Crimea: Drivers for Russian Intervention and the Strategic Warming Solution
Introduction
Today, Russia and the West are on the verge of entering strategic competition the likes of which they have not experienced since the Cold War. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state-of-the-nation speech in March 2018 encapsulated perfectly the new dangerous era the world is on the path to entering as he boasted the new “Sarmat” Intercontinental Ballistic Missile which is capable of firing nuclear weapons over the Earth’s poles and the Status-6 Ocean Multipurpose System which threatens coastal cities with amphibian attacks. The obvious motivator for the path to strategic competition is souring Russia-West relations. Ukraine constitutes a key driver of declining relations. Russia and the West tiptoed through a fragile Cold Peace from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 until Russian intervention in Crimea in 2014. For the U.S. to repair relations with Russia and avoid repeating an expensive and risky arms race, it must first seek to understand why Russia intervened in Crimea. There are three primary motivators for Russia’s intervention. The first is the threat from the West which reflected a combination of (a) the threat of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Ukraine, (b) zero-sum European Union (EU) policies, and (c) Western political meddling in Ukraine threatening Russia’s prestige and underlying security concerns. The second is that as a gas-dependent state, Russia coveted Crimea’s vital gas reserves and sought to prevent its dependence on said reserves. The third is that Putin had a gambling nature, and that the response was in part an improvisation to short-term developments hurting Russia. To gain an understanding of why Russia intervened in Crimea, the West must proceed to enact a Strategic Warming policy plan with three components. First, the West should scale down the prospects of NATO in Ukraine, zero-sum EU policies, and political activism in Ukraine. Second, it should launch a massive investment plan in Siberian energy. Third, to address the Kremlin’s apparent tendency to gamble and improvise, it should make clear to Putin and his winning coalition — who stand to benefit from energy rents from Siberia — that the West’s coordinated investment plan is contingent upon a commitment from the Russians to cease impromptu acts of military aggression.
NATO Encroachment, Zero-Sum EU Policies, And Western Political Meddling
Historically, Ukraine has been a special ally for Russia, and Western encroachment — threatening Russia’s prestige status and the underlying national security “buffer,” that Ukraine represents — prompted Russian intervention. For Russia, status as a great power has been vital since the Russian Moment when Peter the Great defeated Sweden and vaulted Russia into the European club of great powers. Russia views prestige largely in terms of Western recognition. It therefore conducts much of foreign policy as a factor of whether the West recognizes Russia or reciprocates Russia’s cooperation as a “legitimate” power. Years of security issues underlie Russia’s seemingly excessive emphasis on being regarded as “great” by the West.. During much of the existence of the Russian Empire, Poland and Sweden posed major threats, attempting to meddle with Russian politics during the Time of Troubles, and both engaging in armed conflict with Russia on several occasions. During World War II, Germany invaded Russia, resulting in the death of 26.6 million Soviets, representing the highest death count of any one country during this conflict. Most recently, in the Cold War, the arms race between Moscow and Washington almost caused a nuclear doomsday during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. It is not surprising that Russia feels vulnerable, and Ukraine — as a partner to Russia — is a vital buffer against potential attacks by the West, especially as Russia becomes an interior state in the context of the rise in military power of Asian states such as China and Japan. The threat of NATO expansion into Ukraine, zero-sum EU policies there, and perceived meddling into the nation’s politics threaten Russia’s prestige and more specifically its related national security needs vis-a-vis Ukraine as a “buffer” state. They represent three standard model drivers for Russia’s intervention.
