Essay: Concealment: Theoretical Background

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Introduction

Interpersonal communication is vital in everyday’s lives of people. People have to communicate to transmit their ideas, intentions, and information to each other. To accomplish this aim, they adopt various means both formal and informal. Interpersonal communication is not as simple as saying what one means; what one means and how one says what he/she means is crucial and differs from one person to another. It is a matter of the language employed and it is influenced by each person’s aims and goals whether he/she aims to deceit, conceal, lie, mislead, or tell the truth. The intentional distortion of the information during the interpersonal communication aims at manipulating the actual information by means of falsification, concealment, telling half truth and deception. This eventually leads to the alteration of informing and thus, leads to arouse a new discipline of studying deception and consequently the emergence of the deception theories.
The study of the concept of concealment, as it is a type of deception, goes back historically to Aristotle who dealt with concealment in his discussion about argumentation. At that time, argumentation had two sides to be treated with; the first one is that argumentation is a cooperating discussion between the arguers; while the other side looks at argumentation as a competing discussion when each arguer hopes that his own argument will win the discussion (Krabbe, 2009: 111).

Aristotle goes with the competitive point of view and suggests roles for both the questioner (arguer) and the answerer (respondent). The questioner supposes a problem to debating it while the answerer makes a thesis to answer the problem. This argument has to be done in this way: the questioner requests the respondent to give certain premise. So Aristotle considers concealment as the strategy which has to be used to keep the answerer (ibid.).

Aristotle also lists a number of strategies of concealment which the questioner should use to make his argument successful. They are: the questioner has to sophisticate his thinking in a way that he would let the interlocutors in a puzzle; he must request different premises changing through the argumentation when the questioner asks for a proposition to be granted, he shouldn’t show the answerer what he wants whether the proposition or its opposition for his argument; and finally the questioner must keep in his mind that people are always ignorant at the beginning but they easily admit at the end so he must ask for premises at the end (ibid.:115).

In the Greek time, concealment was used in different perspective. It was part of literary criticism. It was considered as one of the main aesthetic principles required for a good style. Artifice, as it was named at that time, weakens the strength of impression of a good style and also draws the attention of the addressee. So the addressee’s attention is taken away from the real intention of the communicator. In order to persuade the addressee, the communicator must use artifice but in a style looks (Cronje, 1993: 55- 6). Naturalness doesn’t mean that no have been used and all forms of artifice have to be abandoned. But naturalness is realized through concealing the artifice (ibid.: 56). Thus, concealment plays a main role in embellishment to make it looks natural which is obligatory for persuasion (ibid.: 57).

After this brief historical background of the concept of concealment, the following sections of this chapter is primarily devoted to discuss the modern perspective of the concept of concealment since it is the main topic to be dealt with in this study.

But before embarking on a more theoretical account and the analysis of concealment and its origin, we need to make a short introduction about Tony Blair whose speeches will be the essence of this study.

Tony Blair, the former Prime Minster of Britain, was born on May 6, 1953. He became the leader of the British Labour Party from the period 1994 to 2007 and Prime Minister of the UK from 1997 to 2007 when he stepped down and left his position as a leader of Labour Party.

Blair came to power in 1997 in his first term. He was not in a good term with the Republicans in the USA. Steve Richard in his report about Chilcot inquiry published in The Guardian on 5th of July, 2016 said:

So he made up his mind to support the USA policy in the war against terrorism after the 11 of September attack. He announced then that ‘we here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends.’ He fully intended to go wherever the Americans went and then he backed up Bush to attack Iraq under faked pretexts of having mass destruction weapons and relations with terrorism.
In order to find way out of accusation of illegal attack on Iraq, he sought and persuaded Bush to go to a third way, the UN. He was sure that if the UN backed the invasion, ‘he would keep a big tent of support in place in the UK and constrain the wilder elements of the Bush administration’ (ibid.).
In this way, he gained the UK pledge to support the military actions. Steve went on saying that (ibid.).
After having acquainted with Tony Blair and his role in making the invasion of Iraq achieved, the researcher finds it necessary to devote the following sections to discuss the origins of the concept of concealment.
Concealment as well as Fabrication, distortion, equivocation, composes Information Manipulation Theory (henceforth IMT) (McCornack, 1992: 11) from which Interpersonal Deception Theory (henceforth IDT) is derived. The discussion in the following sections will start form IMT to IDT reaching concealment.
It is worth mentioning here that when the researcher started this study, she did not find any reference primarily devoted to this subject. She consulted internet and downloaded many relevant books but what she found were a few lines here and there in the books that are devoted to manipulation and deception theories. Therefore, this study is the first comprehensive study on this concept ever written. It may become a reference for others whom they intend to write about linguistic concealment.
2.2 Concealment and Information Manipulation Theory (IMT)
Manipulation plays an important role in many areas of our life like religion, advertising and politics. It has been tackled by many scholars in the fields of linguistics, discourse analysis, psychology and political science. But those scholars are cautious from obscurity and the lack of a comprehensive definition for the concept of manipulation (De Saussure, 2005: 117).
The main job of manipulation, as Goodin (1980: 59) says, is
Van Eemeren & Groodentorst (1984) make remarkable contributions to the study of manipulation when they characterize argumentation as a complex speech act. Although they don’t provide a clear-cut definition of manipulation but suggested that manipulation must be intentional on the part of the speaker or writer and for successful manipulation this intention must remain hidden.
Eminent intentionality is one of the main characteristics of manipulation. There is no manipulation without the intention to manipulate. This intentionality should be hidden; if the manipulative discourse manifests itself as such is not manipulative (Parret, 1987: 254-8). The manipulative intent should be dissimulated.
The original IMT is concerned with the content of the message as well as in a given context of situation in which it is delivered. It suggests that (McCornack et al., 2014: 350). The speaker may choose to omit, alter or falsifies certain facts intentionally to let the receiver believes in what is set in advance to be untrue information. The process of perception from the part of the receiver of this information is called information manipulation. McCornack et al (ibid.) refer to Grice (1989: 26) in discussing the Cooperative Principle (henceforth CP):
IMT adopts Grice’s maxims and the (CP) as bases for describing deceptive message. The relation between IMT and IDT is that the former views deception as a result of obvious violations of one or more of Grice’s four maxims (quality, quantity, relevance, and manner). The violations of quality result in the falsification of information, the violations of quantity result in the violations of relevance result in deception by evasion; and deception by equivocation results from the violation of manner. Besides, the violation of these maxims triggers conversational implicature; a deductions about intending meanings that exceed the literal meaning of the spoken words.
Steven McCornack (1992) is the first who launch IMT in which he studies interpersonal communication and later, in the second article, McCornack et al. (1992) provide an empirical test of that theory.
Manipulative utterance, using McCornack’s (1992:11) scale, involves undetected concealment, fabrication, distortion and equivocation of the truth. The communicator, who intends to manipulate his addressee, works on hiding relevant information which could affect addressees’ decisions
IMT, according to McCornack (1992) also refers to the difference between deception and collaboration and cooperation between speakers and hearers that occur during the process of flouting these maxims. McCornack, (ibid.:13) clarifies the natural implication of IMT. He says and concludes that IMT (ibid.).
In a further development of the theory, McCornack et al. (1992) propose an empirical test of the original IMT. They give an example about two partners who are engaged in a love story. Suddenly, they want to break down their relationship. McCornack et al. (ibid.) propose two ways in doing so: either they use (McCornack et al., 2014: 349) and say that:
These two versions of IMT agree on the fact that IMT is an integrated part of IDT. It is believed that the deceptive messages are results of blatant violations of one or more of Grice’s maxims exactly as (IMT) does.
Whereas Galasinksi (2000, cited in Blass, 2005: 170) on the other hand, paraphrases manipulation definition as:
Galasinski (ibid.) states that manipulation has two forms: persuasion and deception. The deception is Baron (2003: 40-45), further identifies multiple type of manipulation. They are:
1. Deceptive Manipulation: this type includes outright lying to the target by making false promises, misleading the target by encouraging false assumptions or fostering self-deception that is gone to the advantages of the manipulator or getting the target to view things differently or interpreting the situation in the light favourable to the manipulator’s purpose (ibid.: 40).
2. Pressure to Acquiesce: it involves browbeating, wearing down the other’s resistance, and making someone agree to something just to avoid further discomfort or embarrassment. By pressure, the target can receive the wrong sort of reason for opting in favour of the manipulator’s proposals (ibid.:43).
3. Emotional: this type of manipulation includes eliciting an emotion with the aim of making use of it. Typical emotions used to manipulate are fear, sympathy, a sense of gratitude towards the manipulator, and feelings of guilt if the target does not agree on what the manipulator wants (ibid.: 44-45).
Manipulation, in Baron’s view, is a type of deceiving the target to the advantage of the manipulator. From this end, it is possible to conclude that manipulation and deception work on the same track and towards achieving the same functions. This classification will be adopted by the researcher to be the main criteria and strategies of concealment in developing the model of the analysis. (see Chapter Three 3.1 and 3.3)
Van Dijk (2006: 360), who defines manipulation as calls such kind of manipulation as a negative manipulation, which has bad intention from the part of the speaker, on one hand, and the recipients, on the other hand, is

