1. Introduction
More and more often, states from the Global South express their dissatisfaction with the way they are being represented in international institutions and organisations (Acharya, 2011). More specifically, they feel that international institutions often do not reflect their interests and identities (Acharya, 2011). It is indeed true that institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organisations, are often dominated by Western powers, and consequently serve the interests of these Western states (Narlikar, Daunton & Stern, 2012). The norms that these institutions follow and prescribe may be global norms, but are informed by Western interests.
However, what exactly are norms? Norms are widely discussed by international relations scholars and different streams in IR have diverging views on the concept. Rationalists approach norms from a point of utilitarianism, where are constructivists focuses on the way that norms shape behaviour of states and how it sets standards of appropriate behaviour and (Acharya, 2011). Constructivists are generally more concerned with norms than the other streams in international relations. Two constructivists that conducted extensive research on norms are Finnemore and Sikkink, who defined a norm as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (1998, p. 891). This is a more or less agreed upon definition, as is illustrated by for example Shannon’s definition of norms, which is very similar to Finnemore and Sikkink’s: “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors within a given identity” (Shannon, 2000, p. 294). Acharya (2011) added to this that norms develop stickiness, which causes an initial logic to be replaced by the new norm.
The creation of norms, norm-making, is traditionally seen as something ‘Western’ and has been dominated by Western powers (Benner, 2013). To see how non-Western, local agents can create norms, Acharya developed a model of norm subsidiarity. This is the idea of “a process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (Acharya, 2011, p. 96). Thus, it concerns the process whereby local actors develop new rules, offer new understandings of global rules or reaffirm global rules in the regional context.
One global norm that is widely contested is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm. The R2P is a commitment to effectively address genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UNA-UK, n.d). R2P was endorsed during the 2005 World Summit (Garwood, 2016), and was developed after the horrors of mass atrocity crimes as witnessed in the 1990s, for example in Kosovo and Rwanda. The aim of the idea of R2P is to effectively initiate international response to humanitarian crises. While the concept was endorsed by all UN member states, not all of them are equally satisfied with how the concept developed after 2005. Indeed, a number of states from the Global South has expressed concerns as they are afraid the R2P norm may be a threat to state sovereignty (Chandler, 2007). Among these states are the BRICS states, being Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In this paper, I apply Acharya’s model of norm subsidiarity on the BRICS and their influence on the R2P norm as established in the UN. Thus, my research question is formulated as:
To what extent can Acharya’s model of norm subsidiarity explain the BRICS’ policies with regard to the Responsibility to Protect norm?
To answer this question, this paper analyses the different elements of Acharya’s model through BRICS statements and Security Council resolutions, using mostly secondary sources. This paper is structured as follows. It first discusses the model of norm subsidiarity as presented by Acharya, after which it elaborates on the R2P norm. In section 6, the BRICS concept is addressed, before moving on to the case of the BRICS and R2P. In that section, the positions of the five BRICS states on the traditional R2P norm and the alternatives they have presented are considered. Section 6 covers the application of Acharya’s model of norm subsidiarity to this specific case, and lastly, conclusions are presented.
2. Norm subsidiarity
In his work “Norm subsidiarity and regional orders: sovereignty, regionalism, and rule-making in the Third World” (2011), Acharya discusses the lack of attention regional norms from the Third World (nowadays mostly referred to as the Global South) have received in academic research. In this study, he developed a model that shows how local norms can be exported to the international stage. This section elaborates on his logic and discuss his model of norm subsidiarity.
Norms exist at all levels of social life, being domestic, regional, global and everything in between (Acharya, 2011). To study the processes of norm-making by regional actors, Acharya created a model and coined the activity of exporting local norms to the global stage “norm subsidiarity”. Acharya defined norm subsidiarity as “a process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (2011, p. 97). According to him, this theory helps us in understanding the “complexities and contestations that go with norm creation in world politics” (Acharya, 2011, p. 118). His model is depicted in Figure 1. In general, subsidiarity in governance “encourages and authorises (local) authority” (Acharya, 2011, p. 97). In his model, this local authority is exported to higher levels.
