His thoughts and concepts have already been on the context that war can be different in every aspect of the world.
Probably, the most significant thought Clausewitz gave was that “war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given cause (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 89).” It can be inferred that Clausewitz himself did not regard war as an occurrence that would occur in only one form. It would never be prejudiced to change, quite the contradictory in fact. Clausewitz was well aware that every war and every general still undergoes a continuous change and cycle every era. He is correct on that fact and at the very least, Clausewitz already had a practical mindset when he had written On War.
What Clausewitz had conducted is already remarkable as the amount of thought he had made still remained relevant under the military objectification. In addition, there is also a broad leadership as well to which he had summarized into the Prussian army thereof, but came off with a more extensive context. Much of what he had written had given way for the wars of his time. More so, if interpreted into the daily context and deeply understood in a wider sense, it can befit that Carl von Clausewitz’s theories can even be applicable of the modern warfare. In hindsight, his opinions primarily conducted to the essentials of war aside from the well-known attributions.
On the other hand, the nature of war is highly unchallengeable. It is a violent clash between contrasting wills with each person seeking to triumph over the other. Clausewitz further identified a few or more principles on the fundamental nature of war. These thoughts have prevailed to still be relevant even today, one of which is that he described war as a performance regarding force that can compel the enemy to do the deed one wants.
The Misconception of “War on Terror”
The Napoleonic Wars, as well as the two World Wars, have held relevance on such conception. For the Terror on War, Al Qaeda had stated that their move is to, “move, incite, and mobilize the Islamic nation to rise up to end US interference in Islamic affairs (Echavarria 2007, p. 11).” Hence, Al Qaeda wanted to use force on the supposed Islamic nation to induce the United States of America to end its interference in the Middle East. In the war itself, the United States wanted to reduce the barriers of terrorism to an unorganized, localized, not sponsored phenomenon. In addition, this is also to influence all the accountable nations and international bodies to approve a strategy concerning zero lenience for terrorism and to agree to delegitimize it (Echavarria 2007).
The relevance of the idea on the concept of The War on Terror can be defined to the type of war one is dealing with. Judging from the United States’ objectives in the War on Terror, one would imagine that the Bush Administration embarked upon an absolute war since it was looking for to annihilate terrorist organizations and their networks of sustainment by using military force. However, problems may arise regarding this. For one, it has something to do with the verbal communication used, when classifying the rejoinder to the 9/11 terrorist attacks a “war” on “terror.” The practice of the expression “terror” can suggest that the United States is combating a war alongside an approach, but at the same time, the usage of the word “war” produces an image of established war with particular opponents and a state, a detailed area or even military headquarters that can be under attack. This is impracticable if one is fighting a war against a method.
Hence, as a consequence, the lack of an obvious meaning of what kind of war will be commenced on cause’s incredible complicatedness for strategic preparation, for the accomplishment of these tactics on the position and also for the soldiers fighting this weak-
defined war. Thus, this can demonstrate the timelessness of the Clausewitzian thought for giving definition to the war that is about to be partaken. Had the Bush Administration clearly defined what kind of war they were on and had they been more cautious in labeling the answer to 9/11, it could be quarreled that the War on Terror might have advanced in a different way.
In addition, there is also what Carl von Clausewitz wrote about the importance of the definition of the kind of war that is about to be undertaken. His thoughts on the emotional conflict and also the intentions that were provided were also one of the many highlighted relevance to the present-day war. It was the intentions and feelings that were far too antagonistic that drove both parties into disagreement with each other. Tthe supposed goal must be rendering the opponent immobilized. Upon inclination for the War of Terror, there is still a thought that it can be applicable even for today.
These particular wide-ranging Clausewitzian conceptualization regarding the intentions and inspirations of incompatible gatherings inflowing wars, once again, emphasize the applicability of Carl von Clausewitz’s train of thought regarding war. His assumptions were true for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of his time, just as much as they apply to the War on Terror. While the fastidious motivations may of course contrast with time and circumstance, the fundamental feelings and intentions recognized by Clausewitz linger and is still unaffected and, hence, are still relevant, since war is merely the “continuation of policy by other means (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 87).” When analyzing the significance of this maintain to the War on Terror, one has to be cautious not to fall in the entrapment of taking this declaration too factually and, therefore, disregarding its deeper connotation and implication.
Once the political purposes in war have been given distinctiveness. The actions that have to be taken in order to achieve these aims will, preferably, also be resolute through the submission of motivation. This does not unavoidably signify that the calculation applied will automatically direct to the accurate actions being selected, since misperceptions of a hazard or one’s own capabilities regarding such may direct to an exploit that seems rational and sensible, but that is based on an indistinct view of the reality of the world. With the frame of mind of the government and the general sentiment at the time the war had occurred, this might have seemed sensible for such.
However, by classifying that the War on Terror is the course of action given predicament by motivation, other options like the large-scale unlawful examination, for example, are not even being measured. Hence, it seems that if one administers to comprehend the reason and reasonableness of the decision makers in the war, it is probable that their actions be traced and be recognized by their motivations. Thus, this had been proven a fact that in Clausewitz’s time, it holds true for the War on Terror and it would still hold factual for as long as human beings are governed by reason and rationality to which are implicated in the decision making procedure. Overall, it has been established that Clausewitz’s Trinity is a timeless thought with respect to the examination of war. The War on Terror is very much exaggerated by the elements of ordinary force, possibility and opportunity, as well as the reason to which were the conventional throughway wars of Clausewitz’s time.
As for the last conclusive part on the War of Terror, there is still the notion of Friction as theorized by Carl von Clausewitz. As Clausewitz (1976) approached the topic, he said that friction is “what makes the apparently easy so difficult (p. 119).” As to further explain, friction can be defined as the effect of the innumerable negligible occurrences, to which one can never generally anticipate.
Friction can be concluded as the unforeseen forces of a chance. It can also be stated that Friction led to prob
ability encounter itself. One cannot particularly partake in the surveillance of one, without the other one as well. Both are the vital and theoretical part of war, on War on Terror, and are still relevant to the present-day warfare.
Conclusion
Clausewitz also proclaimed that in war, there is really nothing final. In other words, success and finality in war can be contingent more on political knowledge than on military accomplishment. As to the observation and analysis of context for the most part on the opinion of other scholars, the Clausewitzian thought can be a dangerous weapon if not handled accordingly. Even with Clausewitz not precisely predicting the repercussion of every war, there is still with consideration that his masterpiece, On War, is just as timely and relevant to the twentieth century warfare as it had been on his timeframe.
After a much briefer and closer inspection of Carl von Clausewitz’s thought, it can be inferred that his findings and receptions of war really is timeless even if some have misinterpreted and consumed as such in another way. At the beginning is how Clausewitz developed such a purpose to make a book out of his relative experience and conceptions on war itself. Furthermore, it had built on the interpretation of others be it negative or positive to alternately find the true meaning behind the relevance of Clausewitz’s thoughts which had been decoded in On War. Coupled by the efforts of some scholars, it had been further acclaimed that the Clausewitz thought is indeed a relevant and timeless piece of information for the modern day warfare of the world.