The manipulators They act against their full will and interests, and in the best interest of the manipulator (ibid.).
He (ibid.: 360) further examines the properties of manipulation and links them to discourse, cognition and society. He says, firstly; most manipulation takes place by text and talk, secondly; because manipulation is always concerned with the mental manipulation and thirdly; These approaches cannot be reduced to one or two of them. They all have to be existed at the same time when studying manipulation. He considers that manipulation is domination. It is a kind of practicing Power and domination are kinds of control that some politicians, media, people or social groups exercise over others.
Therefore, the main aspect of manipulation is (Chilton (2002) cited in Kuzio, 2015: 95). But when discursive strategies haven’t been used with the intention of manipulation, the result is that the receiver can predict the content of a massage so there is no manipulation (ibid.).

2.3 Concealment and Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT)
Deception, which means (Webster’s, 1999) is introduced by Ekman & Friesen in (1969). They are the pioneers in initiating the deception theories. They published their first paper on deception in which they maintained.They specify certain behaviours such as that are leaked when deception occurs. They propose the term ‘leakage’ to refer to non verbal behaviours which are shown by the one who tries to deceive others which express his/her true emotion. They further argued that deception occurs on the strategic level which is the intentional manipulation of deceptive cues and the non strategic level which is the deceiver’s nonverbal behaviors.
IDT, as a linguistic theory, is introduced for the first time in 1988 by David Buller and Judee Burgoon. They are considered as the founders of this theory. Later in (1994), they differentiate between intentional and unintentional deception. They say that They continue developing IDT. They, in (1996: 205), define deception as
They (ibid.:206) elaborate this theory to be as a means of mixing the aspect of interpersonal communication into the definition of deception. IDT concentrates on the explanation of deception and how people behave towards it would:
For Buller & Burgoon, deceivers achieved their goals by manipulating information through falsification, concealment, or equivocation: Falsification is the creating of a false story; equivocation is defined as a dodging the relevant information; concealment is simply defined as the hiding of a (Buller & Burgoon, 1996: 98).
They explain the deceptive messages as a messages which are typically consist of three components; they are namely: (ibid.: 209). The most important types are the central and the ancillary messages. These two types function intentionally to foster credibility.
Deception, as a communicative action, arouse from an interaction between the sender and receiver. From this point, Buller & Burgoon, (2004:239) depart and launch a new development of their theory of interpersonal deception. They say that deception is found in newspapers and Television where we find people use all manner of deceptions; politicians lying about their private lives, businessmen covering their deals, etc. It is all around us.
They (ibid.: 2) consider that:
And further, they (ibid.: 4-5) say that deception in IDT is an intentional act by which senders consciously transmit messages with the intention to send a false information or interpretation by the receiver and to accomplish this act, they specify three classes of strategic activity; these strategies are: information, behaviour, and image management. The term management implies that. The purpose here indicates the benefits the sender gains, although it appears that these benefits are to be for the receiver or for a third party in the conversation. They explain these three strategies as following:
These three strategies work hand in hand to establish a believable message. They illustrate these strategies in the following example.
They (ibid.: 6) specify several factors to determine the process of deception since such a process is considered as a challenge because of its subtlety. These factors are (ibid.). These factors show who hold a relative advantage during deceptive episodes, the senders or receivers?
They elaborate on these factors and divide them into: ‘Input factors’ and ‘Relational Factors’. Input factors (ibid.: 7) includes: Context Factors: They see.They call it the concept of. People usually during interpersonal interaction expect their counterpart part in the conversation to be honest and truthful. These expectations are increased as long as the interaction process increases. During the interactivity, the senders (ibid.: 8) while Relational Factors refers to the nature of the relationship between the sender and the receiver that influences the (ibid.: 10).
Relational familiarity includes both. People in relation with others usually have more knowledge about one another and more familiar with the behaviour of each other. Such familiarity enables the receiver to detect the deceptive messages. Besides, the shared history also makes the partners recognize how each one behaves in the conversation. Thus, it helps them to recognize the deviations from normal patterns better and consequently, to detect the abnormal responses.
Burgoon & Buller (ibid.: 39- 41) suggest 18 prepositions. These 18 prepositions concentrate on two core ideas: First, deception is interactive type of interpersonal communication; second, strategic deception requires cognition efforts:

