In the beginning of 2014, Dutch citizens’ reacted to Ukraine’s unsettled accession into the EU with an initiative to force a non-binding referendum on a wide-reaching treaty between Brussels and Ukraine. Ukraine’s accession into the EU has been somewhat of a tug-of-war between politicians and members of Ukrainian society. As we know, influential figures in Ukrainian politics continuously wavered between joining the EU or forging closer ties with the Russian federation. Hereby, this left Ukraine at a stalemate, of which meant that joining the EU was not as simple as just signing on the dotted line, with Ukraine’s close ties to Russia constantly hindering any progress. When considering the Russian ties to Ukraine, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovyic went back on his word to sign a trade agreement with the EU in November 2013, where he was dissuaded to follow through in the face of Russian threats of trade sanctions and higher gas prices. Hereby, Yanukovych’s decision led to protests, of which accumulated into the later coined ‘Orange Revolution’, of which increased tensions between Eastern and Western interests. Following such developments, Yanukovyic was voted out of parliament, which suggestively ignited the Russian annexation on the Crimea. What followed was a vote, which cast the Crimean parliament as unanimously in favor of being annexed by Russia. Even though the EU and the United States condemned such an agreement, Vladimir Putin contented to suggest that Ukraine should ignore such actions as their country would be incompatible to join the EU.
Moreover, in response to these developments, Netherlanders gathered 446,000 signatures through a campaign by online blog Geenstijl, think-tank Forum voor Democratie and the Burgercomite EU association . Furthermore, as the campaign received such high levels of support, of which were utilized through hand signed and posted letters, the Dutch latterly approved legislation to allow ‘advisory referendums’ on controversial topics, if supporters gather over 300,000 signatures. Moreover, the Dutch parliament has already voted in favour of the treaty. Through the implementation of the agreement, the Netherlands hopes they can aide Ukraine’s potential accession, allowing Ukraine to foster political relationships and kick start economic integration as many within Ukrainian society hope the country can move away from Russia and more towards the west. Moreover, as with any campaign, it is not without opposition. Here, opponents say the treaty will cost Dutch taxpayers billions of euros and another European enlargement is commonly believed to have a negative impact on democracy in the Netherlands .
Now that the referendum has been introduced and proposed, I will now examine a section of the accession agreement, providing a brief insight in proposing what types of promises have been made, the problems with them, what the EU is offering and what problems are clash with Russian interest(s). Chapter 23, outlined ‘Education, training and youth’ will be the focus of my discussion, where I will apply the above criteria, whilst also suggesting why and how Netherlanders should vote in consideration of this chapter of the document.
Within the ‘Education, training and youth’ section of the document, article 430 outlines promoting “cultural and linguistic diversity” coupled with “parties promoting cooperation in the field of education, training and youth in order to enhance mutual understanding, promote intercultural dialogue and increase the knowledge of their respective cultures” . This particular article resonates well with my view upon the state of Ukrainian education, of which has struggled to identify itself as independent from Russian models of education, where most achievements are explained by the resources the nation inherited from the Soviet era. Furthermore, Ukraine has struggled to detach and move forward from Soviet era educational practices in a society where corruption and over-regulation undermine education.
Within the enactment of the criteria in the following article 431, I hope Ukraine can develop an education system of which can move away from damaging concepts, such as impetus upon Ukrainian business, of which cares little about strategic development and an well-educated and innovative workforce. However, overcoming problems such as the business administration in Ukraine would be difficult, as business in Ukraine has a dire focus based of survival. Hereby, education-related risks and challenges vary from region to region. For example, geographically education quality still varies immensely across the 27 regions of Ukraine , drawing similarities to education in the Soviet era, with heavy impetus upon the center and not much else.
Aside from these clear underlying problems, I feel as if the following statements in the agreement of which consist of “promoting convergence in the field of higher education from the bologna process” hold promise in Ukrainian society. As the EU offers the Bologna process, Ukraine would be able to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) based on international cooperation and academic exchange, of which would prove attractive to European students and staff as well as to students and staff from other parts of the world. Such developments I feel can improve the dismal situation surrounding University enrollment. Here, even though the capital boasts 100 percent enrollment, only 30 to 40 percent of school graduates have access to higher education in some agricultural regions – a figure that is comparable to developing Asian or Latin American countries .