Effectively, the threat of NATO expansion into Ukraine provoked Russian attack because of its hit on Russian prestige and implications for defense. The hit on Russian prestige surrounding NATO is twofold. First, NATO excluded Russia from joining NATO back during the beginning of the Cold Peace when Russia sought to integrate with the West. Exclusion from instrumental security framework is a tough hit to a Russia so self-obsessed with great power status. Second, the U.S. failed to reciprocate an important Soviet concession regarding NATO. In 1989, the U.S. and the USSR made an informal agreement that NATO was not to extend eastward beyond its current borders ending in West Germany. It was this agreement that formed the basis of Soviet acceptance of German reunification. However, NATO has since expanded to three post-Soviet states and eight additional countries formerly under the Iron Curtain. In 2008, regarding Georgia and Ukraine, NATO stated “These countries will become members.” Western neglect to reciprocate an important Soviet concession undermines Russian prestige on the world stage. The prospect of NATO in Ukraine not only diminished Russia’s prestige, but it posed a real threat and thus triggered Russian security concerns. NATO historically balanced and opposed Russia in the Cold War but went so far as to exclude it during the Cold Peace. NATO in Ukraine would mean the reorientation of Ukraine from an ambiguously aligned state in terms of security matters to a state primarily aligned with a historically anti-Russian, non-reciprocating security framework; Ukraine as a “buffer” would be in jeopardy.
Zero-sum policies by the EU drove Russian movement into Crimea for similar reasons. The EU excluded Russia from the onset, hurting Russia’s integral sense of prestige. It also reeled in several former Iron Curtain and Soviet states. While they certainly did not help Russia’s prestige, the “loss” of former Soviet-block states to the EU constituted substantive losses to Russia. Rising provisions forced states making EU agreements to choose either full alignment with Western or Russian institutions, forcing a zero-sum or “Europe wins and Russia loses” outcome for each successful addition to the EU. Ukraine was a case of extreme zero-sum EU policies in an integral place for underlying Russian security concerns and thus eventual intervention. The Association Agreements explicitly forced Ukraine to choose between a path to EU membership or membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). From a security perspective, a zero-sum pushing out of Russia in Ukraine — in this case through the EU — would mean Russia’s complete loss of Ukraine as a “buffer.”
Western meddling into domestic Ukrainian political affairs drove Russian intervention in Crimea for similar reasons. Yanukovych was vital to Russian influence over Ukraine. As a pro-Russian leader, he bent to Russia’s will on many occasions, such as with a deal to allow Russia naval control over much of the Black Sea. Notably, he refused to sign the EU’s Association Agreements, prompting the Maidan protests which would eventually lead to his ousting. Western leaders opposed this pro-Russian leader in an era of Russia-West tensions over NATO and the EU in Ukraine. U.S. Senator John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee traveled to Kiev to protest with others on the Maidan. Under the auspices of the Obama administration, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland spoke with U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffey Pyatt about post-Yanukovych personnel preferences in a call that was intercepted by Russian intelligence. The extent of opposition and the eventual toppling of Yanukovych amidst protests undermined Russian prestige. Yanukovych’s pro-Russian tilt supported Russia’s great power narrative, and Western forces toppled him, leading to direct security losses. Yanukovych and Putin had made a deal allowing Russia significant naval control of the Black Sea, however his loss meant the loss of the deal. The hit to Russia’s prestige along with underlying security concerns due to Western political meddling in Ukraine drove Russia to intervene in Crimea.