In IDT, the sender’s nonverbal behaviors can signal dishonesty. Buller & Burgoon, (2006: 103) provide four reasons for the appearance of such leakage: First, the deceiver’s motivations to manage the information can create efficient performance; Second, deception increases physiological activation; Third, the main feelings of the deceiver are guilt and anxiety; and Four, the complex cognitive factors involved in deception can tax the brain beyond its capacity (ibid.).
IDT has been tackled by other scholars. Of them is Whaley, (1982: 188, cited in Gerweher & Glenn, 2000:15) who defines deception as
Hopper & Bell (1984: 289) identifies two different types of deception
1. Intentional: When the deception event occurs deliberately in order for the deceiver to reach his/her goals; and
2. Unintentional: When the deception event occurs unintentionally and does not goals but unintentionally does so. Example on this kind of deception are forgetting, omitting information and misremembering (ibid.).
This theory has been continuously developed by successive scholars. McCornack (1992:5-6), for instance, suggests that deceptive messages covertly violate one or more of conversational maxims. He, through IMT, provides a pragmatic explanation for why deceptive messages deceive:
This means that the principal claim of IMT is that the deceptive messages are derived from covertly violations of Grice maxims. These kinds of violations are not clearly apparent to the listener, therefore, the listener is eventually misled by his/her assumptions that the speaker is abiding by the CP of conversation and by Grice maxims.
Gerwehr & Glenn’s (2000: 15) definition of deception is that deception aims to manipulate others intentionally, whereas Galasinski, (2000:20) sees deception as a type of message that (cited in Blass, 2005: 170).
Boon & Mcleod (2001:467), on the other hand, based on the work of Ekman & Friesen (1969), define deception as.
Although the major contributions in the study of deception can be found in the disciplines of psychology and political science (Davidson, 2004: 6), but it has been studied in many disciplines like philosophy, psychology, sociology, medical, legal and political science and persuasion (Bryant, 2013:1).
Finally, what can be summed up is that deception means lying. Lying is the most essential means that leads to intentional deception. When lying, the speaker intentionally manipulates information in order to exploit the second party’s ignorance without warning (Austin et al., 2007: 179). The consequences of this action cause others to be convinced despite incorrect information and half-truth information.
As far as political speeches are concerned, deception in political discourse can be analyzed depending on the acts by which the content of a message is communicated (Van Eemeren, et al., 2013: 355). So the strategies of deception will differ depending on the situation in which the politicians told their speeches.
Concealment, therefore, as one of deception strategies, will be thoroughly discussed in the next section as it is the main theme of this study.

2.4 The Concept of Concealment
Concealment, among other crucial notions, appeared during the process of political discourse analysis, means hiding the truth by one of the parties participating in the communication event who intends to deceive the other party. It is the manipulation of information or changing the truth whether intentionally or unintentionally.
The literal meaning of the word ‘concealment’ as it comes in the Oxford Dictionary is (English Oxford: online).
Now a day, concealment, as shown above, has been dealt with from deceptive and manipulative perspectives. Scholars who are interested in manipulation, on one hand, consider concealment as one of manipulation strategy. One of them is McCornack (1992: 11) who considers concealment as one of four manipulation strategies; these are namely, Fabrication, distortion, equivocation and concealment. On the other hand, scholars who are interested in deception theories consider concealment as one type among other three types of deception; they are: (Burgoon & Buller, 2004:16).
Hancock et al, (2004: 130) state that deception is not limited to lying. They add further forms such as concealment, exaggeration, falsification and equivocation. As far as concealment is concerned, they define it as hiding a secret and it occurs when one presents information and does not say that it is incomplete which consequently, let others to create wrong assumption. Furthermore, concealment is used for hiding truthful information and prevents others from knowing the truth. It is called negative concealment. But it is not always negative; sometimes it is used in order to prevent problems (Ekman, 2009: 288).
Blass (2005:173) considers omitting information with a hiding intention is concealment, thus concealment becomes a strategy of manipulation. He (ibid.:170), identifies manipulation as. Blass’s notion of concealment goes hand in hand with Fanaian’s (2016: 68) point of view who considers concealment as an inherent characteristic of manipulation. Manipulation, from the psychological perspective at a social level.
It is, using Carson’s (2010: 56-57) words, an attempt to hide information by disguising a person and preventing him from discovering that. Carson (ibid.) further adds that concealment contains in itself the deception or the intention to deceive. He differentiates between concealing information and withholding it from the deception point of view. He asserts that withholding information may not convey the attempt to deceive especially in business cases where the business person has no professional commitments to provide such information (ibid.), while in fact the essential characteristic of concealing information is the intention and the attempting to deceive. In other words, it is the way by which the sender of the message chooses certain facts from the message to omit or change or hide them. It is the act of deceiving and providing false information, whereas Klemp (2012: 5) conceive the concept of concealment from different perspective. He looks at it as a way of omitting information for the purpose of manipulation; it
Thus, the strategy that one group of people employs to influence the choices of others and even manipulate them to achieve their goals is concealment which is one of the manipulation strategies.
Sperry et al. (2015: 1093), on one hand, look at concealment from social, psychological and scientific perspectives. They relate the concept of concealment to the concept of stigma. It is known that stigmatized people attempt to conceal their reality from others in order not to be exposed to embarrassment and then even to the rejection of the society which is the predominant emotions of such people. So they try to hide their shameful history which could bring physical and/or psychological threats, while Bellebaum (1992: 88), on the other hand, views concealment as a branch of silence but what makes it different from silence is that concealment can occur in discourse without speaking. But concealment more often occurs in the verbal communication which has a concealing function. (cited in Schroter, 2013: 17).
Van Prooijen & Lange (2016: 3) agree with Carson and consider concealment as a means of misrepresenting or withholding information to mislead others as well as one of dishonest strategies which people may use to get an illegal benefit for themselves.
The above discussion shows that while studying concealment, one should refer to IMT and IDT equally. Both theories consider concealment as one of its components and speakers in general, and politicians in particular, should use concealment if they intentionally want to manipulate or deceive their audience and consequently they persuade them.
2.4.1 Concealment Parameters
These parameters are stated for IMT by Coons & Michael (2014: 35). The researcher finds them suitable for the current study, so she adopted and modified them to be read as ‘concealment parameters’ instead of ‘manipulation parameters.’
These parameters are: the target (hearer), intention, covertness and speaker’s interest. They are considered the prerequisites of any situation of concealment without which, the concealment process will be defeated.
2.4.1.1 The Target (Hearer)
Concealing relevant information will have an influence on the target according to the speaker’s wants. In concealment situations, the behavior of the speaker is characterized by having an impact on the target’s aims. The target believes that he has made up his mind and selects the best available option freely but he is actually under a hidden interference in his judgment and by this way concealment process succeeds.
2.4.1.2 Intention
Concealment cannot take place without the intentionality of the speaker. It is not an accidental and observable process. This parameter in concealment situation cannot be observed by the target otherwise, the process of concealment will be aborted.
2.4.1.3 Covertness
Covertness is the most important factor to achieve the concealment situation. Overt intentions of concealing information will fail the whole process.
2.4.1.4 Speaker’s Interest
The speaker in concealment situation should feel that the information he receives goes up to his interest. When the speaker holds some information or provides irrelevant or incorrect information in order for the hearer to behave accordingly, this goes in the benefit and interest of the speaker without being aware of it (De Saussure, 2005:119).
The speaker who intends to conceal, in general, motivates the hearers to believe or do things that are in the interest of the speaker and against the interests of the hearer at the same time (Van Dijk, 2006: 360).