When considering the model, it should be studied from the bottom up. The local agents are regional actors, and Acharya argued that these local agents fear domination by more powerful, central actors. To fight this fear, local agents can export the norms they have locally constructed to the international stage. By doing this, local agents can either be international norm makers or norm rejecters. They can reject outside ideas of powerful central actors, if they do not view them as worthy of selection, borrowing or adoption. On the other hand, they can also strengthen existing norms if they view these norms favourably and these norms are in line with their local norms. It is important to note that the subsidiary norms as presented by local agents do not have to be a coherent set of norms, or a norm accepted by all regions. Rather, these can be “distinctive, similar, overlapping and mutually reinforcing subsidiary norms developed by different regions” (Acharya, 2011, p. 99). Travelling from one region to another, new variations of the subsidiary norm can emerge in both their understanding and their application (Acharya, 2011).
Figure 1. Model of norm subsidiarity
An important question to ask is, when do states engage in norm subsidiarity? According to Acharya, two forces have to present in order for his model to work. Firstly, the local agents have to experience a feeling of exclusion from international rule and norm making. Institutions dominated by great powers not always reflect the ideas, interests and identities of weaker states (Acharya, 2011). Secondly, local agents can resort to norm subsidiarity when confronted with great power hypocrisy. This can happen when powerful actors violate existing global norms that are valuable for local agents. Local agents may be successful in norm subsidiarity, in which case their norms can undermine powerful actors’ policies and rules. However, the current, Western informed norms may also be too strong and be able to resist the challenge of local agents (Acharya, 2011).
3. Responsibility to Protect
As addressed in the introduction of this paper, the R2P norm is a debated norm. In this section I will further elaborate on the concept and lay out the difficulties and concerns associated with it.
In the 1990s, the world witnessed horrific atrocities during the wars in, for example, Rwanda and Srebrenica (UNRIC, n.d.). As a response to that, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan started an initiative, and in 2001 the idea of R2P was first coined. Garwood (2016) describes the birth of the R2P a shift from the right to intervene of the international community to indeed the international being responsible for the protection of citizens. It is this “re-conceptualisation of the relationship between state sovereignty and human rights, in which sovereignty is viewed “not as an absolute term of authority but as a kind of responsibility” (Garwood, 2016, p. 4), that was revolutionary. Four years later, R2P was endorsed on the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (Garwood, 2016). Support of the UN Security Council for R2P was formalised in April 2006 (UNRIC, n.d.). From then onwards, R2P was to be the tool of the UN to effectively address genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Benner, 2013).
To understand how the R2P can address mass atrocity crimes, one should be aware of how the concept is constructed. Most importantly, the R2P consist of three pillars which can be seen as different dimensions of R2P, and were created by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to better conceptualise the concept (Benner, 2013). The first pillar emphasises a state’s obligations to protect all populations within its own borders (UNA-UK, n.d.). Pillar ll outlines the international community’s role in helping states to fulfil this obligation (UNA-UK, n.d.). Lastly, Pillar III “identifies the international community’s responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, peaceful or coercive means to protect civilian populations where a state manifestly fails to uphold its obligations” (UNA-UK, n.d.). It is this last pillar which is controversial, and considered problematic by a number of countries, mainly from the Global South (Garwood 2016). The reasons for this are concerns about state sovereignty. These states disapprove of intervention in state affairs, as they fear this may impact their own sovereignty. Most scholars argue that the birth of these concerns can be traced back to the war in Libya in 2011, when the third pillar of the R2P was implemented.