Crimean Gas
Looking beyond standard model drivers, it is critical to note the strong economics and domestic politics model driver for intervention in Crimea, reflecting Ukraine’s status as both a consumer and potential source of Russian energy.. Russia is a top producer of both oil and natural gas, and its exports are disproportionately composed of these two commodities. According to a study by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2013, oil and gas consisted of 68% of Russia’s exports. However, it faces two major hurdles according to Leon Aron in his article “The political economy of Russian oil and gas”: new technology has made these sources of energy cheaper for would-be importers to obtain through other methods, and for Russia to keep producing at the same level, it must invest in its reserves in the cold and sparsely populated Siberia. Diversification of Russia’s economy would be a healthy exit strategy for the quagmire Russia’s economy is currently in. However, as Aron and other scholars of the domestic economics model have pointed out, Putin needs oil and gas rents to keep his winning coalition satisfied. Without the satisfaction of his winning coalition, the strength and legitimacy of his regime are at stake. To keep his power — following the domestic politics model assumption that leaders want to do so — he is effectively keeping his economy reliant on oil and gas and his winning coalition happy. In the wake of the outlined energy challenges Russia faces, Russian control of Crimea with newly discovered offshore gas deposits is a solid opportunity to keep Ukraine dependent on Russian gas and to capitalize on a relatively inexpensive gas extraction opportunity. Effectively, Crimea has a maritime zone triple its land size with energy resources potentially worth trillions of dollars according to William J. Broad of the New York Times. The extent of the profitability of the Black Sea’s energy zone became known in 2012 when a ship found a massive gas field off the coast of Romania. Moscow had tried to secure the rich Crimean maritime zones following this discovery in a failed pact with Kiev, indicating its heavy interest in Black Sea energy despite Russian leadership publicly denying such interest. After all, Black Sea energy is closer and cheaper than energy from thousands of miles from Russia’s population centers in Siberia. Moscow’s takeover in Crimea also kept Ukraine dependent on Russian energy by turning its rising energy independence from its would-be control of the gas deposits in Crimea on its head. Effectively, Ukraine planned on gaining energy independence largely through new reserves in the Black Sea; however Russia’s takeover of Crimea from Ukraine turned the latter’s newfound independence into artificially prolonged energy dependence. To develop a new cheap energy source while keeping Ukraine hooked on Russian gas exports, Russia took Crimea.
The Gamble Element
Another important driver of Russia’s intervention in Crimea to keep in mind is that it was in many ways an improvisation or a “gamble” on Putin’s part. Rather than simply being the culmination of prestige or security issues with the West or domestic energy challenges, the intervention was in part a short-term tactical response to the loss of the Black Sea agreement in Ukraine. Political scientist Daniel Triesman points out in his article “Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin” that Russia’s intervention was notably chaotic in nature. Indeed, politically, the intervention seemed to suffer from a “farcical lack of preparation.” The most obvious example of this is Putin’s indecision on whether he wanted to annex Crimea even a week after having invaded it.
Policy Prescription – Strategic Warming:
The West must effectively respond to a cocktail of drivers of Ukraine’s annexation in order to repair relations with Russia. These drivers include encroachment of its organizations there threatening Russia’s prestige and underlying security concerns, interest in a new relatively cheap gas reserve while keeping Ukraine hooked on Russia, and a gamble element on the part of Putin. With so much at stake, the proper response from the West lies in a Strategic Warming policy plan consisting of three provisions. It must first scale back its NATO, EU, and political involvement initiatives in Ukraine going forward to avoid antagonizing Russia vis-a-vis its prestige and underlying security concerns. Due to the importance Russia places on prestige and underlying security issues, a scaleback initiative by the West is mandatory for the improvement of Russia-West relations. Second, the West must launch an investment campaign in Russia’s oil and gas reserves in Siberia. Russia’s energy dependence is here to stay given its importance for Putin in keeping his winning coalition satisfied. However, the West has the ability to influence how Russia manages its dependence. Russia is already partially turning to Siberian reserves to feed its dependence thanks to investment from Asia. Access to these reserves, though expensive in the short-run, drastically reduces Russia’s need for Ukraine’s newly discovered Black Sea gas deposits. Since Russia’s greatest constraint to Siberian access is financial in nature, Western investment has the capability to complement Asian investment and massively reorient Russian focus and aggression on the Black Sea to Siberia, reducing the vitality of Ukraine to Russia and thus also the contentious nature of disputes there. Finally, the West must include in its proposed Siberian investment plan a key provision that impromptu Russian acts of military aggression such as in Crimea are grounds for stopping Siberian investment. Since energy rents are integral to Putin’s power due to his need to please his winning coalition, this provision will likely drive Putin to eliminate or at least minimize chaotic military gambles. Only with such a plan can the West hope to avoid the current strategic competition from escalating into at best an expensive arms race and at worst nuclear war.