Russia & the World: Final Paper
Explaining the similar voting Patterns of Russia and China in the UNSC.
Introduction
In my briefing paper and presentation, my argument focused upon the shared voting patterns of Russia and China in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Within these assignments, the vetoes cast by both countries regarding the Syrian crisis was evaluated through justification of historical reasoning, legacies, material interests and strategic concerns. Yet, in this paper, an attempt will be made to explain the reasons behind an overall correlation seen in UNSC voting patterns between Russia and China. Nevertheless, the Syrian crisis will still be utilised as an example latterly in the paper. Hereby, using the same framework as in the briefing paper, this final paper will first regard correlations on a wider scale, whilst hoping to present to what extent each area contributes towards voting patterns and a Sino-Russian relationship.
Context
In 2011/12 Russia and China both vetoed three western backed resolutions in the Security Council against UN intervention in Syria to prevent government forces suppressing less well-armed oppositionists . Interestingly, this contrasted with the abstentions cast by the two countries in accordance to UN intervention in Libya at the beginning of 2011. However, upon closer examination many more voting patterns correlate between Russia and China. Hereby, in this research paper I will attempt to explain how/why this is the case and explore whether correlations between the two hint at closer Sino-Russian relations.
As already mentioned, both Russia and China jointly voted regarding Libya & Syria. Even though these particular votes contrasted to the remaining P5 states (U.S, Britain, France), Russia and China have jointly voted together in more occasions. The table inserted below supports these claims, where Russia and China clearly reflect higher levels of harmonization in their voting records. Importantly, the table also reveals that Russia and China share a high level of convergence, alongside France and the UK, over the U.S.
Additionally, ‘neither Russia nor the United States consistently votes with the majority as often as do most members’ . Here, China differs from Russia, as they vote with the majority more than other P5 states, which perhaps reveals greater Chinese diplomatic self-confidence and proves that Chinese support or acquiescence ‘could be an important precondition for winning at least the same response from non-permanent members of the SC who are from the developing world’ .
Table 1: Voting Records in the General Assembly of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, 1974-2008 (in per cent)
Voting Records in the General Assembly of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, 1974-2008 (%)
Overview of Voting Patterns
In 2007, both Russia and China cast their veto power against an SC resolution that called for sanctions against Myanmar because of its continued cruelty towards democracy activists, its failure to combat AIDS/HIV, its tolerance of drug-trafficking and its policy of driving opponents abroad as refugees. A year later, in 2008, Russia and China vetoed a resolution on Zimbabwe that sought to restrain supporters of Robert Mugabe from attacking opponents and inflicting economic chaos upon the country. In this case, Humanitarian INGOs had been vocal in their demands for UN action against both regimes for years. Yet both resolutions were vetoed. Nonetheless, it is not the case that Russia and China routinely veto UN intervention. Whilst they do not vote in favour, they often abstain. For example, they accepted UN military intervention in Cote d’Ivoire in 2011 after a small UN peacekeeping force there had been attacked by the troops of President Gbagbo. Also, whilst they had been strongly opposed to the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, they did not prevent the deployment of a UN mission afterwards to try to manage the peace.
Existing Debates
My argument will draw from previous debates, including a report compiled by the Directorate-General for External Policies within the European Parliament. This existing debate posits that the similar voting patterns of the two states derives ‘from the posture of these two states towards the role of the UN in global governance generally, as well as their particular strategic concerns in the UNSC’ . Drawing from this debate, my paper will decipher the importance of these strategic concerns, whilst introducing a theoretical debate, which will look at the role of history, legacies, material interests and wider geopolitical considerations. Moreover, this paper will also consider the arguments put forward by Kjell Engelbrekt and John Watts of the Swedish Defence University. Within this debate, both scholars put forward a persuasive assessment in which the term “axis of convenience” is utilised to capture the state of the relationship and the pragmatic stance exerted by Moscow and Beijing. Importantly within this debate, this report expands on the works of Yong Deng and Bobo Lo, who compiled a report aiming to understand Sino-Russian relations in the 21st Century.
Importance
When looking at the importance of this debate, this translates as examining the importance of Sino-Russian relations in the UN. Here, one must outline how in Moscow, the Kremlin views the relationship, whilst also considering the views of the government in Beijing. This is necessary before examining the significance of the relationship on the world stage.
