Sociology is a child of modernity. It tries to understand the processes that lead to social and cultural change in society. Not that change only occurred in modern times yet with the ascendancy of industrialisation change acquired a new dynamism that exceeded any previous transformations in pre-modern societies. Sociologists are notoriously disagreed as to what initiated the various processes of change and as to how to describe them accurately.
Anthony Giddens’s notion of the pure relationship added a new
dimension to the debates amongst sociologists about the catalysts and
phenomena of social transformations. His concept of the pure
relationship tries to capture the development of novel foundations for
personal relationships, while applying it by no means only to sexual
interaction. In fact, Giddens is at pains to point out that the private
and the public stand in a relation of mutual influence (Giddens 1992,
p.195). The pure relationship thus can be usefully employed in
conceptualisations of the public as well as the personal space in
modern society. The essay will look at the way in which Giddens
conceives of the interaction between trust, modernity and intimacy and
why he believes this may lend particular credence to his notion of the
pure relationship. His thesis, in a nutshell, is that trust in modern
societies requires a new basis which can be adequately described as a
process of mutual disclosure. The second part of the essay will try to
articulate some criticism of Giddens’s ideas. It will be argued that
Giddens formulation of the pure relationship feeds upon a particular
perspective of the therapeutic practice, one that often has effects
contrary to those Giddens ascribes to the concept of the pure
relationship.
Giddens work has been a poignant formulation of the disastrous
effects of modernity on social relationships. He focuses in his work on
the idea of trust and how trust is created between individuals. With
the onslaught of the forces of rationalisation and industrialisation
(Giddens broadly concurs here with Marxist and Weberian portrayals of
the origins of modern capitalist societies), personal relationships
undergo a radical transformation. While they used to be based on a
face-to-face interaction in which trust was created by direct
communication and institutionalised connections such as family,
kinship, or wider networks of friendship or community, modern
relationships are distinctly impersonal. They are characterised by the
absence of direct interaction between the individuals. In fact, so
Giddens writes, people have to rely increasingly on abstract systems in
which personalised types of trust are impossible to build up. The
various mechanisms to engender trust between individuals are profoundly
altered. Face-to-face interaction is replaced by ideational connections
between individuals and abstract systems. Trust now relies on the
plausible conveyance of expertise. This new form of trust building
mechanism however is very fragile and often breaks down. Giddens cites
various examples for such a breakdown. One useful illustration is lack
of trust in the reliability of planes to fly. People who experience
something like fear of flying say that it is brought about by an
absence of faith in planes to defy the laws of gravity. Although there
may be a whole range of factors that contribute to this fear, many who
suffer from this fear often indicate that their fear subsides to a
certain degree once they hear the pilot’s voice. Within Giddens
sociological framework to explore the notion of trust, this is a
classic example when faith in abstract systems (in this instance modern
technology represented by the plane) is supplanted by the creation of a
more or less ‘personal’ relationship with a particular individual who
appears trustworthy in virtue of his expertise. Giddens thinks that the
fragility of trust in modern society often requires this additional
process to complement impersonal trust relationships with personal
ones, in a way signalling a residue of pre-modern societies.
This, however, is only part of the story of modernity. Modern times are
also marked by a noticeable presence of democratic ideas. Democracy,
epitomised by principles of equality and participation in public
affairs, determines social and personal aspects of citizen’s lives. We
will return to the issue of democracy at a later stage. For the time
being it is important to note that Giddens believes that the processes
generating modern society are intricately linked to the ideas of
democracy and a new foundation of mutual trust. In fact, so Giddens
argues, both issues are two sides of the same coin, ideas that
condition each other.
With the fundamental changes brought about by modernity, Giddens
suggests that personal relationships are de-institutionalised,
borrowing this notion from Peter Berger (Berger 1980). While trust was
previously embedded firmly in communities that prescribed and
sanctioned certain traditions and practices, with the dissolution of
these communities and their co-operative framework, personal
relationships acquire an unprecedented freedom. But this freedom is of
a duplicate nature. The formation of identity that was previously
predetermined by communal forces largely outside of the individual’s
control, is now replaced with an area of self-exploration.
