Essay: Iran’s nuclear capability

With particular reference to understanding the mechanism behind Iran’s nuclear negotiations, Post-Colonialism leads me to argue that, by virtue of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty being an instrument of western diplomacy; Iran has been reluctant to come to the negotiating table out of fear. The Iranian nuclear project benefited from the legitimacy and national patriotism of the common Iranian; thus international regulatory institutions are largely seen as the product of interstate diplomacy dominated by Western great powers” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p331). Devlen’s (2010) analysis on the previous Iranian nuclear negotiation reveals that the Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement but they have a sceptical and conflictual view of the United States, because they feared that if they showed the willingness to negotiate, the United States could exploit it to its advantage. One could argue that, Iranian foreign policy is dominated by the belief that Nuclear Weapon States seek to curtail its right to nuclear determination; a continuation to what it perceives as Western oppression and interference. The entrenched nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, coupled with the fact Nuclear Weapons States have sought to maintain their monopoly on nuclear proliferation is indicative of an international community based on American dominance which maintains “the logic of colonial violence, oppression, and inequality as represented by the characteristic clash between nuclear haves and nuclear have-not” (Biswas 2001, Peterson 2010). Like Ahmadinejad proclaimed the end to US hegemony and the end of Western oppression, his defiance to negotiate a nuclear resolution can be likened to the battle against nuclear apartheid or perhaps the fear of losing its sovereignty by means of Western invasion.
One begins to sense that the historical dialogue between Iran and the United States has morphed itself into a struggle for power and recognition; and arguably the Iran nuclear ambition acts a tool for recognition through defiance. Through Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, we know that the interpretation and imposed values on the world is not void of history; and their origins are often brutal and far removed from the values which they produce. For example, the value of good is measured on that which the powerful nobles applied to himself in contrast to the common man. In other words, the value of the master depended on that which is perceived to be ‘good’, as opposed to the slave which connotes that which is ‘bad’ and it is the tragedy of distance, between the high-born versus the low-born that creates a sense of superiority over inferiority; thus leading to the ressentiment of the superior (Pearson & Diethe, 2006). Scheler (1972 p45-46).) defines ressentiment “as a self-poisoning of the mind which has definite causes and consequences. The feeling of ressentiment manifests itself in the form of systematic repression of certain emotions and affect, which when projected lead to conflict in the quest for revenge”. On this basis, it could be argued that an aggressive Iranian foreign policy towards the United States is born out of the feeling of ressentiment towards the value the United States has placed on itself as good and towards the value Iran perceives the United States has placed it as evil. Post-structuralism draws our attention to the power of language meta-narrative and seeks us to deconstruct what we know about “truth” in political discourses in international relations. Through the processing of otherisation, states act differently towards what they perceive as enemies or allies; because enemies are threatening and friends are not. The international system poses complexities; and it is only through knowledge or perception of the “other” in the international system that states are able to shape foreign policies which leans either towards cooperative or uncooperative measures (Campbell 1998). Quintessentially fear plays a part in guiding Iran’s foreign policy towards America because it deems the United States and its allies as threatening to its sovereignty. Relations between Iran and the United States epitomises Wendt’s assertion which argues that anarchy is what states make of it; sociological interaction, identity formation and construction are key components of state relations. The foreign policy of Iran is constructed by following a discourse which articulates around the nodal point of anti-Western revolutionary identity. State behaviours are constructed and re-constructed to a great deal by the dominating norms and dynamics within the international system; thus international norms define the goals and purpose of states (Wendt 1992, 1993). For example, within the international system, a state’s accessibility to or level of nuclear technology attracts a label of either a weak state or a strong state. Therefore, for Iran to create a self-identity relevant to that which is codified as strong, Iranian foreign policy-makers seeks to pursue or have access to nuclear technology. Iran deems nuclear technology as an important component, moreover previous norms and Cold War discourse with particular reference to the nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia, proved that, to be a force to be reckoned with nuclear technology is a must. Iran considered it was losing the Iran-Iraq War to Saddam and American as a result of weakness; therefore, it saw an incentive in restarting a full-fledged nuclear program in deep in the throes of the war in 1985 (Jafarzadeh, 2001: p132). Individuals derive part of their identity from membership in various social groups and because membership reflects back on the self, people want their group to have a positive identity. Iran has a deep sense of pride in its Persian heritage she boasts of as dating back to the time Xerxes and Cyrus (Tajfel, 1974 Kissinger, 2014). Out of vulnerability and fear of western meddling, Iran has legitimised an aggressive foreign policy towards the West in form of acquiring nuclear capability. Iran hoped to establish its identity as a technologically advanced and independent entity deserving recognition within the international order. The nuclear front become a symbol of unity and independence from Western dominion which is also closely connected to its national pride. Iranian leaders and Iranians mutually benefit from this aggressive policy in that; it is useful enough to summon Iranian resentment towards the “other” and it was strong enough for the Iranian, as it offered them a sense of pride in reproaching the evil inherent in Western influence.