2.5 Concealment: A pragmatic Perspective
The main pragmatic perspective of manipulation, deception and subsequently concealment is flouting Grice maxims.
McCornack (1992: 11) adopts Grice’s (1989) conversational maxims and fundamentally relies on conversational implicature in his classification of manipulation into: Fabrication, distortion, equivocation and concealment. These four strategies correspond to the four Grice’s conversational maxims. The conversation should be informative as needed (quantity), truthful and complete (quality), illustrates relevant information (relevance), and how it is said clearly and precisely (manner). Grice’s four maxims need to be followed by during communication, otherwise, manipulation, deception and subsequently, concealment necessarily occurs as a result of the violation of these maxims in the following ways: (Mittal, 2013: 5). (see section 2.6.1)
The pragmatic dimension of concealment also covers several pragmatic theories as well as contextual factors as concealment is manipulated just to achieve certain aims and goals linguistically. It is the process that can be identified through the presence of breaching conversational maxims, rhetorical devices, certain personal deixis, Politeness theory, and fallacious arguments because these pragmatic strategies are necessarily needed to achieve the speaker’s goals and aims and make the speeches pragmatically achieved.

2.6 The Pragmatic Theories of Concealment
This section is primarily devoted to discuss the pragmatic theories that work as machines to produce concealment. These theories will be part of the model of the analysis developed for the purpose of this study. Generally speaking, concealment is initiated by breaching Grice maxims. Breaching, as such occurs consequently by the following pragmatic theories.