4. The BRICS
The concept of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) was first coined by investment bank Goldman Sachs as an investment category, but the concept was later adopted by the states themselves, after which they have grown to be an informal grouping. In 2011, the four states were joined by South Africa, creating the BRICS with capital S. The formation of informal groupings of states is a manifestation of the global shift in economic power, and BRICS is a clear example of such a grouping on the international stage (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). The BRICS are noteworthy because of its coverage across continents, the size of the economies and their activities to influence the Western-led world order, despite numerous internal differences. BRICS’ main purpose is to enhance cooperation between their states to strengthen their position in the international order (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). Shared ideas include a desire for better representation in international organisations and a larger say in global affairs. This desire is based on the idea that their economic weight should be reflected more fairly.
It is relevant to study the BRICS’ cooperation in the UN Security Council as they wish to cooperate here (Ferdinand, 2014). Moreover, they were all members of that Council in the year 2011, which is especially relevant since that was the year in which the Council was concerned with the conflicts in Libya and Syria, in which the R2P was employed. They showed coherent voting behaviour on Resolution 1970 on Libya, which imposes sanctions and an arms embargo (Armijo & Roberts, 2014). Later they all abstained from a resolution treating the crisis in Syria (Stuenkel, 2015). In response to their concerns with the R2P, the BRICS have been active in developing their own norms. In the next section, I will apply Acharya’s model to the activities of the BRICS.
5. The case of the Responsibility to Protect
5.1 BRICS’ position on traditional R2P
Scholars disagree on the position of the BRICS towards R2P. Some, including Chris Keeler (2011), have argued the BRICS are reluctant in supporting R2P. Oliver Stuenkel (2014), on the other hand, considered the BRICS to be relatively supportive of the R2P. He points out that South Africa has encouraged other African states to support the concept already in 2005. Additionally, more practically, China has supported resolutions that included reference to the R2P after the Libya resolution. Thus, one is not able to simply argue the BRICS denounce the idea of R2P, nor can be BRICS be seen as ‘revisionist’ or ‘revolutionary’. Nonetheless, Stuenkel realises that BRICS’ attitude towards R2P can influence the future of the norm. Rather, the BRICS are reluctant towards a specific part of the R2P concept. More specifically, the BRICS have expressed concerns about the coercive measures under the third pillar of R2P. In his work, Garwood (2013) clearly outlines why this pillar is problematic for the BRICS states. He states that the concept implies a challenge of the view on state sovereignty, as held by the BRICS. The BRICS have a strict Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs is central to this idea. Furthermore, the states had concerns that this military component could be misused by powerful, Western states to pursue other strategic objectives (Garwood, 2016). In any case, the fact that the BRICS states have presented their own interpretations of the R2P illustrates that they are not in full agreement with the existing norm. In the next section, I address the alternatives to the R2P as constructed locally.
5.2 Alternatives to the traditional R2P
Brazil’s Responsibility while Protecting
Brazil has openly expressed support for the concept of R2P, but struggled with the implementation of it. More specifically, it fears that the third pillar of R2P can be used for purposes other than those stated in the pillar, for example to pursue regime change (Benner, 2013). To overcome this problem, Brazil developed a norm called Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), which was supposed to be complementary to the existing R2P norm. The proposal as presented to the Security Council stated that all three pillars of R2P have to be executed chronologically, and all peaceful means must have been exhausted before considering the authorisation of force (Government of Brazil, 2011). Moreover, it recommended additional procedures when employing R2P. Apart from the content of Brazil’s proposal, the proposal is notable because it was the first time for Brazil to engage in developing a critical global norm, and even more so one relating to a concept that had been subject of heavy international debate.
China’s Responsible Protection
One year after Brazil presented the RwP concept, China brought forward the idea of Responsible Protection (RP). Like Brazil, China is mostly concerned that Pillar III may be used to pursue objectives other than civilian protection (Garwood, 2016). Thus, China proposed six elements to establish a re-interpretation of this pillar. The elements draw on both the R2P norm as proposed initially in 2001, as well as Brazil’s RwP (Garwood, 2016) and aim to enhance monitoring and supervision of the use of force.
