CANDIDATE NUMBER: 87251
COURSE CODE: HY423
TRC: Dr. TAYLOR C SHERMAN
WORD COUNT: 4976
TOPIC: Discuss the motivations and the methods by which the East India Company used pre-existing structures to govern India before 1857.
The East India Company since its inception in 1600 A.D. was a commercial enterprise and the main reason for the company to venture into the Indian subcontinent was to take control over the spice trade. However,” In the mid-eighteenth century, there began a steady dismantling of the Mughal successor state system and its replacement by British domination which began with the British conquest of Bengal in the 1750s and 1760s.” The breakthrough in Company striving towards achieving political supremacy happened when a concession was made to the Company in the year 1717 A.D. by the Mughal emperor Farukhsiyar, who issued a farman (grant). The farman allowed the company to trade freely in Bengal without having to pay any duty tax. This strengthened the company’s commercial position and with the battle of Plassey in 1757, followed by the battle of Buxar and the Grant of diwani rights “which made them assume the official Mughal post of Diwani” in 1764 and 1765 respectively, this ‘strengthened’ position was further consolidated. Thus, this induced closeness between many of the independent Indian rulers and the Company, as has been opined by Burton Stein, "The company received a host of requests for officers to train infantry divisions from Sultans and Kings and even for contingents of Company troops to support royal army.”A subsidiary alliance system was conjured up which slowly placed the company in the role of an administrator. The question whether the British rule altered the structure of Indian society or did it lean on pre-existing structures dominates the historiography of the period. Robert Frykenberg, David Ludden, Pamela Price, J.G.A. Pocock are few of the historians who believe in the ‘continuity’ of the pre-existing structures in the continent. The other side of the coin is the disagreement in the view which resonates in the concept of ‘rupture’ from the erstwhile structures as has been seen in the works of Prasanna Parthasarathi, Nicholas Dirks, Jon Wilson to name a few. However, the nature of the company rule at least for the first century of its existence is best explained as a ‘hybrid state’, as the British lacked both the means and the local knowledge to operate independently of Indian assistance. In the words of Douglas Peers, “For all its pomp and circumstance, British rule in India was, at least initially, dependent upon Indian labour, Indian capital, and the tacit cooperation of key segments within Indian society.””Modern states treat their subjects as strangers”, however governance in both Europe and Asia until the 19th century rested upon the model of familiarity between the ruler and the ruled and was characterised by a face to face exchange. This shared model induced the East India Company to rely on the interaction that had been somewhat established in the pre-colonial times which became a crucial instrument in governing the subcontinent in the early years. The overarching aim of the company throughout the period was the desire to make money, to limit risky encounters with local inhabitants or bringdown the amount of paper work, all of which contributed to the interaction between the company and the indigenous structures. The period was characterised by Anglo French War which heightened the British’ need for ‘security’ and that could be only satisfied if ‘a dialogue’ between the ruler and the ruled took place in the forms of a pre-existing structure in military, economic, cultural, judicial systems and etc. Apprehension loomed large in the policies of administration of the Company about treading too quickly, and thus consensus was reached on proceeding in a piecemeal fashion. The common belief was that India was too ill-equipped for any rapid change and thus the company undertook the practice to operate within Indian practices and institutions, at least as they understood them. The vestiges of the Mughal empire lived on in the colonial era in the form of its administrative, fiscal and considerable amount of judicial systems. The company’s reliance on pre-existing structure toned down after 1830, and what emerged was a peculiar hybridization. The features taken from the pre-existing structure was often maneuvered to meet the company’s interest and slowly brought forward a new system in the subcontinent that were to be followed in the subsequent years. Thus, it so appears that the features taken from the pre-existing structures formed the base upon which the company built a superstructure in accordance with its own interest. However, the contribution of the preceding Indian structures cannot be denied in consolidating the Company rule in India. This has led many historians to conclude that, “Indians acquired India for the British empire, rather than the British themselves”. Though the above-mentioned statement might come off as facetious, however, there are layers of truth interlaced in the observation which will be explored hereafter.