‘Where large areas of a person’s life are no longer set by pre-existing
patterns and habits, the individual is continually obliged to negotiate
life-style options. Moreover – and this is crucial- such choices are
not just ‘external’ or marginal aspects of the individual’s attitudes,
but define who the individual ‘is’. In other words, life-style choices
are constitutive of the reflexive narrative of self.’ (Giddens, 1992,
p.75)
This new gained freedom however also demands additional efforts of
orientation and commitment from individuals, something that, for many,
diminishes the advantages of liberation from parochialism. In a time of
increased existential risks, human beings try to enhance the sources of
mutual trust and this process runs parallel to and is influenced by the
process of self-formation. Giddens writes:
‘The establishing of basic trust is the condition of the elaboration of
self-identity just as much as it is of the identity of other persons
and of objects.’ (Giddens 1991, p.41-42)
Giddens now uses the concept of intimacy to describe the processes that
allow people to produce a stability in their interpersonal
relationships. Intimacy, as Giddens understands it, extends way beyond
the realm of sexual interaction. It encompasses the spheres of family,
kinship and mutual friendship. All three fields were intensely affected
by the rise of modernity and the concomitant transformation of trust.
Intimacy thus is a conceptual tool for Giddens to explore the
foundations of social stability that he believes have been put in place
following the disintegration of the personal, face-to-face connections
amongst individuals. In a passage clarifying the methodological
approach he favours, Giddens writes:
‘The transformation of intimacy can be analysed in terms of the
building of trust mechanisms; and … personal trust relations…are
closely bound up with a situation in which the construction of the self
becomes a reflexive project.’ (Giddens 1990, p.114)
With some verve he declares that intimacy is the ‘promise of democracy’
(Giddens 1992, p.188) in the personal sphere. But why does intimacy
feature this close link to democracy? What is democratic in the nature
of intimacy? We have already seen that Giddens attaches much
significance to the fact that modernity is tied up with the various
ideas and maxims of democracy. Modernity, so Giddens argues, has often
come to be synonymous with the development of individual freedom and
equality. These ideas however are central to the institutional
framework of democracy and a democratic society cannot exist without
individual autonomy. He elaborates extensively on this idea of autonomy
simply because it is the missing link that indicates that processes of
modernisation are of similar character and structure in the public and
the private sphere. While the call for political participation leads to
empowerment of individuals in the political sphere, growing autonomy in
the private realm echoes these developments. Giddens even argues that
the increasing degree of autonomy is heavily reliant on the advancement
of reasoning in shaping the basic institutions of society (Giddens
1992, p.186 and p.200). As people find traditional forms of social
organisations less legitimised, they turn to forms of public
deliberation, a process that accelerates the dependence on reason. A
similar process is under way in the personal sphere. Status, position
and distribution of resources within the family increasingly require
justification beyond the legitimation through traditions and customs.
This gives rise to two elements of modernity that shape the structure
and character of intimacy. Giddens argues that democracy in the public
and private sphere in essence is a framework of rules (1) and the
reliance on dialogue (2) as a procedure for building consensus. This
consensus has certain important features. It is non-coerced, rests on
the voluntary consent of those affected by the rules and outcomes of
the deliberation process, and it is negotiated fairly. This dualistic
pair of rules and dialogue makes up the foundation of what he calls the
pure relationship. In the public sphere just as in the private sphere,
rights and duties are accorded to fair rules and the distribution of
resources and tasks is negotiated in a spirit of justice and mutual
respect. This accurately describes the notion of the pure relationship.
Intimacy is thus the conceptual means to explain the way in which
people ensure social stability in modern societies. Giddens’s notion of
intimacy extends to the public and private realm and generates a
pattern of human interaction which conforms to the most fundamental
principles of democracy: equality and justice.