It is only when policy-makers come to terms with the complex mechanisms that shape Iranian foreign policy, that normative International Relations theorists can begin to simplify their explanation for Iranian behaviour within the international system. A fundamental flaw in the current world order is that, in its quest for universalism, it assumes all nations are equal. Using the analogy of George Orwell, all states are equal but some states are more equal than others. Though the international order is based on the equal principles of Westphalian notions of sovereignty; nation-states differ in cultural context, economies, power and normative IR scholars ought to consider how historical interaction between Iran and the United States may influence Iranian foreign policy today. I have used Post-Colonialism and Post-Structuralism to argue that Iran’s quest for nuclear capability is a product of the feeling of vulnerability and its policies reflect that of an individual revolting against another out fear. Iran’s defiance and hostile diplomatic relations toward the United States is a combination and part of its historical interaction and a battle against the feeling of oppression. On this ground, I argue that Iranian leaders may change from conservatives to reformist, nonetheless the foreign policy structure of Iran will remain unchanged and its key objectives will be guided by an ambition which relies on ousting Western meddling in its affairs. Positivist normative approach in international relations with particular reference to realism fails to acknowledge complex elements such as culture and historical relationship between states.
Having understood that Iran’s behaviours in the international system is a product of fear; I am now going to assess how realism can add to our understanding of Iranian nuclear policies. Realism in international relations is not a unified theory, but an array of ideas that share a common ground in the belief that all states are unified rational actors and that states will always act in ways that benefit their own self-interest, regardless of their political structure or circumstance (William 2013). For the purpose of this paper, I am going focus on neorealism; as they argue that it is the structure of the international system that predisposes states into violent behaviours. Structural realism argues that there exists a sense of lawlessness in the international system; it assumes given that the international system is anarchic in nature, states are forced to act in its own self-interest based on the principles of survival and self-help. Defensive realism holds that states will seek to avoid wars by balancing and will pursue enough force to defend itself from what it considers as threat to its survival. On the other hand, offensive realists argue that states will aim to gather as much power as possible in order to ensure its safety (Williams 2013, p18-22). For realists, states are the predominant actors within the sphere of international relations and there is little scope for moral or ethics in state relations. Taking these assumptions into account and not forgetting the argument made in preceding paragraphs, for realist the main purpose of Iranian nuclear ambition is for the purpose of deterrence. Iran views nuclear capability as a means of deterrence essential to its survival. The general principles of deterrence in Security Studies is the ability to control or influence the behaviour of actors through fear rather than through direct actions, be it military force or economic threat because once force is used deterrence has arguably failed. Therefore Deterrence must be credible, that is policy-makers in Iran need to demonstrate that Iran’s actions are capable of producing a nuclear capability (William, 2013).
The decisive form of deterrence is nuclear, because of the unrivalled damage nuclear capable countries are able to administer; thus, states will attempt to attain nuclear weapons as a balancing mechanism in an environment where states feel a sense of insecurity (Shilling, 2008, 19-22). The United Nations failure of admonishing Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War arguably dented Iran’s faith in the international community and their diplomatic tension with Israel; an ally of the United States has given Iran an incentive to pursue a nuclear capability (Waltz, 2012, 2-3). The United States announced its nuclear capability to the world in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and whilst Israel has not openly admitted to its nuclear stock, it has generally accepted having nuclear capabilities since 1960 (Allison and Zelkow 1999, 25). Iran’s military expenditure was quoted as being around 30 billion dollars by president Obama in 20015 and Iran suffers from economics sanctions (The New York Times, 2015). Iran is aware that a direct military confrontation with the United States or Israel poses grave consequences detrimental to its survival; as such Iran risks defiant nuclear negotiations as a means of deterrence; uranium enrichment is Iran’s leverage. The United States proved credible in using force as a continuation of its policies with the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, which arguably also deepened Iranian sense of fear. From a realist perspective, Iran’s feeling of insecurity predisposes it to seek protection in an aggressive manner in order to balance the United States and Israel. I for one believe that Iran does not directly intend acquiring a nuclear bomb, as that would add more risk to Iran’s survival. Having said that, I strongly believe that Iran has a deep urge for a civilian nuclear capability that can be swiftly militarised should it believe its survival and interest are deeply threatened. Iran’s experience with chemical weapons under Saddam Hussein, coupled with on and off diplomatic relations with a nuclear capable Pakistan are a cause for worry, which also naturally shapes Iranian ambition for nuclear capability. North Korea has also acted as a good model for Iran and it has shown that perhaps nuclear capability is credible with regards to deterring Western invasion. On the other hand, the case of Iraq has showed Iran the detriment that rest in the inability to protect oneself from Wester hostility (Sherrill 2012, 40).
