Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has shifted their long-standing links with the People’s Republic (PRC) of China. With their geographical proximity in Asia in question, it beggars thoughts of whether the creation of a superpower axis which would be economically, militarily and politically strong enough to challenge the West.
Given their nuclear and technological capabilities, an alliance would be beneficial for both states, a point which will be argued further within the essay. Despite never formally announcing an alliance, the two states have worked amicably together. The relationship between Russia and China can be described as an ‘cordial entente’ as they have mutual respect and understanding of one another’s position as global powers.
This essay outlines why a shared understanding of foreign policy strategies and agreements regarding capabilities does not equate a bond that is substantial enough to form an alliance in itself. The essay will outline the means in which particular feats of each state will remain separate from one another irrespective of how close they may appear. Due to differing foreign policy objectives, the Sino-Russian relationship remains hampered ideologically, strategically and economically. In order to explore this relationship, the strengths and weaknesses within their bilateral relationship will be assessed.
Theoretical analysis:
Applying Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism to the Sino-Russia entente shows compatibility between the idea that states do not have adequate information about one another to sufficiently assert the intentions of the other state actor. The state of perpetual flux allows for benign intentions to swiftly turn malignant (Toft, 2005: 383). Relating this to Russia and China, neither state is fully aware of the intentions of the other because certain interests of each state have an element of ambiguity to them. They cannot formally align with each other based on this innate wariness.
The idea that international politics is based on survival of the state is applicable in this instance as Russia faced significant weakening following the collapse of the Soviet Union and has had to reformulate its foreign policy. In modern politics, Russia has exerted hard power tactics to safeguard its security status in the region, as well as having to deal with retaliatory attitudes from other states. China however, has a history riddled with economic crisis and wars that have debilitated the nation. Their survival is deeply rooted in not only ensuring their rise economically and militarily, but also in simultaneously restoring their former greatness; a point emphasized in their bolstering nationalism (H. Wang, 2015). However, survival is not necessarily ensured by alliances despite the prevalence of globalization. States are of no use to one another if they have nothing to offer, therefore state actors must focus on the development of their individual structures. Albeit alliances can lead to the progression of their own competences, they remain vigilant against becoming too greatly dependent on one another.
In the case of China, Mearsheimer’s idea that military capability is the “ultimo ratio of international politics” is not wholly pertinent as China’s soft power strategy in Africa and its naval expansion in the South China Sea coupled with its economic competition with the West renders this idea too singular to be the number one factor that contributes to power security. Latent forms of power have proved to be just as effective when conducting reassurances of command. This is not to say that military enlargement is not a measure China have failed to take, but there are other ways in which power has been attained; measures that China has steadily executed in order to protect its rise.
Diverging military strategies:
Building on the ideas of geostrategist Alfred Mahan, Mearsheimer (2010: 383) states that China is aggressively displaying Mahan’s philosophy of sea control and decisive battle. The Department of Defense in Australia (2009: 34) stated that China’s ‘military modernisation will be increasingly characterised by the development of power projection capabilities’. Maritime power in the Asian-pacific is a large component that leads to the breakdown of China’s military intentions. The build up of the ‘Second Island Chain’ in the Western Pacific exemplifies China’s maritime interests, signaling its navy’s expansion of combative forces. Conduct by China such as these were seen as retaliations against trilateral arrangements made by US-Japan-South Korea, displaying its feelings towards a Western power becoming too close with its neighboring Asian states with which it has tense relations. It is ‘conventional wisdom’ that the South China Sea has been elevated to a level where China deems it one of its core interests (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013: 4), tensions over the Senkaku, Taipig and Spratly islands causing regional tension in the Asian hemisphere. The U.S. weighing in on these disputes has arguably halted the escalation of further aggressive rhetoric surrounding the islands but it has also frozen the status quo, which leads to further complications. The strategies of China’s rivals possess ‘no real or de facto containment’, but it is China’s perspective on the hostile environment they are in that is of relevance to how it positions itself militarily (Fensom, 2014). Thus, their feelings of strategic encirclement have contributed to the state’s implementation of ‘high-level statements’ which back their more aggressive and assertive actions and rhetoric when addressing security threats. Issues relating back to Western hegemony can be related to this, such as the Trans Pacific Partnership of the West (predominantly) versus the Southeast Asian equivalent, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, competing for control of pacific trade. China’s exclusion from the TPP trade pact between the two bodies paved way for competition with the West in a bid to seize control over export access and as such become the world’s ‘biggest bloc’ of free-trade zone (Kim, 2015). Despite the TPP’s initial invitation for China to join, based on the state not wanting to dilute its ‘Communist Party’s quasi-monopoly on information’ nor adhere to restrictive measures of state enterprises that membership would entail, China declined this invite (G. Chang, 2015).
