At its heart, the deficit model of science understanding concerns itself with how science and scientific ideas are communicated (Anderson, 2002). However, as we shall see, this is only part of the story, as this process of communication has a wealth of varying outcomes and ramifications that place notions such as the deficit model within a broad network of sociological and psychosocial as well as scientific concerns.
The deficit model has been termed, or has been closely allied with, the
“cognitive deficit model” (Layton et al, 1993, cited in Dunwoody,
Friedman and Rogers, 1999: 50), the “scientific literacy model “
(Dunwoody, Friedman and Rogers, 1999: 50) or even the “public ignorance
model” (Irwin, 1995: 92) and has formed the theoretical basis for the
understanding of the public’s perception and interaction with science
over the last thirty of years. In a report by the House of Lords,
Science and Technology – Third Report (HMSO, 2000), Sir Robert May
called the approach “a rather backward looking vision” (HMSDO: 2000:
sc. 3.9) and the British Council “went so far as to call it ‘outmoded
and potentially dangerous’” (HMSO, 2000: sc. 3.9).
The deficit model of scientific understanding assumes that the public’s
knowledge of scientific discourse and research is non-existent. The
public, as Jane Gregory and Steve Miller point out are “empty vessels”
(Gregory and Miller, 2000: 17) or “blank slates” that need to be
informed by a knowledgeable, hierarchical scientific community. It is
the public’s deficit of knowledge that the scientist aims to fill with
simple, generic instructions, commands and insights.
Of course, this notion has a huge variety of differing outcomes in
social situations ranging from the public’s understanding of the link
between lung cancer and smoking (Dunwoody, Friedman and Rogers, 1999:
50), to the effects of nuclear attack in the 1950s and 60s to the
current interest in mobile phone technology and health matters. The
deficit model sees the public as being very much the receiver of
scientific knowledge concerning only areas that might be of use to
them; in this way it is inextricably linked to concepts such as the
welfare state and post-war ideological notions of the state’s
relationship to society.
As Anderson (2002) states, the deficit model also suggests mistrust of
and lack of interest in science and scientific research by the public.
Spurred on, perhaps, by the recent exponential advances in scientific
discovery, the public is sometimes seen as being alienated by the
scientific community’s own successes. In order for there to be a
reasonable working knowledge of science based tools, in computing for
instance, or concerns, as in health, there must first be a basis for
understanding, a basis that can only come about when interest is
aroused.
The deficit model is, as Dunwoody, Friedman and Rogers (1999) assert,
built on the importance of scientific understanding in a
socio-political context:
“Rationales for raising public awareness and understanding of science
in this cognitive sense have ranged from the importance of such
literacy to a civic and democratic culture to its importance for
personal efficacy to its value as preparation for the world of work.“
(Dunwoody, Friedman and Rogers, 1999: 50)
This notion recognizes the importance of imparting knowledge to remove
the deficit of understanding from all manner of different social
discourses; a farmer or environmental worker, for instance will need a
different set of intellectual tools as a patient suffering from lung
cancer or a person at risk from AIDS and, of course, these groups will
overlap and cross-fertilize.
Simon Besser Locke in his Constructing “The Beginning”: Discourses of
Creation Science (1999) points out that the deficit model of scientific
understanding focuses, to a very large extent, on what the public does
not know rather than what it does know:
“In contrast, research that is interested in public understanding of
science has a much less restricted scope, concerned to establish what
members of the public make of science. This goes beyond the simple
testing of knowledge (although knowledge claims may be part of the
research interest), to consider the meaning that science has for people
and the use made of it within specific social contexts” (Besser Locke,
1999: 11)
It is this notion that forms the foundation of the recent loss of faith
in the deficit model as a reasonable method of understanding the
dynamic between the public and the scientific community. Another is the
extent that the scientific community can reach reasonable consensuses
with which to base public understanding on (Dunwoody, Friedman and
Rogers, 1999: 51). In order to communicate on a politically expedient
level, the discourse must first, of course, be firmly in place. The
recent medico-political difficulties with the MMR vaccine, for
instance, is an ideal example, where ambiguity and disparity within the
scientific community caused public uncertainty that, far from creating
understanding and trust, created a negative affect.
The deficit model also assumes that the public has no or very little
knowledge to begin with. With the rise of new information based systems
such as the internet and greater access to scientific research through
the media, the public’s understanding of scientific discourses can be
seen to be growing. This means that, more and more, members of the
public can assess the truth and validity of what they are told by the
Government and its scientists. This makes the relationship between the
ordinary member of the public and the scientific community one of a
dialectic rather than a hierarchically based system of pedagogy.
The deficit model has a great deal, I think, to tell us about the ways
in which Governments are changing in order to more closely reflect the
society that they form a part of. As the House of Lords report suggests
(2000), the relationship between the Government, its scientists and the
public is changing and the models of communication need to change in
order to reflect that. The actual process of information communication
and dissemination may be more complex than the deficit model suggests.
References
- Besser Locke, Simon (1999), Constructing “The Beginning”: Discourses of Creation Science, (London: Lawrence Erlbaum)
- Dunwoody, Sharon, Friedman, Sharon and Rogers, Carol (1999),
Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial
Science, (London: - Lawrence Erlbaum)
- Gregory, Jane and Miller, Steve (2000), Science in Public: Communication, Culture and Credibility, (London: Perseus)
- House of Lords Science and Technology – Third Report (HMSO: 2000)
- Irwin, Alan (1995), Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development, (London: Routledge)
- Scanlon, Eileen, Hill, Roger and Junker, Kirk (eds) (1999), Communicating Science – Professional Context, (London: Routledge)
- Scanlon, Eileen, Whitelegg, Elizabeth and Yates, Simeon (eds) (1999),
Communicating Science – Context and Channels, (London: Routledge)