The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure has been effective to some degree, but is facing several substantial challenges (Xiaodong, 2012). This essay, focusing on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, will present the thesis that Central Asia, China and Russia have vastly different perspectives on the SCO, it is Russia who is driving the security focus of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, that China is advocating largely for the economic integration of the SCO, the significant criticism that the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure has received as underdeveloped and ineffective is justified and Central Asia, China and Russia have vastly different perspectives on the SCO. Firstly, the operations of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (herein referred to as the RATS), and the perspectives of each member of the SCO, aside from Pakistan and India, will be assessed. Pakistan and India remain absent from this assessment, as for the purposes of this assignment, it is not practical to assess the RATS priorities of both India and Pakistan as the newest members of the SCO. Secondly, the two directions of the SCO will be briefly analysed, before the RATS operating budget, personnel and activities, including cyber defence and interactions with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, will be assessed. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for the RATS will be presented.
Firstly, the perspectives of countries on the SCO are important to understanding the operations of the RATS. Colonel Zhao Xiaodong, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) researcher and military lawyer at the PLA Academy of Military Science, presents a relatively impartial but Chinese-centric perspective on the SCO. Xiaodong puts forward that China sees the SCO not only as a symbolic representation of its engagement with Central Asia, but also a useful tool to achieve its goals in the region (Xiaodong, 2012, p. 19). Russia on the other hand, does not want to appear to be fully investing in the SCO due to the important role that Europe and European institutions such as the EU play in its long-term strategic interests (Xiaodong, 2012, p.19), while the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan focus on the benefits of membership, specifically economic and social issues, rather than for their own political benefit (Xiaodong, 2012). China and Russia use the SCO as a platform to achieve their strategic objectives. Central Asia have expectations that the SCO will serve their own interests and focus on the benefits of membership (Xiadong, 2012, p. 19) The SCO plays a very important role for counter-terrorism and the maintenance of regional stability, but the lack of practical cooperation is noticeable (Xiaodong, 2012 p. 20). However, there are significantly contrasting positions proposed, as some analysts have difficulty in determining exactly what the SCO is, what is does and how it functions (Blank, Making Sense of the SCO, 2013) pp. 39).
Official RATS definitions of the three evils (terrorism, separatism and extremism) are much looser than other international definitions. SCO members are required to give mutual recognition to acts of terrorism, separatism and extremism regardless of the national definition (Wallace, 2014, p. 204). RATS is an explicit security pact designed to facilitate cross-border policies combating transnational threats (Wallace, 2014, p. 1). China’s passivity in the RATS contravenes realist theory, which would dictate a hardline security focused approach (Wallace, 2014, p. 200). Chinese participation in RATS is very limited, and while the accomplishments of the RATS are limited, all parties seem to view it as a success (Wallace, 2014, p. 200). While the author of the following information Thomas Wallace, an experienced Research Associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses, puts forward the contentious claim that the Chinese preoccupation with a domestic threat has powerful downstream implications for what claims to be an international security organisation, he does present very detailed analysis on the RATS activities, their successes, operating budget and staffing composition.
Furthermore, his work was reviewed by Michael Dominguez, an experienced former U.S. Department of Defense official who served as acting Secretary of the Air Force and as Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; in addition to David Shambaugh, the former editor of the China Quarter, a Professor at George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, and a former National Security Council China analyst who in 2015 was named the second-most influential China expert in the US by the China Foreign Affairs University (Elliot School of International Affairs, n.d.). Wallace states that there are problems in agreements between members about the intelligence sharing database and that commitments that have been made to combat narcotics and transnational crime remain unfilled (Wallace, 2014). China uses RATS as mechanism for locating and repatriating Uyghur dissidents. The RATS does not functions as a joint analytical environment, collect intelligence, integrate command structures or formulate joint doctrine like other similar organisations (Wallace, 2014). While there has been changes to RATS since 2014, specifically the integration of counter narcotics, border security and engagement with the groups such as the UN Counter Terrorism Committee and the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, there is still no firm data about the success of the organisation’s operations.
Seven PRC personnel assigned to Tashkent HQ, estimated budget of $2 mill for RATS, China contributed 24%, total staff of 30 (Source 9 in Wallace). In 2004, the RATS was estimated to have a $500,000 budget and 30 personnel – 7 from China and Russia, 6 from Kazakhstan, 5 from Uzbekistan, 3 from Kyrgyzstan and two from Tajikistan. In 2006, Du Wei, then the assistant secretary of the SCO cited the budget at $1.25 million (Wallace), while a Russian 2007 estimate has the budget at $2 million and the same personnel numbers. A US visitor in 2012 reported that the Tashkent HQ consisted of a single moderately sized compound, with a single guard and was told by member of the EC that “a couple of dozen staffers were employed (Weitz, 2012). Zhang Xinfeng, the director of the RATS EC separately told a Chinese newspaper that “not many people are in the office” (Wallace).
A single non-combat theatre NATO intelligence fusion centre has over 200 personnel.
CYBER
Only after the Arab Spring and NSA SIGINT leads did RATS move from pledges to intra-alliance action. 2012 RATS Council signed joint agreements on measures “to combat thet use or potential use of computer networks for terrorist, separatist and extremist ends”. Provoked by alleged Western cyber attacks on RATS infrastructure, with Russian intelligence chief Sergei Smirnov stating after a RATS meeting in Tashkent that “Wester security services… would like to inflict some damage upon use in terms of cyber security infrastructure and noting that “all the countries in the SCO experience the same pressure”. Followed by a public announcement in Sep 13 that the SCO would take steps to “strengthen its ability in processing information and coordinating the cyber security agencies of member states to fight against the three evils forces. While there is little public information regarding implementation of cyber initiatives in the SCO, Wallace asserts that these statements suggests that Russia, not China is spearheading SCO cyber efforts (Wallace, 2014, p. 207). Russia security services such as the FSB have collaborated with telecommucations providers across Soviet Union to install packet inspection and surveillance capabilities capable of broad, persistent monitoring Internet and telephone communication. This system dubbed. SORM, the Russia acronym for System of Operative-Investigative Measures – has been installed in many SCO member states (most recently Kyrgyzstan) but appears to be coordinated on a bilateral basis between Moscow and the Central Asian member states, with minimal RATS or Chinese participation (Wallace, 2014, p. 207). This however is counteracted by the April 2018 meeting of the technical and legal experts from each country’s RATS contributing agency discussing “provisions on the protected information and telecommunication system of communication between the competent authorities of member states (RATS, 2018)”.
Some members have refused to let joint military forces to cross their borders, for example, Uzbekistan refused to allow Kazakh forces heading to Peace Mission 2012 cross its territory. SCO has never deployed. Chinese analysts reportedly are aware that such lack of action has exposed the organisations limitations. Mutual distrust between Central Asian states and Russian influence in the region are significant barriers to a more integrated and capable RATS.
Uzbekistan blocked Kazakhstan from using its airspace to travel to SCO drills, anecdotal reports suggest that states are nearly totally unwilling to feed classified information into RATS for fear of empowering their rivals. Beijing appears to value RATS as a rhetorical and moral justification for domestic policies, not as a means of pooling hard power to counter external security threats.
Interbank consortium, highway and bridge construction between members, cultural exchanges.