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created as a means to oppose Russian power, particularly post-Communism when the Soviet Union fell (Cuthbertson, 2008). Its close relationship with the U.S. and the EU has been the source of Russian frustration in the past few decades as tensions have built up rapidly. NATO’s expansion towards the East has been deemed as an attempt to work closely with the U.S. to encircle and thus geographically and politically contain or at the very least, significantly lessen Russia’s power in the region. Following NATO’s invitation for Montenegro, Ukraine and Georgia to join its military alliance, its relationship with Russia has deteriorated as the state has taken this as a blatant violation of the promises made by Western leaders at the end of the Cold War following negotiations over German reunification (Klußmann, Schepp and Wiegrefe, 2009).This is due to Russia viewing NATO’s growth as a form of strategically placing bases around its borders and Western Europe, for a broader agenda which threatens its regional position. NATO’s expansion has not only alienated Russia, but it has caused concern for other states in the region such as China. China weighing in on the hostility felt towards and created by NATO has been an interesting observation for the international community as usually the state remains neutral and silent on the foreign affairs of other nations. Nevertheless, regarding NATO expansion, China sent a very clear political statement calling for them to relax their aggressive role in European affairs; this is in particular in regards to the Ukrainian crisis. Though China publicly recognises Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, the hostile environment that was a result of the standoffish temperament between NATO and Russia was what China’s ambassador to Belgium, Qu Xing, stated as a “game” between Western powers and Russia (Garanich, 2015). He urged for Western powers such as the U.S. and EU member states to “abandon the zero-sum mentality” they felt towards Russia. China can empathize with Russia on this stand-point as they themselves are subject to being geographically surrounded by Asian states that are allies of Western powers.
Nevertheless, it is imperative to compare Chinese military strategy to that of Russia. Russia’s military strategy has been sporadic in the past decade. Displaying its aggressive hard power tactics, Moscow repetitively threatened Baltic and Nordic countries; it has not only menaced civilian airplanes but it has also escalated intelligence infiltration, whilst deploying ‘unprecedented military forces against those states’ (J. Blank 2015). Its mobilization of nuclear forces and disposition of these forces contributed to the violation of the 1987 treaty of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces by intimidating Moldova (ibid). This shows that China and Russia have conflating ideas about how to influence states; China rooting for soft power tactics versus Russia’s belligerent and coercive means of establishing military authority. Russia’s sometimes violent and erratic military doctrine when dealing with other states is something China is wary of and is another factor of why neither Russia nor China will form an anti-West alliance. Despite China’s growing military assertiveness, it has championed soft power balancing when dealing with counterparts in Eurasia.
In addition, “Maskirovka” meaning ‘Russian deception’ is something that is prevalent in their warfare, direct and asymmetrical. They do this by means of imitation, decoys and disinformation (prominently seen in cyberspace). Ironically, in this sense, the two states have even more reason to see through the façade of their relationship as they understand illusion and the ‘fog of war’ to a large degree. China understands that manipulation through politics and psychology is just as operative in military strategy, its dynamism ranging from the build up of momentum to strategic configurations. It is emphasized in Chinese military strategy that the use of force does not guarantee gains in the long term, as they are conscious of the consequences of their actions. Russia’s threatening stance is not nearly as mindful of the future significances of present-day actions. Thus, an alliance for China, from a militaristic lens, would be unreliable.
