1. INTRODUCTION
Was Singapore’s education policy instrumental to its economic success? I hypothesize that Singapore’s education policy has been highly instrumental to its economic success. I have chosen this topic because while many factors have been credited with Singapore’s economic success, from the authoritarian leadership style of its founding father, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (Popham, 2015), to its strategic location (Popham, 2015), less credit has been attributed to its educational policies. This paper follows the development of Singapore’s education from its pre-independence years to present day and illustrates how education policy has evolved in tandem with the changing economic needs of the country as it undergoes 3 main restructuring processes to effectively meet the manpower demands of the economy in the past 5 decades.
In this paper, section 1 provides a brief introduction and the reason behind my choice of topic; section 2 reviews theories that can help explain how education was instrumental to the development of Singapore, namely Utilitarianism and Human Capital Theory; section 3 highlights relevant background on Singapore, on its first Prime Minister (Lee Kuan Yew) and on the state of Singapore post separation from Malaysia; section 4 follows the development of Singapore’s education via three significant phases. These three phases are: 1) Survival Phase; 2) Efficiency Driven Phase; and 3) Ability Driven, Aspiration Driven Phase (Singapore’s Ministry of Education [MOE], 2010). This fourth section supports my hypothesis by illustrating the way Singapore has configured its education system at each stage to provide the relevant labor force necessary for its country’s economic needs. Section 5 of this paper further illuminates the characteristics of Singapore’s education that has equipped it to be highly responsive to the manpower needs of the country. Some of these characteristics include its: 1) Training and Provision of Quality Teachers; 2) Investments in Vocational and Technical Training; 3) Uniquely Integrated System; and 5) Bilingual Policy.
2. RELEVANT THEORY
There really isn’t a single economic theory that can explain Singapore’s economic success. On more than one occasion, Lee Kuan Yew himself stated that he is not an ideologuehe is more robustly steered by logic than theories, and that the latter played little role in his thoughts and world views. As he put it, “I am not great on philosophy and theories. I am interested in them but my life is not guided by philosophies or theories. I get things done and leave others to extract principles from my successful solutions. You may call me a utilitarian or whatever. I am interested in what works.” (Singapore and the World View of Lee Kuan Yew, 2015).
Elegant, Elliot and Smith (2005) described Lee’s core values as “Confucian Values” and can be summarized as “a political philosophy that might be loosely summed up as respect for authority and order, while putting the good of society above that of the individual.” These values, they said, had influenced Lee to employ a utilitarian form of policymaking, that virtue is derived from bringing about the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. Tom Plate, author of best selling “Giants of Asia” book series, said this of Lee, “In the fashion of a driven utilitarian, Lee was seen judging himself by standards that could be scientifically measured. He was almost always in a deliberate rush to achieve for Singapore top rankings in per capita income, international competitiveness, scholastic scores, low inflation and high unemployment. ” Therefore, while Singapore’s founding father did not subscribe to any particular theory of development, signs of utilitarianism are evident in the ways Lee led Singapore to capitalize what he referred to as its only resource—the people—in order to bring about an overall increase in the living standard of the whole country.
One can easily qualify the success of the Asian tigers (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) from the perspective of an economic theory perspective. “Comparative advantage enables a country to specialize in exporting what it is relatively more efficient in producing compared with other countries, and importing from them what it is not as efficient in producing.” (Lim, Singapore’s Economic Growth Model, 2008).
Like its fellow “Asian tigers” and before them, Japan, Singapore’s was a classic growth model that went from being an exporter of labor-intensive goods to technological services. Like Korea, Taiwan and Japan, but dissimilar to Hong Kong, economic development in Singapore was largely orchestrated by the state and included a managed-float currency system. Unlike Korea, Taiwan and Japan, but similar to Hong Kong, such development was accomplished with free trade and capital flows (Lim, 2008). With similarities present, Singapore had to distinguish itself from its neighbors; Lee Kuan Yew demystified the dynamic force behind Singapore’s success with a simple rationalization: “The quality of a nation’s manpower resources is the single most important factor determining national competitiveness. It is the people’s innovativeness, entrepreneurship, team work, and their work ethic that gives them that sharp keen edge in competitiveness” (Juma, 2013).
