Essay: The Cuban Missile Crisis – limited force of negotiation

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the United States and the Soviet Union ever got to nuclear war during the Cold War, or at any other point in history. This crisis was solved last minute through a deal that President Kennedy made with Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union. President Kennedy worked tirelessly with many members of his committees and with the CIA to determine the best possible option to resolve this crisis. The idea for the Bay of Pigs invasion, backed by the United States and inherited from the Eisenhower administration, was a complete failure that resulted from a hasty decision and a refusal to negotiate. In determining the resolution for the later part of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he was open to more suggestions, and ultimately decided that limited force of negotiation was the best option.
Although President Kennedy inherited the Cuban problem and the idea for the Bay of Pigs invasion from the Eisenhower administration, he made the problem much worse. Eisenhower wanted to train Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro, while the CIA also worked on covert tactics to overthrow Castro. As a result, Castro retaliated and tried to de-Americanize Cuba, and turned to the help of the Soviet Union. When Kennedy came into office, he thought Cuba was more of a threat than it actually was. He had his doubts of the invasion in Bay of Pigs, but continued with the plan anyway. McGeorge Bundy, the national security affairs advisor stated that Kennedy “really was looking for ways to make it work…and allowed himself to be persuaded it would work and the risks were acceptable.”
Overall, the Bay of Pigs invasion was a complete failure, as it was very obvious that the United States was involved in the affair. Bay of Pigs also escalated the Cuban Missile Crisis greatly. As stated by Thomas Paterson in the book, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations:
Had there been no exile expedition at the Bay of Pigs, no destructive covert activities, no assassination plots, no military maneuvers and plans, and no economic and diplomatic steps to harass, isolate, and destroy the Castro government in Havana, there would not have been a Cuban missile crisis. The origins of the October 1962 crisis derived largely from the concerted U.S. campaign to quash the Cuban Revolution.
The decision by Khrushchev to put nuclear weapons in Cuba benefitted both parties involved. The Soviet Union was hoping to overcome the United States in the arms race, and Cuba needed protection from the possible United States invasion. Therefore, President Kennedy’s decision to invade Cuba played directly to the benefit of the construction of missile sites in Cuba.
President Kennedy’s mistakes in the Bay of Pigs invasion were the exact opposite of his mistakes in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In Bay of Pigs, he worried he had listened to too few advisors’ opinions, and hadn’t given the issue enough thought. He tried to remedy this mistake in his future decisions, and when trying to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis, he brought in many advisors, listened to their opinions, and exhausted all possible options.
The Central Intelligence Agency was vital in helping Kennedy look at every possible United States’ action and the corresponding Soviet reaction in their document from October 20, 1962. After establishing the inventory of Soviet weapons in Cuba, they mention that the purpose of the arms buildup in Cuba is to show the world that the balance of power has shifted from the United States to the Soviet Union, and to prove that the United States can no longer stop Soviet advancement. First and foremost, the CIA states that if the United States does nothing, and accepts the Soviet buildup in Cuba, this buildup of arms will continue, and the U.S. will not have as great an influence as they once did. Considering the option of warning Khrushchev, the CIA believes he would just offer to negotiate the idea of foreign bases, and imply that the United States also had the option to establish bases in Cuba. A warning would also ruin a surprise U.S. attack, if decided upon. The CIA next considers a blockade in Cuba, however, a blockade would not prevent the use of missiles and supplies already established in Cuba. The Soviet Union could also use political means to force the U.S. into action. Military force is the next option considered.  They state that the Soviet Union would be surprised by the United States’ use of force, but also realize that this reaction could escalate to general war, even though they do not believe this is likely. They believe that the Soviet Union will resort to action outside of Cuba, most likely in Berlin. Therefore, the CIA determines that military force in Cuba would be the best option.
Going along with the decision of military force, an air strike is discussed in a meeting with President Kennedy. General Sweeny was convinced that the air strike would be successful, however he admitted that the locations of all missiles were most likely not known, therefore, all would not be destroyed. President Kennedy says that he wants the air strike to be carried out on the following Monday morning. However, the Attorney General was opposed to the attack, saying it would be like Pearl Harbor, and it would be unknown how the Soviet military would respond. Mr. John McCone agreed with the Attorney General, and added that the United States, itself, should be prepared for an air strike and invasion on U.S. soil.
On October 22, 1962, Kennedy gives a radio-TV address to the country, addressing the dire situation and his opinions on the matter. It is clear that he feels betrayed by the Soviet Union, in their defiance of previous pacts and agreements, especially within a nation that historically, has had a relationship with the United States. Kennedy believes that the actual firing of missiles is not the only thing that constitutes a challenge or threat to a nation. For many years, the United States has been careful not to upset this status quo, by secretly transferring any nuclear weapons to another country, just as the Soviet Union has done. He says that the United States has no desire to dominate or conquer any other country, however, the country will not accept this secret and swift buildup of arms. He continues on by saying that the 1930’s taught us a clear lesson in that aggressive conduct should not go unchecked or unchallenged, because it ultimately leads to war. As a result of this, he is changing the United States’ policy from one of patience and restraint to the use of limited force.
After the crisis was averted, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. discussed talking points for President Kennedy’s speech informing the country of the new U.S. foreign policy of “limited force for limited purposes,” and the role it played in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Schlesinger suggests that Kennedy discuss how the promise of no invasion still aligns with American beliefs and attitudes, and that the force of change will be more effective than invasion of Cuba. Schlesinger states, “We learn first that firmness in defense of our vital interests is the central guarantee of security and peace.  If we aren’t prepared to be firm, we can expect neither security nor peace.” He goes on to specify that the United States will only use force when necessary, when the world balance of power is being threatened.
Before the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States’ foreign policy was one of restraint and peace. The escalating situation in Cuba caused the government to take a step back and rethink this policy. The Bay of Pigs invasion was a fiasco that led directly to further aggression from Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev. Kennedy ultimately decided to change this first policy decision, and brought in more advisors. Upon listening to the opinions of the CIA, General Sweeny, the Attorney General, and John McCone, the United States’ foreign policy was changed to that of limited force when necessary. The possibility of nuclear war was on the horizon, and was only avoided when Khrushchev reached out to Kennedy, and negotiations were made under the table. From that point on, the United States decided on the foreign policy of limited force, which was acted upon for the duration of the Cold War.