“Three objectives dominated British policy making in India in this period (as well as thereafter): security, Stability and the quest for profitability.” The changeover of the company into a trading corporation with territorial responsibilities was not smooth, thus the need to find an already existing system of government was crucial to cater to the three main objectives of the company. India with its enormous geographical contiguity coupled with varied customs and languages made it difficult for the company to maintain its stability and security in the initial years. This was because, the ‘knowledge’ that was required to govern the foreign land was not in their grip due to linguistic impediment, thus limiting the Company’s grasp overall. This induced an intensified quest for information of varied categories by individuals as well as by the East India Company. The need to gather information gave rise to systematization of information acquired from the native soil which shaped the “investigative modalities” instrumented by the British. The first move was to learn the local languages such as Classical Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit, the grasp over these languages was necessary to “issue commands, collect taxes and maintain law and order.”knowledge over local language acted as a fundamental method over which information about other avenues were easily acquired which expedited administrative business. The learning of local language was so crucial that Fort William college was established in 1800 A.D. to acclimatise the freshly arrived British officials in local languages and customs. The preceding empire however ‘arbitrary’ it was, gave the East India Company a structure over which the company’s governance could develop accordingly. The question of how to adapt ‘the pre-existing structure’ shaped by the Mughals without hampering the indigenous societal status quo at the same time reap utmost commercial benefits became a fundamental concern to the company. Thus, primarily the Company decided to rely on the Indian functionaries such as the Hindu Pandits and Muslim Maulvis with the belief that the actions taken by the company would be backed by the indigenous written sources interpreted by them. Thus building correspondence began with the help of the functionaries such as Dubashi whose anglicised version would be a translator and who helped the Company in the initial phase of its rule. In Bengal, the Akhund, for example, who was often referred as ‘the Mohammedan School Teacher’ was responsible in interpreting all the letters and writings in Persian, was often vested with diplomatic missions and was also sent to deliver important documents to Mughal officials. These functionaries had a certain level of specialized knowledge and expertise which was crucial in bridging the gap between the ruler and ruled, at least from the ruler’s perspective. Warren Hastings, the first governor general of Bengal was an open advocate of this need to be efficient in the local language and custom and from “1770 onwards the British consciously made an effort to appropriate Indian languages to serve as a crucial component in their construction of the system of rule”.
Originally what had interested Jones, Wilkins, Halhed and Ellis had to be incorporated in their system of governance which would make a strong case for India to be an earlier ‘civilisation’ or “a museum of ancient practices, from which earlier stages of universal world history could be recovered.” Philologists delved in deep to understand the structure and the origin of the Indian languages and this had been further strengthened by Sir William Jones ,who in 1784 formed the Asiatic Society where the development of the idea that there is a close genetic relation between Indo European languages crystallised ,thus legitimizing the existence of the Ancient Indian civilisation .Persian and Arabic acted as the instrument through which the pre-existing legal structure could be accessed, on the other hand this period also saw the need to put Ancient Indian civilisation in the limelight which made the study of Sanskrit an important part of the ‘language learning process’. Many texts of the Hindu religion were deciphered with the help of the Indian ‘assistants’ of the company. The emphasis on the Sanskrit texts also illuminate the argument of ‘oriental despotism’ which was used to explain the need to reintroduce the once glorious entities of Ancient Indian civilisation where the language Sanskrit played the driving force. Religion was a focal point in shaping the Indian society, and often overlapped with legal, cultural structures as well. Thus, it was no surprise that the Company would turn towards the religious texts in comprehending the Indian society however, it wasn’t constructed by the British, the Indian intermediaries helped a lot in this venture.Nevertheless, a mention must be made that the effort or the governmental system to know the language and the custom of the conquered territory wasn’t a novel feature of the colonial state; it very much existed in the pre-colonial times. Thus, it can be safely argued that the system of gathering and classifying information and using it to consolidate power was a continuing feature which had been taken from the erstwhile reigning Mughal empire.
