Paste your text in here..The role of reason in determining moral action has been most renown in philosophy with the work of Immanuel Kant. Reviewing arguments for consequentialist or biblical ethics, Kant's precedent of a perfect Good Will overcomes the failures seen here by positioning reason at the crux of moral action; it is with reason that we come to make sense of our universal moral duties. These arguments, are incompatible with Kant's philosophy characterising the eighteenth-century Age of Enlightenment, and are easily seduced by our unholy human inclinations, contrastable with the inviolable and holy moral law. I shall sustain arguments for Kantian Ethics, adducing the example of feminist literature to argue for its relevance in protecting human dignity.
Of worth note is the exact nature of reason within Kant's philosophy. In order to properly consider the importance of reason to Kant, it is necessary to delineate the two-aspect reality of transcendental idealism – the distinction between the scientific and metaphysical and our human relationship to both. This is all to arrive at the idea that humans are imperfect and subject to a perfect moral law only perceived through rational, moral action which follows duty.
Kant argues that we have an a priori (prior to) knowledge of the world always prerequisite to our scientific, empirical understanding. Frederick Copleston analogises this cogently with the idea of a person viewing the world with red-tinted spectacles: the person who sees the world as red does not create the world as red but chooses to see it this way. This part constitutes a person's interpretation of the world; our vision of the world is twofold since we both perceive it and read personal interpretations into it. They would then have to understand that the world – the spatio-temporal objects – as they exist in relation to one another are not so because of the spectacles but because of some a priori knowledge they have of the world. The world's 'redness' however, is contingent on their specific, empirical experience of it (Copleston, 2003, 226). Yet, according to Kant's theory of transcendental idealism this is not the only way to speak of things. Our knowledge of things is like the person who only sees the world through their red-tinted spectacles; the way that things are, however, is independent of our experiences.
Kant contends here that there are things that are causally determined (scientific) and things like freedom that can be called metaphysical. Both exist and cannot logically co-exist with only one scientific definition of reason. A person that tells a malicious lie is motivated by their bad upbringing, but they also, as a human agent, have free will and can choose to tell the truth. Yet, under only a scientific interpretation of the world their actions are causal and, by consequence, unfree. To ascribe him both free will and causality would lead to a contradiction under the scientific reason interpretation. As such we encounter a Kantian antimony: a contradiction that leads necessarily back to the idea of transcendent idealism (Anderson, Bell, 2010). It then follows that freedom is needed for the generation of a good act – one that rejects the perpetration of a malicious lie by our causal inclinations in this circumstance. The morally right act will contravene our inclinations, favouring instead the transcendent moral law. Morality, thus, is a prescription according to Kant – a more rational way of acting as opposed to the thoughtless motion of our proclivities. Morality is transcendent; it is not earth-bound.
Here, we have established the transcendent rational nature. A good maxim, therefore, is one that is good for all of humanity; if a maxim is moral it is rational, and only a rational maxim considers the whole of humanity. Kant delineates this notion through his formulations of the Categorical Imperative, distinguishing the difference between maxims that are good in that they satisfy a means to a personal end, and maxims that are good in that they follow our rationally endorsed duty (Kant, 2002). It is in this respect, and in regard to Kant's agent theory, that human moral action is distinct from other creatures and physical activity. Unlike Humean action theory wherein our desires and inclinations are considered to not only drive us, but govern our decisions, Kant argues that this relegates us to a puppet-like status which contravenes the precedent set for our freedom and rationality. What's more, a Humean theory for action is not conducive to moral action. The distinction, of course, is one of freedom – according to Kant, we are only truly free when we act morally adhering to our duty. Actions based on inclinations – that is to say, causal actions – contravene the nature of our being which is to be free. Kant thinks of freedom as one's inner capacity to act according to the principles of reason; acting according to duty.
However, is this a reliable thought? Consequentialist theories that focus on the outcomes of our actions as a metric for morality regard the rational formulation of maxims limited and ignorant of the state of affairs as they exist from culture to culture. For instance, G.E Moore makes a case for ideal Utilitarianism following intuitive justifications from which my argument is based (Darwall, 1986, 296). Even if a person ought to act in a certain manner from duty adhering to a transcendent moral law, they are promoting the best state of affairs which is to say, something of intrinsic value. It would then be the case that every other person ought to promote the act of the aforementioned agent and for that same agent to promote the acts of others. As such, there becomes less of a focus on the individual and their dutiful acts; their position is more relational, acting from maxims that are not qua reason, but instead maxims that point to an ultimate end that promotes intrinsic goods. This is an end in which all moral agents participate.