Let us now look at the particular aspects of the pure relationship that
inform Giddens’ theory of intimacy. Having explained how the
foundations of trust are being transformed and how it acquires new
forms, the notion of the pure relationship becomes transparent. The
pure relationship is in fact the ‘ethical framework for democracy in
the personal order’ (Giddens 1992, p.188), something that Giddens
previously declared as the conceptual purpose of intimacy.
‘A pure relationship is one in which external criteria have become
dissolved: the relationship exists solely for whatever rewards that
relationship can deliver. In the context of the pure relationship,
trust can be mobilised only by a process of mutual disclosure.’
(Giddens 1991, p.6)
Given the similar characterisation of intimacy and the pure
relationship the latter can at best be seen as the mirror image of
intimacy in personal relationships. At worst it is a conceptual
duplication that adds little to his notion of intimacy. Be this as it
may, as the maxim of autonomy is the ‘guiding thread’ for intimacy so
it is for the pure relationship (Giddens 1992, p.189). It is the
outcome of the ‘reflexive project of self-formation, realised by
relating yourself to others in an egalitarian way’ (Giddens1992,
p.189). The ground rules are laid down by individuals negotiating in an
environment which is characterised by mutual respect. In fact autonomy
sustains the principle of respect that should regulate the interactions
between individuals and marks the boundaries of individual space. As
such then autonomy exemplifies the ideals of the pure relationship. But
how does the pure relationship come about? How do people enter into it
and why may they be inclined to endorse or reject it?
Giddens is conspicuously vague on these questions. He seems to assume
that individuals somehow recognise the urgency and particular
usefulness of the pure relationship in building their partnerships.
Central to this argument is the process of mutual disclosure. Since the
relationship is entered into ‘for its own sake’ any pure relationship
possesses a tension to reconcile mutual trust and commitment with the
knowledge that the relationship is voluntary’ and can be terminated at
any time (Jamieson 1999, p.479). Giddens argues that revealing to the
partner the whole range of sentiments, emotional inclinations and
practical commitments in our life, is tantamount to a voluntary
expression of endorsement of the democratic principles. Mutual
disclosure is, as it were, a way of acknowledging equality and respect
as the fundamentals of the prospective relationship. He thereby rejects
strongly those sociologists who argue that the secret of a successful
personal relationship is to retain a rest of mystique, something that
remains inevitably unknown to the partner. Giddens contends that mutual
disclosure must comprise the entirety of personal lives. The act of
revelation is a way of expressing ‘binding aspiration of democratically
ordered interaction.’ (Giddens 1992, p.190). Mutual disclosure thus
encapsulates the principles of democracy and the opportunities of
building trust in relationships through new forms of intimacy.
But is this a viable picture of modern relationships? Does the practice
of mutual disclosure that is critical to the notion of the pure
relationship allow individuals to access a new type of mutual trust?
What motivates Giddens to place so much confidence in human beings that
they will not exploit the additional information about their partners
in order to create new inequalities and dependencies within the
relationship?
Jamieson has articulated the most stringent criticism in an article
that targets the viability of Giddens’s concept of the pure
relationship from the empirical perspective (Jamieson 1999). He argues
that two components should caution us to accept Giddens’s conceptual
take on modern relationships. First, despite anecdotal evidence,
inequalities persist and are hard to eradicate. One of the reasons is
that they cloak themselves in new ways that are difficult to detect and
grasp with conventional concepts. One may object that Giddens’s concept
of the pure relationship addresses exactly this problem since it is
certainly a novel formulation of the problem of equality in personal
relationships. However, Jamieson warns us that Giddens’s pure
relationship is tied into an older discourse that has lost much of its
credibility (Jamieson 1999, p.480). Jamieson argues that Giddens’s
notion of mutual disclosure feeds upon a therapeutic language which has
often worked against empowerment of women rather than in their favour.
