As defined by Professor Magagna in Lecture 14 May 2, domestic commitment is the willingness to pay the price for one’s country in times of war. These costs include taxes, damages that are inflicted on the home country, the cost of human lives, and the cost of focusing on the war effort by the country instead of other personal endeavors. It is expected that these costs, with their continual rise in price to the people paying for the war, will defer people from paying the price and eventually result in opposition or defiance against the government. However, in the coming years, we see the exact opposite; the obligation and willingness to pay these domestic commitment costs have increased. This paradox of the domestic commitment problem can be answered by the theory of bargaining.
There is a willingness to accept and pay the domestic commitment to war because as they continue to raise the debt to enroll and participate in warfare action also increases. Increasing taxes and debt and the repercussions of war will undoubtedly rise with the rise of the war, World War II. All of these unpaid costs of the war affect the domestic economy. The paradox of the domestic commitment, as outlined by Professor Magagna in Lecture 14, comes into play because we assume that individuals would typically “have an obversion to paying for war unless it is necessary and beyond question” (Lecture 14, May 2).
When countries are faced with direct conflict on their own land, with the threat of invasion and conquer, it is understandable that they are willing to omit the payment necessary for the domestic commitment problem. It is curious, however, how countries like the United States, who do not see the first-hand war on their own soil, are willing and able to pay these domestic costs. This is explained by examining the opportunity costs of the war itself. This opportunity cost looks at the different options or opportunities the citizen could have gained, had they picked a different outcome; in this case, had they refused to pay the domestic commitment costs of the war. This is observed when the governing body imposes these costs on its people in the form of increased labor, taxes, or enlistment that the public general responds in favor of the war effort.
This was reflected in the Soviet Union investments made during the Cold War. There were some benefits to investing in the Cold War, such as scientific advancements in research and education to further nuclear testing or medicine, however, the overall cost was very much apparent, and one would expect the opposition to parallel the increased demands of the legislative body’s demands for support.
Professor Magagna explains this phenomenon of support in three different hypotheses, coercion, nationalism, and bargaining. Coercion is defined as the “the practice of persuading someone to do something by the use of force or threats.” This method of coercion translates to government usage through the intimidation of the public to comply with the demands for the costs of war. Nationalism is the second tactic that is used to gather the people of the country to fight against the opposition. Ones pride for one’s country is a compelling force that has the power to elicit dedication for a cause such as the cost of war. David Fromkin highlights this sense of nationalism in Europe. “On the continent of Europe the flames of nationalism threatened to burn down even structures that had endured for centuries.” (Fromkin 24). The national hypothesis is strong in its ability to ignite the irrational feelings of people when protecting or attacking something for the sake of their country. The last and main explanatory hypothesis is the bargaining method. This method forces those in power to bargain with those being ruled to reveal how much they are willing to exchange for the cost of commitment to the war. A prime example of this was shown post-Italy unification. They introduced a draft for the military where they needed to persuade its subjects to enlist in the draft. During this time Italy required several qualifications for the right to vote. In order to bargain or incentivize the people of Italy to comply with enlistment, they came to the agreement that if they would sign up for service in the war, they would be given suffrage, bypassing previous requirements. These government deals are cut and clear; if you pay the domestic commitment cost, you will gain a benefit allocated by the government. This is one incentive increasing the cost-benefit analysis people must do when deciding whether to resist or comply with government demands during times of conflict. We see this bargaining method in several different instances throughout history; origins of the welfare state, college education benefits, timing of political shifts (Lecture 14, May 2). This is also seen in several other military benefits within the United States. After World War II, veterans were given loans and several fees were waved in an effort to move away from the city and into the suburbs. This shift allowed for the growth of large suburbs like Lakewood, California to flourish with former military men and their families. These men were even offered jobs building these new suburbs which they would eventually live in, that closely resembled and were modeled after former military camps with uniform tract housing that required no skill or creativity to build and had a “one-size-fits-all” aesthetic.
