an extensive stockpile of chemical weapons including mustard gas, sarin, and the VX nerve agent as well as delivery systems which included scud missiles and artillery. During the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, chemical weapons would see much use as the fighting between rebel groups and al-Assad’s regime intensified. Much of these weapons would be released on August, 24 2013, near Damascus, in Ghouta which was considered the most deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria yielding 1,459 casualties until recently with the chlorine attack in Eastern Ghouta (Syria: A). The former attack on Ghouta prompted international investigations for alleged chemical weapons use and Syria’s entry into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Although the Syrian government had agreed to the provisions of the CWC, chemical weapons would still be produced and used amidst the conflict. Chlorine, which was initially ignored by UN and OPCW investigations alike, was converted and being used in chemical weapon attacks. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had determined that Syria hadn’t declared all of its chemical weapons to the CWC. Reports have also found that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been receiving chemical weapons from al-Assad’s regime. Chemical weapon attacks in Syria would persist to current day (Syria).
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
When chemical agents were released in Ghouta in 2013, the International community pressured Syria into joining the CWC. As the fighting continued, the OPCW would conduct a series of investigations and have determined that the use of sarin, chlorine, and another unidentified nerve agent was being used in the conflict. In June 2014, Syria had halted chemical weapons production and started sending agents abroad to the U.S. and U.K. for destruction. By January 2016, the OPCW had declared eradication of all chemical weapons in Syria, but a confidential report had revealed, within that same year, that the OPCW’s findings were inaccurate and that al-Assad was continuing chemical weapons production (Syria).
Human Rights Watch
Following the attack on Ghouta, the Human Rights Watch established itself in Syria and has since consistently collected data from the region. After examining a total of 85 chemical weapon incidents, the Human Rights Watch has determined that 50 of the chemical weapon attacks have been orchestrated by al-Assad’s regime. 42 incidents involved the use of chlorine, two involved the use of sarin, and seven involved the use of an unknown chemical agent. Because chlorine hadn’t been declared by Syria when submitting to the OPCW, chlorine production was ignored during international inspection. Hence, the continued production of chlorine prompted the majority of chemical weapon attacks in recent time. The two incidents involving sarin and the seven involving the VX nerve agent was due to al-Assad’s ability to continue chemical weapons production (Calamur, Holmes, Syria: A).
Russia
Formerly known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Russian Federation is in possession of a myriad of chemical and biological weapons. Proliferation of these weapons began during the cold war and would continue even after ratification of their respective treaties. The former Soviet Union would ratify the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975 but immediately after, would expand its biological weapons program under the guise of agricultural research with the codename—Ekologiya. Under this program, the Soviet Union would construct a stockpile of biological weapons using anthrax, brucellosis, glanders, Marburg fever, melioidosis, plague, Q fever, smallpox, tularemia, and Venezuelan Eequine encephalitis (Russia). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has made efforts to enact provisions under the Biological Weapons Convention. However, the vast immensity of biological weapons research conducted previously has made it incredibly difficult to examine eradication progress. Cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programmes between the U.S. and Russia has served to eradicate biological weapons in the past, but in recent years Russia has denied renewing any CTR programmes. Hence, the current state of biological weapons eradication is unknown within Russia (Russia).
Similar to biological weapons, chemical weapons development expanded significantly during the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s stockpile of Chemical weapons was considered one of the largest in the world. Chemical weapons were constructed using phosgene, sarin, soman, VX, mustard, and Lewisite. When the Russian Federation ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, it declared ownership of 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons (Russia). Russia would continue destruction of its chemical weapons beyond the November 2016 deadline and will continue eradication until the next deadline in December 2020 (Russia).
United Nations
The Security Council under the United Nations passed resolution 1540 which stated that nation-states couldn’t aid non-state actors with weapons of mass destruction. As a member of the United Nations, Russia is obligated to comply with the export controls and other preventive measures entailed in the resolution (UN, Russia).
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has established several treaties with its member-states regarding the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The most pivotal being the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the United States—a member of NATO—and with Russia regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems (Weapons).
Evaluation
In general, International efforts to halt the use of chemical weapons in Syria have been ineffective. As a branch under the United Nations, the OPCW hasn’t taken any recent measures to prevent the use of chemical weapons besides fact-finding missions. The Human Rights Watch has collected substantial data in Syria but recommends that countries take a unilateral approach to impose sanctions and condemn Syria for the use of chemical weapons. In similar manner, the international community seems passive when limiting Russian development of biological and chemical weapons. Although Russia has been able to maintain eradication of chemical weapons in a timely manner, the state of Russia’s biological weapons is unknown (Syria, Syria: A, Russia).
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the threat of biological and chemical weapons still persists within Syria and Russia. This has led to a series of treaty violations and in modern day atrocity. Chemical weapons production in Syria remains uninterrupted even after ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. Attacks involving sarin, chlorine, and agent VX have been made possible either due to mistakes made during the OPCW’s initial investigation or because Syria had withheld from declaring possession of all of its chemical weapons. NGOs and IGOs continue to operate in Syria and provide the International community with data regarding the use of chemical weapons. The Syrian Civil War continues with the prevalence of chemical weapons used on its population. On the other hand, Russia has been compliant with the CWC but has refrained from revealing any information regarding eradication of its biological weapons. Although treaties and resolutions have been passed by IGOs limiting Russia’s ability to produce biological weapons, Russia has alienated itself from the international community and raises concerns whether or not the matter is being handled.