In fact, it redirects our conceptual efforts into a track that
individualises personal problems (similar to the therapeutic effort)
and therefore downplays the social dimensions of interpersonal
relationships. Giddens in fact sustains his sociological theory with a
psychological explanation, thus conceding territory to a questionable
strategy of individualised problem solving. Sociological explanations
of the difficulties of relationships gain little attention in Giddens’s
view of the matter, inadvertently playing into the hands of those who
have a vested interest in the continuation of conditions of inequality
and unfair distribution of resources between partners. The second
reason why Jamieson believes Giddens’s theory of the pure relationship
to be flawed has to do with the fact the Giddens fails to recognise the
importance of basic sentiments such as love and care that are often
catalysts as well as provide channels to problem solution in modern
partnerships. Giddens in a way is compelled to disregard these
significant aspects of partnerships since they contradict the thrust of
the process of mutual disclosure. Love and care often revitalise
commitment to partners in spite of remaining secrets or uncertainties
about the partner’s trustfulness (Jamieson 1999, p.486).
Jamieson points to the prevalent optimism in Giddens’s work and doubts
whether this reflects accurately social reality. Although evidence is
often ambiguous and down to interpretation some observations that can
claim a high degree of objectivity, point into the opposite direction.
Jamieson refers briefly to an illuminating alternative view on the
procedure of disclosure. He contrasts Giddens favourable view on
therapeutic efforts through disclosure with Foucault’s thesis that
disclosure dis-empowers individuals, operating as a subtle form of
control and regulation (Jamieson 1999, p.481). Additionally, Giddens
disregards in his theory the negative aspects of relying in the
expertise of specialists in counselling or psychological environments.
He concludes that Giddens’s ‘psychological theory remains unpacked.’
(Jamieson 1999, p.481).
A far more questionable claim, according to Jamieson, is however
Giddens attempt to conceptually link the context of ‘ontological
security’ in childhood with the process of mutual disclosure amongst
partners. Giddens argued that child-parent relations mirror the ideal
of pure relationships amongst adults. What he overlooked, so Jamieson
suggests, is that parent-child relationships are frequently determined
by the particular objective of mothers or fathers to retain control
over the children as they approach adolescence. Mutual disclosure thus
serves a purpose that contradicts fundamentally the disinterested
impetus of the pure relationship (Jamieson 1999, passim).
Overall Giddens’s theory of intimacy and the pure relationship reduces
human relationships to a one-dimensional affair and fails to
acknowledge the whole range of factors that determine whether or not a
partnership becomes a successful one. Additionally, Giddens’s portrayal
of modern partnerships as being based on the pure relationship is not
borne out by the evidence. Although we have witnessed over the last
decades a noticeable shift in taboos and themes in public discourse,
the media are rarely a reliable indicator of sexual activity or
practices of conflict resolution (Jamieson 1999, p.483). Even less
obvious is the interconnection between public and private forms of
intimacy. Democracy may inform much of the personal and public forms of
negotiating solutions to conflicts, it is less clear however how equal
the positions of partners in these negotiations are and how much they
would affect wider society. Jamieson argues that, with all likelihood,
‘the causal arrows point the other way – efforts within personal life
are countered elsewhere – there is not a diffusion of change from the
personal to other arenas without sociological explanation of
intervening mechanisms.’ (Jamieson, p.490)
What makes a good relationship is still less dependent on mutual
disclosure, that may ultimately only enhance the weaponry of the
partner in conflict situations, but ‘ a shared repertoire of cover
stories, taboos, and self-dishonesty.’ (Jamieson, p.487). For Jamieson,
Giddens’s optimism is unwarranted.
Bibliography
-
Peter Berger and Hans Kellner (1980). Marriage and the Construction of
Reality. In Martin Anderson (ed.) (1980). The Sociology of the Family.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp.302-324. - Anthony Giddens (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press
- Anthony Giddens (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Anthony Giddens (1992). The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love
and Eroticism in Modern Societies. Stanford: Stanford UP. - Lynn Jamieson (1999). Intimacy transformed? A critical look at the
‘pure relationship’. Sociology, Vol. 33, No.3, August, pp.477-494