The British since the early days of their rule understood the importance to glean knowledge from every corner of the subcontinent due to its direct relation with power. Thus, gathering information which would be translated into knowledge worked at many levels. The help from indigenous political surveillance from the year 1760s witnessed the assimilation of information in a different level. “The networks of Indian running spies, news writers and knowledgeable secretaries whom the East India Company recruited and deployed in their efforts to secure military, political and social information became a major determinant of their success in conquest and profitable governance.” The various forms of information givers ranging from the astrologers, physicians to the mid wives , marriage makers all contributed in the Company’s understanding of the indigenous politics, economics and other activities which otherwise would be an impediment for the Company to rule with efficacy. The communication system that formed the very basis of the company’s intelligence system was a concoction of “colonial state’s surveillance and autonomous networks of social communicators by using the concept of information order”. The notion of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ meant a working intelligence system was in need, however “problems arose when the company tried to engage with the information order of the conquered society” due to their erroneous European biases. The fear of unknown or in the words of C.A. Bayly ‘ignorance of the wiles of natives’ grappled the British’ mindset. Thus, the need to penetrate deep in to the indigenous forms of intelligence system was the need of the hour. The best way to do that was to steer its way towards the Mughal structure, which from the 1200 introduced a regular system of official political reporting which was seen in the likes of Dak Chaukis under recognised officials which continued being the arteries of the British India as well. Every province had a commercial office of ‘recorders of events’ who were known by the names of ‘waqai nigars’ and ‘waqai navis’ who looked into other matters. A detailed prescription of their role had been laid out in the Ain-I-Akbari penned down by Akbar’s counsellor and chronicler, Abu Al-Fazl which was used by the East India Company with its own network of British agents: Residents. These officers sent their reports through runners known by the name harakas who were also integrated in the department of daroga-i- harakon (coordinated espionage) and were dispatched under the charge of the head postmaster known by the name daroga-i- dak along with these the emperor at all times was informed of the intelligence coming in from the regional news writers.
The transition from the office of Mughal Akhbar Nawis (newswriters) to British forms reflects the persistence of the office, however transformed it may be. Various other overlapping systems of watch and ward existed and which helped in bringing news and information like the chief police officer known by the Indian name Kotwal and night watchmen known as Chaukidar who was responsible for patrolling the streets all day long. There was a whole range of officials who contributed in making the Mughal intelligence system a workable one and thus were assimilated by the Company. The civil magistrate (Kazi), chief cleric (mufti) and censor (muhtasib) are some of the officials who had a significant role in “investigating, recording and alerting authorities to commercial, proprietary and moral issues”. The munshi khana or literally the writer’s office and the data collector (kanungo) played a crucial role in establishing the British rule which was a continuation of the earlier governing body. The fact that there was no consistency in ‘colonial knowledge’ emphasizes the importance of the role of Indian intermediaries. After the demise of the Mughal empire, the Indian states continued to be involved in the process of information gathering by the British, for example, “the defeated ruler of Awadh after 1764 began to supply the Company with numerous copies of formulaic and interpretive akhbarat and other intelligence reports, drawn from his own extensive network of akhbar nawis and wakils across India.” A hybridization was noticed in the system where “ Indian intelligence system was allied with the writing skills and knowledge of learned Brahmins with the hard bodies and running skills of tribal and low caste people”.
The fear of ‘instability and insecurity’ became a recurrent concern for the company before 1857. This was mellowed to a certain extent by the Indian intermediaries in every sector of the British administration as that helped in being in control over the ‘forms of knowledge’ acquired by the British through these intermediaries. “The British undertook the art of listening in, on the internal communications of Indian polity and society” which overcame the fear of unknown. The company rule saw an increased amount of dialogue with Indian collaborators. The East India company primarily had a heightened trading interest and was mainly interested to get best possible commercial returns at the same time never “directly controlled more than two-thirds of the subcontinent-hence the role of collaborators of one sort or another was of fundamental importance”. India was a developing capitalist economy with an increasingly substantial trading class, sophisticated credit networks and transcontinental means of exchange. The company rule in India was often characterised by being aided financially and politically by Indian merchants, which was noticed in the case of Surat in 1759 where with the support of the Muslim nobility and local merchants the British were able to seize control of Surat. The Banias and the Shroffs from North India with their long trading lineage had been adept at exploiting the Company rule with the credit system of the subcontinent dominated by the hundis in the western part, the company became heavily dependent upon them. The indigenous credit and assistance had helped the smooth running of the Bombay presidency as well as proliferated the china trade, thus catering to the Company’s need of being commercially benefitted, thus consolidating the political rhetoric of the company.