As displayed in the graphs provided by Professor Magagna in Lecture 14, the costs of warfare, which include diverting costs, damage, duration, and preparation, from the 1500s to the 2000s peaks at 1945 and declines and slowly plateau before the 2000s. This spike is a result of World War II and the Korean War during this peak time (1945 – 1953). In comparison, the domestic commitment parallels graph A, however, the domestic commitment continues to fall after 1945 while the need domestic cost stays stagnant, resulting in a lack of domestic commitment compared to the cost that we experience today. However, these projections are much lower than the actual domestic commitment that levels off at the same rate of the domestic cost. The basic trend shown over time is an increase in the minimum commitment threshold. This means that people, even in areas that do not experience the threat of war, are willing and desire to keep a high military presence and value military strength. One would typically assume that this overall trend would diminish, even result in people refusing to pay costs of war altogether, however, that is not the trend that is displayed. As previously discussed this is due to the several methods used by governments to incentivize their populations, specifically with bargaining.
This is not to say people do not oppose conflict or that they wish to enter wars unconditionally. Take, for instance, the resistance to the Vietnam war or the threat of war between European powers. According to David Fromkin in his book titled, Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? "…European powers ran up against one another. Time and again, war threatened, and only skilled diplomacy and self-restraint enabled them to pull back from the brink.” (Fromkin 18). Although the threat of war was looming over Europe as it does continually throughout history, it is apparent that those in power and those being governed do wish to keep relations peaceful for as long as possible. However, when conflict eventually ensues, the probability of victory does rely heavily on the morale of the people and their willingness to pay the costs that are strung along with it.
The United States is an interesting case study for this paradox, particularly during World War II. This is because, as previously stated, the threat of envisioning by foreign enemies was not present in the United States. Although it is important to note that Japanese forces were able to conquer two remote islands off of the coast of Alaska and the initial attack of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, but no major land territories in the United States faced the threat of invasions. Although the United States residents were granted the benefit of living peacefully in their home country, the overall nationalism and military procurement efforts did not slow or let up. People were willing to spend the cost of fighting the war despite the lack of imminent invasion. There are several instances where ending the war would be to the benefit of the American people several times, but the overall participation of the people does not decrease, and victory is achieved. The only plausible explanation for this epidemic as outlined by Professor Magagna is the theory of bargaining.
A prime illustration of a specific period when the pressure to abstain from World War II was present was during 1944 and 1945 with the "Endless" Pacific War and American Commitment (Lecture 14, May 2). During this time, the United States still continued to hold elections and the overall vote of the people revealed that there was a desire for a return domestic economic stabilization. Although war typically brings about a better economy because of the military procurement, the eventual shift back to old economic endeavors can potentially slow down the United States economy and cause a recession. Despite this apparent economic boom that resulted from the war, during World War II, restrictions and rationing were set in place to monitor certain foods that would have been imported from a country at war. Not to mention, several factories that once produced cars and other machinery were now producing tanks, weapons, and supplies for soldiers, so those commodities were no longer available to the American public. All labor is shifted to the war effort and the economy of a country fighting overseas. It seems as though everything was put on hold for the sake of the Pacific War, but the desire to return to normalcy is present.
This return would not happen unless the surrender of Japan was acquired, and this would only come with the use of bargaining. The Japanese, although it may seem unfavorable to fight on home soil, are given the advantage of waging war on land that is familiar to them, giving them the tactical advantage and the continued moral to protect their home country, encouraging their moral and willingness to pay the domestic costs of war. This only makes matters worse for Americans, who are experiencing a draft shortage of young adults and a significant number of casualties, although not in the same percentages of Japanese casualties. The conditions of Americans at war in Japan are increasingly worsening resulting in a shift in American public opinion. The press was able to monitor and write back detailing the horrible conditions they faced while at fighting at Okinawa. These stories made their way back to the United States press and public opinion of whether a truce or withdrawal should be sought after.
The two-front war fought by the United States was an overall opportunity cost to the American public. They had to endure several opportunity costs: increased taxes, aversion to military procurement, the lack of infrastructure development on home soil, the casualties endured of American military men and women, just to name a few. It is arguably a large enough cost that is equal to or outweighs, in some respects, the overall economic gain that is obtained by World War II by the United States. These domestic costs were met by domestic commitment, which they paid the cost through was Professor Magagna identifies as coercion, nationalism, and bargaining. One cannot be one hundred percent certain about the reasoning behind the devotion to back mobilization made by countless countries in times of war, but the disproportionate willingness to pay these costs is apparent and continues to be a trend seen throughout history.