These considerations, though intuitive, are too relative to form maxims for moral actions. In any case, Kant does indeed consider the fact that we have a duty to have 'love for our neighbour, which is incumbent on us as a duty' (Kant, 2017,223) and, on such a maxim, it is definitely not immoral to promote the acts of others. However, the distinction between an action done from duty and an inclination is the reason behind the action it – the maxim from which it was determined. It might be the case that others intuitively promote the acts of others as Moore suggests, but this does not necessarily constitute morality. Moreover, this fails as a criticism since Kantian Ethics considers the right prior to the good; acts are good if they are right and in accordance with reason. Presenting intrinsic values as the groundwork for moral actions stands at odds with what constitutes true morality. The idea that we ought to promote intrinsic value begets strong interpersonal relations and preference to those relations on the basis that they promote intrinsic value. Moore himself holds that friendship or personal affection has intrinsic value (Darwall, 1986), yet the idea that maxims can be generated upon such values causes problems in respect to the universalisation of maxims. If we consider the Trolley Problem devised by Philippa Foot, the right action according to Moore would be one that preferences and promotes the intrinsic value of friendship – we would better save one friend from a runaway trolley than five strangers (Foot, 1967). This, as Kant would contend, is a tenuous moral claim, based only on the hypothetical end of the individual – a universal maxim cannot be derived. For instance, a situation such as the former could not be justified for the whole of humanity, and in particular, not for the lawmaker of that society. If it were the case that humans could be treated as a means to an end of friendship, then even lawmakers (as rational beings equal to us) might consider safeguarding the lives of their friends primarily, and the rest of their government second. Moore's consequentialism displaces the sacred nature of humankind, without which maxims cannot be formed. Kant captures the universalizability of reason in his philosophy; its ability to discern profound human values that persist culture to culture.
It is here that Kant makes his formulations for the categorical imperative. A maxim is good, according to Kant if it (1) it can be universalised without provoking any logical contradiction (2) it treats humanity as an end rather than a means (3) it is formulated as though you were a legislative member of a law-making community (Kant, 2002). These contrast the divine view of morality: the idea that morality begins with God and his commands are right because he is good. As such, a tension exists between Kant and theologians whereof one form of moral religion is pit against. Primarily, we can observe their compatibility through the work of Mary Wollstonecraft. On the question of innocence, she observes that women are taught from infancy that they are to be passive and obedient to men in order to obtain their protection. Opposite such analysis she adduces the work of John Milton and in particular the epic poem 'Paradise Lost' in which he describes Eve as frail, 'formed for softness and sweet attractive grace' (Wollstonecraft, 1992, 100). This, of course, seeks parallel in the source material, 1 Corinthians stating, 'if a woman have long hair, it is glory it is a glory to her: for her hair is given her for covering' (1 Corinthians 11:15). The rights of women, and their disposition as innocent creatures, delineates their submission and weakness according to Wollstonecraft, contradicting the nature of humankind: 'for if it be allowed that women were destined by Providence to acquire human virtues.' (Wollstonecraft, 1975, p. 101). It is, therefore, a matter of reason that we can will people to treat women with respect so that they can develop their virtue for this could be said to have inner worth (Kant, 2002).
But to what extent are these rational maxims left unaffected by biblical influence? His comments on women seem to echo on biblical comments pertaining to femininity. Writing that 'women will avoid the wicked, not because it is unright, but because it is ugly; and virtuous actions mean to them such as are morally beautiful' (Kant, 2011, 77). In this way, he takes women to fall short of the practical reason needed to behave morally. This is particularly worrying as the freedom to behave morally is the cornerstone of Kant's view. As such, Kant's theory of moral action resides in echo chambers for male discourse; the view that women are less apt to moral action than men resonates with the aforementioned biblical idea of women as disposable. Furthermore, speaking of women desiring the 'morally beautiful' negates the moral worth of their act – only an act that is understood from duty is said to have worth. Like a shopkeeper that gives change from inclination and a concern for profit, a woman that desires only the beautiful fails to discern the need to act from duty – their act is shallow and ill-informed.
Kant's statement does not involve a premise that states that women are incapable of moral actions, but rather makes prescriptive comments of them: 'just as it is not woman's role to go to war, so she cannot personally defend her right and engage in civil affairs for herself' (Anthology p.209). Though problematic by a feminist reading, it is important to note the distinction made between virtue and moral worth: in short, moral worth is a feature of actions whereas virtue is a feature of persons. Here it appears as though Kant is extolling virtues of woman – virtues that are precipitant of his era. Nonetheless, the second formulation of the categorical imperative remains consistent with the view that humans, as part of their dignity, have the freedom to act dutifully and according to reason. And though it may be typical of a woman to behave in a certain manner and desire things that are beautiful by inclination, it doesn't mean that she must. Moral failure is not predicated on being female, but as society extols the virtues of a woman, acting from duty is seemingly more difficult.