The Bologna process offered by the EU would be able to target these specific issues, starting with targeting problems of staff mobility, with the intention to remove obstacles that are currently blocking educational progress. Here, the process intends to introduce mobility programmes within higher education in Ukraine, through implementation of the following measures.
1.
Allowing teachers to exchange between different higher education institutions.
2. Providing opportunity of holding more than one position by teachers of different higher education institutions, hereby cancelling the original agreement that one teacher must only undertake one position.
Moreover, external staff mobility will also be targeted through the
experimentation of the Ukrainian higher education institution teachers in
leading European universities. What this means is that, through the signing of interuniversity bilateral agreements on staff exchange, joint training programmes will be declared for specialists within leading European universities. This process will aim to unite Ukrainian university programmes with leading universities of the European Higher Education Area, allowing for collusion and educational development.
All of these above processes, I feel will boast the attractiveness of European Higher Education/ Ukrainian higher education, coupled with closer ties with other European countries. However, such conclusions will now be considered with the problems that Ukraine will face in such a transition and how problems of Russian interest interplay.
Firstly, Ukrainian education may struggle with achieving such stipulations, as an overarching development of principles, mechanisms and procedures of creating a quality assurance system for higher education must be developed, to correspond with European standards and norms. Not only is this process difficult to enact, but also because of the current state of Ukrainian education the process may take a while to fully implement itself.
Russian clashes of interests with Ukraine adopting the Bologna process I feel lie in the fact that the process has a direct impact on the entire cycle of the on-going economic, social and administrative reforms. The Soviet-era devised educational models present in Ukraine would have to undergo reforms through the labour market, including structuring and differentiating market demand differentiating labour supply, i.e. offering three degrees of competence, the Bachelor, the Master and the Ph. D.), and the reform of the public sector (creating independent universities and associations) . Indirectly, the Bologna process would limit the regulatory role of the state in the higher education and with the large number of Russians in Ukraine, they may struggle to integrate fully, as one of the prerequisites sights a change of the language of instruction in schools from mostly Russian to Ukrainian; b) adjusting secondary education to a 12-year basic education cycle in line with European standards; and c) assessment policy reform.
Overall, although I have only considered one section within such a diverse and wide-reaching document, I feel as this snapshot allows me to be in position to discuss how Netherlanders should consider these areas, whilst developing opinions overall. Here, it appears to me that improvements made within the realm of education would align Ukraine alongside some of the major European states. Through an improved education system according to EU rules and regulations, Ukraine would be able to produce a new generation of smart thinkers and limit the desperation many feel to leave the country with the necessity to become well-educated individual. Furthermore, the university situation in Ukraine reveals itself as one where its students are not studying the subjects their country needs. Hereby, with the association agreement, European harmonisation could be achieved, where mistreated disciplines such as law and economics would be able to stand by the strength of others such as science, technology and maths.
In terms of the interest of the Dutch people and reasons for why I feel many should vote in favour of the referendum is because in terms of the chapter I have considered, I feel Ukrainian universities could develop partnerships with Dutch universities. Here, through EU frameworks such as ‘horizon 2020’ , Dutch universities would be able to access EU funding, also with Ukraine potentially considered as a long-term growth area, investment could pay off in the future. Furthermore, such a partnership could help Ukrainian universities reach effective international collaboration and potential coupling of partnership building grants in the field of oil and gas exploration could aide Dutch natural resource development.
However, some Netherlanders may not see the benefits of such partnerships and effective restructuring of Ukrainian education to their personal benefit. Here, benefits of any form of collaboration cannot be seen as immediate, and many may not want to risk partnering with a previously volatile region. Furthermore, aside from considering specific areas of the agreement to Dutch benefit like I have done so above, I feel many may also reject the agreement for reasons not developed with the actual treaty in mind. Here, I feel some Netherlanders may feel as if the agreement is not democratic enough, where they are more concerned with Holland’s own democratic faults. Moreover, a common conception that Ukraine is still seen as the younger brother of Russia, coupled with the oligarchs and corruption are running clear, many may be skeptical that the Ukraine could change. Finally, one more reason they may reject such an association may also stray away from the specific document, to just basing an opinion upon a fear of mass Ukrainian migration to the country, or a mass cash injection into Ukraine, afraid the Netherlands through financial aid are dismissing problems at home.