Another theory that Singapore brings to mind is the Human Capital Theory. Human Capital Theory postulates that formal education is both contributory and indispensable to the productive aptitude of a populace; in other words, an educated population is a productive population. Human Capital Theory stresses that education boosts the productivity and efficiency of workers by heightening their cognitive ability. It sees the delivery of education as an astute investment in human capital which it considered to be of higher worth than physical capital (Woodhall, 1997). In the following sections, this paper will demonstrate how Singapore’s mobilization of its human capital has contributed greatly to the high level of economic achievements that the island country has enjoyed.
3. BACKGROUND
The following background on Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew and the condition of independent Singapore after its departure from Malaysia supports my hypothesis by showing the low productivity level of Singapore prior to development of its education system.
3.1 Relevant background on Singapore
Prior to its transformation, Singapore was a sleepy, swampy village in the unknown. The founding of Modern Singapore came about in 1819 by Sir Stamford Raffles who consciously selected it as a British trading post due to its strategic location and deep harbor. In 1826, Singapore became an official British Colony. In 1959, as nationalism grew, Singapore under its newly elected Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, negotiated with the British for self rule and was granted self government that year (with British maintaining control of internal security and defense). In 1963, in a political effort to build a viable state with legitimacy, Singapore merged with the Federation of Malaysia to become Malaysia. However, on August 9, 1965, the Parliament of Malaysia voted 126-0 to have the state of Singapore ousted from Malaysia due to escalating tensions between the Malays and Chinese and a perceived threat by the UMNO (United Malays National Organization), of a Chinese takeover by Lee Kuan Yew and his political party, People’s Action Party (National Library Board of Singapore, 2015).
3.2. Relevant Background on Lee Kuan Yew
Lee Kuan Yew is the first Prime Minister of Singapore who has strongly influenced the policies that have shaped Singapore over the years. Born on September 16, 1923, Lee was a fourth-generation Singaporean of Hakka and Chinese Peranakan descent. He was educated with his would-be wife, Kwa Geok Choo, at Ra
ffles Institution, the oldest and most prestigious school in Singapore for tertiary education, even to this day. There, she was the only student who beat his scores in the English and Economics subjects. Together, they went on scholarships to read law at Cambridge University in the UK. Lee subsequently graduated First Class in both parts of the Tripos with an exceptional Starred-First (perfect score) for Part II Law in 1949, which placed him at the very top of his cohort and earned him the Fitzwilliam's Whitlock Prize. Though he was licensed to practice English law, Lee chose to return to Singapore to serve his country (Lee Kuan Yew, Third World to First, 2000).
Having returned from being a law student in the UK, Lee had this to say about British rule in Singapore, “Here in Singapore, you didn’t come across the white man so much. He was in a superior position. But there you are (in Britain) in a superior position meeting white men and white women in an inferior position, socially, I mean. They have to serve you and so on in the shops. And I saw no reason why they should be governing me; they’re not superior. I decided when I got back, I was going to put an end to this.” So, on November 12, 1954, he formed the People’s Action Party with the aim of putting an end to British rule. After Singapore was granted self-government in 1959, Lee continued to rise through the ranks of Singapore’s political system before becoming prime minister on June 5, 1959 in a landslide electoral victory (Lee, 2000).
3.3 Post Separation from Malaysia
After separation from Malaysia, the resource-poor Singapore, with little fresh water, fierce population growth, ethnic divisions, high unemployment, political instability, poor infrastructure in health, housing and education, became an independent country of its own. During that time, education was not mandatory, and a majority of the 2-million populace was illiterate and unskilled. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, in face of such unfavorable circumstances, set about achieving two overreaching ambitions: to construct a modern-day economy and to instill an awareness of Singaporean national identity (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], 2010).