Concerning the Kremlin, Russia openly aims towards becoming a ‘swing power’, between the United States and China on a global level, whilst positioning themselves between China and Japan in East Asia. Hereby, to achieve this status, the Kremlin sees a relationship with China as pivotal to national security and towards building a ‘polycentric system of international relations’ , which translates as a multipolar world order on Russian terms. Russia also sees China as a key counterweight to U.S dominance in the International system. However, it is worth noting that even though Russia aims to quell the hegemony of the U.S, they certainly do not want China to be positioned here instead of the U.S, yet, it remains more important to counter U.S global influence rather than countering Chinese power in Asia.
On the other hand, Beijing does not see Russia as a counterweight to U.S hegemony, yet still regards positive relations with Russia as vital. Firstly, in cooperation with Russia, China will be able to secure a ‘strategic rear’ , which will allow focus to concentrate on modes of domestic modernization and foreign policy concerns, including relations with the U.S and attempts to foster friendly ties over turbulent ties with Japan. Moreover, a key relationship with Russia will also allow for China to ascend into Central Asian space, accumulating with building economic, political and security interests. However, Beijing must be wary of over-committing strategically with Moscow. This can be avoided through belittling their relations with Moscow, over relations with the U.S, who offer more of an indispensable partnership than Russia.
Strategic Concerns
The first area of explanation behind joint Sino-Russian voting patterns in the UNSC revolves around the strategic interests of both states. Firstly, both Russia and China view each other as the P5 state of which they share the most in common with and trust each other more so than the Western based P5 states. Here, the European Parliament suggests that such relations are based upon ‘a broader-based network of trust among elites on both sides’ .
Aside from examining the blossoming relationship at the top concerning elites, public opinion remains significant in determining how relations are viewed lower down in society. The table below reveals findings of repeated yearly surveys carried out in Russia by the Levada Centre. As you can see, the table denotes a rise in opinions of China in 2006, where the favourable rating has somewhat fallen back, although it is still higher than it was in 2005. Nevertheless 48 per cent of the respondents regarded the countries of Western Europe as the ones with whom Russia should seek in cooperation, whilst only 23 per cent thought it should be with China and India, one per cent more than those who prioritised cooperation with the U.S. These candid findings suggest that whilst Russia and Russians still distance themselves from the U.S, opinion is changing towards other western states and their eastern neighbours, something that we are clearly seeing in the UN. These findings also may stem from well-known issues outside of the UN, where Russia and China share common positions in wishing to see the international economic order stray from exclusive dependence upon the U.S dollar as the dominant reserve currency.
Table 2: Russian Responses to Survey Question: ‘Name Five Countries That You Regard as the Closest Friends or Allies of Russia’ (top five, in per cent)
Kozlov, L., Yuri Levada Analytical Center, Public Opinion – 2011 (Moscow, 2011), p.212.
Additionally, the two governments cohesion has been on the rise with their cooperation in various international and regional organisations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS with Brazil, India and South Africa. Here, Putin has commented upon the relationship with China, stating that “we’ve agreed upon closer coordination of our foreign policy steps, including those in the UN, BRICS and APEC” . Moreover, this formal trust allows each other cast vetoes, as without each other casting theirs, they would feel reluctant to cast vetoes alone, thus avoiding isolation. This applies particularly with regard to issues concerning the Middle East. There, according to Fyodor Lukyanov: ‘is an informal agreement between China and Russia to vote in solidarity in the UN Security Council. When Russia voted for sanctions against Iran, China did the same. When Russia abstained in Libya, China did the same. When Russia was opposing on Syria, China did the same’ . Moreover, the Russian dominative role in Middle Eastern decision-making is cemented via 52 Chinese diplomats, who claimed that they were pressured by Russia into going along with a veto on Syria .
Furthermore, Russia and China also view themselves as slightly cast aside by the other P5 states. Evidentially, in the early 1990s, as Russia left behind its Communist past, the U.S would bitterly disregard their influence as a major superpower. Here, as recently as 2014, Barack Obama dismissed Russia as a ‘regional power acting out of weakness’ over developments in Ukraine. Moreover, China received similar belittling treatment following the Tiananmen Square massacre, where western governments urged Beijing to exercise restraint and when they refused, western leaders subbed their influence and importance. Now, as both governments have recovered their self-confidence, they wish to make sure that that does not happen again. Occasional brandishing of the veto, especially jointly, ensures that they are not taken for granted.