Cyberspace has been a platform for the sharing of intelligence, cybercrime and cyber espionage to occur. Given the unorthodox nature of this domain, asymmetric warfare has been prevalent in this arena. In 2015, Russia and China both agreed to memorandum stipulating that neither states would launch cyber attacks on one another and would additionally pair together in order to combat technological threats which would lead to the destabilization of “internal political and socio-economic atmosphere” (Gady, 2015). For China, the conditions of the strategic cyber-security strategy that they have structured with Russia have underlying anti-Western sentiments. This is due to their desire to make digital space line up to the political realities of Chinese communism (Gady, 2014). Such limitations online are what China deem as “Internet Sovereignty”, a counter concept to the West’s notion of Internet freedom, which is generally universally accepted. This is another mode of challenging Western hegemony. The newly enforced cyber scheme falls under a 2011 UN approved outline called the, “International code of conduct for information security”. This blueprint promotes the intensification of multilateral unification and works in resistance against ‘western cyber-hegemony’, highlighting the supplementation of the pre-eminent Sino-China relations. In spite of this, Article 4 of the signed frameworks specifies that states have the ‘right to self defense’ in cyber space in retaliation against “unlawful use or unsanctioned interference in the information resources of the other side” (United Nations General Assembly, A/69/723: 2015), thus the extent to which mutual co-operation will occur between them is up to judgment of either/ both states. They are not bound to ratify these guidelines set if they feel they have been violated.
Economic co-operation:
Economic co-operation between Russia and China has rapidly increased in terms of bilateral trade (Sidorenko, 2013). China’s unprecedented economic growth is reason to see why China sees “economics as power”. Its economic might expands in great volumes and is set to supersede the GDP of the U.S. by 2020 due to its double digit annual growth, proving it to be the dominating economic powerhouse in the Asian region. Nevertheless, China has sought out alternative, or rather, additional means to establish monetary victory over the West. Due to the world reserve currency being the U.S. dollar, China and Russia paved the way for a new global currency which would bypass the U.S. dollar (Schortgen Jr, 2013). This fiscal entente contains 23 other countries, a majority of them Western countries consisting of states such as Germany, France and the UK, all 23 of which account for 60 percent of gross global GDP. EU member states such as these are essentially signing up to a treaty which would entail the Eurozone casting the dollar aside in favor of a new banking system. This shift of economic power acts as a harbinger that significantly hints at a higher probability of the international community transitioning from existing unipolar sphere to a multipolar paradigm. In order for this new currency to be successfully implemented, there had to exist a bank which had repute and sufficient means to handle commercial trade under this new currency. One did not exist until 2014 when the formation of the New Development Bank (NDB) which Russia and China are founding both members of, also known as the BRICS Development Bank.
Replacement of the petrodollar system where states no longer have to trade with the dollar as a default process before trading with other currencies creates a change that is problematic for the U.S., nevertheless, due to so many other Western countries being invested in this new financial system, it does not directly challenge nor damage the economy of the West as a whole. The adaptability of Western states at a time where they cannot compete with China’s growing economic power is imperative at a time where existing commercial monopolies are being altered. Nevertheless, another perspective states that the Chinese system can simply run parallel to the Western economic system (Wei, 2010).
Neoliberals’ institutional theory states that actors can lessen uncertainty, solve collective-action problems and lower transaction costs (Joseph M, Ikenberry: 2003, 116), which is something both Russia and China are both economically privy to as member states belonging to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, BRICS, Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Beijing has been steered towards the arms of Moscow as its domestic requirement of oil renders stabilizing substantial energy sources as a necessity of its goals of foreign policy (J.Mitchell, 2007: 137). The abundance of oil in Siberia and Russia’s Far Eastern region and Chinese demand for oil consumption creates a pragmatic foundation for co-operation in the energy sector, as both states stand to mutually benefit from such a partnership. Low productivity rates in Russia, paired with a shortage of economic funds and outdated technologies debilitated its already struggling economy (Yishan, 2008: 8). The Ukrainian crisis has catalyzed Sino-Russian rapprochement on Russia’s part as the “the need to diversify markets, develop infrastructure and increase non-energy exports” had to be addressed in order to abate economic losses the state accumulated due to EU and Western sanctions (Kashin, 2014). Russian eagerness to tackle economic and social instability particularly after suffering adverse effects of the actions it undertook in Ukraine were immensely eased following gas companies Gazprom and China’s National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) signing a multibillion dollar deal in 2014. The contract entails steady co-operation in the energy field with one another for three decades, in which Russia will supply China with 30 bcm of gas annually (Blagov, 2015). This is greatly symbolic to how they envision their future co-operation as bilateral relations are visibly emerging onto a more fixed path. The dependence of China on Russia strengthens their relations and vice versa as Gazprom also invested in Chinese energy in East and Northeast China where this area will provide them with gas-powered electricity.