Russia, India and South Africa
Although neither Russia, India or South Africa presented a concrete proposal to alter the R2P norm, all three countries have concerns related to the norm. After the use implementation of the R2P in Libya, and after it vetoed resolution to implement the R2P’s third pillar in Syria, Russia stated that “it is unacceptable that military interventions and other forms of external interference be carried out on the pretext of implementing the concept of the responsibility to protect”. (The Russian Federation as cited in Baranovsky & Mateiko, 2016, p. 51). Russia has generally been conservative towards the emergence of new norms, and was so too with regard to the R2P. Vladimir Baranovsky and Anatoly Mateiko (2016) argue that Russia tries to contribute to the debate on the concept and implementation of R2P, but that it’s recent history as a state complicates this. Of the five BRICS states, South Africa may have the most favourable position towards R2P. Before its conclusion in 2005, South Africa acted as a promoter of R2P (Smith, 2015). Nevertheless, the country voted against UN Security Council resolutions proposing the implementation of the third pillar. Karan Smith (2005) notes however, that South Africa’s concerns differ from the other BRICS states in that they mare procedural rather than substantive. Illustrating for the case of India, is the fact that this country was one of the last countries to support the R2P in 2005 (Hall, 2013). In India, most of the debate has focused on the outcomes of R2P, rather than the procedures of it (Bommakanti, 2017).
6. The norm subsidiarity of the BRICS
To study whether Acharya’s theory of norm subsidiarity is able to explain the policies of the BRICS with regard to the R2P, his model with the relevant actors and norms included, is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Norm subsidiarity for the R2P norm
What is interesting about the ‘norm subsidiarity’ of the BRICS, is that the BRICS are not traditional local, Third World actors, due to the permanent membership of Russia and China of the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, they use their power to challenge the current, Western-led world order. As explained earlier in this paper, two forces are required for triggering norm subsidiarity. The first one is the exclusion from rule-making (norm-making), the second the perceived hypocrisy of great powers defending agreed principles. To assess whether norm subsidiarity took place among the BRICS states in the R2P, the possible presence of these two circumstances will now be discussed.
6.1 Exclusion form rule-making
Generally, the fact that only very few non-Western states were reasonably part of the international order which was formed by the Western European states and the US, can explain the rejection by the Global South of norms that are part of this system (Acharya, 2011). It is widely discussed that the BRICS feel they are not part of international norm making, and they have referred to the Brazilian term ‘sentimento do exclusão’; a feeling of exclusion by the great powers (Bellamy, 2011). This feeling is adequately illustrated by their efforts to reform international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (Armijo & Roberts, 2014).
Nonetheless, one could argue that the BRICS were part of the norm-making process of the R2P, as they all signed the World Summit Outcomes adopting the R2P in 2005. However, the BRICS states expressed concerns with the interpretation and possible implementation of the concept throughout the drafting of the norm (Bellamy, 2011). This is for example illustrated by Primakov’s statement, Russia’s former prime minister and intelligence chief, that humanitarian intervention is not the future (Primakov, 2004). To counter these concerns of, among others, the BRICS, the final document of the World Summit Outcome was altered to more clearly distinguish it from regime change (Bellamy, 2011). Taking the above into account, one can conclude that the BRICS were not excluded from the norm creation of R2P as they have been from other norms. Rather, the BRICS did have an influence in how the concept was formulated.
6.2 Perceived hypocrisy of great powers
Despite the formulation of the R2P in the World Summit Outcomes, the implementation of the third pillar remained controversial. The BRICS surely perceive the great powers to be hypocrite in their use of the R2P in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya. Where the concept should be about protecting civilians, critics argued that R2P is being used as a tool for regime change. The Chinese statement in a Security Council meeting in 2011 illustrates this position: “The international community and external organizations can provide constructive assistance, but they must observe the principles of objectivity and neutrality and fully respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned. There must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians” (Security Council, 2011, p. 20). Likewise, South Africa stated to be “concerned that the implementation of these resolutions appears to go beyond their letter and spirit (Security Council, 2011, p. 18). India’s UN ambassador Hardeep Sing Puri added that NATO actions have “given R2P a bad name” (Benner, 2013, p. 4). UN operations in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya confirmed the BRICS’ suspicions of the great powers and their objectives for R2P, and proved that R2P’s could be disputed. Clearly, the BRICS experienced hypocrisy of the Western powers in their application of the R2P norm.