2.6.1 Breaching Grice’s Maxims of Conversational Implicature
Concealment is the product of the breaching of Grice maxims as the main pragmatic tool in producing concealment.
Grice (1975) argues that a person can interpret what someone else says by adhering to cooperative principles and its maxims (what Grice calls ‘implicatures’). The CP says that you should (Grice, 1975: 45). The CP is based on the maxims of quality, quantity, relation and manner. He assumes that people in conversation are cooperative and follow four maxims: Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner:
The maxim of quantity: Be informative
1 ‘Make your contribution as informative as required;
2- Do not make your contribution more informative than required.
The maxim of quality: Be truthful
Do not say what you believe to be false;
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
The maxim of relation: Be relevant
Make your contribution relevant.
The maxim of manner: Be perspicuous
1-Avoid obscurity of expression
2 -Avoid ambiguity
3- Be brief
4- Be orderly
According to Grice (1975) conversational implicature can be created in one of three ways. Implicature is created by violations or flouting one or more maxims. Another way of creating a conversational implicature is when maxims themselves clash. Finally, implicature can be created even when not violations occur. This violation has been made covertly in a way that the hearer is deceived by the assumption that the speaker is adhering to the cooperative principle and the conversational maxims and so be manipulated.
Breaching these maxims mean that the norms of conversation are deliberately and intentionally broken and the speaker knows that the hearer shall recognize that he breaks these maxims. Grice (1975: 41-58) identifies four flouting possibilities:
1- The flouting of the maxim of quantity takes place when the speaker blatantly provides inadequate information and gives more information than the situation requires.
2- The flouting of the maxim of quality takes place when the speaker blatantly says something untrue or for which she\he lacks adequate evidence.
3- The flouting of the maxim of relation comes about by making a response or an observation which is very obviously irrelevant to the ongoing talk exchange.
4- The flouting of the maxim of manner occurs when the speaker does not avoid obscurity and ambiguity. Since ambiguity is a common linguistic phenomenon, so it is hard to be fully observed. Nevertheless, when ambiguity is used in certain contexts, the hearer may deliberately distort what the speaker has said to convey extra message. (see section 2.5)
2.6.2 Rhetorical Devices
The important question to be raised here is what makes rhetoric fall within the scope of pragmatics? The answer is that the relationship between pragmatics and rhetoric is deeply rooted. Pragma-rhetoric’s crucial goal is to link rhetoric with pragmatics and combine, at the same time, communicative intention and persuasive intention. It is, as Sadock (2006: 318) asserts, the suitability of language within a particular situation regarding various contextual factors as the main area of pragmatics.
The concept of rhetorical pragmatics is early referred to by Walton (2004: 21) as.The logical property of pragmatic effect, as Walton claims, is to successfully convince or persuade a respondent.
2.6.2.1 Pragma-Rhetorical Devices
Rhetorical pragmatic devices include argumentation appeals and rhetorical figures of speech. These are considered as powerful tools of deviation that characterize rhetorical means combined with pragmatic devices.
2.6.2.1.1 Argumentation Appeals
The relationship between rhetoric and argument can be seen through their aim of persuasion. Many rhetoricians (Van Emeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 43 and Walton, 2007: 127) for instance, explain arguments as rhetorical means of persuasion by pragmatically appealing to the emotional state of the listener (pathos), the character of the writer (ethos), or to the reason itself (logos):
1. Ethos
It is the rhetorical pragmatic strategy that refers to the ability to persuade which is directly affected by the credibility of the person. Credibility is the degree to which a statement, a person, and / or a company is perceived to be ethical, trustworthy, and sincere. It is strongly related to the audience’s perception of how believable a speaker is. It is an attitude that exists in the mind of the audience (Walton, 2004: 171).
2. Pathos
Pathos is a term that is sometimes referred to as ’emotional appeals’. Emotions, as Walton (ibid.) indicates, move us to act and motivate us to do things. Emotional appeals are intended to make listeners feel afraid, compassionate, proud, angry, shameful, and the like. As such, the appeal to pathos is directed towards the emotions of the audience. In many situations, emotion remains the most powerful persuasive factor. Where logical arguments sometimes fail, emotions often have the power to motivate people to respond and act.
3. Logos
The third rhetorical pragmatic strategy of the argument is the appeal to reason or what is referred to by Walton (ibid.: 332) as the logical appeal (logos). It is the best standard one can reasonably hope to achieve in any natural argument when s/he provides an evidence of a particular proposition.
Kennedy (2007: 4) points out that logos refers to the internal consistency of the message, the clarity of the claim, the logic of its reasons, and the effectiveness of its supporting evidence. The impact of logos on an audience is sometimes called the argument’s logical appeal.
2.6.2.1.2 Figures of Speech
McQuarrie & Mick (1996: 3) argue that any proposition can be expressed in a variety of ways. One of these ways is the use of rhetorical figures of speech. There are many figures of speech that can be viewed from different linguistic fields, such as phonology, syntax and pragmatics.
Levinson (1983: 109) asserts that a figure of speech is an artful deviation from the norms. It occurs when an expression shows a deviation from conventional communication either in form or in content.
McQuarrie & Mick (1996: 3) classify figures of speech into two types: Schemes and Tropes. A figure of speech in the schematic mode involves a deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words. It is a change in the standard word order or pattern, e.g., repetition, ellipsis. By contrast, a figure of speech in the tropic mode involves a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of words, e.g., pun, hyperbole (ibid.).
For the purpose of this study, only tropes are appropriate since their pragmatic consideration helps to advance the ideas of the present work as they are rhetorical pragmatic strategies from the specifications of flouting Grice’s maxim in given situations.
1. Tropes
McQuarrie & Mick (1996: 6) consider tropes as figures of speech that provide hearers with incomplete or vague information. They imply messages that do not mean exactly what they are. To effectively comprehend these messages, hearers are required to infer and resolve the inconsistencies within the messages and assign the appropriate subjective meaning.
McQuarrie & Phillips (2008: 6) distinguish two types of tropes: destabilization and Substitution. Destabilization tropes include pun and metaphor and substitution tropes include overstatement, understatement, and rhetorical question.
A. Destabilization tropes
The pragma-rhetorical operation of destabilization tropes, as Van Mulken (2003: 119) sees, involves the use of an expression whose meaning is indeterminate in its context. These destabilizers are pun and metaphor:
1- Pun
Bussmann (1996: 968) regards the destabilizer as a pragmatic strategy of ‘word play’ in which a word or phrase unexpectedly and simultaneously combines two unrelated meanings. Pun evokes disparate meanings in context where each applies differently.
2- Metaphor
Davis (1998: 12) thinks that the rhetorical pragmatic strategy of metaphor is to depend on flouting the maxim of quality. It suggests a comparison between two different entities to arouse imaginative interpretation of one in the light of the other. McQuarrie & Phillips (2008: 8) identify metaphor as a substantial or fundamental resemblance between two terms. One does not expect to see these two terms associated but does so in a pragmatic way that opens up new implications.
B. Substitution tropes
The pragma-rhetorical operation of substitution is referred to by McQuarrie & Mick (1996: 6) to be a selection of an expression that requires an adjustment by the message recipient in order to grasp the intended meaning. Van Mulken (2003: 116) states that in this type of tropes, one says something other than what is meant and relies on the recipient to make the necessary correction while Leech (1983: 145) considers substitution, as a rhetorical pragmatic strategy, a case where a speaker’s description is stronger than the actual situation. It is detected from the flouting of the maxim of quantity.
Within destabilization, the meaning may go different, while in substitution, it sways in a scale. For the pragma-rhetorical end of this study, three types of substitution tropes are considered. They are rhetorical question, understatement and overstatement:
1- Rhetorical Question
Sathoff (2002: 3) states that rhetorical questions are probably as old as public speaking itself. This technique, as Abrams (1993: 183) asserts, is often used in persuasive discourse, i.e., for pragma-rhetorically persuading someone of a truth without argument.
Harris (2005:3) defines rhetorical question as a questions that (ibid.).
Anderson (2007: 12) considers this rhetoric strategy working on pragmatics as it flouts the maxim of quality and does not expect an answer. It is seen as a question that is meant to have an obvious answer and can be interpreted and reformulated as a declarative sentence expressing a proposition.
2- Understatement
This pragma-rhetorical figure of speech is recognized by Cruse (2006: 186) as generating implicatures through saying something different from what the writer/ speaker intends to convey. He (ibid.) considers understatement as a statement of the quantity or intensity of something that is less than what its natural state is. It is the opposite of overstatement but similar in the flouting of the maxim of quantity.
Harris (2005: 5) defines understatement as a means which. When the writer’s audience can be expected to know the true nature of a fact which might be rather difficult to describe adequately in a brief space, the writer may choose to understate the fact as a means of employing the reader’s own powers of description. For example, instead of endeavoring to describe in a few words the horrors and destruction of the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco, a writer might state.
3- Overstatement
Cruse (2006: 80) points out that this figure of speech involves deliberate exaggeration for pragmatic effect to increase impact or to attract attention.
The researcher will choose tropes figures of speech of the above mentioned pragma-rhetorical devices to be part of the model of the analysis. These figures are appropriate for the current study as they help the speaker to deviate from the norm by flouting the maxims of conventional interaction and, in turn, give rise to many pragmatic figures of speech.
As far as the rhetorical devices are concerned, the following devices that are set by Tindale (1999:5) are found to be ultimately appropriate for this study. Therefore, the decision was made to add them to the model of the analysis to enrich the model with these rhetorical devices that are specifically prepared for the politicians. Tindale (ibid.) observes three devices employed by politicians; they are: profound words, padding and weasel words.
a. Profound Words
These are words that have a great impact on the hearer when receiving them, like: (great, terrible, superb, magnificent’etc.) (ibid.: 23).
b. Padding
It is the process of adding significant-sounding sentences here and there that in fact say nothing or little (Cavender & Kahane, 2006: 163).
c. Weasel Words
These are locutions that seem to make little or no change in the content of a certain construction or statement, while, in fact, sucking out all or most of its content (ibid.).
These devices are seen in chapter three: section 3.4.2.
2.6.3 Diectic Expressions
Levinson (1983: 55) considers diectic expressions as pragmatics because they directly relate between the structure of language and the contexts in which they are used (ibid.).
He (ibid.: 38) classifies into five categories: time, place, social, discourse and person. For the purpose of this study, only person deixes will be explained. He (ibid.: 62) sees the role of these deixes as the ‘the encoding role of participants in the speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered’ (ibid.). He, further, categorizes plural pronouns by encoding them as ‘we’ and ‘they,’ (ibid.: 41) and makes a distinction between the inclusive ‘we’, which includes the speaker and the hearer when the speaker is one person asking another about something they share or would both like to do and the exclusive ‘we’, which excludes the speaker from the hearer (ibid.).
The main aim behind employing the continuum ‘I, you, we’ is that the speaker tries to persuade the hearer to crossover to his ideological position, and accordingly, to achieve his main aims and purposes. Chilton & Schaffner (1997: 216) assert that they are an effective means that enhance the legitimization of the speaker’s action. For instance, all inclusive ‘we’ can be used by the speaker to bring on to his side the hearer in his ideological and power positioning. Chilton (2004: 140) defines the ‘We’, and its variants, ‘our’, ‘ours’ and ‘us’, as the representative of (ibid.).
The politicians’ selection of these variants in political discourse is never arbitrary, according to Wilson (1990: 21) and Fairclough (2001: 33). Wilson (ibid.: 87) and Fairclough (ibid.: 22) confirm that politicians use those personal deixes mainly to persuade people, make alliances, attack, or express an ideological basis. As well as, they show the in group and out group, identity and membership (ibid.: 33).
Accordingly, to achieve these goals, politicians utilize personal deixes, of the diectic expressions, to create an elusive and deceptive effect on the hearer. These inclusive and exclusive personal deixes will be a component part of the model. (see section 3.4.3)