Joint enterprises such as these stand as a testament of expanding long-term markets with one another. Such investment in companies and resources was intentionally intended for Europe and Russia but was abandoned following the Ukrainian crisis. One opinion is that this energy alliance directly threatens liquefied natural gas deals around the world (Paik, 2015:1). Russian estrangement from the West and China’s pressure to bridge the gap between economic growth coupled with its need to detach the state from its reliance on coal due to its damaged air quality were factors that are not compatible with both states coinciding to form an anti-Western alliance. Additionally, Gazprom supplies LNG to Western states such as the UK and the U.S. irrespective. “Western Europe is almost wholly dependent on imports, mostly from North Africa the Middle East”, the U.S. being dependent on the Eastern Hemisphere for only a small percentage of imports (Office of Economic Analysis, 1971). Thus this union was more of an obvious geopolitical strategy, as oppose to forthrightly opposing the West. The agreements were contracts Russia was economically bound to, whereas China sought energy stability to manifest their energy revolution. China have ensured that dependence on Russia for gas is not to a point where they become too reliant as they have sought alternative energy deals, exemplified with Turkmenistan gas imports.
In the context of economics, it is imperative to understand the financial aspirations and roots of each state to affirm why Sino-Russia alliance would not happen. China has had an imperatively “thicker” integration with international economy, whereas Russia’s conformation to it has been waning; their small GDP growth a clear indicator of this (Yasenchak, 2011). According to the modernization theory, Russia should have surpassed China in terms of development and falling into line with western progression as an industrial power and even had more time to do so, nevertheless, it has been China in the past three decades who have won on these economical points having successfully been able to apply the western economy models within the boundaries of Chinese characteristics. The ability of the Chinese to not only accept globalization and adopt a hybrid system but to tactically use it to the point where they are predicted to become the largest economy in the world highlights two things: China, in economic terms, has utilized Western makeups of economic prosperity to thrive in their region and globally alike. Secondly, Russia’s economic lag simply cannot keep up with Chinese investment. To further distinguish between the two, the point of corruption affecting economy was made. Economic policies fostered by the Chinese have flourished under the influence of government officials, entrepreneurs and investors (Balzer, 2008:39), however the Russian government have limited its growth, the supplementation of corruption by oligarchs and elites further reinforcing these restraints. Russia’s need to stabilize their economy and its growth versus China’s desire for economic domination they deem a route to security pinpoint why based on economy, the intertwinement of these states to form an anti-West alliance given China’s vast foreign investment with Western nations will cease to happen.
In conclusion, a Sino-Russian anti-Western alliance will not happen. Their economies face different struggles; Russia’s compulsion to first stabilize its deceasing economic growth which is detrimentally affected by its elites as oppose to China’s obligation to maintain its annual growth through successful foreign investment. Their military strategies differing on points of hard power versus soft power illuminate disparities in what they deem to be security threats and how to deal with them. Russia is more focused on Europe and NATO expansion, whereas China fights for territorial ownership in the South China Sea, something have specified to be a ‘core interest’. Though energy relations are prosperous between them and have been described as prevailing at their highest degree, China is doing what it must to ensure survival by reaching out towards Russia for natural gases. China has been attentive to not become exclusively dependent on Russia regarding gas imports as it has sought alternative back ups other than Russia and Russia too, has continued its continual business in LNG exportation.
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