Without natural resources, human capital has always been looked upon as Singapore’s most invaluable asset. Education was perceived, from the get go, as an essential to building both the economy and the country; it was tasked with generating a “human capital engine” for economic progression and instilling an awareness of Singaporean identity. The economic goals of education have given Singapore’s education strategy a very practical lean towards scientific and technical arenas (OECD, 2010).
Prior to Singapore’s independence, only the wealthy received an education. In education, the colonial heritage was one of four varied mediums of instruction for the respective ethnic groups. Investment in school infrastructure was very low and the curriculum was inappropriately “British based” (National Institute of Education (NIE), 2001). At that time, education was poorly linked to emerging economic needs. The teacher-training infrastructure was poor and teaching was considered a profession of low status.
Over the past 50 years, Singapore’s education system has evolved in tandem with the changing economy and socio-political needs of the nation. More specifically, it has undergone three significant phases of development in its adaption to changing economic circumstances and ideas: first, a survival-drive phase, second, an efficiency-driven phase, and finally, an ability-driven, aspiration-driven phase (OECD, 2010).
4. SIGNIFICANT PHASES OF EDUCATION IN THE SINGAPORE ECONOMY
This section supports my hypothesis by illustrating the development of Singapore’s education in tandem with its changing economic needs so as to supply the type and amount of manpower necessary to boost the economic power of the country.
4.1 Survival Driven Phase (1959 to 1978)
The survival driven phase that took place from 1959 to 1978 saw Singapore engaging in mass education efforts to provide the labor force necessary for its initial stage of industrialization. In this phase, the emphasis was on yielding fundamental literateness from a population whose majority was illiterate. As Singapore was selling cheap labor on the world labor market, it was very important that its labor be literate (National Center on Education and the Economy [NCEE], 2015).
However, even though industrialization was extensively known by the pro-capitalist Southeast Asian states as the key to existence and economic evolution, the lengthy era of colonization had fabricated imbalanced economic configurations that limited them (including Singapore) to small trading undertakings and limited small-scale manufacturing and processing. While Import Substitution Industrialization [ISI] (which basically comprises “small-scale production of non-durable consumer goods whose production requirements are compatible with conditions, such as abundant unskilled labor and unsophisticated technology”) could have done away with import dependence, this was not a viable alternative for the little state of Singapore (Lee, Gor, Fredriksen, Peng, 2008).
4.1.1 Export Oriented Industrialization
Following its separation from Malaysia in 1965 and losing its ability to take advantage of the wide hinterland market to its north, Singapore could not adopt the strategy of import substitution because of the lack of a large domestic market. This initial stage of Singapore’s economic development was also closely influenced by the political situation in the region at the time. Having inherited a narrow economic structure that depended mainly on the entrepot trade, Singapore government leaders, under Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party, saw the need to shift towards Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI). It was apparent that Singapore needed a labor force with applicable manufacturing skills, a communicable language with investors and importers, and the political drive and expertise to deal with state issues. Lee Kuan Yew swiftly merged the ethnically diverse educational systems into a single national system (Lee et al, 2008).
In the 1960s and 1970s, multinational corporations (MNCs) from the developed nations, especially those in the electronics and textile industries, were facing rising production costs and market saturation. They were pressured to transfer part or all of their production and technological resources to low-cost locations in Southeast Asia. This interest was enthusiastically reciprocated as countries in the region, especially Singapore, set out to attract the MNCs (Lee et al, 2008).
This came at an opportune time for Singapore, who was looking to transition its industrial base to an open, export-based economy. It rapidly went about enticing foreign industrialists in need low-skilled labor (such as textiles, garments, and wood products) to attain the twofold purposes of serving up jobs and achieving know-how (OECD, 2010).
4.1.2 Challenges of Unemployment
To address the challenges of attracting foreign investors during this Survival Driven Phase, the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB) was formed in 1961. Immediately, its manpower unit was placed in charge of developing programs to support vocational training necessary for the manufacturing processes (Cahyadi, Kursten, Weiss, Guang, 2004).
