The Arab-Israeli conflict has been interminable for most of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Driven by nationalistic, religious, and ethnic aspirations, the principal adversaries have remained relatively the same: Israel and her neighboring Arab States. The outcome of the first crisis in the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict was essentially predetermined by both sides: each side being highly sensitive to ethnoreligious claims of territory— both prepared to engage in military action regardless of cost. From the onset, it was clear that Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states would never accept Zionism, while Jewish Zionists were equally unwilling to concede anything less than a Jewish state in Palestine (Bickerton 2011). The first of many international crises in the Arab-Israeli conflict began when the General Assembly of the newly formed United Nations voted to partition the British Mandate of Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state with Jerusalem as an international city on 29 November 1947 and ended with the Arab League’s invasion on 15 May 1948.
Against the backdrop of the receding Axis threat in the Middle East, British military control over Palestine came to a head in the 1940’s. Since World War I, British Mandate Palestine ensured the strategic control of the Suez Canal and secured vital lines of communication to the mainstay of the British Empire: India (Charters 1994, 321). Yet, as the mandate reached its later years, nationalistic ambitions and deteriorating relations between Arabs and Jews began to pressure the foundation of the British colonial project.
The impending crisis was exacerbated by rising violence, economic boycotts, and general instability in Palestine. While the newly elected Labour government was deeply committed to a Jewish State in Palestine (Bloom 1999, 141-171), Prime Minister Clement Attle found British positions in the Middle East dependent on good Anglo-Arab relations–– any action pertaining to the future of Palestine risked undermining Britain’s position in the region (Great Britain. Colonial Office 1922). While London continued to search for a political or diplomatic breakthrough, Arab and Jewish leaders looked to exploit London’s political paralysis: Arab riots across Palestine increased in both number and intensity; and, both in and outside of Palestine, Zionist activity in support of Jewish statehood sought to undermine British control and legitimacy. Realistically, any solution proposed by London to either endorse or abandon the creation of a Jewish sovereignty in Palestine was sure to trigger a crisis.
The Setting
The setting was not favorable towards the Zionists goal of achieving statehood in Palestine. Post-World War II tensions between the allied forces revitalized the strategic importance of Palestine: the discovery of new oil reserves and paramount concern over the spread of Soviet influence led America and Britain to look to reassure the Arab world of their friendship (Bickerton 2011, 67). Arab states also began to take more of an interest in Palestine than before: Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt outlined their interests in the 1922 Alexandria protocol. Arab leaders expressed deep regret over the tragedy inflicted upon European Jewry by Nazi Germany and her collaborators— yet made clear that the problem of surviving European Jewry mustn’t be solved by “inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine” (The Alexandria Protocol 1944).
The decimation of European Jewry in the Holocaust had convinced many that the Jewish people needed a state of their own (Gallup 1947). Particularly in the United States, British attempts to stop illegal Jewish immigration caused intense outcry. British enforcement of the Mandate soon became impossible. Support to remain in Palestine began to erode within the British government in early 1947 while Jewish terrorism and the threat of another Arab uprising threatened to wreck Anglo-Arab relations. Thus, in September 1947, with economic and strategic considerations in mind (Ravndal 2011, 417; Sinanoglou 2009, 148), Attle’s cabinet made the decision to surrender the Mandate and withdraw all military and administrative forces (Charters 1994)
The phases of the crisis
Phase 1: Pre-crisis maneuvering
The initial phase of the crisis may be taken as the period leading up the UN General Assembly vote on UN Resolution 181. Jewish and Arab insurgency against British rule and each other hastened a crisis in the eyes of decision makers in London and Washington D.C. Opinion in America and Britain ranged from that of the American Department of State and the British Foreign office— general opposition to partition (Cohen 1978, 34-44; Roosevelt 1948, 5)— to the view of key White House and Downing street advisors, that support of partition would help secure Jewish votes in upcoming elections (Ovendale 1989, 222-26; Roosevelt 1948). Nevertheless, British attempts to appease Arab demands regarding the future of Palestine were complicated by Palestinian leaders, specifically Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem. Political leader of the Arab residents of Palestine since 1929, (Mattar 1988, 230) Al-Husayni relationship with Adolf Hitler and attempts to rally Arab Palestinians to support the Axis forces during the Second World War (Bickerton 2011, 67) undercut any indirect-support Palestinian Arabs may have enjoyed within the US Department of State and British Foreign Service Office.
The first indication of the British government’s policy towards the final status of Palestine came when the British Cabinet decided to refer the issue to the United Nations on 14 February 1947. The final decision came on the heels of the London Conference for Palestine— a last attempt by Arthur Creech Jones, the colonial secretary of Palestine, and Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary to reach a solution (Ravndal 2011, 422). Both parties, Arab and Jewish, refused to negotiate with the British: the Jewish Agency for Palestine viewed the British proposal as a step towards a single state in Palestine with an Arab majority; the Arab Higher Committee as a step towards partition (CM22(47) 1947).
At a special session of the UN General Assembly from 28 April to 15 May 1947, it was agreed that a special committee on Palestine would be commissioned to study the problem. In a move that surprised Western officials, Soviet ambassador to the UN, Andrei Gromyko, delivered a fiery speech which signaled one of the most stunning reversals of Soviet foreign policy: the Jewish people had the right to establish their own state:
“During the last war, the Jewish people experienced exceptional sorrow and suffering. Without any exaggeration, [one can say] this sorrow and suffering are indescribable. It is difficult to express them in dry statistics on the Jewish victims of the fascist aggressors… This is an unpleasant fact, but unfortunately, like all other facts, it must be admitted. [This fact] …explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own state. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspirations" (United Nations 1947).
Still, American and British officials made little regard such a shift in Soviet policy towards Palestine.
During the summer of 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) visited Palestine and refugee camps in Europe, gathering testimony and evidence from states, organizations, and individuals. On September 3 in its report submitted to the UN, the majority of UNSCOP recommended partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 1947).