6.3 Result of the R2P norm subsidiarity
After having discussed the forces that are required for norm subsidiary to take place, one can consider the result of BRICS’ efforts in adapting the norm. While initially Western powers rejected the idea of Brazil’s RwP, they later adopted a more favourable stance on the concept (Benner, 2013). Thorsten Benner (2013) argues that their initial negative reaction relates to the idea that norm creation should be something of the West. However, the realisation that the RwP could serve a bridge to unite the different camps in the R2P debate eased their position. China’s RP has received less attention, although the Chinese issues with the concept have impacted the use of R2P. Chinese and Russian abstentions of the Security Council resolution to implement the third pillar in Syria demonstrates that the norm is under pressure (Keeler, 2011). Even a watered-down version of the initial resolution was not adopted by the Council. This demonstrates that the R2P norm is not necessarily a global one, and “the BRICS countries have determined that humanitarianism should not compromise the sovereignty of individual states and should not restrict the rights of governments over domestic matters” (Keeler, 2011).
7. Conclusion
Acharya’s model helps to understand the norm making by local agents, and these local norms can be exported to the international stage. These norms can then threaten or strengthen existing global norms. In this paper, Acharya’s model was taken to study to what extend the policies of the BRICS relating to the R2P can be explained by the model. It aims to answer the following research question:
To what extent can Acharya’s model of norm subsidiarity explain the BRICS’ policies with regard to the Responsibility to Protect norm?
First of all, the BRICS can be considered as local agents as they are not part of the established powers in the Western-led world order. Secondly, the BRICS have been developing their own norms. While Brazil and China have put forward concrete proposals to adapt the norm, the other BRICS have not done so. Nonetheless, Acharya stated that subsidiary norms can be developed by different regions, and can be overlapping or distinctive. Thus, one can argue that the BRICS have put forward subsidiary norms on the R2P concept. By presenting subsidiary norms, local agents can be norm makers or norm rejecters. It is clear that in this case, the BRICS have been norm rejecters through their disapproval of the use of the R2P third pillar. Rather than the third pillar being used for humanitarian purposes, they consider it being used for regime change. This clashes with their strong feelings on sovereignty and the importance of non-intervention in state affairs. This rejection of the norm resulted in discarding the resolution proposing the implementation of the third pillar in Syria. Additionally, Western powers have started to open up to the RwP norm, as they realised it may help to overcome the divide in the R2P discussion.
In so far, the model of norm subsidiarity is able to explain the behaviour and policies of the BRICS. The last aspects to consider are the two drivers of norm subsidiarity that have to be present to validate Acharya’s model. These drivers are a feeling of exclusion by the local agents from norm making, and perceived hypocrisy of great powers by local agents. The latter is undoubtedly present after the use of R2P’s third pillar in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, which according to the BRICS, did not aim for civilian protection but rather for regime change. However, the first driver is less evident. While the BRICS have often expressed their feelings of exclusion in the Western-led order, they did have a say in the development of the R2P norm. Even, the norm was adapted following their concerns before it was eventually adopted in 2005.
Thus, Acharya’s model is able to explain the policies of the BRICS to the extent that the BRICS are local agents, they have developed their own, local norms, and exported these to the international stage to challenge the existing R2P. Their actions followed after great power hypocrisy, but not necessarily exclusion from norm-making. In any case, the BRICS have been able to challenge the R2P norm, and their actions have impacted the implementation of the concept.
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