In the late 1950s, Singapore derived 70 percent of its gross domestic product from entreport activities (Dixon 1991, 158). Its industrial base was very small and limited, comprising light engineering, assembly of vehicles, marine engineering, printing, and processing (Colony of Singapore, 1955). Although employment in the manufacturing sector doubled from around 22,000 in 1955 to around 44,000 in 1961, manufacturing development was slow and stagnated at about 12 percent of gross domestic production in 1960. In th
e meantime, the postwar baby boom in the early 1950s and the free immigration policy had resulted in an average annual population growth rate of 4.4 percent in 1957. The unemployment rate stood at 5 percent, rising to a high of 9.2 percent in 1966. It was clear to the government that solving the rising unemployment problem was a matter of high priority (Lee et al, 2008).
4.1.3 Early Development of Education
Nonetheless, the task of expanding manufacturing activities for a trading port was not expected to be smooth because of the “dearth of skilled labor in Singapore” (Colony of Singapore 1954). The year 1968 was a watershed in terms of a shift in industrial strategy to more export-oriented manufacturing activities. Because of Singapore’s lack of natural resources, the development of the country’s human resources was of paramount importance for the government to support its EOI strategy. To achieve this end, an education system that would support the development of a literate and technically trained workforce was introduced (Lee et al, 2008).
Under British colonial rule, education was a tool to meet political and ethnic primordial interests. In 1965 and after, an intimate link between education and economic development of the small city-state was strongly emphasized. The government set about developing new skills and work attitudes to accommodate new economic strategies. Lee Kuan Yew saw national integration through a national system as the key condition for nation building (especially in terms of building a Singapore identity) and economic survival. To attain these national objectives, the government under his leadership rightly recognized the necessity to provide every child with at least six years of education from the age of six—without discrimination on the basis of race, language, sex, wealth, or status (Lee et al, 2008).
4.1.4 Language policy
Lee Kuan Yew, seeing English as the language of international diplomacy, science and
technology, and international finance and commerce after World War II, believed it was necessary to equip Singaporeans with English so that they might better be able to compete in the global marketplace (MOE, 2011). English was thus offered as one of the vernacular languages of education; along with Chinese, Malay and Tamil, it was installed as one of the four official languages of Singapore, with the aim of conserving equality and maintaining unity in diversity. (Speech by Lee Kuan Yew, ELIS, 2011).
Subsequently, bilingualism became a key component in Singapore’s education system. The decision on bilingualism was not just for the achievement of social cohesion in a largely pluralistic society. Although Lee Kuan Yew saw English as a necessary tool in Singapore’s effort to make the world its marketplace, with the increasing demand for English, he was also concerned that the young could become less attuned to their own cultures and not use their mother tongues. “If we were monolingual in our mother tongues, we would not make a living. Becoming monolingual in English would have been a setback,” he wrote in his memoirs. “We would have lost our cultural identity, that quiet confidence about ourselves and our place in the world,” Lee explained his insistence on a bilingual policy for Singapore’s education (Lee Kuan Yew, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, 1999)
In response to the national drive towards high value-added industrialization and to an economy where the language of business is English, pragmatic parents were avidly driving their children towards the English language stream of education. In 1959, only 47 percent of children entering primary one were in the English stream while 46 percent were in Chinese schools. However, by 1979, the English stream was enrolling 91 percent of the primary one cohort with only 9 percent in the Chinese stream and a negligible number in the Malay and Tamil language streams (Lee et al, 2008). In 1960, Lee Kuan Yew made the learning of a second language compulsory in all primary schools, and the policy was extended to all secondary schools in 1966. This bilingual policy would assure parents that their children would not grow up ignorant of their cultures (Lee et al, 2008).
Singapore’s bilingual policy is very unique in the world. It is an East-West model that allows Singaporeans to attain competency in the use of the English language, the language of the West, and in the use of the Chinese language (or other indigenous languages, such as Tamil and Malay), languages of the East. This contrasts with the Western concept of bilingualism in schools, which is based more on a Latin model in which pupils will usually learn, for example, German and English or Italian and English (Gopinathan & Goh, 2006).