Yet, many have dismissed elements of strategic trust as a basis for voting patterns shared by the two and often suggest the relationship is formed over somewhat of an ‘axis of convenience’ . Rather than proposing that strategic concerns echo like-mindedness between the two, cooperation benefits seem to explain more. Dismissing strategic concerns as the explanations behind voting patterns stem from divergences felt over Moscow worries about China’s growing assertiveness in East Asia, the displacement of Russian influence from Central Asia, and the emergence of a China-centred or G-2 world, in which Russia would play a subordinate role.
Moreover, Russian strategic interests stray away from sole cooperation with China, due to an ambition to determine a diplomatic line, which opens up opportunities for other states to implement their own views upon either state. In general, Russia’s diplomatic preferences are more alike to those of European states, whilst China is more open to arguments from the US, provided they appear to stem from core American interests. However, variances between the other three Western P5 states can also provide ‘opportunities for reverse influence from Russia and China if the two of them hold to coordinated positions’ .
The role of National Sovereignty & Humanitarian Intervention
Both Russia and China exert strong support for the principle of national sovereignty and this often determines when Russia and China veto Security Council resolutions. This can be attributed to recent joint vetoes on Myanmar (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and Syria (2011–12). Here, both states adopt a negative stance towards western backed regime change and pride themselves upon principles that include upholding state sovreignity and noninterference in states interal affairs after a leader is overthrown. In doing so, both point to examples such as Libya and Iraq, where western states interrfered and replaced an out of favour leader with one that would suit western interests geopolitically, in turn usually leaving behind a failed state. Regarding Libya, Yun Sun, Fellow of the Centre for Northeast Asian Policy Studies argues, “the bitter lesson from its belated and on-going unstable relationship with the Libyan National Transitional Council has prompted Beijing to adopt a more sophisticated hedging strategy on Syria” . Likewise, Russia holds a similar outlook, largely disappointed by western states involvement in Gadhafi’s demise paving ‘way to chaos, civil war, and the slow-motion implosion of the Libyan state’ .
Russia and China’s further abstention from UNSCR 1973 concerning Libya meant that NATO military intervention would follow swiftly. Even though both Russia and China sees its compliance as directly contributing to the fall of Gadhafi, both adopted negative views towards a payoff and afterlife. First of all, the joint abstentions were viewed as agreements made in compliance to the West. Here, speculation gathered questioning whether both were abandoning their long held non-interference principle, in turn damaging reputation(s). In China, domestic nationalists criticized Beijing for “compromising its principles” and “acquiescing to Western demands” . Internationally, some even questioned the independence of each other’s foreign policy and its ability to handle Western pressure. Following these developments, Russia and China felt that after gaining nothing while losing everything in Libya through abstaining on UNSCR 1973, heavily contributed towards their vetoes concerning the Syrian resolution.
However, it would be too quick to indicate that Sino-Russian convergence in voting patterns reflects solely on their joint belief in sovereignty and fear of promoting regime change. Hereby, when looking at highlighted developments below, these stray away from voting reliant upon joint notions on sovereignty and intervention.
• In 2003, China and Russia accepted the UN peacekeeping force in Iraq. However, the Chinese government was internally divided on the issue.
• In 2011, both accepted UN military intervention in Cote d’Ivoire.
• In 2010, Russia cancelled S-300 missile air defence system for Iran, under pressure from US and Israel.
• In 2010, Russia and China voted in favour of resolution imposing sanctions on Iran.
• In 2011, Russia and China voted in favour of no-fly zone in Libya (in contrast to votes on Syria in 2011–12.)
• China has occasionally voted in favour of UN resolutions criticising North Korea’s nuclear programme.
Moreover, China and Russia insist upon exhausting all diplomatic opportunities for the resolution of conflict before the use of force is contemplated. This position suggests that Russia and China expect the UN to mediate, not lead. Hereby, both see the UN’s association with partial interventions as hindering its very role as a mediator in future conflicts. Thus, both states expectations about the role of the UN in international affairs differ from those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.