The nuclear imbalance in the Middle East is a deep source of concern and a nuclear capable Iran would act as a balancer in the region. This has the ability to caution Israel and opens Israel to negotiation with other countries within the region. Furthermore, the risk of a nuclear attack will be reduced once this balance has been attained, because the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine will repress states from using nuclear weapons, as it may also lead to self-obliteration (Waltz, 2012). In addition to this, “if a state has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests” (Waltz 2007 – p137). Notwithstanding, it is important to note that concerns over the Iranian nuclear ambition in the international order is based on the view that a nuclear Iran will not stop short at protecting itself from outside forces. Proponents of this argument have the view that the Middle East is complex and a nuclear Iran will only further deepen the security issues in the fragile region. The case of Pakistan has been likened to what a nuclear Iran might become; in light of Pakistan joining the nuclear club, it has become more aggressive and provoked the Kargil war and an array of further incidents (Fitzpatrick, 2006). The fear of the international society is valid considering Iran’s history with state sponsored terrorism; there is a belief that Iran may offer nuclear assistance to terrorist groups. I have argued that Iran behaviour is a product of its relations with the international society and taking into account the new Iranian nuclear deal; Iran’s foreign policy posturing can only be understood as a country striving to evade the tyranny of western oppression.
Once western policy makers come to terms with Iranian behaviour and reasons for its behaviour, one begins to understand that the chances of Iran making nuclear technology available to terrorist organisations would be detrimental to Iran’s national interest and such chances are remote. Iran may continue to use insurgency and guerrilla tactics to disrupt western hegemony in the Middle East, but a conventional confrontation with western forces is unlikely. In order for Iran to maintain a moderate behaviour and a move towards normalisation of diplomatic ties with the United State, Iran needs to perceive that it is not been oppressed by the West and its dealings with America has connote that of equality. President Obama in interview acknowledged that Iran has a deep mistrust for the United States and in the long road to normalising diplomatic relations with Iran; policymakers need to acknowledge how the deep history of mistrust justifies Iranian foreign (The New York Times, 2015).
Perhaps Iran case is a victory for realism; because through a series of zero sum games, the creation of a security dilemma and the diplomacy of fear, Iran on is on the path to ending sanctions that have impeded the growth of its economy. With the crisis in Syria, Iran has gained renewed influence in the Middle East and one cannot deny that for the Syrian crisis to be resolved, Iran has to be a force to be reckoned with. The historical interaction between the West and Iran reveals that Iran may bow to the dominance of the West as a temporary concession, but a sense of pride in its national identity shapes a foreign policy culture where it wants to be seen to negotiate with the West on equal terms (Kissinger 2014). Therefore, in order to maintain a policy which moves towards normalisation between Iran and the West, it would be recommended the West begin to negotiate with Iran on equal principles of sovereignty and the code non-intervention are to be strictly adhere to. Should Iranian policymakers have the conviction that the West cannot resist interfering in its domestic affairs, Iran may be forced to exclude itself from the international community out of fear. Both the United States and Iran have a parallel interest in the Middle East with particular reference to ISIL and stability around Iranian boarders; a transparent diplomatic relation between both entities is key in order to achieve that common goal (Esfandiary, 2015). With regards to Iran’s quest for nuclear capability, the West needs to come to concession with the fact that Iran will not relinquish its right to a peaceful nuclear pursuit and any attempts to curtail Iranian rights will only encourage Iran to aggressively pursue nuclear capability. A progressive diplomatic policy will aim to negotiate a realistic framework which would require at least a clear acceptance of uranium enrichment within Iran but also persuade Iran to give unprecedented verification of its nuclear projects (Parsi 2012)