2.6.4 Politeness Theory
Politeness, as a sub-discipline of pragmatics, is crucial in explaining why people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean.
The politeness theory by Brown & Levinson (1987) provides politeness strategies in spoken interaction. They say that (Brown & Levinson 1987:61).
Within politeness theory, face is best understood as every individual’s feeling of self worth or self image. This image can be damaged, maintained or enhanced through interaction with others.
They define ‘face’ (ibid.). They specify two aspects of: negative face and positive face. Negative face, on one hand, means the basic claim of a member of society to personal freedom of action which is not to be invaded by other members of society while positive face is the wish to create a positive self-image in relation to other members of society.
They consider face as an individual want rather than a societal norm in order to account for actual linguistic behavior between persons. They classify face into:
(1) negative face: the want of that his actions be unimpeded by others
(2) positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others (ibid.: 62).
They explain negative face as the notion of formal politeness, the (ibid.) while they define positive face as the want to obtain positive, admiring or approving reactions from fellow members of society. In order to achieve their communicational purpose, it is beneficial for speakers to take care that they do not impede the face wants of their addressees. However, it is sometimes necessary for speakers to perform acts that threaten their addressees’ face. These acts are referred as or ‘FTAs’ (ibid.:65). FTAs happen consciously and can threaten the negative face: if they indicate (ibid.). This includes, for example, orders, requests, advice or threats; or threatening the positive face of a person if the acts (ibid.:66), for example expressions of disapproval, contempt or ridicule.
Brown & Levinson employ this model to explain politeness strategies in language. They use the construct of a Model Person, who is a (ibid.:58) and possesses the two properties of face and rationality.
They (ibid.) state several strategies for positive and negative politeness. The researcher will select certain strategies that are surely proper for this study. The details of these strategies are to be discussed in chapter three to avoid repetition. (see chapter three 3.4.4)
2.6.5 Fallacy
Fallacy is viewed at as a vital part of our daily life; people interact with each other and make fallacies in their interaction every where in their daily activities. It is the essence of their daily argumentation. To define fallacy properly, one finds too many view points and inconsistency in making a fully approved definition.
Studying fallacy systematically started with Aristotle and has extended later with the retention of the original Aristotelian list of thirteen types of fallacies. (Van Eemeren, 2009: 1). Aristotle concentrated on fallacies which attempt to refute the opponents’ theses to win the argument (ibid.). He classified fallacy into two main types: those that are dependent on language and independent of language (ibid.).
The first type, dependent on language, consists of six types; they are namely: equivocation, amphiboly, combination of words, division of words, accent and form of expression (Tindale, 2007: 7). The second type, independent of language, consists of the remaining refutations; they are namely: secundum quid (accident), consequent (affirm consequent), non cause (non-cause for the cause), begging the question (circular reasoning), ignoration elenchi (appeal to ignorance of refutation) and many questions (ibid.). The distinction between these two types is problematic. Language dependent fallacies are considered as less problematic to modern scholars than the language independent fallacies. To solve the problem, they decide to consider the accident fallacy as a part of the language independent fallacies (Van Eemeren, 2009:14-15).
Many scholars make different approaches to fallacy. Among the most important scholars are Walton (1995: 23) who defines fallacy as. Walton’s main motivation for the study of fallacy is his observation that there are factors that make certain argument fallacious. He meets Aristotle’s definition of fallacy in one point that is the concept of fallacy has an element of deception on the dialectical level (ibid.: 14). Other scholars are Van Emeren & Grootendorst (1999), who study fallacy from a pragma-dialectical perspective.
Johnson (2000: 4) discusses that fallacious argument as the form of argument which violates one of a good argument rules. He (ibid.: 208-209) concentrates on two forms of fallacious arguments: the ‘dialectical tier’ which is the argument where the arguer can discharge obligations on his opponent and the ‘illative core’ as a structure composed of the elements of premise, warrant, and conclusion.
Johnson (ibid.) provides four criteria for evaluating fallacious arguments; they are: acceptability, truth, relevance and sufficiency. If an argument constitutes a violation of one or more of these criteria or rules, it will then be considered as fallacious.
1- Acceptability
This criterion was firstly used by Hamblin (1970) who states that acceptance is the basic criteria for evaluating an argument (cited in Johnson, 2000: 191).
Johnson (2000:192) criticizes Hamblin’s acceptance criterion as a weakness in his approach because he thinks that Hamblin can’t provide a comprehensive definition for this criterion. Johnson (ibid.: 194-5) states through his definition of acceptability criterion that each element in an argument should be put in a way that the hearer finds it acceptable; otherwise, it can’t achieve a rational persuasion.
This criterion has been considered as a pragmatic one because the requirement of acceptability must be understood in terms of a dialectical situation of interacting between a proponent and a respondent in a certain context (ibid.).
When this criterion is applied to a certain premise the arguer should know whether such a premise would be acceptable by his addressee or not (ibid.: 201). This applicable in studying concealment process where the result of acceptability criterion is that if the speech hasn’t been accepted for the speaker means that he intentionally conceals certain facts and information.
2- Truth
This criterion is first used by Grice (1975) as a sub maxim of the maxim of quality of the CP. According to Grice (ibid.: 67), the speaker should say things that he believes to be true and avoid saying what is false.
Then, Johnson (2000: 197-8) makes use of this criterion to judge arguments whether they are fallacious or not. It judges the truth vs. falsity of certain utterance and violating it may result in fallaciousness. This criterion has been violated in concealment when the speaker makes use of the omission of certain facts. However, this criterion is used heavily by the speaker in order to affect the hearer’s choices.
3- Relevance
This criterion is first tackled by Grice (1975) as one of the cooperative principle maxims which, according to him (ibid.: 72), states that the speaker must be relevant in what he says to the context in which he is involved.
According to Johnson (2000: 203), this criterion can be used to judge fallaciousness of an argument. What kinds of relevance means for Johnson is the propositional relevance to distinguish it from topical relevance and audience relevance (ibid.). In this sense, relevance is considered to be as a property of the premises that must be applied to the evidence presented to support the conclusion. Relevance has been dealt with as a pragmatic criterion because what is considered to be relevant in one context may not be in another (ibid.: 208).
Sometimes politicians, in their attempt to conceal the truth, try to switch the conversation to a different topic. Thus, they violated the relevance criterion to achieve their ends.
4- Sufficiency
According to this criterion, enough evidence should be presented to prove the target claim (ibid.: 209). It is also considered to be a pragmatic criterion in the sense that: first, what is sufficient in one context may not be so in another; second, it is closely related to Gricean maxim of quantity (ibid.: 255).
In conversation, the hearer assumes that the speaker will provide the relevant information as informative as required. But, if the speaker chooses to manipulate so he will conceal critical information. This omission of information gives a deceptive nature to the conversation (McMcornack, 1992:11).
Walton (2007), besides other scholars, takes the responsibility of developing this theory. Fallacy, according to Walton (2007: 159), is a crafted means of deliberate deception. It is presented in the context as a means of influencing someone to accept something in the argument or claims presented mainly before the fallacious argument. That’s why the researcher feels necessary to discuss this concept and related it, as a process, to the concept of concealment, the main subject of this study.
Damer (2009), on the other hand, concerns himself with the results of violating the criteria of acceptability, relevance and sufficiency while the fallacy that results from violating the truth criterion has been the concern of Luque’s (2011) model. Damer’s (2009) Model of fallacy consists of many types. The researcher chooses only the certain types that are considered proper for the analysis of the data in the present study. For more details, see chapter three, section 3.4.5.
Fallacy, as a process, has a starting point and an end point and it is a dynamic entity that moves through different stages toward a collective goal based on the collaborative conversation (Walton & Reed, 2003: 12). Walton & Godden (2007: 8) suggest that the process of fallacy occurs on three stages:
1-The start-point stage: in which the arguer presents the main topic in the form of argument in order to persuade the participant to take an action concerning the topic in question.
2-The argument stage: in which the arguer employ the fallacious argument to reinforce the previous argument in a deliberately manipulative way.
3-The end point stage: in which the role of the participant in evaluating and responding to the fallacious argument comes.
Politicians strongly rely on fallacious argumentation to accomplish their aims and goals. They, among others, are highly interested in using fallacy to persuade the targeted audience. Their tools are rhetorical persuasive linguistic elements by which they aim at influencing others’ beliefs and values as well as changing their thoughts and attitudes. To achieve their aims, they totally neglected reasonableness of argumentation and focus on the emotions of the addressee who may be convinced by such fallacious argument (ibid.: 21). They are after effectiveness rather than reasonableness, thus they prefer principles of influence like fear, pity, emotion, interest, flattery, value, reciprocity as well as appeals to social beliefs, self-interest, threats and finally to authority and power they are authorized to (ibid.: 30).
The aim of allocating this section to discuss the concept of fallacy is that this concept is one of the pragmatic strategies of concealment and the above mentioned stages will be adopted in the eclectic model of this study.