The company in its earliest days may have critiqued the oriental despotism, however once it started acquiring power, the despotism proved to be attractive. Thus, importance of natives was buttressed, even if the native rulers lost the power to wage war with the British, they hardly disappeared into oblivion, mention must be made of Muhammed Reza Khan who took it upon himself to instruct the Company as to the proper forms of indigenous intelligence. He was also a defender of Mughal customs between 1769 and 1772 which invoked a subtle set of relationships between the continuing sovereignty of the Mughal emperors and the British. The recurrent concern of the Company’s governance was the increasing need for stability and security as the Company landed with enormous tracts of land, formerly belonging to Mysore, the Marathas and the Mughals, the need of the hour was how to gain maximum profit from the newly acquired land without upsetting the structure. “The Bengal Revenue system had already been subjected to reform under the Late Mughals, when many of the small zamindaris had been grouped together as to streamline the collection of revenue and The British adopted this system of zamindari division and only made it permanent.” (The Permanent Settlement). “Ranajit Guha may have made a valiant effort to find, in the Permanent settlement of 1793, the beacon to an epoch of private property rights and unfettered market capitalism, however, it plainly bedazzled his reading of the permanent settlement’s text: which held that whatever rights it might be thought to create, none should be treated as overriding pre-existing custom”. In the south the British borrowed a revenue system from Tipu Sultan, which depended on collecting tax from individual cultivators-ryotwari system and that was noticed in the west and the north as the mahalwari system. The motivations for undertaking the pre-existing structures in the land revenue systems were sometimes due to their insufficient knowledge about economy, land and people and sometimes they were political where it would be instrumental in undermining the power of an enemy power by gaining support from the indigenous individual cultivators, utilising the pre-existing structures to their utmost potential.
The Company’s decision to depend on the indigenous legal structure was because of the “reluctance to assume the burden of direct administration and hesitant to pose such an explicit challenge to Mughal rule” due to their precarious position on the native soil. The ancient Mughal constitution became a vehicle for imagining a comprehensive model of sovereignty. Indian powers however ceremonial it was, was still utilized to legitimize the company rule in the subcontinent. The expanse of the British Indian empire made them realise that at least in the initial years the subcontinent should be governed in the name of a familiar ruler and the system of governance should be based on a pre-existing structure in order to gain considerable support from the inhabitants. This was achieved through the usage of the Emperor’s face on the coins used in the colonial era, thus legitimizing their sovereignty. This was also noticed in the way the Company continued the tradition of khilat (robes of honour) to visiting zamindars and receiving nazrs (donations) in return. The Company’s increasing interest in maintaining ‘stability and security’ was noticed through its legal framework. The East India Company had to construct a state through which it could rule, and the general consensus was that the Indian subcontinent was though in a state of flux “had a state system with recognizable institutions and functions.” “The regulations of 1772 inaugurated a process by which the colonial state claimed exclusive rights judicial and punitive authority as the prerogative to of sovereignty. Warren Hastings primarily had mixed executive and judicial powers in a defined area, a district and was demarcated the pre-existing Mughal revenue units, circas. Hastings also focused on the centralist aspects of Mughal order structured around the faujdar, when he touched on the theme of criminal justice. It was the faujdar, the representative of the nazim, he contended, not the local raja or zamindar to whom the people looked for justice and protection.” “The Company had instituted the Islamic law as the substantive law for criminal justice using the argument of 'ancient usage'. Certainly, the association between the sharia and the Mughal imperial tradition was of crucial importance to the Company as the Company's faujdari adalats and diwani adalats could draw upon a pool of personnel trained in a certain legal and administrative structure” Indigenous forums continued to thrive, for example, “petty cases were overseen in Madras by the hereditary village headman, the adigar in the local choultry courts, and soon the choultry judges became Company servants.” “The civil courts would apply Muslim law to Muslims, and Hindu law to Hindus and the criminal courts would apply Muslim law universally”, thus, reiterating Jones’ argument in using established legal system to prepare the inhabitants for superior British system.
