In a response aimed at Plato’s account of knowledge most commonly known as Justified True Belief (JTB), Gettier proposes counterexamples which he calls Case I and Case II, in order to make the claim that a justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge. With Gettier’s claim in mind, we can come to see how appealing to infallibility, or the inability to be wrong, will allow us to accept justification as grounds for absolute certainty in order to avoid the Gettier problem. In this essay, I will run through Gettier’s analysis of justified true belief, bring to question the infallibility approach to knowledge, and argue for why appealing to infallibility avoids the Gettier problem and ultimately is a workable solution.
Gettier argues each component of JTB – justification, truth, and belief – may be necessary for knowledge, but altogether are not sufficient; there has to be something more. With that being said, it is easy to see that there is somewhat a gap between what we consider to be justified true beliefs and what we consider to be knowledge, but where is this said gap and what can we do to fill it? Gettier argues that there are numerous examples where one may hold a justified true belief, yet still not know, or have knowledge of, something. That is to say that all of the conditions of JTB are satisfied, but the outcome still is not knowledge. In his counterexamples, one can be technically right, or be said to have knowledge of something, merely by luck or by chance, but they do not ‘know’ because their justifications are false. To avoid this problem, many philosophers attempt to add on a fourth condition to the JTB account of knowledge. Every condition and premise has been tried and tossed out, which causes many arguments very tiring in nature, viciously circular, with a great deal of heat and very little light. By attempting to define knowledge in this way, fallibility proponents run into an infinite regress where they continue to add more and more conditions to justify our beliefs, which goes on and on, ultimately never coming to an end or conclusion that anyone can agree on.
In looking at all of these failed attempts to define knowledge, it is easy to find the concept of infallibility to be attractive; that is to say, it is simpler to come to the conclusion that there are no logically possible grounds or reasons for doubting some true belief. Whereas fallibility proponents look at all of the problems that could arise from the JTB account of knowledge and look to add conditions, infallibility supporters focus more so on the idea that no problems should even be able to arise due to the fact that there can be no such thing as a justified false belief, which is exactly what Gettier presents in both of his cases, as discussed in the following paragraph.
Descartes probes infallibilism in his Meditation I with his constant reductions in his opinions. He concludes that, if P (a proposition) is said to be known, then there is no possibility for P to be mistaken or false, thus one cannot be mistaken about said proposition. Other epistemologists follow similar tracks taking the infallibility approach to knowledge and the view that ridding our beliefs of fallible (false) justifications ultimately can help avoid Gettier problems. Looking back on Gettier’s cases refuting the JTB account of knowledge, we are able to see that Smith’s justifications are based off fallible beliefs. In Gettier’s Case I, Smith is mistaken in his belief that Jones will get the job rather than himself, therefore his belief cannot be accepted as knowledge. Likewise, in Gettier’s Case II, the conclusion that Smith comes to is also based on a fallible belief: that Brown is in Boston, or Barcelona, or even Brest-Litovsk. In that, Smith’s justification is fallible, or flawed. He could be mistaken in his beliefs, therefore his belief, again, cannot be accepted as knowledge.
By allowing the definition of knowledge to only be justified with infallible means allows for many interesting conclusions to arise. The first is that it wipes the JTB definition clean of Gettier cases. Gettier cases cannot coalesce without the false fallible justifications that Gettier’s cases lay out. Quickly, it’s useful to delineate fallibility and infallibility. Fallibility arises with any observation of our senses that can be mistaken. For instance, the belief that you’re reading this; you could be asleep, and this could be a nightmare. You cannot be sure of that. Infallible beliefs, on the other hand, are beliefs that cannot be wrong. To apply this, let’s look at Chrisholm’s sheep in the field. By viewing what you see to be a sheep (this observation, your observation with fallible eyes) allows the Gettier problem to be solved here: sure, you were lucky you were right, but it’s not attributed to a JTB because you used a fallible justification (i.e. your very own eyes). The fake barn county case (Goldman) example illustrates this as well; the mere act of ‘seeing’ belies its fallibility, dropping a piece from the JTB equation not allowing it to continue.
This view however wipes out most of our so-called ‘knowledge’. Almost all current knowledge is based on a premise or justification that is fallible. All of our senses our fallible and able to be fooled. By continuing with this definition or even explaining it to others leads to the conclusion that people know very, very little. This is not popular. Few will readily accept this without at least a small bribe. It wipes out what most honest men believe and leads to few – if any – useful conclusions for them. This is commonly referred to as skepticism, and skepticism, while a legitimate belief, does not make itself useful beyond reading news articles and annoying your in-laws during Thanksgiving.
With accepting the definition of JTB to use only infallible justifications, you lead yourself to accept that almost all knowledge is fallible. By realizing all knowledge is fallible, one will have to constantly question and reevaluate their positions. It keeps one on their toes, not allowing for laziness and hopefully less mistakes throughout life. While it would be nice to have a definition of knowledge that wasn’t built with the bricks of skepticism, there seems to be no better avenue at this point in time. With an acceptance of infallibility, this allows the Gettier problem to be solved (in some sense) and for other problems in philosophy to be explored.
Infallibility also strays away from constant questioning and circular argument of whether or not JTB is knowledge and whether or not there is a specific way to fill the gap that there seems to be between JTB and knowledge. And if this is true, it is also true that the infallibility approach can lead to radical skepticism, which can easily run away from some and cause all sorts of other questions: What do we know? What beliefs do we hold that are absolutely certain? The uncomfortable answer might be none. Infallibility could cause its followers to believe that they know nothing, even in ordinary, everyday situations. How are we to know that our father actually is our father? Is my mother my mother? Was the doctor wearing really great VR goggles during ‘my delivery’? What if the doctor is my father? How can we know anything in our lives for sure? So, although appealing to infallibilism does not run into the problems of infinite regress that many other attempted solutions to the Gettier problem tend to, it does turn into skepticism and the impossibility of knowledge. This is a major problem. The infallibility approach defeats the purpose of searching for an answer to what exactly knowledge is, rather it deems knowledge to be an impossible goal to attain. Infallibilism takes the question and answers; there is no answer, the question is impossible to answer with the ‘knowledge’ we have.
In conclusion, I have discussed how the Justified True Belief account of knowledge brings about the Gettier problem and how appealing to infallibility avoids the Gettier problem. This is simply because the infallibility approach eliminates the possibility of fallible justifications and conditions for knowledge from being used in the first place. Skepticism arises from the infallibility conclusion that leads to pros and cons on both sides for accepting it. But until a better definition of Justified True Belief is found, it is a workable conclusion.