2.7 Contextualization of Concealment
To say that pragmatics is concerned more with the context of an utterance, the focus in the analysis therefore, will be on the content of utterances in certain contexts and on the implied meanings generated by the speakers as well rather than on structural matters. The generation and perception of any utterance depend heavily on context. No talks or conversations can occur in vacuum, i.e. nil contexts.
In dealing with pragmatic concepts, context becomes a must concept in this argument since utterances can have different meanings in different contexts. The misunderstanding of any text by the hearer comes from constructing and selecting a wrong context in interpreting the speaker’s utterances. The fact that the same utterance can have different meanings in different contexts is very important to be explored.
The concept of context is first initiated by Malinowski (1923) and J.R. Firth (1957). They consider that context is the main element in achieving a correct interpretation of the meaning in any utterance. Halliday (1978: 39), on the other hand, also agrees with his teacher Firth and continues concentrating on the importance of context in his theory Systemic Functional Grammar by which he launches the new approach of the functionality of language.
Context, as Mey (1993:38) define it, is It makes the participants in the conversation understand the linguistic elements and how these elements are used in a concrete setting, i.e. context.
As such, it is considered that ‘context’ as ‘a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumption about the world. It is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world, that affect the interpretation of an utterance.’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 15-6). In this sense, it is not limited to the information about the immediate physical environment. They believe that may all play a crucial role in making the interpretations by the hearer. In their theory of relevance, they make a useful explanation why people often interpret the same event in different ways; it is because ‘context’ is not given but ‘chosen’ in the search for ‘relevance’ (ibid.: 141).
Van Dijk (2002b: 225) necessitates the availability of the factor of context as well as intended aims and the participants to say that this is a political discourse. No political discourse is so called unless it is delivered in political situations. A context for Van Dijk is a mental representation or model constructed by the speech participants of or about a certain situation.
The theory of context of situation for the current study is of Hymes’ (1972: 13-53). Hymes’ S P E A K I N G model of context is of great suitability for the present study. These contextual factors are:
1. Setting and Scene: Setting is the time, place and physical circumstances in which the event occurs whereas scene is the psychological setting, i.e. the cultural definition of a setting which comprises the degree of formality and sense of seriousness.
2. Participants: This contextual factor covers the speaker, the hearer and the audience.
3. Ends: This means the aims and the goals of the speaker(s) in certain speech event besides the outcomes, i.e. the effects of the event.
4. Act-Sequence: This factor refers to the form and order of the event.
5. Key: It refers to the clues employed by participants in a speech event helping to demonstrate the tone, manner, or spirit of the speech act.
6. Instrumentalities: Stands for the form and style of speech.
7. Norms: Symbolizes both the social rules that grip the speech event in addition to the participants’ actions and responses.
8. Genre: This factor represents the type of discourse.
All these factors must be available in the political speeches in order to be realized as fully comprehended speeches; otherwise the participants will not be able to achieve mutual understanding. For this purpose, this model is selected to be taken into consideration while analyzing the data of this study.