This East-West language approach has proven to be particularly useful for Singapore’s business internationalization strategy. Fast-forward 50 years later today, China’s rise as an economic power has provided unique commercial opportunities for the majority of Singaporeans who are bilingual in English and Chinese. Companies are coming to Singapore because it offers a hybridization of the east and the west, something unavailable elsewhere (Gopinathan & Goh, 2006).
4.1.5 Universal Education
Back to the survival period, Singapore was eager to put in place a program for training a new generation for the needs of a forward-looking, modern, industrial and technological society. Free primary education was made available to all. Schools were constructed at a rapid pace. Between 1959 and 1965, one new school was constructed every month for seven years. In 1962, out of a population of 1.7 million, the student population stood at a staggering 400,000. The people of Singapore had become so education conscious that universal primary education in Singapore was achieved in 1965 without making it compulsory. The attainment of universal secondary school followed closely in the early 1970s (Lee et al, 2008).
4.1.6 Large-Scale Recruitment of Teachers
Corresponding to the increase in schools and student enrolment, MOE began to hire teachers on a large scale. To achieve such a large-scale recruitment, a part-time teaching program was introduced whereby a teacher would be training in the morning and teaching in the afternoon, and vice versa. A “Textbook for All” policy was further put in place to ensure that no needy children from lower-income families should be denied an education merely because of an inability to purchase textbooks. The ownership-of-textbook-to-student ratio was close to 1:1, attributable to the low cost of production achieved through a competitive tender system administered by the Education Publishing Bureau (EPB) with private printers. Almost in entirety, education was financed generously from state revenue. This differs from African countries where schools were mostly funded by private entities and suggests enthusiastic government support in Singapore for education (Lee et al, 2008).
4.1.7 Vocation and Technical Education
The period of survival-driven Singapore also saw the review and upgrade of its technical and vocational education. Its curriculum was aimed to equip students for employment in establishments where basic vocational skills are required. Classes consisted largely of subjects such as woodwork, domestic science, arts and crafts, and technical drawings (Gopinathan & Goh, 2006). By 1968, the Ministry of Finance determined that the school system would be able to provide sufficient technically trained workers meet the demands of the new industries. In 1968, only 18,000 out of the 144,000 students in secondary schools were on mechanical and occupational tracks. Consequently, the government fast-tracked campaigns for the growth of technical education (Lee et al, 2008).
A Technical Education Department was set up in the MOE in June 1968, and from 1969, all male middle school pupils were mandated to attend two years of schooling in technical courses, while g
irls were allowed to choose between technical courses and home economics. The Technical Education Department deployed all existing training facilities located in four freshly constructed vocational institutes to churn out “skilled workers, such as welders and machinists, to service the shipbuilding, oil refinery, electrochemical, electromechanical, precision engineering, metalworking, and woodworking industries. From 1970 to 1973, for example, 1,789 trainee welders received formal technical training.” (Lee et al, 2008).
In order to keep up with the rapid developments in technical and vocational education, extensive teacher training and retraining programs were developed, and the Finance Ministry made funds freely available for such purposes. The number of technical teachers increased from 425 in 1968 to 1,950 in 1972. This was by no means an easy feat, as the labor market was getting increasingly competitive. In addition to teachers specifically trained in technical subjects, academic subject teachers were also encouraged to be retrained as technical subject teachers. In 1968, some 4,000 teachers received training in metalwork, including fitting and sheet metal, woodwork, printing, motor mechanics, radio and television servicing, and electrical fitting and installation (OECD, 2008).
The survival-driven model of education sustained into the 1970s with the unceasing breeding of an industrial-oriented education to supply the labor for industrial progress. The Vocational and Industrial Training Board (VITB, the predecessor of the current Institute of Technical Education) was set up in 1979 to enrol secondary school leavers who not as academically adept. Vocational training institutes under the VITB offered a varied assortment of subjects, the most sought after were electrical, electronics, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles, refrigeration, air conditioning, carpentry, masonry, and plumbing. Matriculation at the secondary level sustained its growth, climbing from about 148,000 in 1969 to 176,000 in 1979. Registration at VITB institutions also rose from 2,800 to 14,000 over the same period. By 1976, almost 20 percent of the secondary school populace was undertaking technical courses. At the tertiary level, the total intake at Singapore’s two leading polytechnics at this time—Singapore Polytechnic and Ngee Ann Polytechnic—rose from about 3,500 in 1966 to about 11,000 in 1980 (Fredriksen and Peng, 2008).