The question of stability and security which dominated the Company’s immediate concern was not unnecessary, this period was marked by both threats externally and internally, hence the ultimate dependence was upon sword, which was a borrowed concept from the Mughals. Thus, establishing a somewhat peaceful society was crucial for the Company to continue exercising its sovereignty over the subcontinent. The military forces would usher in the ultimate state of security. British organizational, fiscal and technical superiority was limited in India , thus certain features of the indigenous military system had to be undertaken. The Indian Army in the subcontinent was characterised by “military fiscalism which can be traced back to the Mughal empire where ‘commercialization of royal power began’.” “It has been argued that the company’s concept of the Rule of Law was another facet of the expansionary momentum which drew Indian states into the fiscal and military orbit of the Company”.“In selecting Indian recruits for service in India, the British began by following Indian traditions, tapping into the pre-existing military labour market of India.” The incorporation of the rural high caste Rajputs in the north and the consolidation of a tight knit community of the upper caste characterised the military system of the Company, this method was also motivated by Warren Hastings’ policy to preserve the Indian caste roles in military and civilian institutions who had the model of Cheyt and Shuja in front of him. “Warren Hastings became convinced of the value of extending British influence through systems of alliances, striking a point midway between the company’s insistence on non-intervention and those officials who clamoured for conquest.” The forced incorporation of civilian society from varied backgrounds required the company to generate knowledge of ‘Indian customs and religious practices’. In order to make the Company seem a government of familiarity , the oath of fealty taken by the sipahis were in their native languages, thus utilising the power of the rhetoric. The recruitment of Rajput and Bhumihar peasant regiments directly from the zamindaris of Bihar was a method taken from the previous empire in the form of ‘armed peasant’ which helped in keeping a check on the powerful native rulers through whom the company recruited it’s sipahis. The recruitment was heavily dependent on the indigenous population of the Jungle Tarai region when the territory was expanded to the frontier in 1772 and the armies consisted of Rohillas, Afghans and Mewatis. The local customs had to be taken into consideration because in order to administer the hilly region efficiently the knowledge of the terrain was required, thus support from local notables was crucial for the Company. The Company being ‘empire of opinion’ used Mughal imagery and military ethics in shaping the Gurkha soldiers who welded theirs along with Nepali military tactics as well, thus contributing in political and social stability in the Company’s newly acquired territories which was the primal concern. Cavalry was the mainstay for the Mughal empire and what emerged were the ‘gentleman troopers’ who had close contacts with the urban and rural professional groups of the quasbahs which is why it continued to thrive even after the formal demise of the empire. The offices of faujdar and amil formed the foci of all military mobilization and this had been taken from the Mughal system. The heterogenous character of the Mughal army that had been borrowed by the British “conciliated a variety of ethnic groups and also helped to keep in check various tremors of recalcitrance and protest in the Raj.” The usage of indigenous raw materials like saltpetre was utilised, they incorporated the usage of rocket in their warfare from Tipu sultan and like the Mughals, they built roads to improve its logistical infrastructure. The fear of unknown, again, induced the Company to heavily depend on the Indians. The Indian recruits would be available at a cheaper price, would know the area and its people properly and would be well adjusted to the climatic conditions of the subcontinent which was still a matter of discomfort to their European counterparts.
The Company rule, thus was heavily depended on the pre-existing structures in order to function smoothly. “The East Indian Company’s superiority in South Asia was due to the British success in exploiting the conflicts and divisions within indigenous societies and in harnessing indigenous aid.” The Company in since its initial days in the administrative pedestal, realized the need to collaborate with the Indian functionaries in order to garner support and firm its footing in the subcontinent. The methods of learning the native tongue, keeping Indian names of the offices and functions intact all contributed to its strengthened position in the subcontinent. However, the character of the state was one where the outer cover remains somewhat the same, the content often changed according to the Company’s interest. Nonetheless, the usage indigenous systems to govern the subcontinent thrived and that was seen in the social reforms as well. The policy of non-interference of the Company abstained the officials from meddling with the practice of Sati (self-immolation) but with Lord William Bentinck assuming the post of Governor General in Bengal, the practice of Sati legally abolished in 1829. However, the interesting fact was that Ram Mohan Roy who aided them Company in the process cited that it wasn’t a sacred Hindu rite, “in addition, fear of the potentially explosive consequences of treading too harshly on Indian traditions persuaded the governor-general to canvass all regimental commanders as to whether they were at all apprehensive that abolition could cause unrest within the ranks of their regiments.” This was the same reason for “‘coerced labour’ in South India to continue which was successful in managing to postpone the metropolitanly ordered abolition of slavery for than a decade.” Thus, ‘continuity’ was seen in every nook and corner in the initial years of the Company rule in the subcontinent, however with the passage of time and as the company familiarized with the unknown conquered territory, they moulded the structures to accommodate their own interest. “Colonial rule didn’t merely supplant or subordinate existing political, military and economic structures of the pre-existing society, instead it co-opted them.”
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