2.8 Persuasive Argumentation in Concealment
This section is primarily devoted to discuss the relationship between argumentation and persuasion.
Before starting with this discussion, one finds him/herself is confronted with the following question: what is argumentation? And what is persuasion? Argumentation is defined by O’neil & McBurney (1932:2) as.
Persuasive argumentation integrates the aims of argumentation with those of persuasion. The two aims do not conflict because there are situations by which one can accomplish a change in behavior to act easily by accepting a reasonable agreement. Persuasion aims work on reinforcement of a position since they go on stimulating an action. So the argumentation’s knowledge integrates with the pragmatic persuasive effectiveness, therefore, they complete each other (Davidson, 2001:15).
Normally, humans practice the activity of giving and asking for reasons due to their rationality and sociality characteristics (Luque, 2011: 2). He (ibid.: vii) states three dimensions of argumentation: logic, dialectic and rhetoric. The three dimensions work as follows: logic which studies the links between sets of premises and conclusions of an argument which the interlocutors reach to them; dialectics looks at the argumentation as an activity of interaction where the participants argue to settle a difference of opinion and fallacious arguments, and rhetoric which is the persuasive arguments based on the beliefs of the target audience and helps the speaker to persuade them and. Thus, rhetorical argumentation aims to persuade others through choosing premises which display the principles of the specific audience.
Argumentation is while persuasion is (Nettel & Roque, 2012: 56). These two concepts seem contracted and overlapped but it is worth mentioning that there is an argumentative discourse without persuasion and persuasive discourse without argumentation, thus there is a kind of overlapping between these two concepts. This overlap is called (ibid.:55).
Persuasive argumentation shares common characteristics of argumentation as well as persuasion. But the former is the means while the latter is the end. This allows the fact that all (ibid.:59). Argumentation, from the means’ point of view, supports a stand point and its domain is the knowledge, on one hand, while persuasion, on the other hand, means the acceptance of a position and its domain is seeking an action (ibid.).
Persuasive argumentation consists of the aims of argumentation plus the aims of persuasion. These aims complete each other because. (ibid.) thus, argumentation aims join the pragmatic aims of persuasive effectiveness.
Speaking of means, persuasive argumentation has a wide range of compatible means that are combined together; that of argumentation is reasonableness and that for persuasion are pathos, ethos and rhetoric. Since persuasion and argumentation share the quality of reasonableness, it is possible to bridge them and combine them and call them.
Persuasion, on the other hand, and as O’Keefe (1990: 15) notices, cannot happen if the persuader has no freedom and free will therefore, the persuasive argument cannot occur unless there is a consent, i.e. the acceptance of the reasons given by the persuader himself, thus acceptance beside reasonableness lead to effectiveness.
As far as the persuasive argumentation is concerned with concealment, Van Dijk (2006: 361) considers the limits between persuasion and manipulation as indefinite and context dependent. It seems that Van Dijk (ibid.) agrees with the idea that persuasion has a covert nature and thus it will be manipulative when he differentiates manipulation from persuasion. He considers that manipulation is a form of persuasion but without its negative association because of its legitimate influence. So participants are free to believe the arguments of the persuader or not, while in manipulation, participants are assigned a passive role so they are victims of manipulation.
As far as this study is concerned, the political argumentation is its main scope of interest. It is a means of showing power and making definitely right decisions which meet the interest of the public and consequently persuading them to adhere to the speaker’s aims and goals. These aims and goals are examples of political argumentations. They are not made randomly and unpredictably but are clearly recognizable by the observers and are heavily context dependent in which the details of any specific case are reflected (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009: 116). Political argumentation can be defined as a non-ruled institutionalized activity carried by individuals talking about politics and characterized as: (1) no time limits. It is free of any time limts; (2) no definite terminus. It means that there is no indicator that gives an evidence that the argumentation is over; (3) non-homogeneous audience. The audience vary in their values; and finally (4) free access. It is open and directed to all (ibid.: 116- 120).
Finally, persuasion and manipulation are explicit forms of human communication. In persuasion process, the interlocutor has a definite aim and he can show it to receiver. But in manipulation, the communicator concealed his goal from the other participants in order to deceive them Larson (2010: 1).

2.9 Persuasion is the main Function of Concealment in Political Speeches

The field of politics, at which this study is targeted, is one of the major domains where concealment is employed. This is so because in politics, politicians need to use different strategies in order to be effective in conveying what they want to accomplish and to construct for themselves a positive picture to achieve their persuasive goals.

Therefore, persuasion is deemed to be the main job of concealment in political speeches. Political speeches which are described as an interaction between a speaker and an audience by which the speaker tries to persuade the audience to do something for their interest but the fact is that they serve the interests of the speaker and rarely serve the audience interest.

The practice of argumentation, as Johnson (1995: 242) states, is teleological (aiming to achieve a certain aim) and dialectical (requiring two or more participants) because argumentation, actually depends on persuasion which is the core of rhetoric. It carries the goal of persuading the addressee to do or accept something, thus it is persuasive argumentation. This type of argument is used, primarily in political speeches, and commercial adv., news reports, or editorials in news papers and magazines as well (Walton, 2007: 1-2).

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