Singapore not only prospered in luring a broad variety of new foreign-owned businesses, its industrialization effort also profited immeasurably from technical and financial assistance of foreign governments and the United Nations Development Program intended to produce industrial expertise. Foreign governments like Japan, Britain and France donated machinery, resulting in the establishment of several more vocational training institutes (Gopinthian, 2006).
By the end of the survival driven phase, Singapore had created a national system of public education. On the economic front, from a high of a 10 percent unemployment rate post separation from Malaysia, the adoption of EOI strategy had enabled Singapore to achieve full employment by the mid 1970s. Growth had averaged 10 percent per annum during this phase and the manufacturing sector’s share of the GDP had also grown from 14 percent in 1965 to 24 percent in 1978 (Lee et al, 2008).
4.2 Efficiency Driven Phase (1979 to 1996)
4.2.1 Shortage of Skilled Labor
The efficiency-driven phase, which took place from 1979 to 1996, was brought about by the annual shortfall of engineers and technical workers. Further, the oil crisis of 1973 had led to increased protectionism in the world economy and also exposed Singapore’s economic frailties. In this second phase, the government sought to shift its competitive advantage in the global labor market from being the low cost of its labor to the quality of its labor, so that it could compete for businesses that would not just locate in Singapore, but locate work in Singapore that would pay well. Therefore, the focus of education policy shifted from basic literacy to quality and to the retention of students in school. The focus was upon getting all students to meet global education standards (NCEE, 2015).
Singapore began focusing on economic-upgrading strategies. This skill-upgrading strategy marked the second stage of Singapore’s economic development. By upgrading, Singapore could bypass the problem of rising protectionism, which was mostly centered on low-skill production. As Southeast Asian nations started to contend efficiently for foreign investments in low-skilled, labor-intensive industries, Singapore’s previous comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactured products was gradually being eroded. To achieve long-term, sustainable development, the country’s economic planners shifted their emphasis to accelerating Singapore’s transition from a “third-league” labor-intensive industrializing country to a “second-league” capital-intensive economy. Thus, the Second Industrial Revolution was launched under the Ten-Year Plan, which sought to raise the manufacturing sector’s share of gross domestic product from 22 percent in 1979 to 31 percent by 1990 (Lee et al, 2008).
Singapore, however, entered the 1980s still severely hampered by a shortage of labor at three critical levels: skilled labor, qualified technical and engineering personnel, and management trained in modern techniques. Compared with the newly industrializing countries in East Asia and in Japan, Singapore in the 1970s suffered from low labor productivity growth. Between 1973 and 1978, real productivity growth in Singapore averaged about 3 percent per annum, compared with an average of 7 percent for Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Education during this period also failed to keep pace with the rapid expansion of the Singapore economy. Educational wastage was significant in the form of numerous early school dropouts and low level of literacy. Moreover, the majority of secondary school and university graduates gravitated toward clerical and administrative occupations, mainly in insurance, banking, trade, and government service. These jobs commanded high prestige and offered the prospects of upward social mobility and job security (Lee et al, 2008).
The tight labor market for skilled workers and professionals soon led to scrunching and counter scrunching of such personnel, especially in the fast-expanding shipbuilding and repair industry and the chemicals-petroleum industry (Chia, 1971). Unemployment between 1979 and 1984 averaged a low 3.2 percent. In the words of then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (2000, 82), “By the late 1970s we had left our old problems of unemployment and lack of investments behind us. The new problem was how to improve the quality of the new investments and with it the education and skills levels of our workers.” As a short-term solution, the government encouraged the inflow of skilled personnel by liberalizing the conditions under which such people could come to Singapore and acquire permanent residence and eventual citizenship (Lee et al, 2008).